[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Emilia Kasper
emilia at openssl.org
Wed May 20 13:44:47 UTC 2015
The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
via 10a70da729948bb573d27cef4459077c49f3eb46 (commit)
via dcbc03ede7625f6a1023389196f62aff8916ce4b (commit)
via b32aa8e63eba643f9c510af2838f1534de70bd2e (commit)
via 82697bc2b9640aaf25c4adb87f41d9c5437b87ab (commit)
from 17b753f23a0b97f9a1db6c4d03e6cdff5a54f8f6 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 10a70da729948bb573d27cef4459077c49f3eb46
Author: Emilia Kasper <emilia at openssl.org>
Date: Tue May 19 11:53:31 2015 +0200
client: reject handshakes with DH parameters < 768 bits.
Since the client has no way of communicating her supported parameter
range to the server, connections to servers that choose weak DH will
simply fail.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>
commit dcbc03ede7625f6a1023389196f62aff8916ce4b
Author: Emilia Kasper <emilia at openssl.org>
Date: Tue May 12 16:10:05 2015 +0200
Update documentation with Diffie-Hellman best practices.
- Do not advise generation of DH parameters with dsaparam to save
computation time.
- Promote use of custom parameters more, and explicitly forbid use of
built-in parameters weaker than 2048 bits.
- Advise the callback to ignore <keylength> - it is currently called
with 1024 bits, but this value can and should be safely ignored by
servers.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
commit b32aa8e63eba643f9c510af2838f1534de70bd2e
Author: Emilia Kasper <emilia at openssl.org>
Date: Wed May 13 12:05:41 2015 +0200
dhparam: fix documentation
The default bitlength is now 2048. Also clarify that either the number
of bits or the generator must be present:
$ openssl dhparam -2
and
$ openssl dhparam 2048
generate parameters but
$ openssl dhparam
does not.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
commit 82697bc2b9640aaf25c4adb87f41d9c5437b87ab
Author: Emilia Kasper <emilia at openssl.org>
Date: Tue May 12 20:15:46 2015 +0200
s_server: Use 2048-bit DH parameters by default.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
CHANGES | 3 +-
apps/s_server.c | 58 +++++++++++------
doc/apps/dhparam.pod | 13 ++--
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod | 106 +++++++++++++-------------------
ssl/s3_clnt.c | 73 +++++++++++++++-------
ssl/ssl.h | 2 +
ssl/ssl_err.c | 4 +-
7 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 4723703..6dabf87 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [xx XXX xxxx]
- *)
+ *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
+ [Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index e662720..acef382 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx);
static void free_sessions(void);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile);
-static DH *get_dh512(void);
+static DH *get_dh2048(void);
#endif
#ifdef MONOLITH
@@ -230,30 +230,48 @@ static void s_server_init(void);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
- 0xDA, 0x58, 0x3C, 0x16, 0xD9, 0x85, 0x22, 0x89, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xAF, 0x75,
- 0x6F, 0x4C, 0xCA, 0x92, 0xDD, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x04, 0xFB, 0x0F,
- 0xED, 0x94, 0xEF, 0x9C, 0x8A, 0x44, 0x03, 0xED, 0x57, 0x46, 0x50, 0xD3,
- 0x69, 0x99, 0xDB, 0x29, 0xD7, 0x76, 0x27, 0x6B, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0x12,
- 0xE2, 0x18, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1E, 0x08, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x7C,
- 0x47, 0x74, 0xE8, 0x33,
+static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
+ 0xF6,0x42,0x57,0xB7,0x08,0x7F,0x08,0x17,0x72,0xA2,0xBA,0xD6,
+ 0xA9,0x42,0xF3,0x05,0xE8,0xF9,0x53,0x11,0x39,0x4F,0xB6,0xF1,
+ 0x6E,0xB9,0x4B,0x38,0x20,0xDA,0x01,0xA7,0x56,0xA3,0x14,0xE9,
+ 0x8F,0x40,0x55,0xF3,0xD0,0x07,0xC6,0xCB,0x43,0xA9,0x94,0xAD,
+ 0xF7,0x4C,0x64,0x86,0x49,0xF8,0x0C,0x83,0xBD,0x65,0xE9,0x17,
+ 0xD4,0xA1,0xD3,0x50,0xF8,0xF5,0x59,0x5F,0xDC,0x76,0x52,0x4F,
+ 0x3D,0x3D,0x8D,0xDB,0xCE,0x99,0xE1,0x57,0x92,0x59,0xCD,0xFD,
+ 0xB8,0xAE,0x74,0x4F,0xC5,0xFC,0x76,0xBC,0x83,0xC5,0x47,0x30,
+ 0x61,0xCE,0x7C,0xC9,0x66,0xFF,0x15,0xF9,0xBB,0xFD,0x91,0x5E,
+ 0xC7,0x01,0xAA,0xD3,0x5B,0x9E,0x8D,0xA0,0xA5,0x72,0x3A,0xD4,
+ 0x1A,0xF0,0xBF,0x46,0x00,0x58,0x2B,0xE5,0xF4,0x88,0xFD,0x58,
+ 0x4E,0x49,0xDB,0xCD,0x20,0xB4,0x9D,0xE4,0x91,0x07,0x36,0x6B,
+ 0x33,0x6C,0x38,0x0D,0x45,0x1D,0x0F,0x7C,0x88,0xB3,0x1C,0x7C,
+ 0x5B,0x2D,0x8E,0xF6,0xF3,0xC9,0x23,0xC0,0x43,0xF0,0xA5,0x5B,
+ 0x18,0x8D,0x8E,0xBB,0x55,0x8C,0xB8,0x5D,0x38,0xD3,0x34,0xFD,
+ 0x7C,0x17,0x57,0x43,0xA3,0x1D,0x18,0x6C,0xDE,0x33,0x21,0x2C,
+ 0xB5,0x2A,0xFF,0x3C,0xE1,0xB1,0x29,0x40,0x18,0x11,0x8D,0x7C,
+ 0x84,0xA7,0x0A,0x72,0xD6,0x86,0xC4,0x03,0x19,0xC8,0x07,0x29,
+ 0x7A,0xCA,0x95,0x0C,0xD9,0x96,0x9F,0xAB,0xD0,0x0A,0x50,0x9B,
+ 0x02,0x46,0xD3,0x08,0x3D,0x66,0xA4,0x5D,0x41,0x9F,0x9C,0x7C,
+ 0xBD,0x89,0x4B,0x22,0x19,0x26,0xBA,0xAB,0xA2,0x5E,0xC3,0x55,
+ 0xE9,0x32,0x0B,0x3B,
};
-static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
+static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = {
0x02,
};
-static DH *get_dh512(void)
+DH *get_dh2048()
{
- DH *dh = NULL;
+ DH *dh;
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
- dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
- if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
- return (NULL);
- return (dh);
+ return NULL;
+ dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL);
+ dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL);
+ if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return dh;
}
#endif
@@ -1867,7 +1885,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n");
- dh = get_dh512();
+ dh = get_dh2048();
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
}
(void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
diff --git a/doc/apps/dhparam.pod b/doc/apps/dhparam.pod
index 6e27cf5..1cd4c76 100644
--- a/doc/apps/dhparam.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/dhparam.pod
@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ check if the parameters are valid primes and generator.
=item B<-2>, B<-5>
-The generator to use, either 2 or 5. 2 is the default. If present then the
-input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead.
+The generator to use, either 2 or 5. If present then the
+input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. If not
+present but B<numbits> is present, parameters are generated with the
+default generator 2.
=item B<-rand> I<file(s)>
@@ -85,9 +87,10 @@ all others.
=item I<numbits>
this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size
-I<numbits>. It must be the last option. If not present then a value of 512
-is used. If this option is present then the input file is ignored and
-parameters are generated instead.
+I<numbits>. It must be the last option. If this option is present then
+the input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead. If
+this option is not present but a generator (B<-2> or B<-5>) is
+present, parameters are generated with a default length of 2048 bits.
=item B<-noout>
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
index 7a27eef..b754c16 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ negotiation is being saved.
If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
-secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially
-the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used
-in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
-has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not
-very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
-this option.
+secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
+attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
+computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
+application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
+The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
@@ -74,82 +74,62 @@ DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly generated during
the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
-openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer
-time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters
-instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
-is mandatory.
+openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. This application
+guarantees that "strong" primes are used.
-Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
-dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of current
+Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current
version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application.
-Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using
-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
-generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
-recommended.
+L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH
+parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an
+attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. Files dh1024.pem
+and dh512.pem contain old parameters that must not be used by
+applications.
An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
-can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach
-has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different
-key lengths.
+can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
-The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
-the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
-ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
+Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
+parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
+cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
+are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
+SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
+B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
+parameters in the callback.
=head1 EXAMPLES
-Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling
+Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling
partly left out.)
- ...
- /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
- DH *dh_512 = NULL;
- DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
- FILE *paramfile;
+ Command-line parameter generation:
+ $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048
+
+ Code for setting up parameters during server initialization:
...
- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
+ SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
+ ...
+
+ /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */
+ DH *dh_2048 = NULL;
+ FILE *paramfile;
+ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r");
if (paramfile) {
- dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fclose(paramfile);
+ } else {
+ /* Error. */
}
- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
- if (paramfile) {
- dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- fclose(paramfile);
+ if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
+ /* Error. */
}
- ...
-
- /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
- DH *get_dh512() { ... }
- DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
-
- DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
- {
- DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
-
- switch (keylength) {
- case 512:
- if (!dh_512)
- dh_512 = get_dh512();
- dh_tmp = dh_512;
- break;
- case 1024:
- if (!dh_1024)
- dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
- dh_tmp = dh_1024;
- break;
- default:
- /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
- setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
- }
- return(dh_tmp);
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
+ /* Error. */
}
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ ...
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index eebd423..c25e077 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -2361,6 +2361,25 @@ int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
return (ret);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *get_server_static_dh_key(SESS_CERT *scert)
+{
+ DH *dh_srvr = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
+ int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
+
+ if (idx >= 0)
+ spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ if (spkey) {
+ dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
+ }
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return dh_srvr;
+}
+#endif
+
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
@@ -2603,25 +2622,14 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
- if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) {
dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
- else {
- /* we get them from the cert */
- int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
- EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
- dh_srvr = NULL;
- if (idx >= 0)
- spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
- if (spkey) {
- dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
- }
- if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ } else {
+ dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(scert);
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
goto err;
- }
}
+
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
/* Use client certificate key */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
@@ -3464,25 +3472,44 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
- !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
- } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+ }
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
- !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
# endif
-#endif
+
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ int dh_size;
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+ dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+ } else {
+ DH *dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(sc);
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+ goto f_err;
+ dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh_srvr->p);
+ DH_free(dh_srvr);
+ }
+
+ if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 70fa00b..8eb852a 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -2641,6 +2641,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107
# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108
# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109
+# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY 340
# define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110
# define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111
# define SSL_F_READ_N 112
@@ -2906,6 +2907,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146
# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147
# define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281
+# define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL 372
# define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148
# define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149
# define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 334
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 76c92ae..fc0fb8f 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* ssl/ssl_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY), "GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED), "GET_SERVER_FINISHED"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO), "GET_SERVER_HELLO"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY), "GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY), "GET_SERVER_VERIFY"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION), "i2d_SSL_SESSION"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_READ_N), "READ_N"},
@@ -459,6 +460,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED), "decryption failed"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),
"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL), "dh key too small"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),
"dh public value length is wrong"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED), "digest check failed"},
More information about the openssl-commits
mailing list