[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update

Rich Salz rsalz at openssl.org
Tue Mar 28 20:20:14 UTC 2017


The branch master has been updated
       via  a6ac1ed686346d2164c16446624c973e51d3ae92 (commit)
       via  cbe952418376a25acd872db4281a0b09735001f1 (commit)
       via  a8cd439bf58708ffe234a9f707cf6a394d28a1f9 (commit)
       via  1ee4b98e695cd041da931c10fbdaf82f0ee0f268 (commit)
      from  09fdfa4b2fe4c9770c27cd523a5bf55b1d50eac9 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a6ac1ed686346d2164c16446624c973e51d3ae92
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date:   Thu Nov 10 01:22:17 2016 +0100

    Fix 0 -> NULL, indentation
    
    Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3066)

commit cbe952418376a25acd872db4281a0b09735001f1
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date:   Thu Nov 10 01:16:27 2016 +0100

    Refomat a few comments on 80 cols
    
    Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3066)

commit a8cd439bf58708ffe234a9f707cf6a394d28a1f9
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Feb 10 23:17:00 2017 +0100

    Spelling fixes
    
    Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3066)

commit 1ee4b98e695cd041da931c10fbdaf82f0ee0f268
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Feb 17 23:13:26 2017 +0100

    Fix a few more typos
    
    Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3066)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                      |  4 ++--
 crypto/asn1/a_int.c          |  2 +-
 crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c       |  4 ++--
 crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c           | 12 ++++--------
 ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c |  8 ++++----
 ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c     |  2 +-
 ssl/statem/statem_lib.c      |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 9c6e897..d176fa1 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
      to service a connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through
      memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes
      place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming
-     that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed conneciton in a timely
+     that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed connection in a timely
      manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed
      again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in
      nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if:
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@
      done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case.
      [Annie Yousar <a.yousar at informatik.hu-berlin.de>]
 
-  *) CA.sh has been removmed; use CA.pl instead.
+  *) CA.sh has been removed; use CA.pl instead.
      [Rich Salz]
 
   *) Removed old DES API.
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index e0bcd6e..c40c7fa 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static BIGNUM *asn1_string_to_bn(const ASN1_INTEGER *ai, BIGNUM *bn,
     }
 
     ret = BN_bin2bn(ai->data, ai->length, bn);
-    if (ret == 0) {
+    if (ret == NULL) {
         ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TO_BN, ASN1_R_BN_LIB);
         return NULL;
     }
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
index 4db3df9..af045cb 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
     int dump_indent, dump_cont = 0;
 
     if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
-            BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
-            return 0;
+        BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
+        return 0;
     }
 
     dump_indent = 6;            /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
index e1aac13..0676426 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
@@ -277,8 +277,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
                 if (!BN_uadd(Y, Y, X))
                     goto err;
                 /*
-                 * as above, BN_mod_add_quick(Y, Y, X, n) would slow things
-                 * down
+                 * as above, BN_mod_add_quick(Y, Y, X, n) would slow things down
                  */
                 if (!BN_usub(A, A, B))
                     goto err;
@@ -348,8 +347,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
              * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
              */
 
-            tmp = A;            /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
-                                 * matter */
+            tmp = A;    /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
 
             /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
             A = B;
@@ -377,8 +375,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
              */
 
             /*
-             * most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp :=
-             * D*X+Y
+             * most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp := D*X+Y
              */
             if (BN_is_one(D)) {
                 if (!BN_add(tmp, X, Y))
@@ -403,8 +400,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
                     goto err;
             }
 
-            M = Y;              /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
-                                 * matter */
+            M = Y;      /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
             Y = X;
             X = tmp;
             sign = -sign;
diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index 400de3f..939ad4c 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
     }
 
     /*
-     * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
+     * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
      * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
      * reviewed later.
      */
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
     }
 
     if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
-        /* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */
+        /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
         hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
 
         /*
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
 
     md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
     if (md == NULL) {
-        /* Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
+        /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */
         return 1;
     }
 
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
 
     if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
         /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
-         * the chain. We ignore any other repsonses.
+         * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
          */
         if (chainidx != 0)
             return 1;
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index 1342272..c6b1641 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -2978,7 +2978,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
         dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
 
     /*
-     * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
+     * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
      */
     peer_cert = s->session->peer;
     if (!peer_cert) {
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
index bf1a5b2..19d4b46 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
@@ -1603,7 +1603,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
                 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
             /*
              * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
-             * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
+             * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
              * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
              */
             if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)


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