[openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit overflow

[Jakob Bohm]

But if the starting value is random, the number of increments
before overflow or wrap will be random too (and could
hypothetically, but rarely, be as little as 1).

Anyway, I thought TLS records were limited to slightly more than
16K each, so the in-record block counter would not count very far.

On 09/03/2017 16:26, Michael Wojcik wrote:
>
> And there's no reason for it to do so, because it isn't needed. If you 
> generate one TLS packet every nanosecond, it will take nearly six 
> centuries to overflow, by which time the version of TLS you're using 
> will have been deprecated and all security guarantees are moot anyway.
>
> In general, most security experts recommend against keeping a TLS 
> conversation open for years at a time.
>
> Michael Wojcik
> Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
>
> *From:*openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] *On 
> Behalf Of *Salz, Rich via openssl-users
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 09, 2017 05:49
> *To:* openssl-users at openssl.org
> *Subject:* Re: [openssl-users] [AES-GCM] TLS packet nounce_explicit 
> overflow
>
> No, it does not do this automatically.
>
> *if the nounce _explicit overflows or overlaps , then does openssl 
> code handles it (atleast by initiating renegotiation )?*
>
Enjoy

Jakob
-- 
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
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