[openssl-users] PRNG is not seeded

[FooCrypt]

> On 31 May 2018, at 1:35 AM, Michael Wojcik <Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com> wrote:
> 
>> From: openssl-users [mailto:openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org] On Behalf
>> Of FooCrypt
>> Sent: Wednesday, May 30, 2018 10:46
>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>> Subject: Re: [openssl-users] PRNG is not seeded
>> 
>>> On 30 May 2018, at 11:55 PM, Michael Wojcik
>> <Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Where would openssl rand be getting its entropy from, in this case? You
>> have a circular dependency: openssl needs entropy, so it tries to get it from
>> PRNGD; and you're asking openssl to put entropy into PRNGD.
>>> 
>> 
>> Usage: rand [options] num
> 
> Spare me, please.
> 
>> RAND(1) describes the multiplicity of sources that can all be used together in
>> some detail.
> 
> And why do you think this solves the problem?

Well its HP’s problem, not openssl’s

> 
>>       The rand command outputs num pseudo-random bytes after seeding the
>> random number generator once.
> 
> So all the entropy you can get from the output of "openssl rand" is whatever OpenSSL was able to gather when it seeded the PRNG. Which is exactly the problem Scott was trying to solve.
> 
>> Make some .rnd’s
> 
> YOU STILL HAVE TO FIND ENTROPY TO PUT IN THEM. All you're doing is pushing the problem around the plate.

generate them on another host

> 
>> 
>>      dd if=/dev/[SOMEDEVICE] of=~/.rnd bs=1 count=1024
> 
> Where [SOMEDEVICE] is your magical unicorn entropy device?

well its not /dev/random, its a HPE NonStop with no entropy that stops the application.


> 
>> Make an engine
> 
> I already mentioned the engine interface in my previous response. And if this is an option for Scott, it would be much better to use the engine in his application, rather than going through the rigamarole of running "openssl rand" to grab some entropy from it. The command-line utility is useful iff he can't change the application.

HPE NonStops don’t have DTrace

> 
>>      Microphones work wonders
> 
> No, they really don't. Look at the literature. (And, again, I mentioned sensors in my previous response.)
> 
>> and you can play with the sound, count,
>> etc….etc….etc...
> 
> Cargo-cult entropy gathering. It may be fine under a given threat model, but we have no idea what Scott's is. As general advice it's poor.

Probably financial sector, with PCI compliance and they can;t afford /dev/random or /dev/urandom


> 
> --
> Michael Wojcik
> Distinguished Engineer, Micro Focus
> 
> 
> 
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