Usage of Secure C (memcpy_s, strcpy_s etc) functions on OpenSSL

[Andrew Tucker]

Unless buffer is a char* instead of a char[] in which case its completely
wrong.   A very common case among buggy C code.



On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 7:09 AM Phillip Susi <phill at thesusis.net> wrote:

>
> Michael Wojcik writes:
>
> > Some C experts have argued that the length-checking versions of the
> library functions, either the C90 ones such as strncat or the Appendix K
> ones, are essentially pointless anyway; that the caller needs to handle
> truncation and so ought to know whether truncation (or overflow) would
> occur before attempting the operation.
>
> Isn't this normally/easilly handled simply by passing sizeof( buffer ) -
> 1?  Then the last byte is always \0 whether or not the copy was truncated.
>
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