回复: openssl-users Digest, Vol 86, Issue 1

Tue Jan 4 23:08:28 UTC 2022

Hi Mark,

Thanks so much for your advice. You're right. This is truely caused by signature_algorithms_cert extension not containing rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401). Below solutions now works well regarding TLS handshake.
1.The ClientHello doesn't include signature_algorithms_cert extension.
2.The signature_algorithms_cert extension in ClientHello contains rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401).

Thanks,
Allen
________________________________
发件人: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> 代表 openssl-users-request at openssl.org <openssl-users-request at openssl.org>
发送时间: 2022年1月1日 15:48
收件人: openssl-users at openssl.org <openssl-users at openssl.org>
主题: openssl-users Digest, Vol 86, Issue 1

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Today's Topics:

   1. RE: undefined symbol: OSSL_provider_init when running "make
      test" for OpenSSL 3.0 (Lee Staniforth)
   2. RE: [openssl-1.1.1l] TLS1.2 Server responses with Alert
      (Michael Wojcik)
   3. Re: [openssl-1.1.1l] TLS1.2 Server responses with Alert
      (Mark Hack)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2021 13:46:49 +0000
From: Lee Staniforth <Lee.Staniforth at synchronoss.com>
To: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>, "openssl-users at openssl.org"
        <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: RE: undefined symbol: OSSL_provider_init when running "make
        test" for OpenSSL 3.0
Message-ID:
        <DM6PR07MB8028DD6128102487938131E882469 at DM6PR07MB8028.namprd07.prod.outlook.com>

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Thanks very much, Matt and defulger.
Removing the "-fvisibility=hidden" has enabled the tests to pass.

I'll now have to see how my application (which is statically linked to OpenSSL) fairs.

Lee

From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Sent: 23 December 2021 10:13
To: Lee Staniforth <Lee.Staniforth at synchronoss.com>; openssl-users at openssl.org
Subject: Re: undefined symbol: OSSL_provider_init when running "make test" for OpenSSL 3.0

On 21/12/2021 15:09, Lee Staniforth wrote: > ./Configure linux-x86_64 no-shared -m64 -fPIC -fvisibility=hidden Try dropping "-fvisibility=hidden". I can replicate this problem when using no-shared and
External (matt at openssl.org<mailto:matt at openssl.org>)
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On 21/12/2021 15:09, Lee Staniforth wrote:

> ./Configure linux-x86_64 no-shared -m64 -fPIC -fvisibility=hidden

Try dropping "-fvisibility=hidden". I can replicate this problem when

using no-shared and -fvisibility=hidden. If I drop the

"-fvisibility=hidden" the problem goes away.

Matt
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Message: 2
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2021 15:05:26 +0000
From: Michael Wojcik <Michael.Wojcik at microfocus.com>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: RE: [openssl-1.1.1l] TLS1.2 Server responses with Alert
Message-ID:
        <DM6PR18MB27005C4E44DE291D1C26B9EEF9469 at DM6PR18MB2700.namprd18.prod.outlook.com>

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

> From: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> On Behalf Of Ma Zhenhua
> Sent: Thursday, 30 December, 2021 23:59

> On the SSL/TLS server, there's one error as follows.
> "SSL Error(118) - no suitable signature algorithm"

Debugging handshake failures isn't my area of expertise, but I note both ClientHellos include a signature_algorithms extension, and the contents are quite different. In particular, the successful ClientHello includes the Signature Hash Algorithm Hash and Signature Hash Algorithm Signature parameters, while the failing one doesn't.

The failing one also includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension, while the successful one does not. I don't know offhand how the algorithms specified in that extension correspond to the signature-algorithm OIDs in signatures, but the server's certificate has 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 (sha256WithRSAEncryption) which seems like it ought to correspond to either rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 or rsa_pss_pss_sha256. (Apparently those are both RSA-PSS with SHA256, as the name implies, and the difference between the two of them is whether the public key is encoded using the rsaEncryption format in the certificate, or the id-RSASSA-PSS format. The failing client is saying it understands both, AIUI.)

So my guess would be the server is unhappy that the failing client's ClientHello doesn't include the parameters for the various supported signature schemes in its signature_algorithms extension. But that's just a guess, and I don't know how you'd fix it.

--
Michael Wojcik

------------------------------

Message: 3
Date: Sat, 01 Jan 2022 01:48:25 -0600
From: Mark Hack <markhack at markhack.com>
To: "openssl-users at openssl.org" <openssl-users at openssl.org>
Subject: Re: [openssl-1.1.1l] TLS1.2 Server responses with Alert
Message-ID:
        <abcec7b3e2f12619015128811528090e09206b51.camel at markhack.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

The server error is correct - the signature_algorithms_cert extension
does not offer rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401) which is the server
certificate signing algorithm.
If the client is written in Java, check java.security  for
"jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms"  and check the constraints.

On Fri, 2021-12-31 at 15:05 +0000, Michael Wojcik wrote:
> > From: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> On Behalf
> > Of Ma Zhenhua
> > Sent: Thursday, 30 December, 2021 23:59
> > On the SSL/TLS server, there's one error as follows.
> > "SSL Error(118) - no suitable signature algorithm"
>
> Debugging handshake failures isn't my area of expertise, but I note
> both ClientHellos include a signature_algorithms extension, and the
> contents are quite different. In particular, the successful
> ClientHello includes the Signature Hash Algorithm Hash and Signature
> Hash Algorithm Signature parameters, while the failing one doesn't.
>
> The failing one also includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension,
> while the successful one does not. I don't know offhand how the
> algorithms specified in that extension correspond to the signature-
> algorithm OIDs in signatures, but the server's certificate has
> 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 (sha256WithRSAEncryption) which seems like it
> ought to correspond to either rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 or
> rsa_pss_pss_sha256. (Apparently those are both RSA-PSS with SHA256,
> as the name implies, and the difference between the two of them is
> whether the public key is encoded using the rsaEncryption format in
> the certificate, or the id-RSASSA-PSS format. The failing client is
> saying it understands both, AIUI.)
>
> So my guess would be the server is unhappy that the failing client's
> ClientHello doesn't include the parameters for the various supported
> signature schemes in its signature_algorithms extension. But that's
> just a guess, and I don't know how you'd fix it.
>
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