Subject Key Identifier hash method

[Robert Moskowitz]

On 6/8/23 01:53, David von Oheimb wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-06-07 at 10:46 -0400, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
>> thanks all.  It is as I thought.  You have to pretty much know what the
>> CA did.  You can guess, but go read the CP!
>
> I doubt that you'll find such inessential info on SKIDs in a CP.
> As Tomas wrote, it's just any identifier for the public key that is 
> unique per CA.
> Since RFC 5280 suggests using the SHA1 hash value of the key and this 
> is a reasonably
> unique and convenient way to achieve that, this is what most 
> implementations do.
> There is no need to use anything more involved such as any of the 
> SHA-2 algos.

Only to look for exceptions to the norm.

Say that the keying is EdDSA448 which uses SHAKE256 internally.  Why 
require SHA code?  So the SKIDs may be computed with SHAKE.

There are other reasonable considerations.  They will tend to be 
noteworthy and thus noted accordingly.


>
> David
>
>>
>> On 6/7/23 10:37, Corey Bonnell wrote:
>>> The hash method isn't explicitly encoded in the certificate, but it 
>>> can be
>>> derived if you have the SubjectPublicKey(Info). If you have the 
>>> public key,
>>> then you can calculate the IDs using the various methods and seeing 
>>> which one
>>> matches the ID encoded in the certificate. The first method defined 
>>> in RFC
>>> 5280, section 
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.2
>>> (SHA-1 of the subjectPublicKey field (not the SPKI as a whole)) is 
>>> by far the
>>> most common method. The two methods in RFC 5280 require only the
>>> subjectPublicKey, whereas some of the methods defined in RFC 7093 
>>> use the
>>> SubjectPublicKeyInfo as a whole.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Corey
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: openssl-users <openssl-users-bounces at openssl.org> On Behalf Of 
>>> Robert
>>> Moskowitz
>>> Sent: Wednesday, June 7, 2023 8:57 AM
>>> To: openssl-users at openssl.org
>>> Subject: Subject Key Identifier hash method
>>>
>>> I am trying to figure out if the Subject Key Identifier hash method 
>>> is carried
>>> in the certificate.  An asn1dump of a "regular" cert shows:
>>>
>>>     276:d=4  hl=2 l=  29 cons:     SEQUENCE
>>>     278:d=5  hl=2 l=   3 prim:      OBJECT :X509v3 Subject Key
>>> Identifier
>>>     283:d=5  hl=2 l=  22 prim:      OCTET STRING [HEX
>>> DUMP]:04144F0C1A75F4AF13DC67EC18465C020FC22A82616B
>>>     307:d=4  hl=2 l=  31 cons:     SEQUENCE
>>>     309:d=5  hl=2 l=   3 prim:      OBJECT :X509v3 Authority Key
>>> Identifier
>>>     314:d=5  hl=2 l=  24 prim:      OCTET STRING [HEX
>>> DUMP]:30168014A8885F91878E4ED6AA2056C535E2212413F96BA2
>>>
>>>
>>> I cannot easily see if the hashing method is contained here.  I am 
>>> assuming it
>>> is a sha2 hash of the EdDSA public keys, but how do I tell?
>>>
>>> Of course I am asking as I want to use the rfc9374 DETs here.
>>>
>>> thanks
>>>
>>
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