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i guess the reason for my original post was that i was so taken
aback by the fact that the body had so many red flags:<br>
1.) '$1000': this list certainly is about money, but it would seem
unlikely that actual terms not coupled with something like
[loss|cost] or the like would seem improbable;<br>
2.) 'giftcard': seems like a very unlikely discussion element here;<br>
3.) 'shipment': ditto;<br>
4.) 'informations' (sic): i realize this list -- being international
in scope -- will not exhibit perfect English usage at all times
(even from native English speakers). however, poor English (even
just spell-checked) combined with other filters could push the score
high enough;<br>
5.) links: examples are always very constructive, but it is
certainly not much of an inconvenience to limit active anchors to
major sandboxes or even one operated by openssl; and<br>
6.) obfuscation: the worst and most-telling is the fact the content
clearly was designed to bypass filters by couching the desired
message within a highly unusual number of non-prose, non-technical
symbols. in this blatant case there was a complete lack of prose
and that will just never occur in this list.<br>
<br>
this list is active, but a very low-volume one and more intensive
body checks that route questionable entries to some monitoring box
would seem to be well worth the small resource utilization required.<br>
<br>
moreover, i do not notice anyone from google's security team(s)
chiming in here and it would seem that good old 'otisevans98' will
skate without consequence for the foray against this list which is
entirely about security. perhaps added body filtering and actual
human intervention would serve the desired benefit of having such
intrusions actually result in an abuse complaint to the MTA
operator.<a href="mailto:otisevans98@gmail.com"></a><br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="80">--
Thank you,
Johann v. Preußen
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2016.Apr.02 15:30, Ben Humpert
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAGbjqfEBrWPORcTTGXbd355dk=xJV8upa-EZG_59iavbLu8sGA@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Fun Fact: (For me) Gmail often marks completely legit emails from
mailing lists as spam and you manually have to mark them as "no spam".
The fun comes in when you notice that actual spam is not marked as
such at all.
Looks like strong encryption is much easier to develop than a decent
spam filter.
The main problem I guess is that neither Google nor any other major
email provider actually block other email providers who do not offer
SPF, SMTP2SMTP encryption or whatever else. If they would do so, we
would have solved most major (email) problems within a week or at
least a month. Either by forcing those to offer these security
features or by "killing" these providers indirectly.
2016-04-02 17:41 GMT+02:00 Jeffrey Walton <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:noloader@gmail.com"><noloader@gmail.com></a>:
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<pre wrap="">On Sat, Apr 2, 2016 at 11:24 AM, Salz, Rich <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rsalz@akamai.com"><rsalz@akamai.com></a> wrote:
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<pre wrap="">
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">why is junk like this not being caught?
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">
Almost all of it is. Nothing is perfect. Thanks for your understanding and patience.
</pre>
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<pre wrap="">
I was looking at some of it landing in my Inbox. Its all from Gmail
users. The headers are Gmail headers submitted via the web. The DKIM
signatures are OK. There are no headers to indicate its been
forwarded. The {from|return|reply to} address does not appear to
forged. Here's an example header from another Gmail user who contacted
me: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://pastebin.com/hRAtRt7S">http://pastebin.com/hRAtRt7S</a>.
I've also had a couple of people contact me asking me to stop spamming
them. I looked at two of those headers, and it clearly appears to be
coming from me though I did not send it (and no evidence in my
Outbox).
I'm thinking there's a vulnerability in the Gmail or Google servers we
have not heard about.
Jeff
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