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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 04/04/2016 22:28, Johann v. Preußen
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=" cite" id="mid_5702CE88_2000407_forthepolls_org"
cite="mid:5702CE88.2000407@forthepolls.org" type="cite">
<meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
i am not certain i understand how it is google's fault that this
owenevans98|Dawn was able to slip into the listserv database. this
is, of course, assuming that this was not done via a simple
sign-up. i also do not understand how prohibiting a posting
(content, infra) that obfuscates a message within a host of
symbols with a net zero percent of prose and 100% anchor
description is responding to some sort of a "fad". this list is re
problems and solutions that can only be conveyed in prose ... no
prose == no message. and permitting private anchors is also a
questionable security practice. it does not seem unreasonable to
require anchors to be to <u>recognized</u> sandbox sites or --
much better -- to an openssl-operated one.<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<tt>No one (until about 2 hours ago) were discussing how the <br>
particular "From" address got past the "you must be <br>
subscribed to post" filter, maybe the spoofed From address <br>
happened to be a subscriber, maybe there is a bug in the <br>
list management software or configuration.</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt>There was discussion of which generic "hard-reject" filters
<br>
should be applied and someone suggested prematurely <br>
applying a number of recently "trendy" such rules promoted <br>
by (ironically in this case) Google and others. I was the <br>
one who used the word "fad" to refer to such recently <br>
promoted "hard-reject" rules and pointed out that many <br>
smaller organizations will be unable to cause legitimate <br>
mail/postings to comply with such rules anytime soon, <br>
simply because it takes time to roll out new protocols to <br>
all the worlds legitimate e-mail sending servers.</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt>As for the suggestion to forbid links to servers other than
<br>
OpenSSL.org servers, this will be fatally flawed as it will <br>
block discussions of such common OpenSSL related topics as:</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt>- URLs of published security research (such as the home <br>
pages of new vulnerability descriptions).</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt><br>
- URLs of sites that publish OpenSSL related software, such <br>
as OpenSSH, stunnel, the Shining Light Windows binaries of <br>
OpenSSL etc.</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt><br>
- URLs that are showing interoperability problems with <br>
OpenSSL.<br>
<br>
</tt><tt></tt><tt>- URLs of independently published OpenSSL patches
(that <br>
have not yet been accepted into the OpenSSL repositories).</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt><br>
- URLs necessitated by the byzantine legal rules regarding <br>
which web servers are allowed to publish cryptographic <br>
software written by which people for use by which other <br>
people.</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt><br>
</tt><tt>These categories of non-openssl.org URLs occur frequently <br>
in legitimate posts to this list and cannot be replaced by <br>
some private openssl.org hosted equivalent of pastebin.com <br>
etc.</tt><tt><br>
</tt><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=" cite" id="mid_5702CE88_2000407_forthepolls_org"
cite="mid:5702CE88.2000407@forthepolls.org" type="cite"> moreover,
as i pointed out in a pm to Steve, this is a real security issue
for openssl's list in that such a breach (if it is one) opens the
names and email contact info of a broad range of
security-responsible people that will invariably include some in
the upper regions of the perm chain. these people are the very
people that are targeted by malicious attempts (and some startling
successes) to breach much more than an organization's email
system.<br>
</blockquote>
<tt>You are now going way outside anything discussed previously, <br>
please enlighten the list as to what you are possibly <br>
talking about here.<br>
<br>
So far the only known breach is an apparent breach of <br>
*Google owned* e-mail servers, allowing perfect spoofing <br>
of gmail.com addresses by causing the fake mail to be <br>
sent by *exactly* the same servers with *exactly* the <br>
same headers as legitimate mails by the legitimate user of <br>
the spoofed e-mail address.<br>
<br>
This does not expose any of the names of any e-mail <br>
addresses stored by the OpenSSL organization, unless <br>
that data can be extracted by e-mailing a command to <br>
listserv from a spoofed administrator e-mail address and <br>
any of those administrator e-mail addresses are actually <br>
hosted by Google.<br>
</tt><br>
<blockquote class=" cite" id="mid_5702CE88_2000407_forthepolls_org"
cite="mid:5702CE88.2000407@forthepolls.org" type="cite"> <br>
yes, this person has seemingly stopped with postings, but i am
hearing no assurance that they have even been eliminated from the
subscription database. just being able to listen will garner a
wealth of sensitive info obtainable re a most desirable crowd of
people/victims.<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<tt>Posts by others indicate that the *spoofing* activity <br>
seemed to have stopped for multiple gmail addresses, <br>
including the e-mail address of one person posting such <br>
an observation, indicating a likelihood that Google fixed <br>
the underlying security issue.<br>
<br>
</tt><br>
<br>
<blockquote class=" cite" id="mid_5702CE88_2000407_forthepolls_org"
cite="mid:5702CE88.2000407@forthepolls.org" type="cite"> even the
most simplistic listserv app has the ability to withhold
subscriber email addr's and still provide a secure pm capability.
now that it is apparent|perceived that the list is vulnerable, i
believe the prudent route to go is to keep those addr's and
subscriber real-world names out of the "limelight". i see no
reason why a sanitized subscriber profile available from a link
within the person's public handle would not be adequate for
identification purposes and would actually become an enhancement
to the listserv app's usefulness to subscribers. this would
certainly shield the subscriber in a reliably meaningful way,
serve to protect a subscriber's own email system, and enhance the
security of openssl's own listserv ops.<br>
</blockquote>
<tt>The issue that the FROM addresses of OpenSSL e-mail list posters
<br>
(not other subscribers) can be seen by anyone receiving or <br>
otherwise finding their postings is age-old and completely <br>
unrelated to any issue related to this discussion (the spammer <br>
in this case obviously did not know that this was a mailing <br>
list, given the incorrect textual name used with the list <br>
SMTP address).</tt><tt><br>
</tt><br>
<tt>Even if OpenSSL were to switch to a surveillance vulnerable <br>
design where PMs between users would have to go through the <br>
OpenSSL servers, the list administrators will probably remain <br>
reachable using well known mandatory e-mail addresses such as <br>
"Postmaster". A similar issue would apply to most of the other <br>
high value subscribers.<br>
<br>
Any such people would already be required (in order to perform <br>
their function safely at all) to employ security measures to <br>
isolate their publicly known e-mail addresses from any e-mail <br>
addresses that are not intended to be publicly known. As an <br>
example, all my (non-blocked) postings on this list use a <br>
dedicated mail address and mail box which allows me to dismiss <br>
e-mails on other subjects to this address as Spam while not <br>
exposing other e-mail addresses used for more trusted uses, and <br>
I obviously employ similar measures for any well known role <br>
accounts I handle myself.<br>
<br>
<br>
</tt><tt></tt><br>
<blockquote class=" cite" id="mid_5702CE88_2000407_forthepolls_org"
cite="mid:5702CE88.2000407@forthepolls.org" type="cite">
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="80">
<b>original anchor description (100% of the message content):</b>
Attn:__here__is__your___$lâ
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__FacebÏÏk__giftcard.
__Wε__Nεεd__YÏμr__ShiÏmeηt__InfÏrmatiÏηs__
Click_Here
</pre>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2016.Apr.04 09:08, Jeffrey Walton
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=" cite"
id="mid_CAH8yC8kQ0J1vxmFNLYGrNRtamv5rY1_ONePnAAnV_o_6ke__UQ_mail_gmail_com"
cite="mid:CAH8yC8kQ0J1vxmFNLYGrNRtamv5rY1+ONePnAAnV_o+6ke-_UQ@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<blockquote class=" cite" id="Cite_536673" type="cite">
<pre wrap="">And anyway, this seems to be a case where the genuine
operator of an e-mail domain is failing to correctly
authenticate submissions by their own users, which no
amount of 3rd party automation (other than blacklisting
the failing provider, in this case gmail) could stop.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">Yeah, I'm guessing there was a vulnerability in one of the other
Google services, and that Google service was allowed to make web-based
email submissions on behalf of the user. Classic injection and failure
to validate sessions or parameters...
I'm also guessing Google fixed it because it has stopped.
</pre>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.wisemo.com">https://www.wisemo.com</a>
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded </pre>
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