<div dir="ltr">from the git repo of cpu jitter i see few files only so may be easy to compile at least.<div>Yeah it can be added to openssl source with macro to enable it.</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 4:05 PM Dr Paul Dale <<a href="mailto:paul.dale@oracle.com">paul.dale@oracle.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style="overflow-wrap: break-word;">Honestly, I’d like to add CPU Jitter to OpenSSL as one of its default entropy sources.<div>I dread the effort that this would entail.</div><div><br></div><div>Pauli<br><div>
<div dir="auto" style="overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none">-- <br>Dr Paul Dale | Distinguished Architect | Cryptographic Foundations <br>Phone +61 7 3031 7217<br>Oracle Australia</div><div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none"><br></div><br class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789Apple-interchange-newline"></div><br class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789Apple-interchange-newline">
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<div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>On 16 Aug 2019, at 8:28 pm, Chitrang Srivastava <<a href="mailto:chitrang.srivastava@gmail.com" target="_blank">chitrang.srivastava@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789Apple-interchange-newline"><div><div dir="ltr">Thanks Pauli,<div><br></div><div>I did checked CPU Jitter and it looks promising. It has openssl engine support too.</div><div>So i guess I have to add this add provide OS specific calls and it should work.</div><div>Will keep you posted.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 3:15 PM Dr Paul Dale <<a href="mailto:paul.dale@oracle.com" target="_blank">paul.dale@oracle.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div>I investigated HAVEGE fairly deeply a couple of years ago. I am completely in agreement with the basis of this source, however the sticking point was the “expansion” phase. Essentially, every bit of entropy gathered is turned into (just under) thirty two bits of “entropy”. This is logically and physically impossible. As a source, it appears reasonable to the usual tests (i.e. dieharder), although <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TestU01" target="_blank">TestU01</a> does pick up on it being less than ideal.<div><br></div><div>I would, however, recommend Stephan Müller's <a href="https://www.chronox.de/jent/doc/CPU-Jitter-NPTRNG.html" target="_blank">CPU Jitter</a>. The gathering is well researched and performed, no hidden tricks are present and the bits produces are equiprobable.<br><div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Pauli</div><div><div>
<div dir="auto"><div style="font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none">-- <br>Dr Paul Dale | Distinguished Architect | Cryptographic Foundations <br>Phone +61 7 3031 7217<br>Oracle Australia</div><div style="font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration:none"><br></div><br class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789gmail-m_306174500190338971Apple-interchange-newline"></div><br class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789gmail-m_306174500190338971Apple-interchange-newline">
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<div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>On 16 Aug 2019, at 7:31 pm, Robert Moskowitz <<a href="mailto:rgm@htt-consult.com" target="_blank">rgm@htt-consult.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789gmail-m_306174500190338971Apple-interchange-newline"><div>
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<div class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789gmail-m_306174500190338971moz-cite-prefix">On 8/16/19 5:26 AM, Chitrang Srivastava
wrote:<br>
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<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Hi,<br>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I am working on an embedded platform and now ported openssl
1.1.1b</div>
<div>TLS 1.2/1.3 is working fine.</div>
<div>While analysing random number , Rand pool initialization
calls where I am returning like this , </div>
<div>size_t <b>rand_pool_acquire_entropy</b>(RAND_POOL *pool)<br>
{<br>
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);<br>
} <br>
</div>
<div>As noticed that <b>rand_unix.c</b> has an implementation
wcih samples 2 bits of RTC, would that give enough entropy or
any other recommendation to have enough entropy for embedded
platforms?<br>
</div>
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<br>
<br>
Check out: <a class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789gmail-m_306174500190338971moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://issihosts.com/haveged" target="_blank">https://issihosts.com/haveged</a><br>
<br>
I talk about it here:
<a class="gmail-m_3928195100863178789gmail-m_306174500190338971moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.htt-consult.com/CentOS7-armv7.html#RANDOMNESS" target="_blank">http://www.htt-consult.com/CentOS7-armv7.html#RANDOMNESS</a><br>
<br>
<br>
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