[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Viktor Dukhovni
viktor at openssl.org
Thu Apr 16 17:52:15 UTC 2015
The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
via c70908d247d1f6866139185b8c6940412bcdd87f (commit)
from e963109fcd4973a6ba13415421b21c1b8aebaf74 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit c70908d247d1f6866139185b8c6940412bcdd87f
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
Date: Thu Apr 16 02:51:52 2015 -0400
Code style: space after 'if'
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <gitlab at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
apps/apps.c | 4 ++--
apps/ca.c | 10 +++++-----
apps/s_client.c | 2 +-
apps/s_server.c | 4 ++--
apps/s_time.c | 2 +-
apps/srp.c | 4 ++--
crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c | 2 +-
crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c | 4 ++--
crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c | 2 +-
crypto/asn1/x_x509.c | 4 ++--
crypto/bio/b_print.c | 4 ++--
crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c | 4 ++--
crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c | 4 ++--
crypto/bn/bn_rand.c | 2 +-
crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c | 2 +-
crypto/des/des.c | 2 +-
crypto/des/enc_writ.c | 2 +-
crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c | 2 +-
crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c | 2 +-
crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 8 ++++----
crypto/dso/dso_lib.c | 2 +-
crypto/dso/dso_vms.c | 2 +-
crypto/evp/bio_ok.c | 2 +-
crypto/hmac/hmac.c | 12 ++++++------
crypto/hmac/hmactest.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
crypto/objects/o_names.c | 2 +-
crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c | 2 +-
crypto/rand/rand_os2.c | 2 +-
crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c | 6 +++---
crypto/threads/th-lock.c | 12 ++++++------
crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c | 8 ++++----
demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c | 2 +-
ssl/d1_both.c | 6 +++---
ssl/s3_clnt.c | 2 +-
ssl/t1_enc.c | 2 +-
ssl/t1_lib.c | 6 +++---
ssl/tls_srp.c | 2 +-
37 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index 9862afd..5b7aedc 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
char *prompt = NULL;
prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info);
- if(!prompt) {
+ if (!prompt) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
UI_free(ui);
return 0;
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1);
if (ok >= 0 && verify) {
buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
- if(!buff) {
+ if (!buff) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
UI_free(ui);
OPENSSL_free(prompt);
diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index 5d29a64..97ad0c1 100644
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if(!tofree) {
+ if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#else
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if(!tofree) {
+ if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2803,7 +2803,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
- if(!tmp) {
+ if (!tmp) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2825,7 +2825,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
if (prevtm) {
*prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
- if(!*prevtm) {
+ if (!*prevtm) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2869,7 +2869,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
goto err;
}
comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
- if(!comp_time) {
+ if (!comp_time) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index 1f37239..b9b7975 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
int l;
- if(!pass) {
+ if (!pass) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index 35b4061..648dc6a 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = inl;
wbuf =
(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num);
- if(!wbuf)
+ if (!wbuf)
return 0;
OPENSSL_free(b->ptr);
@@ -2916,7 +2916,7 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
{
unsigned int count = 0;
do {
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0)
return 0;
/*
* Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix
diff --git a/apps/s_time.c b/apps/s_time.c
index a40997a..38788f7 100644
--- a/apps/s_time.c
+++ b/apps/s_time.c
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int parseArgs(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
maxTime = atoi(*(++argv));
- if(maxTime <= 0) {
+ if (maxTime <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "time must be > 0\n");
badop = 1;
}
diff --git a/apps/srp.c b/apps/srp.c
index c679448..c0ff417 100644
--- a/apps/srp.c
+++ b/apps/srp.c
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if(!tofree) {
+ if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
# else
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if(!tofree) {
+ if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
index fa4dd82..96110c5 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags,
if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) {
/* We want multipart/signed */
/* Generate a random boundary */
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
c = bound[i] & 0xf;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
index 4a73ca9..31949b8 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/bio_ndef.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
- if(!p)
+ if (!p)
return 0;
ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
- if(!p)
+ if (!p)
return 0;
ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
index 7c54f9d..5e7d53e 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1);
- if(!seqtt)
+ if (!seqtt)
return 0;
tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt);
if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld,
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
index d51b76e..f56e837 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
/* Save start position */
q = *pp;
- if(!a || *a == NULL) {
+ if (!a || *a == NULL) {
freeret = 1;
}
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
goto err;
return ret;
err:
- if(freeret) {
+ if (freeret) {
X509_free(ret);
if (a)
*a = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/crypto/bio/b_print.c
index c2cf6e6..452e5cf 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
if (*maxlen == 0)
*maxlen = 1024;
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
- if(!*buffer) {
+ if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
} else {
*maxlen += 1024;
*buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
- if(!*buffer) {
+ if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
index 44d1029..a04f32a 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
#if 1
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
return -1;
num = (n & 0x07);
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = nt->lwn;
nt->lwn = 0;
} else {
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
return -1;
num = (n & 7);
}
diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
index 2e78fd1..8035213 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
*/
sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
- if(!authchunks) {
+ if (!authchunks) {
BIO_vfree(bio);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
if (data->save_shutdown && !BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b)) {
char *tmp;
data->saved_message.bio = b;
- if(!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) {
+ if (!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) {
BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
index 48de9cb..9e78d4d 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
unsigned char c;
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1) < 0)
goto err;
if (c >= 128 && i > 0)
buf[i] = buf[i - 1];
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index b9c560d..a8322dc 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
return 0;
}
tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
- if(!tmp)
+ if (!tmp)
return 0;
/* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
diff --git a/crypto/des/des.c b/crypto/des/des.c
index dcdb8dd..586aed7 100644
--- a/crypto/des/des.c
+++ b/crypto/des/des.c
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ void doencryption(void)
len = l - rem;
if (feof(DES_IN)) {
for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) {
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0)
goto problems;
}
buf[l++] = rem;
diff --git a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
index 0777b4f..25041f2 100644
--- a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
+++ b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
if (len < 8) {
cp = shortbuf;
memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len);
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) {
return -1;
}
rnum = 8;
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
index 1dec109..873eb2e 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
str = ASN1_STRING_new();
- if(!str) {
+ if (!str) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
index 3123352..d686ab0 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
goto err;
if (!seed_len) {
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;
} else {
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index b30eab0..6edb26d 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -106,23 +106,23 @@ static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
#define DSA_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,rr,a1,p1,a2,p2,m,ctx,in_mont) \
do { \
int _tmp_res53; \
- if((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
+ if ((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
_tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp((dsa), (rr), (a1), (p1), \
(a2), (p2), (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
else \
_tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp2_mont((rr), (a1), (p1), (a2), (p2), \
(m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
- if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
+ if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
} while(0)
#define DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,r,a,p,m,ctx,m_ctx) \
do { \
int _tmp_res53; \
- if((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
+ if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
_tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp((dsa), (r), (a), (p), \
(m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
else \
_tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp_mont((r), (a), (p), (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
- if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
+ if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
} while(0)
const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c b/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
index d2a48bb..09b8eaf 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_lib.c
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
* honest. For one thing, I think I have to return a negative value for any
* error because possible DSO_ctrl() commands may return values such as
* "size"s that can legitimately be zero (making the standard
- * "if(DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
+ * "if (DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
* times. I'd prefer "output" values to be passed by reference and the return
* value as success/failure like usual ... but we conform when we must... :-)
*/
diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c b/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
index 0eff96e..d0794b8 100644
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
{
int len = strlen(filename);
char *not_translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
- if(not_translated)
+ if (not_translated)
strcpy(not_translated, filename);
return (not_translated);
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
index 859712f..5c32e35 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int sig_out(BIO *b)
* FIXME: there's absolutely no guarantee this makes any sense at all,
* particularly now EVP_MD_CTX has been restructured.
*/
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(md->md_data, md->digest->md_size) < 0)
goto berr;
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->md_data, md->digest->md_size);
longswap(&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]), md->digest->md_size);
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
index 2daacf6..b1f7317 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmac.c
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
if (md != NULL) {
reset = 1;
ctx->md = md;
- } else if(ctx->md) {
+ } else if (ctx->md) {
md = ctx->md;
} else {
return 0;
}
- if(!ctx->key_init && key == NULL)
+ if (!ctx->key_init && key == NULL)
return 0;
if (key != NULL) {
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
&ctx->key_length))
goto err;
} else {
- if(len < 0 || len > (int)sizeof(ctx->key))
+ if (len < 0 || len > (int)sizeof(ctx->key))
return 0;
memcpy(ctx->key, key, len);
ctx->key_length = len;
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
if (FIPS_mode() && !ctx->i_ctx.engine)
return FIPS_hmac_update(ctx, data, len);
#endif
- if(!ctx->key_init)
+ if (!ctx->key_init)
return 0;
return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, len);
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
return FIPS_hmac_final(ctx, md, len);
#endif
- if(!ctx->key_init)
+ if (!ctx->key_init)
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i))
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx)
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&dctx->md_ctx, &sctx->md_ctx))
goto err;
dctx->key_init = sctx->key_init;
- if(sctx->key_init) {
+ if (sctx->key_init) {
memcpy(dctx->key, sctx->key, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK);
dctx->key_length = sctx->key_length;
}
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c b/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
index 5c8ec4c..86b6c25 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
@@ -173,22 +173,22 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
/* test4 */
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if(HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD and key (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
}
- if(HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+ if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
}
- if(HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty key (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
}
- if(HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+ if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
@@ -196,32 +196,32 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
printf("test 4 ok\n");
test5:
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if(HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+ if (HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, -1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, -1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with invalid key len(test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
printf("Error finalising data (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
@@ -233,17 +233,17 @@ test5:
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[5].data, test[5].data_len)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[5].data, test[5].data_len)) {
printf("Error updating HMAC with data (sha256) (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
printf("Error finalising data (sha256) (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
@@ -255,17 +255,17 @@ test5:
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[6].key, test[6].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[6].key, test[6].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC with key (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[6].data, test[6].data_len)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[6].data, test[6].data_len)) {
printf("Error updating HMAC with data (new key) (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
- if(!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, buf, &len)) {
printf("Error finalising data (new key) (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
@@ -280,22 +280,22 @@ test5:
}
test6:
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if(!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[7].key, test[7].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[7].key, test[7].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
- if(!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[7].data, test[7].data_len)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx, test[7].data, test[7].data_len)) {
printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
- if(!HMAC_CTX_copy(&ctx2, &ctx)) {
+ if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&ctx2, &ctx)) {
printf("Failed to copy HMAC_CTX (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
- if(!HMAC_Final(&ctx2, buf, &len)) {
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx2, buf, &len)) {
printf("Error finalising data (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
diff --git a/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/crypto/objects/o_names.c
index c6774f4..2485992 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/o_names.c
+++ b/crypto/objects/o_names.c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type,
d.names =
OPENSSL_malloc(lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh) * sizeof *d.names);
/* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */
- if(d.names) {
+ if (d.names) {
d.n = 0;
OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d);
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
index fdfddf9..c19648c 100644
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ext.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int ocsp_add1_nonce(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **exts,
ASN1_put_object(&tmpval, 0, len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
if (val)
memcpy(tmpval, val, len);
- else if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len) < 0)
+ else if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmpval, len) < 0)
goto err;
if (!X509V3_add1_i2d(exts, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce,
&os, 0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE))
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c b/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
index 02148d5..706ab1e 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (DosQuerySysState) {
char *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(256 * 1024);
- if(!buffer)
+ if (!buffer)
return 0;
if (DosQuerySysState(0x1F, 0, 0, 0, buffer, 256 * 1024) == 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
index 902df10..50f75d7 100644
--- a/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(user, username, NULL))
goto err;
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
goto err;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
}
if (*salt == NULL) {
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
goto err;
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
srp_bn_print(g);
if (*salt == NULL) {
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
goto err;
*salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
diff --git a/crypto/threads/th-lock.c b/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
index 28884c2..cc8cf25 100644
--- a/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
+++ b/crypto/threads/th-lock.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
int i;
lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(HANDLE));
- if(!lock_cs) {
+ if (!lock_cs) {
/* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
return;
}
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
# else
lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(rwlock_t));
# endif
- if(!lock_cs) {
+ if (!lock_cs) {
/* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
return;
}
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
char filename[20];
lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(usema_t *));
- if(!lock_cs) {
+ if (!lock_cs) {
/* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
return;
}
@@ -328,11 +328,11 @@ void CRYPTO_thread_setup(void)
lock_cs = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(pthread_mutex_t));
lock_count = OPENSSL_malloc(CRYPTO_num_locks() * sizeof(long));
- if(!lock_cs || !lock_count) {
+ if (!lock_cs || !lock_count) {
/* Nothing we can do about this...void function! */
- if(lock_cs)
+ if (lock_cs)
OPENSSL_free(lock_cs);
- if(lock_count)
+ if (lock_count)
OPENSSL_free(lock_count);
return;
}
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
index dca6ab2..0febc1b 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_cpols.c
@@ -230,11 +230,11 @@ static POLICYINFO *policy_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
goto merr;
if (!sk_POLICYQUALINFO_push(pol->qualifiers, qual))
goto merr;
- if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) {
+ if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_cps))) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_POLICY_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if(!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new()))
+ if (!(qual->d.cpsuri = M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new()))
goto merr;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(qual->d.cpsuri, cnf->value,
strlen(cnf->value)))
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
POLICYQUALINFO *qual;
if (!(qual = POLICYQUALINFO_new()))
goto merr;
- if(!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) {
+ if (!(qual->pqualid = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_qt_unotice))) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_NOTICE_SECTION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static POLICYQUALINFO *notice_section(X509V3_CTX *ctx,
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(unot); i++) {
cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(unot, i);
if (!strcmp(cnf->name, "explicitText")) {
- if(!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()))
+ if (!(not->exptext = M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new()))
goto merr;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(not->exptext, cnf->value,
strlen(cnf->value)))
diff --git a/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c b/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c
index df6ae6c..5682e91 100644
--- a/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c
+++ b/demos/easy_tls/easy-tls.c
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ SSL_CTX *tls_create_ctx(struct tls_create_ctx_args a, void *apparg)
if (tls_dhe1024 == NULL) {
int i;
- if(RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&i, sizeof i) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)&i, sizeof i) <= 0)
goto err_return;
/*
* make sure that i is non-negative -- pick one of the provided
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 5cb30a5..68218e7 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
bp += payload;
/* Random padding */
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
return -1;
}
@@ -1625,11 +1625,11 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Sequence number */
s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
/* 16 random bytes */
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0)
goto err;
p += 16;
/* Random padding */
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0)
goto err;
ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 30ca11a..3d6b491 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -2729,7 +2729,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
- if(RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
+ if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 4e2845f..2736238 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
count++;
}
- if(!count) {
+ if (!count) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index f011248..1ad2507 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2612,7 +2612,7 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
bp += payload;
/* Random padding */
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
return -1;
}
@@ -2698,13 +2698,13 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Sequence number */
s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
/* 16 random bytes */
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 16;
/* Random padding */
- if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
diff --git a/ssl/tls_srp.c b/ssl/tls_srp.c
index 6bdf7f3..bb719ba 100644
--- a/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- if(RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0)
return -1;
s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
OPENSSL_cleanse(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
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