[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Matt Caswell
matt at openssl.org
Fri Aug 14 16:22:20 UTC 2015
The branch master has been updated
via efcdbcbeda556876c0147dca21d51610de30dfd9 (commit)
from 561e12bbb0a85c44d2b5501ccd430f2fb2fd63aa (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit efcdbcbeda556876c0147dca21d51610de30dfd9
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date: Mon Aug 3 12:57:51 2015 +0100
PACKETise ClientKeyExchange processing
Use the new PACKET code to process the CKE message
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
ssl/s3_srvr.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 119 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index a015a49..8bdb082 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2211,10 +2211,10 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
- int i, al, ok;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int al, ok;
long n;
unsigned long alg_k;
- unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
@@ -2229,6 +2229,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
+ PACKET pkt;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ size_t remain;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
@@ -2237,7 +2240,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
@@ -2246,13 +2253,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
size_t psklen;
- if (n < 2) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
- if (i + 2 > n) {
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
@@ -2271,14 +2273,20 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
-
+ s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 1);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, (unsigned char *)s->session->psk_identity,
+ i)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->psk_identity[i] = '\0';
psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
psk, sizeof(psk));
@@ -2308,13 +2316,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
-
- n -= i + 2;
- p += i;
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
/* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
- if (n != 0) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
@@ -2362,17 +2367,34 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ remain = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
+ if (remain != i) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
- } else
- p -= 2;
- } else
- n = i;
+ } else {
+ remain += 2;
+ if (!PACKET_back(&pkt, 2)) {
+ /*
+ * We already read these 2 bytes so this should never
+ * fail
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ remain = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
}
/*
@@ -2382,13 +2404,20 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
* bound is sufficient to be safe.
*/
- if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+
+ if (remain < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, remain)) {
+ /* We already checked we had enough data so this shouldn't happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/*
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
@@ -2401,7 +2430,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
goto err;
decrypt_len =
- RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ RSA_private_decrypt(remain, data, data, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
ERR_clear_error();
/*
@@ -2420,9 +2449,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
*/
version_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+ constant_time_eq_8(data[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
version_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+ constant_time_eq_8(data[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
@@ -2436,9 +2465,9 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
+ constant_time_eq_8(data[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
workaround_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
+ constant_time_eq_8(data[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
@@ -2455,11 +2484,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
*/
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
+ data[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, data[j],
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, data, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret),
+ 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
@@ -2470,9 +2500,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
int idx = -1;
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
- if (n > 1) {
- n2s(p, i);
- } else {
+ size_t bookm;
+ unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bookmark(&pkt, &bookm)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
@@ -2481,14 +2517,19 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
i = 0;
}
- if (n && n != i + 2) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != i) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
} else {
- p -= 2;
- i = (int)n;
+ if (!PACKET_goto_bookmark(&pkt, bookm)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ i = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
@@ -2528,14 +2569,22 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
- } else
- pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
+ /* We already checked we have enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
+ }
if (pub == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
+ i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
@@ -2550,7 +2599,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
else
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, i, 0)) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
@@ -2567,6 +2616,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
const EC_KEY *tkey;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ unsigned char *shared;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -2645,21 +2695,21 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
}
/* Get encoded point length */
- i = *p;
- p += 1;
- if (n != 1 + i) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
- * to the start
- */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
@@ -2668,10 +2718,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
- NULL);
+ shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
+ if (shared == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
+ srvr_ecdh, NULL);
if (i <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ OPENSSL_free(shared);
goto err;
}
@@ -2682,7 +2738,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
- if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, p, i, 0)) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
@@ -2692,17 +2748,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- int param_len;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
@@ -2724,8 +2776,6 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
- p += i;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
@@ -2757,15 +2807,20 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, n)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (ASN1_get_object
- ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
+ ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
- start = p;
+ start = data;
inlen = Tlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
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