[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL source code branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable updated. OpenSSL_1_0_2-beta3-140-g85cfc18

Dr. Stephen Henson steve at openssl.org
Mon Jan 5 14:36:53 UTC 2015


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- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 85cfc188c06bd046420ae70dd6e302f9efe022a9
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sat Dec 20 15:09:50 2014 +0000

    Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
    
    By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
    certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
    Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
    this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
    certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
    
    1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
    
    If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
    the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
    
    2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
    
    Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
    certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
    errors for some broken certificates.
    
    3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
    
    Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
    signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
    
    This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
    (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
    program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
    (negative or with leading zeroes).
    
    CVE-2014-8275
    Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia at openssl.org>
    
    (cherry picked from commit 684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                |   37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/asn1/a_verify.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c  |   14 +++++++++++++-
 crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 crypto/x509/x_all.c    |    2 ++
 5 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index edf0ee3..5b2f388 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -365,6 +365,43 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+     By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+     certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+     Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+     this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+     certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+     1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+     If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+     the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+     2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+     Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+     certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+     errors for some broken certificates.
+
+     Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+     3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+     Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+     signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+     This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+     (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+     program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+     (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+     Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+     of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+     (CVE-2014-8275)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
    *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
       version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
       version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index fc84cd3..a571009 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
 		goto err;
 		}
+
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		goto err;
+		}
 	
 	inl=i2d(data,NULL);
 	buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
@@ -146,6 +152,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
 		return -1;
 		}
 
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
 	/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
index 6058534..473af87 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
@@ -176,13 +176,25 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 	     const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
 	{
 	DSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = DSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	DSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
index ef9acf7..2836efe 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "ecs_locl.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
@@ -84,13 +85,25 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 		const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
  	{
 	ECDSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_all.c b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
index b2223ce..d722950 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x_all.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x_all.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
 
 int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r)
 	{
+	if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(a->sig_alg, a->cert_info->signature))
+		return 0;
 	return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),a->sig_alg,
 		a->signature,a->cert_info,r));
 	}


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