From mark at openssl.org  Thu Jul  2 09:49:18 2015
From: mark at openssl.org (Mark J. Cox)
Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 09:49:18 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1435830558.493240.21570.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  d1ec4a0f232f39a66aeb83bba3fcaf76113e050f (commit)
      from  df19ba3056b64a54cfc10837cdc9f4b40633e8a6 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit d1ec4a0f232f39a66aeb83bba3fcaf76113e050f
Author: Mark J. Cox <mark at awe.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 2 10:48:54 2015 +0100

    My PGPv2 key is no longer useful, update

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 about/index.wml | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/about/index.wml b/about/index.wml
index 7df98f3..cf363e5 100644
--- a/about/index.wml
+++ b/about/index.wml
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ The current OpenSSL core team consists of (in alphabetical order):
 <blockquote><table>
 <tr><td><b id="sf">Individual</b></td>   <td><b id="sf">Email</b></td> <td><b id="sf">Location</b></td>  <td><b id="sf">Key ID / Fingerprint</b></td></tr>
 <tr><td><hr noshade size="1"></td><td><hr noshade size="1"></td><td><hr noshade size="1"></td> <td><hr noshade size="1"></td> </tr>
-<tr><td>Mark J. Cox</td>         <td><a href="mailto:mark at openssl.org">mark at openssl.org</a></td> <td>UK</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xEEAD4CFD49A563D9">49A563D9</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td>Mark J. Cox</td>         <td><a href="mailto:mark at openssl.org">mark at openssl.org</a></td> <td>UK</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x36CEE4DEB00CFE33">B00CFE33</a>, <a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xEEAD4CFD49A563D9">49A563D9 (old key)</a></td></tr>
 <tr><td>Dr. Stephen Henson</td>  <td><a href="mailto:steve at openssl.org">steve at openssl.org</a></td> <td>UK</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x62605AA4334AF9F0DDE5D349D3577507FA40E9E2">FA40E9E2</a>, <a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xA2D29B7BF295C759">F295C759 (old key)</a></td></tr>
 <tr><td>Ben Laurie</td>          <td><a href="mailto:ben at openssl.org">ben at openssl.org</a></td> <td>UK</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x765655DE62E396FF2587EB6C4F6DE1562118CF83">2118CF83<tr><td>Andy Polyakov</td>       <td><a href="mailto:appro at openssl.org">appro at openssl.org</a></td> <td>SE</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xB652F27F2B8D1B8DA78D7061BA6CDA461FE8E023">1FE8E023</a></td> </tr>
 </a></td> </tr>
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ The current OpenSSL development team consists of (in alphabetical order):
 <tr><td><b id="sf">Individual</b></td>   <td><b id="sf">Email</b></td> <td><b id="sf">Location&nbsp;</b></td> <td><b id="sf">Key ID</b></td> </tr>
 <tr><td><hr noshade size="1"></td><td><hr noshade size="1"></td><td><hr noshade size="1"></td><td><hr noshade size="1"></td> </tr>
 <tr><td>Matt Caswell</td>         <td><a href="mailto:matt at openssl.org">matt at openssl.org</a></td> <td>UK</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x8657ABB260F056B1E5190839D9C4D26D0E604491">0E604491</a></td></tr>
-<tr><td>Mark J. Cox</td>         <td><a href="mailto:mark at openssl.org">mark at openssl.org</a></td> <td>UK</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xEEAD4CFD49A563D9">49A563D9</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td>Mark J. Cox</td>         <td><a href="mailto:mark at openssl.org">mark at openssl.org</a></td> <td>UK</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x36CEE4DEB00CFE33">B00CFE33</a>, <a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xEEAD4CFD49A563D9">49A563D9 (old key)</a></td></tr>
 <tr><td>Viktor Dukhovni</td>  <td><a href="mailto:viktor at openssl.org">viktor at openssl.org</a></td> <td>US</td> <td></a></a></td></tr>
 <tr><td>Dr. Stephen Henson</td>  <td><a href="mailto:steve at openssl.org">steve at openssl.org</a></td> <td>UK</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x62605AA4334AF9F0DDE5D349D3577507FA40E9E2">FA40E9E2</a>, <a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xA2D29B7BF295C759">F295C759 (old key)</a></td></tr>
 <tr><td>Tim Hudson</td>  <td><a href="mailto:tjh at openssl.org">tjh at openssl.org</a></td> <td>AU</td> <td><a href="http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xC1F33DD8CE1D4CC613AF14DA9195C48241FBF7DD">41FBF7DD</a></td></tr>

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  2 12:04:02 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 12:04:02 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1435838642.356984.9710.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c (commit)
      from  f8f75a7e4a7746caba9cab843e14ed6a41dfad21 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 1 23:40:03 2015 +0100

    Fix PSK handling.
    
    The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
    and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
    by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
    
    Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/s3_clnt.c | 17 +++--------------
 ssl/s3_srvr.c |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 2346ce5..6af145a 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -1456,8 +1456,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
     if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-        char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
         param_len = 2;
         if (param_len > n) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
@@ -1483,17 +1481,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
         param_len += i;
 
-        /*
-         * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
-         * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
-         * so create a NULL-terminated string.
-         */
-        memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
-        memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
-        if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-            OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-        s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
-        if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+        s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
             al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto f_err;
@@ -3077,7 +3066,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             }
 
             memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
-            psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+            psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
                                              identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
                                              psk_or_pre_ms,
                                              sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 8885694..acd3b9e 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2780,7 +2780,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
         if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
             OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
         if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto psk_err;

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  2 12:08:05 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 12:08:05 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1435838885.123205.10265.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  d6be3124f22870f1888c532523b74ea5d89795eb (commit)
      from  eb0e2a5c5d904c3f74a9387d27bfbad4861469a9 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit d6be3124f22870f1888c532523b74ea5d89795eb
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 1 23:40:03 2015 +0100

    Fix PSK handling.
    
    The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
    and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
    by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
    
    Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/s3_clnt.c | 17 +++--------------
 ssl/s3_srvr.c |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 0879a0f..35ad121 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -1381,8 +1381,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
     if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-        char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
         param_len = 2;
         if (param_len > n) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
@@ -1408,17 +1406,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
         param_len += i;
 
-        /*
-         * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
-         * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
-         * so create a NULL-terminated string.
-         */
-        memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
-        memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
-        if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-            OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-        s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
-        if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+        s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
             al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto f_err;
@@ -2951,7 +2940,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             }
 
             memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
-            psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+            psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
                                              identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
                                              psk_or_pre_ms,
                                              sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 9aa3292..3a5f71d 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2792,7 +2792,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
         if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
             OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
         if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto psk_err;

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  2 12:08:05 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 12:08:05 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1435838885.052947.10243.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  1392c238657ec745af6a40def03d67d4ce02a082 (commit)
      from  989ba38f7fa27e567612ab717975c82215c591ba (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1392c238657ec745af6a40def03d67d4ce02a082
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 1 23:40:03 2015 +0100

    Fix PSK handling.
    
    The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
    and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
    by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
    
    Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/s3_clnt.c | 17 +++--------------
 ssl/s3_srvr.c |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 980c74c..b3a10d1 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -1240,8 +1240,6 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
     if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-        char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
         param_len = 2;
         if (param_len > n) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
@@ -1267,17 +1265,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
         param_len += i;
 
-        /*
-         * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
-         * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
-         * so create a NULL-terminated string.
-         */
-        memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
-        memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
-        if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
-            OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-        s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
-        if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+        s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
             al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto f_err;
@@ -2621,7 +2610,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             }
 
             memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
-            psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+            psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
                                              identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
                                              psk_or_pre_ms,
                                              sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 7ebcca6..ef2510b 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2583,7 +2583,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
         if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
             OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
         if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto psk_err;

From steve at openssl.org  Sat Jul  4 21:08:41 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Sat, 04 Jul 2015 21:08:41 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL-fips-2_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1436044121.137262.6579.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL-fips-2_0-stable has been updated
       via  a0f8d282d728a3584f08ecb5f8321c37bb06dd28 (commit)
       via  0f38e9cd782167471898440c3179c648e196d456 (commit)
      from  34f39b062c76fbd3082521b26edee7f53afc061d (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a0f8d282d728a3584f08ecb5f8321c37bb06dd28
Author: Steve Marquess <marquess at opensslfoundation.com>
Date:   Sat Jul 4 15:18:46 2015 -0400

    Add new iOS subdirectory
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 0f38e9cd782167471898440c3179c648e196d456
Author: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Date:   Sat Jul 4 15:17:45 2015 -0400

    Add new VxWorks x86 platform
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Configure            | 1 +
 fips/fips_canister.c | 3 ++-
 util/fipsdist.pl     | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index 613f829..5f3d0cd 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -613,6 +613,7 @@ my %table=(
 "vxworks-ppc860","ccppc:-nostdinc -msoft-float -DCPU=PPC860 -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h:::VXWORKS:-r:::::",
 "vxworks-simlinux","ccpentium:-B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DL_ENDIAN -DCPU=SIMLINUX -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK:::VXWORKS:-r::${no_asm}::::::ranlibpentium:",
 "vxworks-mips","ccmips:-mrtp -mips2 -O -G 0 -B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DCPU=MIPS32 -msoft-float -mno-branch-likely -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -DNO_STRINGS_H -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip::-D_REENTRANT:VXWORKS:-Wl,--defsym,__wrs_rtp_base=0xe0000000 -L \$(WIND_BASE)/target/usr/lib/mips/MIPSI32/sfcommon::${mips32_asm}:o32::::::ranlibmips:",
+"vxworks-pentium","ccpentium:-Os -B\$(WIND_BASE)/host/\$(WIND_HOST_TYPE)/lib/gcc-lib/ -D_VSB_CONFIG_FILE=\"\$(WIND_BASE)/target/lib/h/config/vsbConfig.h\" -DL_ENDIAN -DCPU=PENTIUM4 -DTOOL_FAMILY=gnu -DTOOL=gnu -fno-builtin -fno-defer-pop -D_WRS_KERNEL -D_WRS_VX_SMP -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h -I\$(WIND_BASE)/target/h/wrn/coreip -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK:::VXWORKS:-r::${no_asm}::::::ranlibpentium:",
 
 ##### Compaq Non-Stop Kernel (Tandem)
 "tandem-c89","c89:-Ww -D__TANDEM -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1 -D_TANDEM_SOURCE -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::THIRTY_TWO_BIT:::",
diff --git a/fips/fips_canister.c b/fips/fips_canister.c
index adbe696..3c33d00 100644
--- a/fips/fips_canister.c
+++ b/fips/fips_canister.c
@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ const void         *FIPS_text_end(void);
 				  defined(__aarch64__)			|| \
 				  defined(__i386__)|| defined(__i386)))	|| \
 	(defined(__vxworks)   && (defined(__ppc__) || defined(__ppc)	|| \
-				  defined(__mips__)|| defined(__mips)))	|| \
+				  defined(__mips__)|| defined(__mips)	|| \
+				  defined(__i386__)|| defined(__i386)))	|| \
         (defined(__NetBSD__)  && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__i386))) || \
 	(defined(__linux)     && ((defined(__PPC__) && !defined(__PPC64__)) || \
 				  defined(__arm__) || defined(__arm)) || \
diff --git a/util/fipsdist.pl b/util/fipsdist.pl
index 53f9d3e..4ebf1ac 100644
--- a/util/fipsdist.pl
+++ b/util/fipsdist.pl
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ while (<STDIN>)
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		next unless (/^(fips\/|crypto|util|test|include|ms|c6x)/);
+		next unless (/^(fips\/|crypto|util|test|include|ms|c6x|iOS)/);
 		}
 	if (/^crypto\/([^\/]+)/)
 		{

From steve at openssl.org  Mon Jul  6 17:35:23 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 17:35:23 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436204123.137329.29564.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  5727582cf51e98e5e0faa435e7da2c8929533c0d (commit)
       via  9cca7be11d62298b2af0722f94345012c86eaed4 (commit)
      from  36f038f1041f9f31878f75b567959ceae08eb34e (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 5727582cf51e98e5e0faa435e7da2c8929533c0d
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 6 14:17:49 2015 +0100

    document -2 return value
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit 9cca7be11d62298b2af0722f94345012c86eaed4
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jun 9 23:17:06 2015 +0100

    Relax CCM tag check.
    
    In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
    the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/evp/e_aes.c                        | 2 +-
 doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 895e8ee..f8365a2 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -1866,7 +1866,7 @@ static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
     case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
         if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
             return 0;
-        if ((c->encrypt && ptr) || (!c->encrypt && !ptr))
+        if (c->encrypt && ptr)
             return 0;
         if (ptr) {
             cctx->tag_set = 1;
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
index 84fc180..380356e 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ and issuer names.
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
 the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
 should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
+If B<nid> is invalid (doesn't correspond to a valid OID) then -2 is returned.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
 
@@ -63,6 +64,10 @@ The list of all relevant B<NID_*> and B<OBJ_* codes> can be found in
 the source code header files E<lt>openssl/obj_mac.hE<gt> and/or
 E<lt>openssl/objects.hE<gt>.
 
+Applications which could pass invalid NIDs to X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID()
+should check for the return value of -2. Alternatively the NID validity
+can be determined first by checking OBJ_nid2obj(nid) is not NULL.
+
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 
 Process all entries:
@@ -95,6 +100,8 @@ Process all commonName entries:
 
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
 return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() can also return -2 if the supplied
+NID is invalid.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
 

From steve at openssl.org  Mon Jul  6 17:38:51 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 17:38:51 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436204331.206701.5188.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  c0b674b7cbd9146982850523293c74b9131b26d5 (commit)
       via  a229c2b805bb8c8081fe6d9cb5d9fc2fb9888c19 (commit)
      from  3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit c0b674b7cbd9146982850523293c74b9131b26d5
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jun 9 23:17:06 2015 +0100

    Relax CCM tag check.
    
    In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
    the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 9cca7be11d62298b2af0722f94345012c86eaed4)

commit a229c2b805bb8c8081fe6d9cb5d9fc2fb9888c19
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 6 14:17:49 2015 +0100

    document -2 return value
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 5727582cf51e98e5e0faa435e7da2c8929533c0d)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/evp/e_aes.c                        | 2 +-
 doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 33cbed8..1734a82 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
     case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG:
         if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
             return 0;
-        if ((c->encrypt && ptr) || (!c->encrypt && !ptr))
+        if (c->encrypt && ptr)
             return 0;
         if (ptr) {
             cctx->tag_set = 1;
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
index c8a8128..109f561 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ and issuer names.
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
 the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
 should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
+If B<nid> is invalid (doesn't correspond to a valid OID) then -2 is returned.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
 
@@ -63,6 +64,10 @@ The list of all relevant B<NID_*> and B<OBJ_* codes> can be found in
 the source code header files E<lt>openssl/obj_mac.hE<gt> and/or
 E<lt>openssl/objects.hE<gt>.
 
+Applications which could pass invalid NIDs to X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID()
+should check for the return value of -2. Alternatively the NID validity
+can be determined first by checking OBJ_nid2obj(nid) is not NULL.
+
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 
 Process all entries:
@@ -95,6 +100,8 @@ Process all commonName entries:
 
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
 return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() can also return -2 if the supplied
+NID is invalid.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
 

From steve at openssl.org  Mon Jul  6 17:38:51 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 17:38:51 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436204331.136493.5165.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  cb6e0ed17a61ae3711d385f517d61be2b4c33a55 (commit)
       via  e5d5019a233d15e3ce93e57925c98bd0c8e71f46 (commit)
      from  d6be3124f22870f1888c532523b74ea5d89795eb (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit cb6e0ed17a61ae3711d385f517d61be2b4c33a55
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jun 9 23:17:06 2015 +0100

    Relax CCM tag check.
    
    In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
    the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 9cca7be11d62298b2af0722f94345012c86eaed4)

commit e5d5019a233d15e3ce93e57925c98bd0c8e71f46
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 6 14:17:49 2015 +0100

    document -2 return value
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 5727582cf51e98e5e0faa435e7da2c8929533c0d)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/evp/e_aes.c                        | 2 +-
 doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
index 1ede7bd..a4327fc 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes.c
@@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
     case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG:
         if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
             return 0;
-        if ((c->encrypt && ptr) || (!c->encrypt && !ptr))
+        if (c->encrypt && ptr)
             return 0;
         if (ptr) {
             cctx->tag_set = 1;
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
index c8a8128..109f561 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ and issuer names.
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
 the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
 should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
+If B<nid> is invalid (doesn't correspond to a valid OID) then -2 is returned.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
 
@@ -63,6 +64,10 @@ The list of all relevant B<NID_*> and B<OBJ_* codes> can be found in
 the source code header files E<lt>openssl/obj_mac.hE<gt> and/or
 E<lt>openssl/objects.hE<gt>.
 
+Applications which could pass invalid NIDs to X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID()
+should check for the return value of -2. Alternatively the NID validity
+can be determined first by checking OBJ_nid2obj(nid) is not NULL.
+
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 
 Process all entries:
@@ -95,6 +100,8 @@ Process all commonName entries:
 
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
 return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() can also return -2 if the supplied
+NID is invalid.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
 

From steve at openssl.org  Mon Jul  6 17:44:00 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 17:44:00 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_0_9_8-stable update
Message-ID: <1436204640.674198.5961.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_0_9_8-stable has been updated
       via  9b914c7f9147c49a569108ab7f524ebaeb92eaaa (commit)
      from  2c9dfa18aacdd22537ced0815d0a53532c019d5b (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9b914c7f9147c49a569108ab7f524ebaeb92eaaa
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 6 14:17:49 2015 +0100

    document -2 return value
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 5727582cf51e98e5e0faa435e7da2c8929533c0d)
    
    Conflicts:
    	doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
index 3b1f9ff..3618b21 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ and issuer names.
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
 the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
 should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
+If B<nid> is invalid (doesn't correspond to a valid OID) then -2 is returned.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
 
@@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by
 X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the
 various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result.
 
+Applications which could pass invalid NIDs to X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID()
+should check for the return value of -2. Alternatively the NID validity
+can be determined first by checking OBJ_nid2obj(nid) is not NULL.
+
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 
 Process all entries:
@@ -91,6 +96,8 @@ Process all commonName entries:
 
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
 return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() can also return -2 if the supplied
+NID is invalid.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
 

From steve at openssl.org  Mon Jul  6 17:44:00 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2015 17:44:00 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1436204640.733577.5983.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  18c5ead86e781ba27c9108ab1854f0b2843238ec (commit)
      from  1392c238657ec745af6a40def03d67d4ce02a082 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 18c5ead86e781ba27c9108ab1854f0b2843238ec
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 6 14:17:49 2015 +0100

    document -2 return value
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 5727582cf51e98e5e0faa435e7da2c8929533c0d)
    
    Conflicts:
    	doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
index 3b1f9ff..3618b21 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ and issuer names.
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
 the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
 should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
+If B<nid> is invalid (doesn't correspond to a valid OID) then -2 is returned.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
 
@@ -59,6 +60,10 @@ X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by
 X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the
 various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result.
 
+Applications which could pass invalid NIDs to X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID()
+should check for the return value of -2. Alternatively the NID validity
+can be determined first by checking OBJ_nid2obj(nid) is not NULL.
+
 =head1 EXAMPLES
 
 Process all entries:
@@ -91,6 +96,8 @@ Process all commonName entries:
 
 X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
 return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() can also return -2 if the supplied
+NID is invalid.
 
 X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
 

From mark at openssl.org  Tue Jul  7 09:11:23 2015
From: mark at openssl.org (Mark J. Cox)
Date: Tue, 07 Jul 2015 09:11:23 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436260283.533793.9928.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  a8e5ad250be42a3a9a386188ff6e75ce8df1342e (commit)
       via  1e7dbe187342b7ff762b9d0796fd536176ec46f0 (commit)
      from  d1ec4a0f232f39a66aeb83bba3fcaf76113e050f (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a8e5ad250be42a3a9a386188ff6e75ce8df1342e
Author: Mark J. Cox <mark at awe.com>
Date:   Tue Jul 7 10:10:59 2015 +0100

    A colleague couldn't find our mailing lists because it's non-obvious what Join means

commit 1e7dbe187342b7ff762b9d0796fd536176ec46f0
Author: Mark J. Cox <mark at awe.com>
Date:   Tue Jul 7 10:09:25 2015 +0100

    Our policy says we'll mention on the home page

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 news/newsflash.txt | 1 +
 support/index.wml  | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/news/newsflash.txt b/news/newsflash.txt
index def6902..eeecf70 100644
--- a/news/newsflash.txt
+++ b/news/newsflash.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+06-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2d and 1.0.1p <a href="https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-announce/2015-July/000037.html">security releases due 9th July 2015</a>
 12-Jun-2015: New releases to resolve ABI compatibility problems:
 12-Jun-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2c is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug fixes
 12-Jun-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.1o is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug fixes
diff --git a/support/index.wml b/support/index.wml
index 025aec3..d3ec74d 100644
--- a/support/index.wml
+++ b/support/index.wml
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ You can contribute to the OpenSSL project in any of the following ways:
 
 <p>
 <ul>
-<li><a href="community.html"><font id=sfl>Join</font></a> the online community<br>
+<li><a href="community.html"><font id=sfl>Join</font></a> the online community via public mailing lists<br>
     Participate in the online community of developers, testers, and contributing end users working to make OpenSSL a better product.
 <p>
 <li><a href="donations.html"><font id=sfl>Donate</font></a> to the OpenSSL project<br>

From levitte at openssl.org  Tue Jul  7 14:41:02 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Tue, 07 Jul 2015 14:41:02 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436280062.712360.20704.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  9cf315ef90d0cfeb8bb7a38873eea07a8f0dffec (commit)
       via  f1cece554ddf282f1512b4da04664467746ffd24 (commit)
      from  5727582cf51e98e5e0faa435e7da2c8929533c0d (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9cf315ef90d0cfeb8bb7a38873eea07a8f0dffec
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 7 14:50:10 2015 +0200

    Document the nameopt change
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit f1cece554ddf282f1512b4da04664467746ffd24
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 7 11:13:20 2015 +0200

    Make "oneline" the default for nameopt
    
    There's no reason why we should default to a output format that is
    old, and confusing in some cases.
    
    This affects the commands "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509".
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES           | 4 ++++
 apps/ca.c         | 6 ++++--
 apps/crl.c        | 5 +++++
 apps/req.c        | 8 +++++++-
 apps/x509.c       | 5 +++++
 doc/apps/x509.pod | 4 ++--
 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 88b3d67..057909e 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
  _______________
 
  Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0  [xx XXX xxxx]
+  *) Changed the default name options in the "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509"
+     to be "oneline" instead of "compat".
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
   *) Remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is SSLeay legacy, we're
      not aware of clients that still exhibit this bug, and the workaround
      hasn't been working properly for a while.
diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index a0f9f79..0a8d7b7 100644
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ opthelp:
                 ret = 0;
                 goto end;
             case OPT_IN:
-		req = 1;
+                req = 1;
                 infile = opt_arg();
                 break;
             case OPT_OUT:
@@ -638,8 +638,10 @@ end_of_options:
             goto end;
         }
         default_op = 0;
-    } else
+    } else {
+        nameopt = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
         ERR_clear_error();
+    }
 
     f = NCONF_get_string(conf, section, ENV_CERTOPT);
 
diff --git a/apps/crl.c b/apps/crl.c
index c897335..b4c9c75 100644
--- a/apps/crl.c
+++ b/apps/crl.c
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int crl_main(int argc, char **argv)
     EVP_PKEY *pkey;
     const EVP_MD *digest = EVP_sha1();
     unsigned long nmflag = 0;
+    char nmflag_set = 0;
     char *infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *crldiff = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
     char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL, *prog;
     OPTION_CHOICE o;
@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ int crl_main(int argc, char **argv)
             badsig = 1;
             break;
         case OPT_NAMEOPT:
+            nmflag_set = 1;
             if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg()))
                 goto opthelp;
             break;
@@ -217,6 +219,9 @@ int crl_main(int argc, char **argv)
     argc = opt_num_rest();
     argv = opt_rest();
 
+    if (!nmflag_set)
+        nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
+
     if (!app_load_modules(NULL))
         goto end;
 
diff --git a/apps/req.c b/apps/req.c
index 03736cc..b3220ba 100644
--- a/apps/req.c
+++ b/apps/req.c
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
     int nodes = 0, kludge = 0, newhdr = 0, subject = 0, pubkey = 0;
     long newkey = -1;
     unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, nmflag = 0, reqflag = 0;
+    char nmflag_set = 0;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
     cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
@@ -323,6 +324,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
             chtype = MBSTRING_UTF8;
             break;
         case OPT_NAMEOPT:
+            nmflag_set = 1;
             if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg()))
                 goto opthelp;
             break;
@@ -352,7 +354,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
                 goto opthelp;
             break;
         case OPT_SUBJECT:
-	    subject = 1;
+            subject = 1;
             break;
         case OPT_SUBJ:
             subj = opt_arg();
@@ -375,6 +377,10 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
     argc = opt_num_rest();
     argv = opt_rest();
+
+    if (!nmflag_set)
+        nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
+
     private = newreq && (pkey == NULL) ? 1 : 0;
 
     if (!app_passwd(passargin, passargout, &passin, &passout)) {
diff --git a/apps/x509.c b/apps/x509.c
index 8293a6e..18e13e7 100644
--- a/apps/x509.c
+++ b/apps/x509.c
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ int x509_main(int argc, char **argv)
     int text = 0, serial = 0, subject = 0, issuer = 0, startdate = 0;
     int checkoffset = 0, enddate = 0;
     unsigned long nmflag = 0, certflag = 0;
+    char nmflag_set = 0;
     OPTION_CHOICE o;
     ENGINE *e = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
@@ -360,6 +361,7 @@ int x509_main(int argc, char **argv)
                 goto opthelp;
             break;
         case OPT_NAMEOPT:
+            nmflag_set = 1;
             if (!set_name_ex(&nmflag, opt_arg()))
                 goto opthelp;
             break;
@@ -488,6 +490,9 @@ int x509_main(int argc, char **argv)
         goto opthelp;
     }
 
+    if (!nmflag_set)
+        nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
+
     if (!app_load_modules(NULL))
         goto end;
 
diff --git a/doc/apps/x509.pod b/doc/apps/x509.pod
index 062a919..a0127fe 100644
--- a/doc/apps/x509.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/x509.pod
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ a B<-> to turn the option off. Only the first four will normally be used.
 
 =item B<compat>
 
-use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no name options at all.
+use the old format.
 
 =item B<RFC2253>
 
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ B<sep_comma_plus>, B<dn_rev> and B<sname>.
 a oneline format which is more readable than RFC2253. It is equivalent to
 specifying the  B<esc_2253>, B<esc_ctrl>, B<esc_msb>, B<utf8>, B<dump_nostr>,
 B<dump_der>, B<use_quote>, B<sep_comma_plus_space>, B<space_eq> and B<sname>
-options.
+options.  This is the I<default> of no name options are given explicitely.
 
 =item B<multiline>
 

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 12:45:38 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 12:45:38 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436445938.901393.32544.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  0dd8b2ab306a6b93e4901b0eb7f787edcd4a7199 (commit)
       via  5f9ad2d09f87c98114ec2f4817cede2ecb89ec80 (commit)
      from  a8e5ad250be42a3a9a386188ff6e75ce8df1342e (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0dd8b2ab306a6b93e4901b0eb7f787edcd4a7199
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 13:38:22 2015 +0100

    Update to vulernabilities xml

commit 5f9ad2d09f87c98114ec2f4817cede2ecb89ec80
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 13:35:25 2015 +0100

    Update website news

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 news/newsflash.txt       |  3 +++
 news/vulnerabilities.xml | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/news/newsflash.txt b/news/newsflash.txt
index eeecf70..1cd231e 100644
--- a/news/newsflash.txt
+++ b/news/newsflash.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+11-Jul-2015: <a href="ROOT/news/secadv_20150709.txt">Security Advisory</a>: one security fix
+11-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2d is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug and security fixes
+11-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.1p is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug and security fixes
 06-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2d and 1.0.1p <a href="https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-announce/2015-July/000037.html">security releases due 9th July 2015</a>
 12-Jun-2015: New releases to resolve ABI compatibility problems:
 12-Jun-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2c is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug fixes
diff --git a/news/vulnerabilities.xml b/news/vulnerabilities.xml
index aaacfdc..49d0038 100644
--- a/news/vulnerabilities.xml
+++ b/news/vulnerabilities.xml
@@ -5,7 +5,26 @@
      1.0.0 on 20100329
 -->
 
-<security updated="20150611">
+<security updated="20150709">
+  <issue public="20150709">
+    <cve name="2015-1793"/>
+    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1n"/>
+    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1o"/>
+    <affects base="1.0.2" version="1.0.2b"/>
+    <affects base="1.0.2" version="1.0.2c"/>
+    <fixed base="1.0.2" version="1.0.2d" date="20150709"/>
+    <fixed base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1p" date="20150709"/>
+
+    <description>
+      An error in the implementation of the alternative certificate
+      chain logic could allow an attacker to cause certain checks on
+      untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag,
+      enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and
+      "issue" an invalid certificate.
+    </description>
+    <advisory url="http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150709.txt"/>
+    <reported source="Adam Langley and David Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL)"/>
+  </issue>
   <issue public="20150611">
     <cve name="2015-1788"/>
     <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8"/>

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 12:48:14 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 12:48:14 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436446094.616084.9993.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  b50b8b11e61183e44d0bb521d5512416fbc261c7 (commit)
      from  0dd8b2ab306a6b93e4901b0eb7f787edcd4a7199 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit b50b8b11e61183e44d0bb521d5512416fbc261c7
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 13:48:04 2015 +0100

    Add security advisory

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 news/secadv_20150709.txt | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 news/secadv_20150709.txt

diff --git a/news/secadv_20150709.txt b/news/secadv_20150709.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7cc8eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/news/secadv_20150709.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+OpenSSL Security Advisory [9 Jul 2015]
+=======================================
+
+Alternative chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
+======================================================
+
+Severity: High
+
+During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and
+1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first
+attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this
+logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted
+certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid
+leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+This issue will impact any application that verifies certificates including
+SSL/TLS/DTLS clients and SSL/TLS/DTLS servers using client authentication.
+
+This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o.
+
+OpenSSL 1.0.2b/1.0.2c users should upgrade to 1.0.2d
+OpenSSL 1.0.1n/1.0.1o users should upgrade to 1.0.1p
+
+This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 24th June 2015 by Adam Langley/David
+Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). The fix was developed by the BoringSSL project.
+
+Note
+====
+
+As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy
+(https://www.openssl.org/about/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL versions
+1.0.0 and 0.9.8 will cease on 31st December 2015. No security updates for these
+releases will be provided after that date. Users of these releases are advised
+to upgrade.
+
+References
+==========
+
+URL for this Security Advisory:
+https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150709.txt
+
+Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional
+details over time.
+
+For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:
+https://www.openssl.org/about/secpolicy.html
+

From mark at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 12:50:11 2015
From: mark at openssl.org (Mark J. Cox)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 12:50:11 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436446211.377141.19537.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  bc096d567c828f6b5e7ec89dbfbe3d20bb5874d8 (commit)
      from  b50b8b11e61183e44d0bb521d5512416fbc261c7 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit bc096d567c828f6b5e7ec89dbfbe3d20bb5874d8
Author: Mark J. Cox <mark at awe.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 13:49:57 2015 +0100

    It's the 9th

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 news/newsflash.txt | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/news/newsflash.txt b/news/newsflash.txt
index 1cd231e..a49983f 100644
--- a/news/newsflash.txt
+++ b/news/newsflash.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-11-Jul-2015: <a href="ROOT/news/secadv_20150709.txt">Security Advisory</a>: one security fix
-11-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2d is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug and security fixes
-11-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.1p is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug and security fixes
+09-Jul-2015: <a href="ROOT/news/secadv_20150709.txt">Security Advisory</a>: one security fix
+09-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2d is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug and security fixes
+09-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.1p is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug and security fixes
 06-Jul-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2d and 1.0.1p <a href="https://mta.openssl.org/pipermail/openssl-announce/2015-July/000037.html">security releases due 9th July 2015</a>
 12-Jun-2015: New releases to resolve ABI compatibility problems:
 12-Jun-2015: OpenSSL 1.0.2c is now <a href="ROOT/source/">available</a>, including bug fixes

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 13:01:12 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 13:01:12 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436446872.941020.30183.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  040b93353e8b48cfc0e2429d96eb3a27f259512d (commit)
       via  6f47ced0157059edee2d4c0d94fcf76e08763c5f (commit)
       via  7f3f41d816bb80e362a5978420f59030b3132c81 (commit)
       via  a64ba70dbb7e4886d7bae0b85a2a1070e22dd8fb (commit)
       via  79a55b1f2796bf6471360e8b6ab131cdedca256e (commit)
       via  aae41f8c54257d9fa6904d3a9aa09c5db6cefd0d (commit)
       via  593e9c638c58e1a510c519db0d024527113330f3 (commit)
       via  2aacec8f4a5ba1b365620a7b17fcce311ada93ad (commit)
      from  9cf315ef90d0cfeb8bb7a38873eea07a8f0dffec (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 040b93353e8b48cfc0e2429d96eb3a27f259512d
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 09:45:22 2015 +0100

    Apply some missing updates from previous commits
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 6f47ced0157059edee2d4c0d94fcf76e08763c5f
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 2 15:38:32 2015 +0100

    Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 7f3f41d816bb80e362a5978420f59030b3132c81
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 25 12:28:28 2015 +0100

    Extend -show_chain option to verify to show more info
    
    The -show_chain flag to the verify command line app shows information about
    the chain that has been built. This commit adds the text "untrusted" against
    those certificates that have been used from the untrusted list.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit a64ba70dbb7e4886d7bae0b85a2a1070e22dd8fb
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 25 12:27:05 2015 +0100

    Add help text for some verify options
    
    Fills in the help text for a number of options to verify that were blank.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit 79a55b1f2796bf6471360e8b6ab131cdedca256e
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 25 12:34:38 2015 +0100

    Add documentation for some missing verify options
    
    Fills in a couple of verify options that were lacking documentation.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit aae41f8c54257d9fa6904d3a9aa09c5db6cefd0d
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 25 09:47:15 2015 +0100

    Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised
    
    The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
    beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
    of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
    call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
    X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
    |ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase  where
    |ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
    X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
    non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
    1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
    in between.
    2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
    the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
    
    With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
    not be supported to allow this.
    
    With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
    crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
    X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
    to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
    
    Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
    likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
    changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
    |ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
    have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
    documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 593e9c638c58e1a510c519db0d024527113330f3
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 2 00:15:56 2015 +0100

    Add test for CVE-2015-1793
    
    This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
    verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
    verification tests.
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 2aacec8f4a5ba1b365620a7b17fcce311ada93ad
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jun 24 15:55:36 2015 +0100

    Fix alternate chains certificate forgery issue
    
    During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
    alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
    fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
    attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
    bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
    certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
    
    This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
    trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
    ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.
    
    Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.
    
    CVE-2015-1793
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                           |  24 ++++-
 NEWS                              |  10 +-
 apps/verify.c                     |  28 +++--
 crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c            |  29 ++++--
 doc/apps/verify.pod               |  20 +++-
 doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod |  22 +++-
 doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod   |   3 +-
 include/openssl/x509_vfy.h        |   1 +
 test/Makefile                     |  31 +++++-
 test/certs/bad.key                |  27 +++++
 test/certs/bad.pem                |  21 ++++
 test/certs/interCA.key            |  27 +++++
 test/certs/interCA.pem            |  21 ++++
 test/certs/leaf.key               |  27 +++++
 test/certs/leaf.pem               |  21 ++++
 test/certs/rootCA.key             |  27 +++++
 test/certs/rootCA.pem             |  21 ++++
 test/certs/roots.pem              |  42 ++++++++
 test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem      |  21 ++++
 test/certs/subinterCA.key         |  27 +++++
 test/certs/subinterCA.pem         |  21 ++++
 test/certs/untrusted.pem          |  42 ++++++++
 test/verify_extra_test.c          | 208 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 util/libeay.num                   |   1 +
 24 files changed, 692 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/certs/bad.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/bad.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/interCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/interCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/leaf.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/leaf.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/rootCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/rootCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/roots.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/untrusted.pem
 create mode 100644 test/verify_extra_test.c

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 057909e..4f0749d 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -434,7 +434,29 @@
      whose return value is often ignored. 
      [Steve Henson]
 
- Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+  *) Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+     During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+     alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+     fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+     attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+     bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+     certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+     (Google/BoringSSL).
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
+
+  *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
+     incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
+     restored.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
 
   *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
 
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index beb2dd3..e51526e 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,7 +5,15 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [under development]
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [under development]
+
+      o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
+
+      o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
 
       o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
       o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
index 227b85b..a823d58 100644
--- a/apps/verify.c
+++ b/apps/verify.c
@@ -83,14 +83,18 @@ OPTIONS verify_options[] = {
     {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] cert.pem...\n"},
     {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"},
     {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
-    {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-'},
-    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/'},
-    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<'},
-    {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<'},
-    {"trusted", OPT_TRUSTED, '<'},
-    {"CRLfile", OPT_CRLFILE, '<'},
-    {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-'},
-    {"show_chain", OPT_SHOW_CHAIN, '-'},
+    {"verbose", OPT_VERBOSE, '-',
+        "Print extra information about the operations being performed."},
+    {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "A directory of trusted certificates"},
+    {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"},
+    {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<', "A file of untrusted certificates"},
+    {"trusted", OPT_TRUSTED, '<', "A file of additional trusted certificates"},
+    {"CRLfile", OPT_CRLFILE, '<',
+        "File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load"},
+    {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-',
+        "Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate"},
+    {"show_chain", OPT_SHOW_CHAIN, '-',
+        "Display information about the certificate chain"},
     OPT_V_OPTIONS,
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
     {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"},
@@ -240,6 +244,7 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file,
     int i = 0, ret = 0;
     X509_STORE_CTX *csc;
     STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+    int num_untrusted;
 
     x = load_cert(file, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, e, "certificate file");
     if (x == NULL)
@@ -261,8 +266,10 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file,
     if (crls)
         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);
     i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
-    if (i > 0 && show_chain)
+    if (i > 0 && show_chain) {
         chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(csc);
+        num_untrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(csc);
+    }
     X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
 
     ret = 0;
@@ -280,6 +287,9 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file,
             X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout,
                                   X509_get_subject_name(cert),
                                   0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+            if (i < num_untrusted) {
+                printf(" (untrusted)");
+            }
             printf("\n");
         }
         sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index a920ea7..df012dd 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -193,6 +193,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
         return -1;
     }
+    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+         * cannot do another one.
+         */
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return -1;
+    }
 
     cb = ctx->verify_cb;
 
@@ -200,15 +208,13 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
      * the first entry is in place
      */
-    if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
-        if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
-            (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
-            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto end;
-        }
-        CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-        ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+    if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+        (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto end;
     }
+    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+    ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
 
     /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
     if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
@@ -392,8 +398,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                         xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                         X509_free(xtmp);
                         num--;
-                        ctx->last_untrusted--;
                     }
+                    ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
                     retry = 1;
                     break;
                 }
@@ -2446,6 +2452,11 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     return ctx->explicit_policy;
 }
 
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->last_untrusted;
+}
+
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
 {
     const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
diff --git a/doc/apps/verify.pod b/doc/apps/verify.pod
index 9407fae..9cc7fcb 100644
--- a/doc/apps/verify.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/verify.pod
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
 [B<-attime timestamp>]
 [B<-check_ss_sig>]
 [B<-CRLfile file>]
+[B<-crl_download>]
 [B<-crl_check>]
 [B<-crl_check_all>]
 [B<-explicit_policy>]
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
 [B<-trusted_first>]
 [B<-no_alt_chains>]
 [B<-untrusted file>]
+[B<-trusted file>]
 [B<-use_deltas>]
 [B<-verbose>]
 [B<-verify_depth num>]
@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
 [B<-verify_ip ip>]
 [B<-verify_name name>]
 [B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-show_chain>]
 [B<->]
 [certificates]
 
@@ -80,6 +83,10 @@ because it doesn't add any security.
 
 File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load.
 
+=item B<-crl_download>
+
+Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate.
+
 =item B<-crl_check>
 
 Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
@@ -178,6 +185,11 @@ behaviour to match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0.
 A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
 in PEM format concatenated together.
 
+=item B<-trusted file>
+
+A file of additional trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple
+certificates in PEM format concatenated together.
+
 =item B<-use_deltas>
 
 Enable support for delta CRLs.
@@ -216,6 +228,12 @@ Supported usages include: default, pkcs7, smime_sign, ssl_client, ssl_server.
 For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
 certificates.
 
+=item B<-show_chain>
+
+Display information about the certificate chain that has been built (if
+successful). Certificates in the chain that came from the untrusted list will be
+flagged as "untrusted".
+
 =item B<->
 
 Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
@@ -480,6 +498,6 @@ L<x509(1)|x509(1)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 
-The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+The -show_chain option was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
 
 =cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
index d8d3346..f8907d7 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_new, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, X509_STORE_CTX_free, X509_STORE_CTX_
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
  int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name);
 
+ int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
 These functions initialise an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure for subsequent use
@@ -40,10 +42,15 @@ is no longer valid.
 If B<ctx> is NULL nothing is done.
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
-The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end entity certificate
-to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional certificates (which
-will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B<chain>. Any or
-all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be B<NULL>.
+It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
+good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
+certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_XTORE_CTX_cleanup()
+and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
+X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
+entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
+certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
+B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
+B<NULL>.
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx>
 to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates 
@@ -71,6 +78,9 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() looks up and sets the default verification
 method to B<name>. This uses the function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() to
 find an appropriate set of parameters from B<name>.
 
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates
+that were used in building the chain following a call to X509_verify_cert().
+
 =head1 NOTES
 
 The certificates and CRLs in a store are used internally and should B<not>
@@ -111,6 +121,9 @@ values.
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.
 
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates
+used.
+
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<X509_verify_cert(3)|X509_verify_cert(3)>
@@ -119,5 +132,6 @@ L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)|X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
 =head1 HISTORY
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() was first added to OpenSSL 1.0.0
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
 
 =cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
index e5cfc6f..48055b0 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and
 SSL/TLS code.
 
 The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no
-certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error) or if a retry
+certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error); if X509_verify_cert()
+twice without reinitialising B<ctx> in between; or if a retry
 operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with
 standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check
 for <= 0 return value on error.
diff --git a/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h b/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
index 4ad2029..8e0a225 100644
--- a/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
@@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 
 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 
 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
diff --git a/test/Makefile b/test/Makefile
index 508c53b..d9aa750 100644
--- a/test/Makefile
+++ b/test/Makefile
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ SRPTEST=	srptest
 V3NAMETEST=	v3nametest
 HEARTBEATTEST=  heartbeat_test
 CONSTTIMETEST=  constant_time_test
+VERIFYEXTRATEST=	verify_extra_test
 
 TESTS=		alltests
 
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ EXE=	$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)  $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)
 	$(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SECMEMTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(P5_CRPT2_TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
-	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
 # $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ OBJ=	$(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o  $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
 	$(BFTEST).o  $(SSLTEST).o  $(DSATEST).o  $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
 	$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
 	$(GOST2814789TEST).o $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(P5_CRPT2_TEST).o \
-	$(CONSTTIMETEST).o testutil.o
+	$(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o testutil.o
 
 SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(MD2TEST).c  $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(BFTEST).c  $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c   $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
 	$(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(V3NAMETEST).c \
 	$(GOST2814789TEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(P5_CRPT2_TEST).c \
-	$(CONSTTIMETEST).c testutil.c
+	$(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c testutil.c
 
 HEADER=	testutil.h
 
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ alltests: \
 	test_ige test_jpake test_secmem \
 	test_srp test_cms test_v3name test_ocsp \
 	test_gost2814789 test_heartbeat test_p5_crpt2 \
-	test_constant_time
+	test_constant_time test_verify_extra
 
 test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt
 	@echo $(START) $@
@@ -399,6 +400,10 @@ test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 	@echo $(START) $@
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CONSTTIMETEST)
 
+test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	@echo $(START) $@
+	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
+
 update: local_depend
 	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
 
@@ -586,6 +591,9 @@ $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) testutil.o
 $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
 	@target=$(CONSTTIMETEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
 
+$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
+	@target=$(VERIFYEXTRATEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
 #$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
 #	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
 
@@ -881,6 +889,21 @@ v3nametest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
 v3nametest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 v3nametest.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h
 v3nametest.o: v3nametest.c
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+verify_extra_test.o: verify_extra_test.c
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
diff --git a/test/certs/bad.key b/test/certs/bad.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4708495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/bad.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/bad.pem b/test/certs/bad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8769231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/bad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/interCA.key b/test/certs/interCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c32fe26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/interCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/interCA.pem b/test/certs/interCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35568ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/interCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/leaf.key b/test/certs/leaf.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1b1721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/leaf.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/leaf.pem b/test/certs/leaf.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb94d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/leaf.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/rootCA.key b/test/certs/rootCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..527f3ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/rootCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/rootCA.pem b/test/certs/rootCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef73d00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/rootCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/roots.pem b/test/certs/roots.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bc6912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/roots.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem b/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a436b4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA.key b/test/certs/subinterCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c867af9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA.pem b/test/certs/subinterCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdf480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/untrusted.pem b/test/certs/untrusted.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d93d312
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/untrusted.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/verify_extra_test.c b/test/verify_extra_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08509f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/verify_extra_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+    BIO *bio;
+    X509 *x;
+
+    bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
+
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (certs == NULL) {
+        BIO_free(bio);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ERR_set_mark();
+    do {
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+        if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
+            sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+            BIO_free(bio);
+            return NULL;
+        } else if (x == NULL) {
+            /*
+             * We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors
+             * generated
+             */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
+    } while (x != NULL);
+
+    BIO_free(bio);
+
+    return certs;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery)
+ *
+ * Chain is as follows:
+ *
+ * rootCA (self-signed)
+ *   |
+ * interCA
+ *   |
+ * subinterCA       subinterCA (self-signed)
+ *   |                   |
+ * leaf ------------------
+ *   |
+ * bad
+ *
+ * rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE
+ * leaf and bad have CA=FALSE
+ *
+ * subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys
+ *
+ * interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store
+ * (roots.pem)
+ * leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem)
+ * bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem)
+ *
+ * Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has
+ * CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad
+ *
+ */
+static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int i;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+
+    store = X509_STORE_new();
+    if (store == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+    if (lookup == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if(!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, "certs/roots.pem", X509_FILETYPE_PEM))
+        goto err;
+
+    untrusted = load_certs_from_file("certs/untrusted.pem");
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file("certs/bad.pem", "r")) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (sctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
+        goto err;
+
+    i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
+
+    if(i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) {
+        /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
+    X509_free(x);
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    if (ret != 1)
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+    OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+
+    if (!test_alt_chains_cert_forgery()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test alt chains cert forgery failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    EVP_cleanup();
+    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+    ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+    ERR_free_strings();
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/util/libeay.num b/util/libeay.num
index 9933499..4d3642f 100755
--- a/util/libeay.num
+++ b/util/libeay.num
@@ -4587,3 +4587,4 @@ CRYPTO_secure_free                      4945	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 BIO_s_secmem                            4946	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 CRYPTO_get_secure_mem_ex_functions      4947	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 CRYPTO_set_secure_mem_functions         4948	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted        4949	EXIST::FUNCTION:

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 13:01:29 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 13:01:29 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436446889.728446.32018.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  a7ef1e907276a899fbfeee642810caccb03fc07c (commit)
       via  33dd08320648ac71d7d9d732be774ed3818dccc5 (commit)
       via  5627e0f77d333b3d6d2f87b0cc616a062cf54aeb (commit)
       via  9dee5244e1d879ee94b203e618202be91936ff71 (commit)
       via  692f07c3e0c04180b56febc2feb57cd94395a7a2 (commit)
       via  f404943bcab4898d18f3ac1b36479d1d7bbbb9e6 (commit)
       via  21376d8ae310cf0455ca2b73c8e9f77cafeb28dd (commit)
      from  c0b674b7cbd9146982850523293c74b9131b26d5 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a7ef1e907276a899fbfeee642810caccb03fc07c
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 13:18:51 2015 +0100

    Prepare for 1.0.2e-dev
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 33dd08320648ac71d7d9d732be774ed3818dccc5
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 13:03:09 2015 +0100

    Prepare for 1.0.2d release
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 5627e0f77d333b3d6d2f87b0cc616a062cf54aeb
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 2 15:38:32 2015 +0100

    Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 9dee5244e1d879ee94b203e618202be91936ff71
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 25 12:34:38 2015 +0100

    Add documentation for some missing verify options
    
    Fills in a couple of verify options that were lacking documentation.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 79a55b1f2796bf6471360e8b6ab131cdedca256e)
    
    Conflicts:
    	doc/apps/verify.pod

commit 692f07c3e0c04180b56febc2feb57cd94395a7a2
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 25 09:47:15 2015 +0100

    Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised
    
    The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
    beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
    of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
    call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
    X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
    |ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase  where
    |ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
    X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
    non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
    1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
    in between.
    2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
    the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
    
    With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
    not be supported to allow this.
    
    With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
    crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
    X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
    to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
    
    Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
    likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
    changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
    |ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
    have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
    documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit f404943bcab4898d18f3ac1b36479d1d7bbbb9e6
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 2 00:15:56 2015 +0100

    Add test for CVE-2015-1793
    
    This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
    verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
    verification tests.
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 21376d8ae310cf0455ca2b73c8e9f77cafeb28dd
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jun 24 15:55:36 2015 +0100

    Fix alternate chains certificate forgery issue
    
    During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
    alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
    fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
    attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
    bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
    certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
    
    This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
    trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
    ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.
    
    Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.
    
    CVE-2015-1793
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                           |  17 +++-
 NEWS                              |   6 +-
 README                            |   2 +-
 crypto/opensslv.h                 |   6 +-
 crypto/x509/Makefile              |   2 +-
 crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c   | 208 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c            |  24 +++--
 doc/apps/verify.pod               |  11 ++
 doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod |  13 ++-
 doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod   |   3 +-
 openssl.spec                      |   2 +-
 test/Makefile                     |  31 +++++-
 test/certs/bad.key                |  27 +++++
 test/certs/bad.pem                |  21 ++++
 test/certs/interCA.key            |  27 +++++
 test/certs/interCA.pem            |  21 ++++
 test/certs/leaf.key               |  27 +++++
 test/certs/leaf.pem               |  21 ++++
 test/certs/rootCA.key             |  27 +++++
 test/certs/rootCA.pem             |  21 ++++
 test/certs/roots.pem              |  42 ++++++++
 test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem      |  21 ++++
 test/certs/subinterCA.key         |  27 +++++
 test/certs/subinterCA.pem         |  21 ++++
 test/certs/untrusted.pem          |  42 ++++++++
 25 files changed, 644 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
 create mode 100644 test/certs/bad.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/bad.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/interCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/interCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/leaf.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/leaf.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/rootCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/rootCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/roots.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/untrusted.pem

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 5aff3e1..11ef03e 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,10 +2,25 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [xx XXX xxxx]
 
   *)
 
+ Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
+
+  *) Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+     During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+     alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+     fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+     attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+     bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+     certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+     (Google/BoringSSL).
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
  Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
 
   *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index f87f926..cb5674b 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,10 +5,14 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [under development]
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [under development]
 
       o
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
+
+      o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
 
       o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
diff --git a/README b/README
index 5f76493..ae17fb4 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.2d-dev
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2e-dev
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index b33edf3..faaf63f 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x10002040L
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x10002050L
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2d-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2e-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2d-dev xx XXX xxxx"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2e-dev xx XXX xxxx"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/crypto/x509/Makefile b/crypto/x509/Makefile
index 01aa3bf..bf197a1 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/x509/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ AR=		ar r
 CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
 
 GENERAL=Makefile README
-TEST=
+TEST=verify_extra_test.c
 APPS=
 
 LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
diff --git a/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c b/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08509f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+    BIO *bio;
+    X509 *x;
+
+    bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
+
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (certs == NULL) {
+        BIO_free(bio);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ERR_set_mark();
+    do {
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+        if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
+            sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+            BIO_free(bio);
+            return NULL;
+        } else if (x == NULL) {
+            /*
+             * We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors
+             * generated
+             */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
+    } while (x != NULL);
+
+    BIO_free(bio);
+
+    return certs;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery)
+ *
+ * Chain is as follows:
+ *
+ * rootCA (self-signed)
+ *   |
+ * interCA
+ *   |
+ * subinterCA       subinterCA (self-signed)
+ *   |                   |
+ * leaf ------------------
+ *   |
+ * bad
+ *
+ * rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE
+ * leaf and bad have CA=FALSE
+ *
+ * subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys
+ *
+ * interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store
+ * (roots.pem)
+ * leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem)
+ * bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem)
+ *
+ * Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has
+ * CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad
+ *
+ */
+static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int i;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+
+    store = X509_STORE_new();
+    if (store == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+    if (lookup == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if(!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, "certs/roots.pem", X509_FILETYPE_PEM))
+        goto err;
+
+    untrusted = load_certs_from_file("certs/untrusted.pem");
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file("certs/bad.pem", "r")) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (sctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
+        goto err;
+
+    i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
+
+    if(i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) {
+        /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
+    X509_free(x);
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    if (ret != 1)
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+    OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+
+    if (!test_alt_chains_cert_forgery()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test alt chains cert forgery failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    EVP_cleanup();
+    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+    ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+    ERR_free_strings();
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 8ce41f9..a2f1dbe 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -198,6 +198,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
         return -1;
     }
+    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+         * cannot do another one.
+         */
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return -1;
+    }
 
     cb = ctx->verify_cb;
 
@@ -205,15 +213,13 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
      * the first entry is in place
      */
-    if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
-        if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
-            (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
-            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto end;
-        }
-        CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-        ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+    if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+        (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto end;
     }
+    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+    ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
 
     /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
     if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
@@ -389,8 +395,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                         xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                         X509_free(xtmp);
                         num--;
-                        ctx->last_untrusted--;
                     }
+                    ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
                     retry = 1;
                     break;
                 }
diff --git a/doc/apps/verify.pod b/doc/apps/verify.pod
index df1b86d..bffa6c0 100644
--- a/doc/apps/verify.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/verify.pod
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
 [B<-attime timestamp>]
 [B<-check_ss_sig>]
 [B<-crlfile file>]
+[B<-crl_download>]
 [B<-crl_check>]
 [B<-crl_check_all>]
 [B<-policy_check>]
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
 [B<-untrusted file>]
 [B<-help>]
 [B<-issuer_checks>]
+[B<-trusted file>]
 [B<-verbose>]
 [B<->]
 [certificates]
@@ -69,6 +71,10 @@ because it doesn't add any security.
 
 File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load.
 
+=item B<-crl_download>
+
+Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate.
+
 =item B<-crl_check>
 
 Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
@@ -133,6 +139,11 @@ be found that is trusted. With this option that behaviour is suppressed so that
 only the first chain found is ever used. Using this option will force the
 behaviour to match that of previous OpenSSL versions.
 
+=item B<-trusted file>
+
+A file of additional trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple
+certificates in PEM format concatenated together.
+
 =item B<-policy_print>
 
 Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
index b17888f..eb38b0a 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
@@ -39,10 +39,15 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B<ctx>. After this call B<ctx>
 is no longer valid.
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
-The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end entity certificate
-to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional certificates (which
-will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B<chain>. Any or
-all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be B<NULL>.
+It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
+good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
+certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_XTORE_CTX_cleanup()
+and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
+X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
+entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
+certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
+B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
+B<NULL>.
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx>
 to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates 
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
index 5253bdc..a22e441 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and
 SSL/TLS code.
 
 The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no
-certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error) or if a retry
+certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error); if X509_verify_cert()
+twice without reinitialising B<ctx> in between; or if a retry
 operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with
 standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check
 for <= 0 return value on error.
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index b721d65..45e737a 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Release: 1
 
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2d
+Version: 1.0.2e
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/test/Makefile b/test/Makefile
index a570fad..e695073 100644
--- a/test/Makefile
+++ b/test/Makefile
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ V3NAMETEST=	v3nametest
 ASN1TEST=	asn1test
 HEARTBEATTEST=  heartbeat_test
 CONSTTIMETEST=  constant_time_test
+VERIFYEXTRATEST=	verify_extra_test
 
 TESTS=		alltests
 
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ EXE=	$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)  $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)
 	$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
-	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
 # $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ OBJ=	$(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o  $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
 	$(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
 	$(BFTEST).o  $(SSLTEST).o  $(DSATEST).o  $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
 	$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
-	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
+	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
 
 SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(MD2TEST).c  $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
 	$(BFTEST).c  $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c   $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
 	$(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
-	$(V3NAMETEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c
+	$(V3NAMETEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c
 
 EXHEADER= 
 HEADER=	testutil.h $(EXHEADER)
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ alltests: \
 	test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \
 	test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
 	test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_ocsp test_v3name test_heartbeat \
-	test_constant_time
+	test_constant_time test_verify_extra
 
 test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
@@ -348,6 +349,10 @@ test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 	@echo "Test constant time utilites"
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CONSTTIMETEST)
 
+test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	@echo $(START) $@
+	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
+
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
@@ -519,6 +524,9 @@ $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
 $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
 	@target=$(CONSTTIMETEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
 
+$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
+	@target=$(VERIFYEXTRATEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
 #$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
 #	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
 
@@ -822,6 +830,21 @@ v3nametest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
 v3nametest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 v3nametest.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h
 v3nametest.o: v3nametest.c
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+verify_extra_test.o: verify_extra_test.c
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
diff --git a/test/certs/bad.key b/test/certs/bad.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4708495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/bad.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEogIBAAKCAQEAwTqNko5vQiQ5BQohPJ3sySrjT6JedjsKtt1OZ8ndR2C1asUi
+HgpVO8QDHKID88Qklx6UCieeKAwIY0VzqWzTyZWTwdqTU9t8arHHJu7IcFlmWsAL
+fwTmARWJmpY+K8fGnQx1Kxfi6nQJ8Whq4bcAqJ2HXzG69Wjs3Ki70ScNbQ9RUwXJ
+n/FeNrsphKAv5K22zBqjWAQdYMg6vtKZAXCET8jw6OkPVnUb/QvyoBEijWt0+HBh
+7wLkSUvMj/7fc88+xtvGqZPyG2Py4DdWW1stpgiZ3TTohEk84t1u5L3qQaRQmVE6
+y5RMImyVY8hegC4zc6aGZDFRv8MR+gk6prcuUwIDAQABAoIBAEkz4YZwJ34rMt7R
+452PRrE/ajY1EQxBeeGlHZr8QrRT0ubMIAy5ZWjq7TLfvhePaz1E/FiMgcIyLMtO
++G5rKCDqZbu/DqlqMUxKZWQ+efj2JWyj7LcGKAypGCRUXuE/IeNFYO4ecnzX0Rx/
+rl4scjdu1mYd9PIb+f/ufJjT7qYtykmwlb0MbEJ25yjTC4iHzacvFLJgdXrPp8b9
+ZGlVBKyuk9ZrZDC8/a4QrKt7Hp2SqqO4WqaTgM1G+cQFYuVBmj74bQhJHMmQ+Opr
+5KXwBKEHMtJkq1GPVZ34W90V82d+8MJAxymuPomwRXKl1dKgnvny+0eobXkiBDcF
+XCBCmIECgYEA8c/fE7Sa1vLZriw0Meq+TxU5hru4YM6OmQ+idc6diCp2U9lW+KJr
+YrIRTZFcmhEGmRjAEZrdK0oFY7h5RhsZ+gTftmNZuL8WJCK9+y2DE9dB++md3oVC
+PK0d4SmQKsivOTTeiK/VYFGoLc8t8Ud/anu2Q1kFdC+7cH/TrRseV4MCgYEAzJDw
+MTil055rYlrAAH8ePEuONomu2MoZRRCX/tWuVvz+eIzA35mryW3OR45l5qNluQoZ
+AdpVE68kBak2wIrF2oyWcF1s8VzSbAJCoqK42lKiSGVDVnr6jb69WUujCkYUZIwR
+Q20QYBUUQu0JiFBU22tRgILIAK+rRah37EP4RPECgYBN3hKH1fDGpw1R+QoVyPHf
+pYYQzQJiqiFhSJeYOCCiaIoSFjrbdfH+pjjMMbMQKctmIYI4KRZvijaSFiV3XeLP
+kCI6KWQLCf2nRUjISa+cBAVLib88mMzrnROyHiA+psFGOrAuc/DSQ3lUxxKUT+HH
++G6I4XHQKE7Du2X+qGzs4QKBgBZyJNjRxWhF7rR5Dq4/RHsLM0yKqPPCoSkx2+ur
+WJjU47sofpVKUE4mzUaOumGnNicqk3nfkgw54HL6kTZpQ7JqUKt9pNGLBM+zI8qi
+njPec04MRmo7zjg1YKNmqDodXGl38QD7+5r/VRzO04fwgI8e5G98aiOhIuLezGHR
+R3GRAoGAAyhwtKoC87fSGrpyZQ16UAYuqNy0fVAQtrDgRgP5Nu4esr9QxS/hWjcR
+8s2P82wsR4gZna6l6vSz4awGVG4PGKnVjteAtZxok3nBHxPmRke5o7IpdObPjpQP
+RJNZYbJ9G/PbYDhciEoTjVyig6Ol5BRe9stSbO7+JIxEYr7VSpA=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/bad.pem b/test/certs/bad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8769231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/bad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/interCA.key b/test/certs/interCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c32fe26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/interCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/interCA.pem b/test/certs/interCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35568ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/interCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/leaf.key b/test/certs/leaf.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1b1721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/leaf.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/leaf.pem b/test/certs/leaf.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb94d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/leaf.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/rootCA.key b/test/certs/rootCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..527f3ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/rootCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwPFrd4isNd/7c1MvkoAvdBYyTfUQIG9sOo7R3GvhLj7DBA+/
+m8TJEtHkC0WX5QbNZjrh4OIr36LE7HvTPTyK/150oKunA2oWW16SxH5beYpp1LyD
+Xq5CknSlK+cAwanc1bFTBw9z946tFD4lnuUe5syRzZUMgEQgw/0Xz5E9YxAcFFv7
+w6jBiLJ3/5zb/GpERET3hewILNTfgaN5yf4em5MWU7eXq75PGqXi+kYF5A2cKqTM
+uR4hoGzEq1mwQDm7+Yit/d+NtAuvfkHgITzIM0VJhC+TBu79T+1P87yb3vwlXlXV
+ddTFezpANQafxIS0bJMMrzdar7ZBTSYjHLgCswIDAQABAoIBAC1EdwJEfqLlOgmE
+qtSkXn3N919y76Wsfqf+eh5M8Tf4YajCSSIyuTpBJE/AtDJ3thkWF4i7h6+gcLNL
+GfR0D+h6MMLBgx259iTZu3V+b9fEMbBHykqcd+IEm/wA5pyJTdaVE/XEGmEqiFEH
+g6wT9XwQ4uRo49X0JfvVlZCNcumapYfPY+BwPQloydm/cLtgUtc1RKUCG7i27aHM
+VaUm+NdYZIwwCQs0Aof/h7PkEWvHq0idaxY9qkLbbZHb1Np/IkmvqCo/PSS1whDj
+/KIQGJDBGuXX/V+cZ+DYkCXAq1fCto9MjarEVmlLW5Hr5QojdbpvwsxSmrGfCqdH
+bfc/9gECgYEA6y6EcYBuvCibmO4G2OA1sNSe5lJF911xUHuUl3CRORdeVFDi9Ch+
+LKzE+XEOlvA+qFSIA/KztevX3dvmvvBMwu0PUWDtBKJZ1mXt4Mgo63MHpYnKIzWz
+YuDaMKpvbl3iTFJlKPUkPlv+/uDccd0QYYvk4gbBrWVQDghV3ya9LqMCgYEA0gW6
+Cu5yRWodehCh0z8VtFfOGDkhZEav6B5mZvyDCk5f+zVeRlsTJwY4BsgnoMUJ+SjQ
+iQwQX3FbWrwcyYPOIA+ja6Hisgb9p/f+hxsQOOhN9nFsk2MNIHkwrMRcE8pj7pc1
+uBoYqpdX8blEs8wkJI+bTI3/SIZw6vjbogSqbLECgYEAhXuQho9byoXN0p3+2ude
+8e+sBJPbzEuH/iM2MkIc2ueNjZOfTO8Sti6VWfK2UisnlQjtbjg5kd67Vdvy+pqP
+Ju/ACvNVc5TmIo8V1cglmYVfaLBtP1DCcTOoA4ko196Hi8QUUIvat14lu+pKlIHh
+Q0xQa41kLhNbvaszegWVyLsCgYEAxhuGySbw/U9CbNDhhL1eANZOXoUNXWRcK6z5
+VS3dgcw6N2C5A86G+2mfUa5dywXyCWgZhRyvGQh5btZApUlCFvYJZc63Ysy7WkTQ
+f6rkm3ltiQimrURirn4CjwVOAZEIwJc7oeRj3g6Scz4acysd8KrRh93trwC55LtH
+mcWi6JECgYAlqCQvaAnvaWpR0RX7m/UMpqWOVgIperGR7hrN3d04RaWG4yv1+66T
+xANNBA8aDxhFwXjAKev4iOE/rp8SEjYXh3lbKmx+p9dk8REUdIFqoClX9tqctW9g
+AkDF34S0mSE4T34zhs2+InfohJa6ojsuiNJSQMBPBxfr6wV2C+UWMQ==
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/rootCA.pem b/test/certs/rootCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef73d00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/rootCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/roots.pem b/test/certs/roots.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bc6912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/roots.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem b/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a436b4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA.key b/test/certs/subinterCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c867af9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA.pem b/test/certs/subinterCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdf480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/untrusted.pem b/test/certs/untrusted.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d93d312
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/untrusted.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 13:01:46 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 13:01:46 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436446906.119933.1171.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  7c17c20a56a76c219dcf35d4956026f021cdee52 (commit)
       via  5ab53da9fbc96b9740a48b318aab845d6616eee4 (commit)
       via  245daa2b733d66233450bab6880cd0afcddb61de (commit)
       via  cb22d2ae5a5b6069dbf66dbcce07223ac15a16de (commit)
       via  b3b1eb5735c5b3d566a9fc3bf745bf716a29afa0 (commit)
       via  d42d1004332f40c1098946b0804791fd3da3e378 (commit)
       via  9a0db453ba017ebcaccbee933ee6511a9ae4d1c8 (commit)
      from  cb6e0ed17a61ae3711d385f517d61be2b4c33a55 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 7c17c20a56a76c219dcf35d4956026f021cdee52
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 13:29:59 2015 +0100

    Prepare for 1.0.1q-dev
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 5ab53da9fbc96b9740a48b318aab845d6616eee4
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 13:22:23 2015 +0100

    Prepare for 1.0.1p release
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit 245daa2b733d66233450bab6880cd0afcddb61de
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 2 15:38:32 2015 +0100

    Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit cb22d2ae5a5b6069dbf66dbcce07223ac15a16de
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jun 24 00:12:38 2015 +0100

    Fix alt chains bug
    
    This is a follow up to the alternate chains certificate forgery issue
    (CVE-2015-1793). That issue is exacerbated in 1.0.1 by a related bug which
    means that we *always* check for an alternative chain, even if we have
    already found a chain. The code is supposed to stop as soon as it has found
    one (and does do in master and 1.0.2).
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit b3b1eb5735c5b3d566a9fc3bf745bf716a29afa0
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 25 09:47:15 2015 +0100

    Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised
    
    The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
    beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
    of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
    call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
    X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
    |ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase  where
    |ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
    X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
    non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
    1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
    in between.
    2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
    the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
    
    With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
    not be supported to allow this.
    
    With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
    crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
    X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
    to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
    
    Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
    likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
    changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
    |ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
    have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
    documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

commit d42d1004332f40c1098946b0804791fd3da3e378
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 2 00:15:56 2015 +0100

    Add test for CVE-2015-1793
    
    This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
    verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
    verification tests.
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
    
    Conflicts:
    	test/Makefile

commit 9a0db453ba017ebcaccbee933ee6511a9ae4d1c8
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jun 24 15:55:36 2015 +0100

    Fix alternate chains certificate forgery issue
    
    During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
    alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
    fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
    attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
    bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
    certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
    
    This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
    trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
    ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.
    
    Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.
    
    CVE-2015-1793
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                           |  17 +++-
 NEWS                              |   6 +-
 README                            |   2 +-
 crypto/opensslv.h                 |   6 +-
 crypto/x509/Makefile              |   2 +-
 crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c   | 209 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c            |  26 +++--
 doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod |  13 ++-
 doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod   |   3 +-
 openssl.spec                      |   2 +-
 test/Makefile                     |  31 +++++-
 test/certs/bad.key                |  27 +++++
 test/certs/bad.pem                |  21 ++++
 test/certs/interCA.key            |  27 +++++
 test/certs/interCA.pem            |  21 ++++
 test/certs/leaf.key               |  27 +++++
 test/certs/leaf.pem               |  21 ++++
 test/certs/rootCA.key             |  27 +++++
 test/certs/rootCA.pem             |  21 ++++
 test/certs/roots.pem              |  42 ++++++++
 test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem      |  21 ++++
 test/certs/subinterCA.key         |  27 +++++
 test/certs/subinterCA.pem         |  21 ++++
 test/certs/untrusted.pem          |  42 ++++++++
 24 files changed, 635 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
 create mode 100644 test/certs/bad.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/bad.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/interCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/interCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/leaf.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/leaf.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/rootCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/rootCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/roots.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA.key
 create mode 100644 test/certs/subinterCA.pem
 create mode 100644 test/certs/untrusted.pem

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index af27f3f..38ae89f 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,10 +2,25 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 1.0.1o and 1.0.1p [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.1p and 1.0.1q [xx XXX xxxx]
 
   *)
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1o and 1.0.1p [9 Jul 2015]
+
+  *) Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+     During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+     alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+     fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+     attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+     bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+     certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+     (Google/BoringSSL).
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
  Changes between 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
 
   *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 1d81d4c..ea0c716 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,10 +5,14 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1o and OpenSSL 1.0.1p [under development]
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1p and OpenSSL 1.0.1q [under development]
 
       o
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1o and OpenSSL 1.0.1p [9 Jul 2015]
+
+      o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1n and OpenSSL 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
 
       o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
diff --git a/README b/README
index 7b9ff6e..c3db93a 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1p-dev
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1q-dev
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index f86e324..78eef03 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x10001100L
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x10001110L
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.1p-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.1q-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.1p-dev xx XXX xxxx"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.1q-dev xx XXX xxxx"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/crypto/x509/Makefile b/crypto/x509/Makefile
index af3c255..aac3ece 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/x509/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ AR=		ar r
 CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
 
 GENERAL=Makefile README
-TEST=
+TEST=verify_extra_test.c
 APPS=
 
 LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
diff --git a/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c b/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1e41f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+    BIO *bio;
+    X509 *x;
+
+    bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
+
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (certs == NULL) {
+        BIO_free(bio);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ERR_set_mark();
+    do {
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
+        if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
+            sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+            BIO_free(bio);
+            return NULL;
+        } else if (x == NULL) {
+            /*
+             * We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors
+             * generated
+             */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
+    } while (x != NULL);
+
+    BIO_free(bio);
+
+    return certs;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery)
+ *
+ * Chain is as follows:
+ *
+ * rootCA (self-signed)
+ *   |
+ * interCA
+ *   |
+ * subinterCA       subinterCA (self-signed)
+ *   |                   |
+ * leaf ------------------
+ *   |
+ * bad
+ *
+ * rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE
+ * leaf and bad have CA=FALSE
+ *
+ * subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys
+ *
+ * interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store
+ * (roots.pem)
+ * leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem)
+ * bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem)
+ *
+ * Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has
+ * CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad
+ *
+ */
+static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    int i;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *store = NULL;
+    X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
+
+    store = X509_STORE_new();
+    if (store == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
+    if (lookup == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if(!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, "certs/roots.pem", X509_FILETYPE_PEM))
+        goto err;
+
+    untrusted = load_certs_from_file("certs/untrusted.pem");
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file("certs/bad.pem", "r")) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+    if (sctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
+        goto err;
+
+    i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
+
+    if(i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx)
+                 == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT) {
+        /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
+        ret = 1;
+    }
+ err:
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
+    X509_free(x);
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    if (ret != 1)
+        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+    CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+    OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+
+    if (!test_alt_chains_cert_forgery()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Test alt chains cert forgery failed\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    EVP_cleanup();
+    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+    ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+    ERR_free_strings();
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+
+    printf("PASS\n");
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 16db4c0..7009ae6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -162,6 +162,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
         return -1;
     }
+    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+         * cannot do another one.
+         */
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+        return -1;
+    }
 
     cb = ctx->verify_cb;
 
@@ -169,15 +177,13 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
      * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
      * the first entry is in place
      */
-    if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
-        if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
-            (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
-            X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto end;
-        }
-        CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-        ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+    if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+        (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto end;
     }
+    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+    ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
 
     /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
     if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
@@ -306,7 +312,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
          * if the user hasn't switched off alternate chain checking
          */
         retry = 0;
-        if (j == ctx->last_untrusted &&
+        if (num == ctx->last_untrusted &&
             !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
             while (j-- > 1) {
                 xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
@@ -328,8 +334,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                         xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                         X509_free(xtmp);
                         num--;
-                        ctx->last_untrusted--;
                     }
+                    ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
                     retry = 1;
                     break;
                 }
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
index b17888f..eb38b0a 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod
@@ -39,10 +39,15 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B<ctx>. After this call B<ctx>
 is no longer valid.
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
-The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end entity certificate
-to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional certificates (which
-will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B<chain>. Any or
-all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be B<NULL>.
+It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B<ctx> is only
+good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
+certificate with the same B<ctx> then you must call X509_XTORE_CTX_cleanup()
+and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
+X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B<store>, the end
+entity certificate to be verified is set to B<x509> and a set of additional
+certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
+B<chain>. Any or all of the B<store>, B<x509> and B<chain> parameters can be
+B<NULL>.
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B<ctx>
 to B<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates 
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
index 5253bdc..a22e441 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_verify_cert.pod
@@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ OpenSSL internally for certificate validation, in both the S/MIME and
 SSL/TLS code.
 
 The negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can only occur if no
-certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error) or if a retry
+certificate is set in B<ctx> (due to a programming error); if X509_verify_cert()
+twice without reinitialising B<ctx> in between; or if a retry
 operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens with
 standard lookup methods). It is however recommended that application check
 for <= 0 return value on error.
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index 67a6074..7ceb322 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
 #Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
-Version: 1.0.1p
+Version: 1.0.1q
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/test/Makefile b/test/Makefile
index 0ee4ec2..eca1400 100644
--- a/test/Makefile
+++ b/test/Makefile
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SRPTEST=	srptest
 ASN1TEST=	asn1test
 HEARTBEATTEST=  heartbeat_test
 CONSTTIMETEST=  constant_time_test
+VERIFYEXTRATEST=	verify_extra_test
 
 TESTS=		alltests
 
@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ EXE=	$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)  $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)
 	$(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
-	$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
 # $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ OBJ=	$(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o  $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
 	$(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
 	$(BFTEST).o  $(SSLTEST).o  $(DSATEST).o  $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
 	$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o \
-	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
+	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
 
 SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(MD2TEST).c  $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
 	$(BFTEST).c  $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c   $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
 	$(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
-	$(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c
+	$(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c
 
 EXHEADER= 
 HEADER=	$(EXHEADER)
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ alltests: \
 	test_enc test_x509 test_rsa test_crl test_sid \
 	test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \
 	test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
-	test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_heartbeat test_constant_time
+	test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_heartbeat test_constant_time test_verify_extra
 
 test_evp:
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
@@ -334,6 +335,10 @@ test_constant_time: $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 	@echo "Test constant time utilites"
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CONSTTIMETEST)
 
+test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	@echo $(START) $@
+	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
+
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
@@ -502,6 +507,9 @@ $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
 $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
 	@target=$(CONSTTIMETEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
 
+$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
+	@target=$(VERIFYEXTRATEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
 #$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
 #	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
 
@@ -792,6 +800,21 @@ ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
 ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
 ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
 ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssltest.c
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+verify_extra_test.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+verify_extra_test.o: verify_extra_test.c
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
 wp_test.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
diff --git a/test/certs/bad.key b/test/certs/bad.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4708495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/bad.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/bad.pem b/test/certs/bad.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8769231
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/bad.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/interCA.key b/test/certs/interCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c32fe26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/interCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/interCA.pem b/test/certs/interCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35568ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/interCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/leaf.key b/test/certs/leaf.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1b1721
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/leaf.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/leaf.pem b/test/certs/leaf.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb94d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/leaf.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/rootCA.key b/test/certs/rootCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..527f3ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/rootCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/rootCA.pem b/test/certs/rootCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef73d00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/rootCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/roots.pem b/test/certs/roots.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bc6912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/roots.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem b/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a436b4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA-ss.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA.key b/test/certs/subinterCA.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c867af9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA.key
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/subinterCA.pem b/test/certs/subinterCA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdf480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/subinterCA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/untrusted.pem b/test/certs/untrusted.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d93d312
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/untrusted.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 13:02:11 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 13:02:11 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2d create
Message-ID: <1436446931.169469.3868.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The annotated tag OpenSSL_1_0_2d has been created
        at  8d5882ee027abc7e271b20f8868bd76569814b6c (tag)
   tagging  33dd08320648ac71d7d9d732be774ed3818dccc5 (commit)
  replaces  OpenSSL_1_0_2c
 tagged by  Matt Caswell
        on  Thu Jul 9 13:03:09 2015 +0100

- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
OpenSSL 1.0.2d release tag

Dr. Stephen Henson (7):
      typo: should be OPENSSL_free
      Add docs for ssl verification parameter functions.
      Don't output bogus errors in PKCS12_parse
      Check for errors with SRP
      Fix PSK handling.
      document -2 return value
      Relax CCM tag check.

Matt Caswell (7):
      Prepare for 1.0.2d-dev
      Fix alternate chains certificate forgery issue
      Add test for CVE-2015-1793
      Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised
      Add documentation for some missing verify options
      Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
      Prepare for 1.0.2d release

Rich Salz (5):
      RT1688: Add dependencies for parallel make
      RT3917: add cleanup on an error path
      RT3907: avoid "local" in testssl script
      RT3907-fix
      RT3682: Avoid double-free on OCSP parse error

Richard Levitte (13):
      Remove one extraneous parenthesis
      Make preprocessor error into real preprocessor error
      Cleanup mttest.c : remove MS_CALLBACK
      Cleanup mttest.c : modernise the threads setup
      Cleanup mttest.c : modernise output
      Cleanup mttest.c : more output changes
      Cleanup mttest.c : make ssl_method a pointer to const
      Cleanup mttest.c : better error reporting when certs are missing
      Cleanup mttest.c : do not try to output reference counts when threads are done
      Add -ldl to the build of mttest.c
      Cleanup mttest.c : because we no longer use stdio here, don't include it
      Rearrange rsaz
      make update

Russell Webb (1):
      RT3856: Fix memory leaks in test code

Vitezslav Cizek (1):
      GH297: Fix NAME section of SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 13:02:11 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 13:02:11 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1p create
Message-ID: <1436446931.047586.3842.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The annotated tag OpenSSL_1_0_1p has been created
        at  1cc64152dce07a7310c19f0e0ed38359e0aadfb7 (tag)
   tagging  5ab53da9fbc96b9740a48b318aab845d6616eee4 (commit)
  replaces  OpenSSL_1_0_1o
 tagged by  Matt Caswell
        on  Thu Jul 9 13:22:23 2015 +0100

- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
OpenSSL 1.0.1p release tag

Dr. Stephen Henson (5):
      Don't output bogus errors in PKCS12_parse
      Check for errors with SRP
      Fix PSK handling.
      document -2 return value
      Relax CCM tag check.

Matt Caswell (7):
      Prepare for 1.0.1p-dev
      Fix alternate chains certificate forgery issue
      Add test for CVE-2015-1793
      Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised
      Fix alt chains bug
      Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
      Prepare for 1.0.1p release

Rich Salz (3):
      RT1688: Add dependencies for parallel make
      RT3907: avoid "local" in testssl script
      RT3907-fix

Richard Levitte (11):
      Remove one extraneous parenthesis
      Make preprocessor error into real preprocessor error
      Cleanup mttest.c : remove MS_CALLBACK
      Cleanup mttest.c : modernise the threads setup
      Cleanup mttest.c : modernise output
      Cleanup mttest.c : more output changes
      Cleanup mttest.c : make ssl_method a pointer to const
      Cleanup mttest.c : better error reporting when certs are missing
      Cleanup mttest.c : do not try to output reference counts when threads are done
      Add -ldl to the build of mttest.c
      Cleanup mttest.c : because we no longer use stdio here, don't include it

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

From levitte at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 13:47:06 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 13:47:06 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436449626.220789.15167.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  1fdfb3c1a661e4e041936ff156aa3cc55ee5d554 (commit)
      from  bc096d567c828f6b5e7ec89dbfbe3d20bb5874d8 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1fdfb3c1a661e4e041936ff156aa3cc55ee5d554
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 15:46:47 2015 +0200

    Add links to SHA256 checksum files

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 openssl.wml | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/openssl.wml b/openssl.wml
index 6369cb0..2adc21b 100644
--- a/openssl.wml
+++ b/openssl.wml
@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ foreach $l (@L) {
 	my $r = "<a href=\"$f\">$f</a>";
 	if (-f "$f.md5") { $r .= " (<a href=\"$f.md5\">MD5</a>)"; }
 	if (-f "$f.sha1") { $r .= " (<a href=\"$f.sha1\">SHA1</a>)"; }
+	if (-f "$f.sha256") { $r .= " (<a href=\"$f.sha256\">SHA256</a>)"; }
 	if (-f "$f.asc") { $r .= " (<a href=\"$f.asc\">PGP sign</a>)"; }
 	$l = $h.$r.$t;
     }

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 15:40:51 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 15:40:51 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436456451.310617.8122.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  851fdda1a1952e482fc3f5f1c7c3acdff132bbae (commit)
       via  88f4f91260653865a5cf668dac95156b37192352 (commit)
      from  040b93353e8b48cfc0e2429d96eb3a27f259512d (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 851fdda1a1952e482fc3f5f1c7c3acdff132bbae
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 12:45:22 2015 +0100

    make stacks
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit 88f4f91260653865a5cf668dac95156b37192352
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 12:44:46 2015 +0100

    Sort @sstacklst correctly.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 include/openssl/safestack.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 util/mkstack.pl             |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/openssl/safestack.h b/include/openssl/safestack.h
index 388f409..e138bfc 100644
--- a/include/openssl/safestack.h
+++ b/include/openssl/safestack.h
@@ -2068,31 +2068,6 @@ DECLARE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK, void)
 # define sk_void_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(void, (st))
 # define sk_void_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(void, (st))
 
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(cmp) ((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *)sk_new(CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC(char, cmp)))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null() ((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *)sk_new_null())
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(st, val) sk_push(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(st, val) sk_find(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(st, i) ((OPENSSL_STRING)sk_value(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), i))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(st) SKM_sk_num(OPENSSL_STRING, st)
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(st, free_func) sk_pop_free(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(char, free_func))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_deep_copy(st, copy_func, free_func) ((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *)sk_deep_copy(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_SK_COPY_FUNC(char, copy_func), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(char, free_func)))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_insert(st, val, i) sk_insert(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val), i)
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(st) SKM_sk_free(OPENSSL_STRING, st)
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_set(st, i, val) sk_set(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), i, CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STRING, (st))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_unshift(st, val) sk_unshift(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find_ex(st, val) sk_find_ex((_STACK *)CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING), st), CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF(char, val))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STRING, (st), (i))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_delete_ptr(st, ptr) (OPENSSL_STRING *)sk_delete_ptr(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, ptr))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_set_cmp_func(st, cmp)  \
-        ((int (*)(const char * const *,const char * const *)) \
-        sk_set_cmp_func(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC(char, cmp)))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(OPENSSL_STRING, st)
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STRING, (st))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop(st) (char *)sk_pop(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STRING, (st))
-# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(OPENSSL_STRING, (st))
-
 # define sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK_new(cmp) ((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) *)sk_new(CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC(void, cmp)))
 # define sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK_new_null() ((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK) *)sk_new_null())
 # define sk_OPENSSL_BLOCK_push(st, val) sk_push(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(void, val))
@@ -2143,6 +2118,31 @@ DECLARE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK, void)
 # define sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(OPENSSL_PSTRING, (st))
 # define sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(OPENSSL_PSTRING, (st))
 
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(cmp) ((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *)sk_new(CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC(char, cmp)))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null() ((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *)sk_new_null())
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(st, val) sk_push(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(st, val) sk_find(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(st, i) ((OPENSSL_STRING)sk_value(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), i))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(st) SKM_sk_num(OPENSSL_STRING, st)
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(st, free_func) sk_pop_free(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(char, free_func))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_deep_copy(st, copy_func, free_func) ((STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *)sk_deep_copy(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_SK_COPY_FUNC(char, copy_func), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC(char, free_func)))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_insert(st, val, i) sk_insert(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val), i)
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(st) SKM_sk_free(OPENSSL_STRING, st)
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_set(st, i, val) sk_set(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), i, CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero(OPENSSL_STRING, (st))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_unshift(st, val) sk_unshift(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, val))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find_ex(st, val) sk_find_ex((_STACK *)CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING), st), CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF(char, val))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STRING, (st), (i))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_delete_ptr(st, ptr) (OPENSSL_STRING *)sk_delete_ptr(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_PTR_OF(char, ptr))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_set_cmp_func(st, cmp)  \
+        ((int (*)(const char * const *,const char * const *)) \
+        sk_set_cmp_func(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st), CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC(char, cmp)))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup(OPENSSL_STRING, st)
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift(OPENSSL_STRING, (st))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop(st) (char *)sk_pop(CHECKED_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING, st))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort(OPENSSL_STRING, (st))
+# define sk_OPENSSL_STRING_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted(OPENSSL_STRING, (st))
+
 # define lh_ADDED_OBJ_new() LHM_lh_new(ADDED_OBJ,added_obj)
 # define lh_ADDED_OBJ_insert(lh,inst) LHM_lh_insert(ADDED_OBJ,lh,inst)
 # define lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(lh,inst) LHM_lh_retrieve(ADDED_OBJ,lh,inst)
diff --git a/util/mkstack.pl b/util/mkstack.pl
index 0739027..8daa1f8 100755
--- a/util/mkstack.pl
+++ b/util/mkstack.pl
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ foreach $type_thing (sort @stacklst) {
 EOF
 }
 
-foreach $type_thing (sort @sstacklst) {
+foreach $type_thing (sort { $a->[0] cmp $b->[0]} @sstacklst) {
     my $t1 = $type_thing->[0];
     my $t2 = $type_thing->[1];
     $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 15:58:44 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 15:58:44 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436457524.734070.12534.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  2a7059c56f885a3fa0842e886f5178def8e5481d (commit)
      from  a7ef1e907276a899fbfeee642810caccb03fc07c (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 2a7059c56f885a3fa0842e886f5178def8e5481d
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 16:56:45 2015 +0100

    Sort @sstacklst correctly.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 util/mkstack.pl | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/util/mkstack.pl b/util/mkstack.pl
index 2bd96cd..f4520d4 100755
--- a/util/mkstack.pl
+++ b/util/mkstack.pl
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ while(<IN>) {
 EOF
 	}
 
-	foreach $type_thing (sort @sstacklst) {
+    foreach $type_thing (sort { $a->[0] cmp $b->[0]} @sstacklst) {
 	    my $t1 = $type_thing->[0];
 	    my $t2 = $type_thing->[1];
 	    $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 16:00:12 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 16:00:12 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1436457612.661344.13290.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  14cf669af13be931c7367bd3d85f344e24647cfd (commit)
      from  18c5ead86e781ba27c9108ab1854f0b2843238ec (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 14cf669af13be931c7367bd3d85f344e24647cfd
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 16:56:45 2015 +0100

    Sort @sstacklst correctly.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 2a7059c56f885a3fa0842e886f5178def8e5481d)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 util/mkstack.pl | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/util/mkstack.pl b/util/mkstack.pl
index f708610..a86d91f 100755
--- a/util/mkstack.pl
+++ b/util/mkstack.pl
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ while(<IN>) {
 EOF
 	}
 
-	foreach $type_thing (sort @sstacklst) {
+    foreach $type_thing (sort { $a->[0] cmp $b->[0]} @sstacklst) {
 	    my $t1 = $type_thing->[0];
 	    my $t2 = $type_thing->[1];
 	    $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 16:00:12 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 16:00:12 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436457612.738556.13312.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  a15ba3cca394d69dc57b4321902adbe2651bc6f0 (commit)
      from  7c17c20a56a76c219dcf35d4956026f021cdee52 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a15ba3cca394d69dc57b4321902adbe2651bc6f0
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 16:56:45 2015 +0100

    Sort @sstacklst correctly.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 2a7059c56f885a3fa0842e886f5178def8e5481d)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 util/mkstack.pl | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/util/mkstack.pl b/util/mkstack.pl
index f708610..a86d91f 100755
--- a/util/mkstack.pl
+++ b/util/mkstack.pl
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ while(<IN>) {
 EOF
 	}
 
-	foreach $type_thing (sort @sstacklst) {
+    foreach $type_thing (sort { $a->[0] cmp $b->[0]} @sstacklst) {
 	    my $t1 = $type_thing->[0];
 	    my $t2 = $type_thing->[1];
 	    $new_stackfile .= <<EOF;

From rsalz at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 19:43:11 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 19:43:11 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436470991.641488.27054.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  99dcd88035330d59ab40b5bc0f551aca7020cd30 (commit)
      from  851fdda1a1952e482fc3f5f1c7c3acdff132bbae (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 99dcd88035330d59ab40b5bc0f551aca7020cd30
Author: Peter Waltenberg <pwalten at au1.ibm.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 14:57:30 2015 -0400

    Exit on error in ecparam
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/ecparam.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/apps/ecparam.c b/apps/ecparam.c
index a0781c5..8464c88 100644
--- a/apps/ecparam.c
+++ b/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -326,8 +326,9 @@ int ecparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
         if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
             ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-        } else
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
 
     }
 

From rsalz at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 19:43:29 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 19:43:29 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436471009.316286.27831.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  fdd6d00952f00fe7e658b342a359e556d1526c65 (commit)
      from  2a7059c56f885a3fa0842e886f5178def8e5481d (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit fdd6d00952f00fe7e658b342a359e556d1526c65
Author: Peter Waltenberg <pwalten at au1.ibm.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 14:57:30 2015 -0400

    Exit on error in ecparam
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 99dcd88035330d59ab40b5bc0f551aca7020cd30)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/ecparam.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/apps/ecparam.c b/apps/ecparam.c
index 06ac77b..f09c802 100644
--- a/apps/ecparam.c
+++ b/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -422,8 +422,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
         if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
             ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-        } else
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
 
     }
 

From rsalz at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 19:43:40 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 19:43:40 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436471020.337824.28078.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  b5e972fdd3e777c777f45f59bb65f62673412ade (commit)
      from  a15ba3cca394d69dc57b4321902adbe2651bc6f0 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit b5e972fdd3e777c777f45f59bb65f62673412ade
Author: Peter Waltenberg <pwalten at au1.ibm.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 14:57:30 2015 -0400

    Exit on error in ecparam
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 99dcd88035330d59ab40b5bc0f551aca7020cd30)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/ecparam.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/apps/ecparam.c b/apps/ecparam.c
index 1f340a9..88ecbc0 100644
--- a/apps/ecparam.c
+++ b/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -419,8 +419,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
         if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
             ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-        } else
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
 
     }
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 20:12:37 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 20:12:37 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436472757.325941.10731.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  bd2dd9e5f5521fae2631f8a54f7b9947a352ce2f (commit)
      from  1fdfb3c1a661e4e041936ff156aa3cc55ee5d554 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit bd2dd9e5f5521fae2631f8a54f7b9947a352ce2f
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 22:12:29 2015 +0200

    Don't display 'latest' symlinks

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 source/index.wml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source/index.wml b/source/index.wml
index 59c571a..59dfd46 100644
--- a/source/index.wml
+++ b/source/index.wml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ We also maintain a clone at GitHub,
 
 
 <p>
-<rfilelist "openssl-*.gz">
+<rfilelist "openssl-*.gz" "grep { !/latest/ }">
 
 <h2>Legalities</h2>
 

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 20:23:03 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 20:23:03 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436473383.377095.20380.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  2fc52c912a79eefe8610984bac5eed3a2589ee85 (commit)
      from  99dcd88035330d59ab40b5bc0f551aca7020cd30 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 2fc52c912a79eefe8610984bac5eed3a2589ee85
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 19:32:36 2015 +0100

    correct example
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
index 332f181..ba16b50 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ them to suit its needs: for example to add a hostname check.
 Check hostname matches "www.foo.com" in peer certificate:
 
  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = SSL_get0_param(ssl);
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, "www.foo.com");
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, "www.foo.com", 0);
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 20:23:49 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 20:23:49 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436473429.443852.27016.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  ded7eee8c238fd814173517fdffb6a58c0758d81 (commit)
      from  fdd6d00952f00fe7e658b342a359e556d1526c65 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit ded7eee8c238fd814173517fdffb6a58c0758d81
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 19:32:36 2015 +0100

    correct example
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 2fc52c912a79eefe8610984bac5eed3a2589ee85)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
index 332f181..ba16b50 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get0_param.pod
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ them to suit its needs: for example to add a hostname check.
 Check hostname matches "www.foo.com" in peer certificate:
 
  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = SSL_get0_param(ssl);
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, "www.foo.com");
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(vpm, "www.foo.com", 0);
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 21:38:50 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 21:38:50 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436477930.872070.16416.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  46d1ed4f31a316a870bf319a5ba61cb08b2cb294 (commit)
      from  bd2dd9e5f5521fae2631f8a54f7b9947a352ce2f (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 46d1ed4f31a316a870bf319a5ba61cb08b2cb294
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 23:34:17 2015 +0200

    Rewrite the source/.htaccess hack
    
    source/.htaccess only had a redirection for latest.tar.gz, we then had
    series specific URLs via symlinks.  This changes does away with all
    that places all of those redirects in source/.htaccess.
    
    This is, btw, some cool use of wml.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile                               |  5 +----
 source/{.htaccess.in => .htaccess.wml} | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 rename source/{.htaccess.in => .htaccess.wml} (52%)

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 3f2f4d5..ddb9619 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -27,10 +27,7 @@ simple: rebuild hack-source_htaccess
 rebuild:
 	wmk $(FORCE) -I $(SNAP) -a $(DIRS) index.wml
 hack-source_htaccess:
-	latest=`grep '<span class="latest">' < source/index.html | \
-		sed -e 's|^.*<span class="latest">||' -e 's|</span>.*$$||'`; \
-	    sed -e "s|%%LATEST%%|$$latest|" \
-		< source/.htaccess.in > source/.htaccess
+	( cd source && wml -o .htaccess .htaccess.wml )
 
 manpages:
 	sh ./run-pod2html.sh $(PODSHOME)
diff --git a/source/.htaccess.in b/source/.htaccess.wml
similarity index 52%
rename from source/.htaccess.in
rename to source/.htaccess.wml
index ee5c94e..9b79140 100644
--- a/source/.htaccess.in
+++ b/source/.htaccess.wml
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-##
+<protect>##
 ##  .htaccess -- Apache per-dir config
 ##
 
@@ -30,5 +30,22 @@ RewriteRule openssl-(fips.*)  old/fips/openssl-$1 [L]
     RemoveEncoding .gz
 </Files>
 
-RewriteBase /source
-RewriteRule ^latest\.tar\.gz$ %%LATEST%% [R=302,NC]
+</protect>RewriteBase /source
+<:{
+    my @tarballs =
+        sort grep /openssl-\d+\.\d+\.\d+[a-z]*\.tar\.gz$/, glob("openssl-*.tar.gz");
+    my %series = ();
+    foreach(@tarballs) {
+        my ($version, $serie) = /^openssl-((\d+\.\d+\.\d+)[a-z]*)\./;
+	$series{$serie} = $_;
+    }
+
+    my $latest = $series{ (reverse sort keys %series)[0] };
+    print "RewriteRule ^latest\\.tar\\.gz\$ $latest [R=302,NC]\n";
+
+    foreach (sort keys %series) {
+        my $rule = "openssl-$_-latest.tar.gz"; $rule =~ s|\.|\\.|g;
+	my $target = $series{$_};
+        print "RewriteRule ^$rule\$ $target [R=302,NC]\n";
+    }
+}:>

From levitte at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 22:41:08 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 22:41:08 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436481668.241620.31283.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  90d48d5e7c0d4785eae7d490351234613526fc1a (commit)
      from  46d1ed4f31a316a870bf319a5ba61cb08b2cb294 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 90d48d5e7c0d4785eae7d490351234613526fc1a
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 00:41:00 2015 +0200

    Move up the processing of 'latest' URLs
    
    If this isn't done first, the old distros rules will take them first.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 source/.htaccess.wml | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source/.htaccess.wml b/source/.htaccess.wml
index 9b79140..23ccfd7 100644
--- a/source/.htaccess.wml
+++ b/source/.htaccess.wml
@@ -4,18 +4,40 @@
 
 RewriteEngine on
 
+RewriteBase /source
+
+# First, rewrite all the 'latest' URLs</protect>
+<:{
+    my @tarballs =
+        sort grep /openssl-\d+\.\d+\.\d+[a-z]*\.tar\.gz$/, glob("openssl-*.tar.gz");
+    my %series = ();
+    foreach(@tarballs) {
+        my ($version, $serie) = /^openssl-((\d+\.\d+\.\d+)[a-z]*)\./;
+	$series{$serie} = $_;
+    }
+
+    my $latest = $series{ (reverse sort keys %series)[0] };
+    print "RewriteRule ^latest\\.tar\\.gz\$ $latest [L,R=302,NC]\n";
+
+    foreach (sort keys %series) {
+        my $rule = "openssl-$_-latest.tar.gz"; $rule =~ s|\.|\\.|g;
+	my $target = $series{$_};
+        print "RewriteRule ^$rule\$ $target [L,R=302,NC]\n";
+    }
+}:>
+<protect>
 # Old distro's are in subdirs.
 RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f
-RewriteRule (openssl-0.9.8.*) old/0.9.x/$1 [L]
+RewriteRule (openssl-0\.9\.8.*) old/0.9.x/$1 [L]
 
 RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f
-RewriteRule openssl-(1.0.0.*) old/1.0.0/openssl-$1 [L]
+RewriteRule openssl-(1\.0\.0.*) old/1.0.0/openssl-$1 [L]
 
 RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f
-RewriteRule openssl-(1.0.1.*) old/1.0.1/openssl-$1 [L]
+RewriteRule openssl-(1\.0\.1.*) old/1.0.1/openssl-$1 [L]
 
 RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f
-RewriteRule openssl-(1.0.2.*) old/1.0.1/openssl-$1 [L]
+RewriteRule openssl-(1\.0\.2.*) old/1.0.1/openssl-$1 [L]
 
 RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f
 RewriteRule openssl-(fips.*)  old/fips/openssl-$1 [L]
@@ -29,23 +51,4 @@ RewriteRule openssl-(fips.*)  old/fips/openssl-$1 [L]
 <Files *.gz.sha1>
     RemoveEncoding .gz
 </Files>
-
-</protect>RewriteBase /source
-<:{
-    my @tarballs =
-        sort grep /openssl-\d+\.\d+\.\d+[a-z]*\.tar\.gz$/, glob("openssl-*.tar.gz");
-    my %series = ();
-    foreach(@tarballs) {
-        my ($version, $serie) = /^openssl-((\d+\.\d+\.\d+)[a-z]*)\./;
-	$series{$serie} = $_;
-    }
-
-    my $latest = $series{ (reverse sort keys %series)[0] };
-    print "RewriteRule ^latest\\.tar\\.gz\$ $latest [R=302,NC]\n";
-
-    foreach (sort keys %series) {
-        my $rule = "openssl-$_-latest.tar.gz"; $rule =~ s|\.|\\.|g;
-	my $target = $series{$_};
-        print "RewriteRule ^$rule\$ $target [R=302,NC]\n";
-    }
-}:>
+</protect>

From levitte at openssl.org  Thu Jul  9 22:47:33 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2015 22:47:33 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436482053.230595.7117.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  24c7ddaa4783a7f9c27a591614bbf9786440b35f (commit)
      from  90d48d5e7c0d4785eae7d490351234613526fc1a (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 24c7ddaa4783a7f9c27a591614bbf9786440b35f
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 00:46:19 2015 +0200

    Revert "Don't display 'latest' symlinks"
    
    The symlinks are no longer needed since the source/.htaccess now
    rewrites those URLs.
    
    This reverts commit bd2dd9e5f5521fae2631f8a54f7b9947a352ce2f.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 source/index.wml | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source/index.wml b/source/index.wml
index 59dfd46..59c571a 100644
--- a/source/index.wml
+++ b/source/index.wml
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ We also maintain a clone at GitHub,
 
 
 <p>
-<rfilelist "openssl-*.gz" "grep { !/latest/ }">
+<rfilelist "openssl-*.gz">
 
 <h2>Legalities</h2>
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 15:25:28 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 15:25:28 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436541928.420169.16462.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0 (commit)
      from  2fc52c912a79eefe8610984bac5eed3a2589ee85 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 15:40:53 2015 +0200

    Stop using tardy
    
    Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
    versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
    already expect that tar variant).
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index e9b49d9..10da644 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -481,25 +481,28 @@ TABLE: Configure Configurations/*.conf
 # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+			       -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
+	       \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+	    | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
 	find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
 	find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
 	find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
-	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
-	$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
-	gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
-	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
 
-tar-snap:
-	@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
-		`find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
 
 dist:   

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 15:33:51 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 15:33:51 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_0_9_8-stable update
Message-ID: <1436542431.083061.21353.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_0_9_8-stable has been updated
       via  0ede4e2e46ec3e093b07c981fa88d3cb5bd3c54b (commit)
      from  9b914c7f9147c49a569108ab7f524ebaeb92eaaa (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0ede4e2e46ec3e093b07c981fa88d3cb5bd3c54b
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 15:40:53 2015 +0200

    Stop using tardy
    
    Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
    versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
    already expect that tar variant).
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0)
    
    Conflicts:
    	Makefile.org

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 0e4fa94..2aad295 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -585,25 +585,28 @@ update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h a
 # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+			       -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
+	       \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+	    | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
 	find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
 	find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
 	find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
-	find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
-	$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
-	gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
-	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
 
-tar-snap:
-	@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
-		`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
 
 dist:   

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 15:33:58 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 15:33:58 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1436542438.356237.21735.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  00e651b8469e06c8c92ea06e346e1ed780417eda (commit)
      from  14cf669af13be931c7367bd3d85f344e24647cfd (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 00e651b8469e06c8c92ea06e346e1ed780417eda
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 15:40:53 2015 +0200

    Stop using tardy
    
    Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
    versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
    already expect that tar variant).
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0)
    
    Conflicts:
    	Makefile.org

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 13ffc15..c8934e1 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -452,25 +452,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
 # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+			       -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
+	       \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+	    | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
 	find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
 	find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
 	find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
-	find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
-	$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
-	gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
-	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
 
-tar-snap:
-	@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
-		`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
 
 dist:   

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 15:34:03 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 15:34:03 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436542443.732914.22020.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  be856204195fe57089ba14e6d1c9068994345234 (commit)
      from  b5e972fdd3e777c777f45f59bb65f62673412ade (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit be856204195fe57089ba14e6d1c9068994345234
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 15:40:53 2015 +0200

    Stop using tardy
    
    Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
    versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
    already expect that tar variant).
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0)
    
    Conflicts:
    	Makefile.org

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 55a3700..2a5f45c 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -499,25 +499,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
 # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+			       -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
+	       \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+	    | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
 	find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
 	find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
 	find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
-	find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
-	$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
-	gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
-	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
 
-tar-snap:
-	@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
-		`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
 
 dist:   

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 15:34:04 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 15:34:04 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436542444.254019.22139.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  efb1a50f371359e34bd4de48d1e9be4b5030977b (commit)
      from  ded7eee8c238fd814173517fdffb6a58c0758d81 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit efb1a50f371359e34bd4de48d1e9be4b5030977b
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 15:40:53 2015 +0200

    Stop using tardy
    
    Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
    versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
    already expect that tar variant).
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0)
    
    Conflicts:
    	Makefile.org

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index d77e264..4844276 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -497,25 +497,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
 # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+			       -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
+	       \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+	    | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
 	find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
 	find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
 	find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
-	find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
-	$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
-	gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
-	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
 
-tar-snap:
-	@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
-		`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
 
 dist:   

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 18:30:36 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 18:30:36 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436553036.676360.7633.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  da24e6f8a05ea657684094e04c1a54efa04c2962 (commit)
      from  27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit da24e6f8a05ea657684094e04c1a54efa04c2962
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 18:29:17 2015 +0200

    Set numeric IDs for tar as well
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 10da644..3e326c0 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ TABLE: Configure Configurations/*.conf
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
 TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
-	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+	                       --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
 			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
 			       -cvf -
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 18:32:09 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 18:32:09 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436553129.919347.8917.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  0ed08a7a985e35e2a2b18da3b8d7dfed9f126a80 (commit)
      from  efb1a50f371359e34bd4de48d1e9be4b5030977b (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0ed08a7a985e35e2a2b18da3b8d7dfed9f126a80
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 18:29:17 2015 +0200

    Set numeric IDs for tar as well
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit da24e6f8a05ea657684094e04c1a54efa04c2962)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 4844276..48469c5 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ TABLE: Configure
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
 TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
-	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+	                       --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
 			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
 			       -cvf -
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 18:32:16 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 18:32:16 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436553136.331634.9160.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  2035e2db681ae3b3b3502892bced0f54d1a2c8c0 (commit)
      from  be856204195fe57089ba14e6d1c9068994345234 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 2035e2db681ae3b3b3502892bced0f54d1a2c8c0
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 18:29:17 2015 +0200

    Set numeric IDs for tar as well
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit da24e6f8a05ea657684094e04c1a54efa04c2962)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 2a5f45c..aa8776e 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ TABLE: Configure
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
 TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
-	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+	                       --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
 			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
 			       -cvf -
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 18:32:18 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 18:32:18 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1436553138.448089.9385.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  916aaef14a520b1e055c8825e4520f0e972b018c (commit)
      from  00e651b8469e06c8c92ea06e346e1ed780417eda (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 916aaef14a520b1e055c8825e4520f0e972b018c
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 18:29:17 2015 +0200

    Set numeric IDs for tar as well
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit da24e6f8a05ea657684094e04c1a54efa04c2962)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index c8934e1..1e0897e 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ TABLE: Configure
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
 TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
-	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+	                       --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
 			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
 			       -cvf -
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Fri Jul 10 18:32:21 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2015 18:32:21 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_0_9_8-stable update
Message-ID: <1436553141.640102.9617.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_0_9_8-stable has been updated
       via  1ac4693c38bc39de8656470413d2cd53cf453de3 (commit)
      from  0ede4e2e46ec3e093b07c981fa88d3cb5bd3c54b (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1ac4693c38bc39de8656470413d2cd53cf453de3
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 10 18:29:17 2015 +0200

    Set numeric IDs for tar as well
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit da24e6f8a05ea657684094e04c1a54efa04c2962)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 Makefile.org | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index 2aad295..098d68a 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h a
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
 TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
-	                       --owner openssl --group openssl \
+	                       --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
 			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
 			       -cvf -
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Mon Jul 13 15:01:17 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 15:01:17 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436799677.362877.17135.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  eeb97bce751296b2e04a92d00c0d0a792ba61834 (commit)
      from  da24e6f8a05ea657684094e04c1a54efa04c2962 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit eeb97bce751296b2e04a92d00c0d0a792ba61834
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 15:48:57 2015 +0200

    Remove extra '; \' in apps/Makefile
    
    Fixes GH#330
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/apps/Makefile b/apps/Makefile
index bf554ab..d0c5b8c 100644
--- a/apps/Makefile
+++ b/apps/Makefile
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
 depend: local_depend
 	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
 local_depend:
-	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(EXE_SRC); \
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(EXE_SRC)
 
 dclean:
 	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new

From levitte at openssl.org  Mon Jul 13 15:14:55 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 15:14:55 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436800495.680605.24720.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  8a1dbda755f7fa4dc3e9637b95ea2df04f0c7e4f (commit)
      from  0ed08a7a985e35e2a2b18da3b8d7dfed9f126a80 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 8a1dbda755f7fa4dc3e9637b95ea2df04f0c7e4f
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 15:48:57 2015 +0200

    Remove extra '; \' in apps/Makefile
    
    Fixes GH#330
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit eeb97bce751296b2e04a92d00c0d0a792ba61834)
    
    Conflicts:
    	apps/Makefile

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/apps/Makefile b/apps/Makefile
index cafe554..8c3297e 100644
--- a/apps/Makefile
+++ b/apps/Makefile
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
 depend: local_depend
 	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
 local_depend:
-	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
 
 dclean:
 	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new

From levitte at openssl.org  Mon Jul 13 15:16:28 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 15:16:28 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1436800588.542949.25483.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  1fb21ac4a9c45000de32b44463b3fbdff8e06bc6 (commit)
      from  916aaef14a520b1e055c8825e4520f0e972b018c (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1fb21ac4a9c45000de32b44463b3fbdff8e06bc6
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 15:48:57 2015 +0200

    Remove extra '; \' in apps/Makefile
    
    Fixes GH#330
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit eeb97bce751296b2e04a92d00c0d0a792ba61834)
    
    Conflicts:
    	apps/Makefile

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/apps/Makefile b/apps/Makefile
index 636f2eb..f94eccf 100644
--- a/apps/Makefile
+++ b/apps/Makefile
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
 depend: local_depend
 	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
 local_depend:
-	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
 
 dclean:
 	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new

From levitte at openssl.org  Mon Jul 13 15:16:37 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 15:16:37 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436800597.769805.25786.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  2794dec7b21f4faf5095008d3dd9743f41cc19ad (commit)
      from  2035e2db681ae3b3b3502892bced0f54d1a2c8c0 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 2794dec7b21f4faf5095008d3dd9743f41cc19ad
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 15:48:57 2015 +0200

    Remove extra '; \' in apps/Makefile
    
    Fixes GH#330
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit eeb97bce751296b2e04a92d00c0d0a792ba61834)
    
    Conflicts:
    	apps/Makefile

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/apps/Makefile b/apps/Makefile
index cafe554..8c3297e 100644
--- a/apps/Makefile
+++ b/apps/Makefile
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
 depend: local_depend
 	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
 local_depend:
-	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
 
 dclean:
 	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new

From rsalz at openssl.org  Mon Jul 13 18:57:19 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 18:57:19 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436813839.739345.10806.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  48f11fd3ec9f218c9c82bc65873fec707cbed0f6 (commit)
      from  24c7ddaa4783a7f9c27a591614bbf9786440b35f (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 48f11fd3ec9f218c9c82bc65873fec707cbed0f6
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 14:56:58 2015 -0400

    RT3941: state.sml is out of date

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 news/state.wml | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/news/state.wml b/news/state.wml
index 59f6dd4..73b93ea 100644
--- a/news/state.wml
+++ b/news/state.wml
@@ -6,17 +6,25 @@
 <h1>Project State</h1>
 
 Here is a short summary of the current development and release state
-of the OpenSSL project.
+of the OpenSSL project as of July, 2015.
+The latest releases can always be found at
+<a href="https://www.openssl.org/source">https://www.openssl.org/source</a>.
 
 <ul>
 
-<li>On 6 August 2014, we released OpenSSL
-<b>0.9.8zb</b>, <b>1.0.0n</b> and <b>1.0.1i</b> with security fixes.
-See <a href="secadv_20140806.txt">the security advisory</a> for details.<br>
+<li>On July 9, we released version <b>1.0.2d</b>.  This is the most
+recent security fixes for the current major release branch.
+We also released version <b>1.0.1p</b> which has the same fixes for
+that branch.
+<br>
 
-<li>Next proposed FEATURE release: OpenSSL <b>1.0.2</b>, currently in beta-test.<br>
+<li>We declared <b>1.0.0</b> and <b>0.9.8</b> to be end of life, with
+all updates ending at the end of 2015.
+<br>
 
-<li>Next proposed MAJOR release: OpenSSL <b>1.1.0</b>, currently in development.<br>
-    The release date is yet to be set.
-</ul>
+<li>Our next major release is <b>1.1.0</b>. It is currently in development.
+It is the master branch, available at
+<a href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl">https://github.com/openssl/openssl</a> (as are all other release branches).
+<br>
 
+</ul>

From levitte at openssl.org  Mon Jul 13 23:10:41 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 23:10:41 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436829041.536863.23097.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  053fa39af62f5b3543ebec8592e4592965b18e26 (commit)
       via  f608b4064d58ca4dfdfdfc921308b51cb96205e2 (commit)
      from  eeb97bce751296b2e04a92d00c0d0a792ba61834 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 053fa39af62f5b3543ebec8592e4592965b18e26
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 16:53:37 2015 +0200

    Conversion to UTF-8 where needed
    
    This leaves behind files with names ending with '.iso-8859-1'.  These
    should be safe to remove.  If something went wrong when re-encoding,
    there will be some files with names ending with '.utf8' left behind.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit f608b4064d58ca4dfdfdfc921308b51cb96205e2
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 16:50:16 2015 +0200

    Small script to re-encode files that need it to UTF-8
    
    This requires 'iconv' and that 'file' can take the options '-b' and '-i'.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                            | 172 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl          |   6 +-
 crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl     |  12 +--
 crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl        |  10 +--
 crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl     |  12 +--
 crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S               |   2 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl        |   6 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl          |  16 ++--
 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c         |   2 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl       |  16 ++--
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl    |   8 +-
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl |   4 +-
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl  |  18 ++--
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl      |   2 +-
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl   |   8 +-
 crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl    |  12 +--
 crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl   |  22 ++---
 crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl          |   2 +-
 crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl       |   2 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl         |   4 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl       |   2 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl       |   2 +-
 crypto/sparccpuid.S                |   2 +-
 crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl      |   2 +-
 crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c             |   2 +-
 crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c            |   2 +-
 demos/easy_tls/README              |   2 +-
 util/mkrc.pl                       |   2 +-
 util/toutf8.sh                     |  17 ++++
 29 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 176 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 util/toutf8.sh

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 4f0749d..a06b1e4 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
   *) Remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is SSLeay legacy, we're
      not aware of clients that still exhibit this bug, and the workaround
      hasn't been working properly for a while.
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as
      the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@
      This parameter will be set to 1 or 0 depending on the ciphersuite selected
      by the SSL/TLS server library, indicating whether it can provide forward
      security.
-     [Emilia K?sper <emilia.kasper at esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper <emilia.kasper at esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
 
   *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification
      parameters by name.
@@ -488,9 +488,9 @@
      callbacks.
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
-     independently by Hanno B?ck.
+     independently by Hanno B??ck.
      (CVE-2015-1789)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
 
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
      (CVE-2015-1790)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
 
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
      (CVE-2015-0289)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
 
@@ -631,10 +631,10 @@
      servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
      a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
 
-     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K?sper
+     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K??sper
      (OpenSSL development team).
      (CVE-2015-0293)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
 
@@ -1139,12 +1139,12 @@
       version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
       version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
       sanity and breaks all known clients.
-      [David Benjamin, Emilia K?sper]
+      [David Benjamin, Emilia K??sper]
 
    *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
       early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
       renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
-      [Emilia K?sper]
+      [Emilia K??sper]
 
    *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
       ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
@@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@
       Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
       was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
       ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
-      [Emilia K?sper]
+      [Emilia K??sper]
 
  Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
 
@@ -1235,10 +1235,10 @@
      with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
      ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
 
-     Thanks to Felix Gr?bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+     Thanks to Felix Gr??bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
      issue.
      (CVE-2014-3510)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
      to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
      properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
      Denial of Service attack.
 
-     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam?ki (Codenomicon) for
+     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam??ki (Codenomicon) for
      discovering and researching this issue.
      (CVE-2014-5139)
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@
 
      Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
      (CVE-2014-3508)
-     [Emilia K?sper, and Steve Henson]
+     [Emilia K??sper, and Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
      for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
@@ -1317,15 +1317,15 @@
      client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
      code on a vulnerable client or server.
 
-     Thanks to J?ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
-     [J?ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+     Thanks to J??ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [J??ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
      are subject to a denial of service attack.
 
-     Thanks to Felix Gr?bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     Thanks to Felix Gr??bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
      this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
-     [Felix Gr?bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+     [Felix Gr??bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
      compilation flags.
@@ -1404,9 +1404,9 @@
      Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
      Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
      (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
-     Emilia K?sper for the initial patch.
+     Emilia K??sper for the initial patch.
      (CVE-2013-0169)
-     [Emilia K?sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+     [Emilia K??sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
      ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
@@ -1581,7 +1581,7 @@
      EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
      EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
      implementations).
-     [Emilia K?sper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
 
   *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
      all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
@@ -1857,7 +1857,7 @@
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
 
   *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
-     [Emilia K?sper (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper (Google)]
 
   *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
      interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
@@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@
      lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
      BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
      the last update always remained unused).
-     [Emilia K?sper (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper (Google)]
 
   *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
      [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
@@ -2680,7 +2680,7 @@
 
   *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
      and response verification functionality.
-     [Zolt?n Gl?zik <zglozik at opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+     [Zolt??n Gl??zik <zglozik at opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
 
   *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
      extension so far.  The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
@@ -3848,7 +3848,7 @@
 
   *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
      initialised value as BN_new().
-     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -3867,7 +3867,7 @@
      some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
      maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
      in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
-     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf M?ller]
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
      that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
@@ -3934,7 +3934,7 @@
      [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
 
   *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
-     [G?tz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell at trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
+     [G??tz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell at trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
 
   *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
      control of the error stack.
@@ -4649,7 +4649,7 @@
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Undo Cygwin change.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
      Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
@@ -4682,11 +4682,11 @@
      [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
 
   *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
      prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
-     [Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> via Lutz J?nicke, resolves #1014]
+     [Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> via Lutz J??nicke, resolves #1014]
 
   *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -5148,7 +5148,7 @@
      pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
      the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
      data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
-     [G?tz Babin-Ebell <babinebell at trustcenter.de>]
+     [G??tz Babin-Ebell <babinebell at trustcenter.de>]
 
   *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
      [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com>]
@@ -7253,7 +7253,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) BN_sqr() bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis at cavium.com>]
+     [Ulf M??ller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis at cavium.com>]
 
   *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
      so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
@@ -7413,7 +7413,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Fix OAEP check.
-     [Ulf M?ller, Bodo M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller, Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
      RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
@@ -7675,10 +7675,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Use better test patterns in bntest.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
  
   *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
      [Bodo Moeller]
@@ -7823,14 +7823,14 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
      BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
-     [Bodo M?ller]
+     [Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Add DSO method for VMS.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
   *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
      wrong sign.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
      packages.  The default package contains applications, application
@@ -7848,7 +7848,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
      random number < q in the DSA library.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'.  This disables the default
      behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
@@ -8114,7 +8114,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
      Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
      Random Numbers.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
      DSA key.
@@ -8334,7 +8334,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
      rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
@@ -8366,7 +8366,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
      RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
@@ -8455,7 +8455,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
+     [Ulf M??ller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
       the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow at DEMENTIA.ORG>]
 
   *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
@@ -8556,7 +8556,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Rolf Haberrecker <rolf at suse.de>]
 
   *) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
      [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
@@ -8575,7 +8575,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
      case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
      assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
@@ -8605,14 +8605,14 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
-     [Ulf M?ller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
+     [Ulf M??ller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
       pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33 at cornell.edu>]
 
   *) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>.  New functions
      RAND_egd() and RAND_status().  In the command line application,
      the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
      or -rand.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
      Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
@@ -8645,7 +8645,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
         #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
         #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
      defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
-     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo M?ller]
+     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
      record layer.
@@ -8696,17 +8696,17 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
      bits.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
      [Andy Polyakov]
 
   *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
      equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
      options to produce them.
@@ -8714,11 +8714,11 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
      get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
      for p == 0.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
      include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
@@ -8742,7 +8742,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
      use void * instead of char * in lhash.
-     [Ulf M?ller] 
+     [Ulf M??ller] 
 
   *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
      (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
@@ -8787,13 +8787,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
      bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
      SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
      the comments.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
      made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
@@ -8803,25 +8803,25 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
      by stat().  RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
      to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
-     [Ulf M?ller, Bodo M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller, Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
      used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
      BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
      BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
      Rabin-Miller iterations.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
      DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
      (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
      "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
@@ -8877,7 +8877,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
      as a shared library without RSA.  Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
      NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. 
-     [Kris Kennaway <kris at hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Kris Kennaway <kris at hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
      has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
@@ -8886,7 +8886,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
      RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
      (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
      3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
@@ -8916,7 +8916,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, 
      unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
@@ -9750,7 +9750,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
      delete an unused file.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
      since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
@@ -9839,7 +9839,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      worked.
 
   *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
-     [Ulf M?ller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling at tislabs.com>]
+     [Ulf M??ller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling at tislabs.com>]
 
   *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
      RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
@@ -9956,7 +9956,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Ben Laurie]
 
   *) DES library cleanups.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
      used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
@@ -9999,7 +9999,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Christian Forster <fo at hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
 
   *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
      File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
@@ -10112,7 +10112,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
      -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
@@ -10169,10 +10169,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Ben Laurie]
 
   *) Support Borland C++ builder.
-     [Janez Jere <jj at void.si>, modified by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Janez Jere <jj at void.si>, modified by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support Mingw32.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -10181,7 +10181,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
 
   *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Update HPUX configuration.
      [Anonymous]
@@ -10214,7 +10214,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) OAEP decoding bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
      David Harris.
@@ -10237,21 +10237,21 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
 
   *) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
      extension adding in x509 utility.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
      prototypes.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
      by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
@@ -10280,7 +10280,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
      8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
@@ -10298,13 +10298,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
 
   *) Change functions to ANSI C.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix typos in error codes.
-     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf M?ller]
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -10341,7 +10341,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New Configure option "rsaref".
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
      [Bodo Moeller]
@@ -10389,7 +10389,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
      the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Tweaks to Configure
      [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
@@ -10399,11 +10399,11 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
      The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
   
   *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
      SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
@@ -10942,7 +10942,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
       Hagino <itojun at kame.net>]
 
   *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
-     [Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
      functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
@@ -10952,7 +10952,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
-     [Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
      [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
@@ -11099,7 +11099,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
      was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
-     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
      [Ben Laurie]
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
index 1c1e23e..767f204 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 # the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
 # register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
 # Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
-# better performance on most recent ?-archs...
+# better performance on most recent ??-archs...
 #
 # Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
 # up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
 $speed_limit=512;	# chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
 			# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
 $small_footprint=1;	# $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
-			# recent ?-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
+			# recent ??-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
 			# I favor compact code to minimize cache
 			# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
 			# in real-life applications...
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ sub enctransform()
 # Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
 # x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
 # Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
-# ?-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
+# ??-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
 # better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
 # eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
 # minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl
index 24b2ba4..5bbc2ac 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-c64xplus.pl
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ ret?:						; B0 holds rounds or zero
 	MVC	B0,ILC
 ||	SUB	B0,1,B0
 
-	GMPY4	$K[0],A24,$Kx9[0]		; ?0x09
+	GMPY4	$K[0],A24,$Kx9[0]		; ??0x09
 ||	GMPY4	$K[1],A24,$Kx9[1]
 ||	MVK	0x00000D0D,A25
 ||	MVK	0x00000E0E,B25
@@ -900,14 +900,14 @@ ret?:						; B0 holds rounds or zero
 ||	MVKH	0x0D0D0000,A25
 ||	MVKH	0x0E0E0000,B25
 
-	GMPY4	$K[0],B24,$KxB[0]		; ?0x0B
+	GMPY4	$K[0],B24,$KxB[0]		; ??0x0B
 ||	GMPY4	$K[1],B24,$KxB[1]
 	GMPY4	$K[2],B24,$KxB[2]
 ||	GMPY4	$K[3],B24,$KxB[3]
 
 	SPLOOP	11				; InvMixColumns
 ;;====================================================================
-	GMPY4	$K[0],A25,$KxD[0]		; ?0x0D
+	GMPY4	$K[0],A25,$KxD[0]		; ??0x0D
 ||	GMPY4	$K[1],A25,$KxD[1]
 ||	SWAP2	$Kx9[0],$Kx9[0]			; rotate by 16
 ||	SWAP2	$Kx9[1],$Kx9[1]
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ ret?:						; B0 holds rounds or zero
 || [B0]	LDW	*${KPA}[6],$K[2]
 || [B0]	LDW	*${KPB}[7],$K[3]
 
-	GMPY4	$s[0],B25,$KxE[0]		; ?0x0E
+	GMPY4	$s[0],B25,$KxE[0]		; ??0x0E
 ||	GMPY4	$s[1],B25,$KxE[1]
 ||	XOR	$Kx9[0],$KxB[0],$KxB[0]
 ||	XOR	$Kx9[1],$KxB[1],$KxB[1]
@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ ret?:						; B0 holds rounds or zero
 
 	XOR	$KxE[0],$KxD[0],$KxE[0]
 ||	XOR	$KxE[1],$KxD[1],$KxE[1]
-|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[0],A24,$Kx9[0]		; ?0x09
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[0],A24,$Kx9[0]		; ??0x09
 || [B0]	GMPY4	$K[1],A24,$Kx9[1]
 ||	ADDAW	$KPA,4,$KPA
 	XOR	$KxE[2],$KxD[2],$KxE[2]
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ ret?:						; B0 holds rounds or zero
 
 	XOR	$KxB[0],$KxE[0],$KxE[0]
 ||	XOR	$KxB[1],$KxE[1],$KxE[1]
-|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[0],B24,$KxB[0]		; ?0x0B
+|| [B0]	GMPY4	$K[0],B24,$KxB[0]		; ??0x0B
 || [B0]	GMPY4	$K[1],B24,$KxB[1]
 	XOR	$KxB[2],$KxE[2],$KxE[2]
 ||	XOR	$KxB[3],$KxE[3],$KxE[3]
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
index f05461a..a0b018c 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 # referred below, which improves ECDH and ECDSA verify benchmarks
 # by 18-40%.
 #
-# C?mara, D.; Gouv?a, C. P. L.; L?pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# C??mara, D.; Gouv??a, C. P. L.; L??pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
 # Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
 # 
 # http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ ___
 ################
 # void	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
 #	BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
-#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0?b1b0
+#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0??b1b0
 {
 $code.=<<___;
 .global	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	$mask,#7<<2
 	sub	sp,sp,#32		@ allocate tab[8]
 
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1?b1
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1??b1
 	str	$lo,[$ret,#8]
 	str	$hi,[$ret,#12]
 
@@ -181,13 +181,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 eor	r2,r2,$a
 	eor	$b,$b,r3
 	 eor	$a,$a,r2
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0?b0
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0??b0
 	str	$lo,[$ret]
 	str	$hi,[$ret,#4]
 
 	eor	$a,$a,r2
 	eor	$b,$b,r3
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)?(b1+b0)
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)??(b1+b0)
 ___
 @r=map("r$_",(6..9));
 $code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl
index e4aa4e4..c79f46f 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl
@@ -120,26 +120,26 @@ _bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
 	.asmfunc
 	MVK	0xFF,$xFF
 ___
-	&mul_1x1_upper($a0,$b0);		# a0?b0
+	&mul_1x1_upper($a0,$b0);		# a0??b0
 $code.=<<___;
 ||	MV	$b1,$B
 	MV	$a1,$A
 ___
-	&mul_1x1_merged("A28","B28",$A,$B);	# a0?b0/a1?b1
+	&mul_1x1_merged("A28","B28",$A,$B);	# a0??b0/a1??b1
 $code.=<<___;
 ||	XOR	$b0,$b1,$B
 	XOR	$a0,$a1,$A
 ___
-	&mul_1x1_merged("A31","B31",$A,$B);	# a1?b1/(a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	&mul_1x1_merged("A31","B31",$A,$B);	# a1??b1/(a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 $code.=<<___;
 	XOR	A28,A31,A29
-||	XOR	B28,B31,B29			; a0?b0+a1?b1
+||	XOR	B28,B31,B29			; a0??b0+a1??b1
 ___
-	&mul_1x1_lower("A30","B30");		# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	&mul_1x1_lower("A30","B30");		# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 $code.=<<___;
 ||	BNOP	B3
 	XOR	A29,A30,A30
-||	XOR	B29,B30,B30			; (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)-a0?b0-a1?b1
+||	XOR	B29,B30,B30			; (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)-a0??b0-a1??b1
 	XOR	B28,A30,A30
 ||	STW	A28,*${rp}[0]
 	XOR	B30,A31,A31
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
index 951abc5..c0cee82 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8:
 // I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
 // (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
 // cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
-// clause in Itanium ?-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
+// clause in Itanium ??-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
 // highly appreciated.
 //
 // On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
index cd9f13e..9d18d40 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
@@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___
 if ($SIZE_T==8) {
 my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
 $code.=<<___;
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1?b1
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1??b1
 	stmg	$lo,$hi,16($rp)
 
 	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0?b0
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0??b0
 	stmg	$lo,$hi,0($rp)
 
 	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	xg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	xg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	lmg	@r[0], at r[3],0($rp)
 
 	xgr	$lo,$hi
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
index 808a1e5..b579530 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 # the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
 # code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
 # and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
-# from one benchmark and ?-arch to another. Below are interval values
+# from one benchmark and ??-arch to another. Below are interval values
 # for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
 # code:
 #
@@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&push	("edi");
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1?b1
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1??b1
 	&movq	("mm7",$R);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0?b0
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0??b0
 	&movq	("mm6",$R);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
 	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	&pxor	($R,"mm7");
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(0));
-	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)-a1?b1-a0?b0
+	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)-a1??b1-a0??b0
 
 	&movq	($A,$R);
 	&psllq	($R,32);
@@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) {
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1?b1
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1??b1
 	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
 	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0?b0
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0??b0
 	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
 	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
 
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
 	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 
 	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(0));
 		 @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
index d548886..d77dc43 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
 # undef mul_add
 
 /*-
- * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath ?-code;
+ * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath ??-code;
  * "g"(0)               let the compiler to decide where does it
  *                      want to keep the value of zero;
  */
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
index 226c66c..42bbec2 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
 # the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
 # for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
-# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and ?-arch to another.
+# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and ??-arch to another.
 # Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
 # [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
 # 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
@@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm4
 	movdqa		%xmm1,%xmm5
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1?b1
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1??b1
 	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm4
 	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm5
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0?b0
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0??b0
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	xorps		%xmm0,%xmm4
-	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)-a0?b0-a1?b1
+	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)-a0??b0-a1??b1
 	movdqa		%xmm4,%xmm5
 	pslldq		\$8,%xmm4
 	psrldq		\$8,%xmm5
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	\$0xf,$mask
 	mov	$a1,$a
 	mov	$b1,$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# a1?b1
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a1??b1
 	mov	$lo,16(%rsp)
 	mov	$hi,24(%rsp)
 
 	mov	48(%rsp),$a
 	mov	64(%rsp),$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# a0?b0
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a0??b0
 	mov	$lo,0(%rsp)
 	mov	$hi,8(%rsp)
 
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	56(%rsp),$b
 	xor	48(%rsp),$a
 	xor	64(%rsp),$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 ___
 	@r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
 $code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
index 7311ad2..2d225cf 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 # processes one byte in 8.45 cycles, A9 - in 10.2, A15 - in 7.63,
 # Snapdragon S4 - in 9.33.
 #
-# C?mara, D.; Gouv?a, C. P. L.; L?pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# C??mara, D.; Gouv??a, C. P. L.; L??pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
 # Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
 # 
 # http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@@ -449,12 +449,12 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
 	veor		$IN,$Xl			@ inp^=Xi
 .Lgmult_neon:
 ___
-	&clmul64x64	($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo");	# H.lo?Xi.lo
+	&clmul64x64	($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo");	# H.lo??Xi.lo
 $code.=<<___;
 	veor		$IN#lo,$IN#lo,$IN#hi	@ Karatsuba pre-processing
 ___
-	&clmul64x64	($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo");	# (H.lo+H.hi)?(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
-	&clmul64x64	($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi");	# H.hi?Xi.hi
+	&clmul64x64	($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo");	# (H.lo+H.hi)??(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	&clmul64x64	($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi");	# H.hi??Xi.hi
 $code.=<<___;
 	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xl		@ Karatsuba post-processing
 	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xh
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl
index a465b42..93f6985 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-c64xplus.pl
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ ___
 #    8/2                                         S1  L1x S2      |        ....
 #####...                                         ................|............
 $code.=<<___;
-	XORMPY	$H0,$xia,$H0x		; 0	; H?(Xi[i]<<1)
+	XORMPY	$H0,$xia,$H0x		; 0	; H??(Xi[i]<<1)
 ||	XORMPY	$H01u,$xib,$H01y
 || [A0]	LDBU	*--${xip},$x0
 	XORMPY	$H1,$xia,$H1x		; 1
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	XORMPY	$H3,$xia,$H3x		; 3
 ||	XORMPY	$H3u,$xib,$H3y
 ||[!A0]	MVK.D	15,A0				; *--${xip} counter
-	XOR.L	$H0x,$Z0,$Z0		; 4	; Z^=H?(Xi[i]<<1)
+	XOR.L	$H0x,$Z0,$Z0		; 4	; Z^=H??(Xi[i]<<1)
 || [A0]	SUB.S	A0,1,A0
 	XOR.L	$H1x,$Z1,$Z1		; 5
 ||	AND.D	$H01y,$FF000000,$H0z
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
index c1074ed..e928c42 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ gcm_init_vis3:
 	or	$V,%lo(0xA0406080),$V
 	or	%l0,%lo(0x20C0E000),%l0
 	sllx	$V,32,$V
-	or	%l0,$V,$V		! (0xE0?i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+	or	%l0,$V,$V		! (0xE0??i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
 	stx	$V,[%i0+16]
 
 	ret
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
 
 	mov	0xE1,%l7
 	sllx	%l7,57,$xE1		! 57 is not a typo
-	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0?i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0??i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
 
 	xor	$Hhi,$Hlo,$Hhl		! Karatsuba pre-processing
 	xmulx	$Xlo,$Hlo,$C0
@@ -411,9 +411,9 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
 	xmulx	$Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
 
 	sll	$C0,3,$sqr
-	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ?0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
+	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ??0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
 	xor	$C0,$sqr,$sqr
-	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0?0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
+	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0??0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
 
 	xor	$C0,$C1,$C1		! Karatsuba post-processing
 	xor	$Xlo,$C2,$C2
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
 	xor	$Xhi,$C2,$C2
 	xor	$Xhi,$C1,$C1
 
-	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ?0xE1<<1<<56
+	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ??0xE1<<1<<56
 	 xor	$C0,$C2,$C2
 	xmulx	$C1,$xE1,$C0
 	 xor	$C1,$C3,$C3
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
 
 	mov	0xE1,%l7
 	sllx	%l7,57,$xE1		! 57 is not a typo
-	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0?i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0??i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
 
 	and	$inp,7,$shl
 	andn	$inp,7,$inp
@@ -490,9 +490,9 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
 	xmulx	$Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
 
 	sll	$C0,3,$sqr
-	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ?0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
+	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ??0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
 	xor	$C0,$sqr,$sqr
-	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0?0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
+	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0??0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
 
 	xor	$C0,$C1,$C1		! Karatsuba post-processing
 	xor	$Xlo,$C2,$C2
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
 	xor	$Xhi,$C2,$C2
 	xor	$Xhi,$C1,$C1
 
-	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ?0xE1<<1<<56
+	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ??0xE1<<1<<56
 	 xor	$C0,$C2,$C2
 	xmulx	$C1,$xE1,$C0
 	 xor	$C1,$C3,$C3
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
index 23a5527..0269169 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ $S=12;		# shift factor for rem_4bit
 # effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
 # Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
 # rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
-# on contemporary ?-archs.
+# on contemporary ??-archs.
 {
     my $cnt;
     my $rem_4bit = "eax";
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
index 6e656ca..5a7ce39 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
@@ -576,15 +576,15 @@ $code.=<<___ if (0 || (&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi)&&0));
 	# experimental alternative. special thing about is that there
 	# no dependency between the two multiplications... 
 	mov		\$`0xE1<<1`,%eax
-	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10	# ((7..0)?0xE0)&0xff
+	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10	# ((7..0)??0xE0)&0xff
 	mov		\$0x07,%r11d
 	movq		%rax,$T1
 	movq		%r10,$T2
 	movq		%r11,$T3		# borrow $T3
 	pand		$Xi,$T3
-	pshufb		$T3,$T2			# ($Xi&7)?0xE0
+	pshufb		$T3,$T2			# ($Xi&7)??0xE0
 	movq		%rax,$T3
-	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Xi,$T1		# ?(0xE1<<1)
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Xi,$T1		# ??(0xE1<<1)
 	pxor		$Xi,$T2
 	pslldq		\$15,$T2
 	paddd		$T2,$T2			# <<(64+56+1)
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	je		.Lskip4x
 
 	sub		\$0x30,$len
-	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax	# ((7..0)?0xE0)&0xff
+	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax	# ((7..0)??0xE0)&0xff
 	movdqu		0x30($Htbl),$Hkey3
 	movdqu		0x40($Htbl),$Hkey4
 
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
index e76a58c..71457cf 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ $code=<<___;
 	 le?vperm	$IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask
 	vxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
 
-	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo?Xi.lo
-	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi?Xi.lo+H.lo?Xi.hi
-	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi?Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo??Xi.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi??Xi.lo+H.lo??Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi??Xi.hi
 
 	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st phase
 
@@ -178,11 +178,11 @@ $code=<<___;
 .align	5
 Loop:
 	 subic		$len,$len,16
-	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo?Xi.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo??Xi.lo
 	 subfe.		r0,r0,r0		# borrow?-1:0
-	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi?Xi.lo+H.lo?Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi??Xi.lo+H.lo??Xi.hi
 	 and		r0,r0,$len
-	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi?Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi??Xi.hi
 	 add		$inp,$inp,r0
 
 	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st phase
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
index 3750d25..fe3a34d 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
@@ -144,10 +144,10 @@ gcm_gmult_v8:
 #endif
 	vext.8		$IN,$t1,$t1,#8
 
-	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo?Xi.lo
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo??Xi.lo
 	veor		$t1,$t1,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
-	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi?Xi.hi
-	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)?(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi??Xi.hi
+	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)??(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
 
 	vext.8		$t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8		@ Karatsuba post-processing
 	veor		$t2,$Xl,$Xh
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 #endif
 	vext.8		$In,$t1,$t1,#8
 	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xl		@ I[i]^=Xi
-	vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H?Ii+1
+	vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H??Ii+1
 	veor		$t1,$t1,$In		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
 	vpmull2.p64	$Xhn,$H,$In
 	b		.Loop_mod2x_v8
@@ -244,14 +244,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .Loop_mod2x_v8:
 	vext.8		$t2,$IN,$IN,#8
 	subs		$len,$len,#32		@ is there more data?
-	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.lo?Xi.lo
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.lo??Xi.lo
 	cclr		$inc,lo			@ is it time to zero $inc?
 
 	 vpmull.p64	$Xmn,$Hhl,$t1
 	veor		$t2,$t2,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
-	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.hi?Xi.hi
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.hi??Xi.hi
 	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$Xln		@ accumulate
-	vpmull2.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t2		@ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)?(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t2		@ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)??(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
 	 vld1.64	{$t0},[$inp],$inc	@ load [rotated] I[i+2]
 
 	veor		$Xh,$Xh,$Xhn
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 vext.8		$In,$t1,$t1,#8
 	 vext.8		$IN,$t0,$t0,#8
 	veor		$Xl,$Xm,$t2
-	 vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H?Ii+1
+	 vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H??Ii+1
 	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xh		@ accumulate $IN early
 
 	vext.8		$t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8		@ 2nd phase of reduction
@@ -300,10 +300,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xl		@ inp^=Xi
 	veor		$t1,$t0,$t2		@ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi
 
-	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo?Xi.lo
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo??Xi.lo
 	veor		$t1,$t1,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
-	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi?Xi.hi
-	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)?(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi??Xi.hi
+	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)??(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
 
 	vext.8		$t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8		@ Karatsuba post-processing
 	veor		$t2,$Xl,$Xh
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl
index f906e09..d04e177 100644
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 # Sandy Bridge	5.0/+8%
 # Atom		12.6/+6%
 # VIA Nano	6.4/+9%
-# Ivy Bridge	4.9/?0%
+# Ivy Bridge	4.9/??0%
 # Bulldozer	4.9/+15%
 #
 # (*)	PIII can actually deliver 6.6 cycles per byte with MMX code,
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
index fa22763..4675106 100755
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 # achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference.
 # If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than
 # RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25%
-# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU ?-arch detection
+# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU ??-arch detection
 # is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be
 # preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance].
 
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
index 4895eb3..e0b5d83 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@
 # switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
 # comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
 # 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
-# pair of ?-ops, and it's the additional ?-ops, two per round, that
+# pair of ??-ops, and it's the additional ??-ops, two per round, that
 # make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
-# as single ?-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
+# as single ??-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
 # equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
 # cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
 # to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
index 6462e45..e907714 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SHA256 block transform for x86. September 2007.
 #
 # Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
-# 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some ?-archs, but
+# 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some ??-archs, but
 # it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
 #
 # May 2012.
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
index e96ec00..2f6a202 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 #
 # IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
 # performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
-# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer ?-archs improvement varies from 15%
+# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer ??-archs improvement varies from 15%
 # to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
 # code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
 # code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even
diff --git a/crypto/sparccpuid.S b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
index 9b6744f..72c7adf 100644
--- a/crypto/sparccpuid.S
+++ b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
 			fmovs	%f1,%f3
 			fmovs	%f0,%f2
 
-	add	%fp,BIAS,%i0	! return pointer to caller?s top of stack
+	add	%fp,BIAS,%i0	! return pointer to caller??s top of stack
 
 	ret
 	restore
diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
index c584e5b..7725951 100644
--- a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
+++ b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 # table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
 # minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
 # channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
-# gap among different ?-archs is smaller.
+# gap among different ??-archs is smaller.
 #
 # Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
 # whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
index c39acd7..ef105dc 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
  * (richard at levitte.org)
  */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H?gskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H??gskolan
  * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
  * All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
index 350b398..43fd362 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
  * (richard at levitte.org)
  */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H?gskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H??gskolan
  * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
  * All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/demos/easy_tls/README b/demos/easy_tls/README
index 816a580..ee89dfb 100644
--- a/demos/easy_tls/README
+++ b/demos/easy_tls/README
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ As noted above, easy_tls.c will be changed to become a library one
 day, which means that future revisions will not be fully compatible to
 the current version.
 
-Bodo M?ller <bodo at openssl.org>
+Bodo M??ller <bodo at openssl.org>
diff --git a/util/mkrc.pl b/util/mkrc.pl
index 0ceadcf..83ee6a4 100755
--- a/util/mkrc.pl
+++ b/util/mkrc.pl
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ BEGIN
             VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
             // Optional:
             //VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
-            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright ? 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright ? 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
+            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright ?? 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright ?? 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
             //VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
             //VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
             //VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"
diff --git a/util/toutf8.sh b/util/toutf8.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a4254b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/toutf8.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+#
+# Very simple script to detect and convert files that we want to re-encode to UTF8
+
+git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD | \
+    while read F; do
+	charset=`file -bi "$F" | sed -e 's|.*charset=||'`
+	if [ "$charset" != "utf-8" -a "$charset" != "binary" -a "$charset" != "us-ascii" ]; then
+	    iconv -f ISO-8859-1 -t UTF8 < "$F" > "$F.utf8" && \
+		( cmp -s "$F" "$F.utf8" || \
+			( echo "$F"
+			  mv "$F" "$F.iso-8859-1"
+			  mv "$F.utf8" "$F"
+			)
+		)
+	fi
+    done

From levitte at openssl.org  Mon Jul 13 23:19:11 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 23:19:11 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436829551.119077.639.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  9f0b86c68bb96d49301bbd6473c8235ca05ca06b (commit)
       via  5a3ce86e21715a683ff0d32421ed5c6d5e84234d (commit)
      from  8a1dbda755f7fa4dc3e9637b95ea2df04f0c7e4f (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9f0b86c68bb96d49301bbd6473c8235ca05ca06b
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 01:15:49 2015 +0200

    Conversion to UTF-8 where needed
    
    This leaves behind files with names ending with '.iso-8859-1'.  These
    should be safe to remove.  If something went wrong when re-encoding,
    there will be some files with names ending with '.utf8' left behind.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit 5a3ce86e21715a683ff0d32421ed5c6d5e84234d
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 16:50:16 2015 +0200

    Small script to re-encode files that need it to UTF-8
    
    This requires 'iconv' and that 'file' can take the options '-b' and '-i'.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit f608b4064d58ca4dfdfdfc921308b51cb96205e2)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                           | 168 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl         |   6 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl       |  10 +--
 crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S              |   2 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl       |   6 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl         |  16 ++--
 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c        |   2 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl      |  16 ++--
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl   |   8 +-
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl |  18 ++--
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl     |   2 +-
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl  |   8 +-
 crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl   |  12 +--
 crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl  |  22 ++---
 crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl      |   2 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl        |   4 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl      |   2 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl      |   2 +-
 crypto/sparccpuid.S               |   2 +-
 crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl     |   2 +-
 crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c            |   2 +-
 crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c           |   2 +-
 demos/easy_tls/README             |   2 +-
 util/mkrc.pl                      |   2 +-
 util/toutf8.sh                    |  17 ++++
 25 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 util/toutf8.sh

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 11ef03e..27cf65e 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@
      callbacks.
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
-     independently by Hanno B?ck.
+     independently by Hanno B??ck.
      (CVE-2015-1789)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
 
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
      (CVE-2015-1790)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
 
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
      (CVE-2015-0289)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
 
@@ -213,10 +213,10 @@
      servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
      a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
 
-     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K?sper
+     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K??sper
      (OpenSSL development team).
      (CVE-2015-0293)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
 
@@ -721,12 +721,12 @@
       version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
       version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
       sanity and breaks all known clients.
-      [David Benjamin, Emilia K?sper]
+      [David Benjamin, Emilia K??sper]
 
    *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
       early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
       renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
-      [Emilia K?sper]
+      [Emilia K??sper]
 
    *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
       ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@
       Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
       was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
       ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
-      [Emilia K?sper]
+      [Emilia K??sper]
 
  Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
 
@@ -817,10 +817,10 @@
      with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
      ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
 
-     Thanks to Felix Gr?bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+     Thanks to Felix Gr??bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
      issue.
      (CVE-2014-3510)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
      to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@
      properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
      Denial of Service attack.
 
-     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam?ki (Codenomicon) for
+     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam??ki (Codenomicon) for
      discovering and researching this issue.
      (CVE-2014-5139)
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@
 
      Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
      (CVE-2014-3508)
-     [Emilia K?sper, and Steve Henson]
+     [Emilia K??sper, and Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
      for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
@@ -899,15 +899,15 @@
      client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
      code on a vulnerable client or server.
 
-     Thanks to J?ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
-     [J?ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+     Thanks to J??ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [J??ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
      are subject to a denial of service attack.
 
-     Thanks to Felix Gr?bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     Thanks to Felix Gr??bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
      this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
-     [Felix Gr?bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+     [Felix Gr??bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
      compilation flags.
@@ -986,9 +986,9 @@
      Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
      Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
      (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
-     Emilia K?sper for the initial patch.
+     Emilia K??sper for the initial patch.
      (CVE-2013-0169)
-     [Emilia K?sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+     [Emilia K??sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
      ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
@@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@
      EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
      EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
      implementations).
-     [Emilia K?sper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
 
   *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
      all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
 
   *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
-     [Emilia K?sper (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper (Google)]
 
   *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
      interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
@@ -1453,7 +1453,7 @@
      lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
      BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
      the last update always remained unused).
-     [Emilia K?sper (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper (Google)]
 
   *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
      [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
@@ -2262,7 +2262,7 @@
 
   *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
      and response verification functionality.
-     [Zolt?n Gl?zik <zglozik at opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+     [Zolt??n Gl??zik <zglozik at opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
 
   *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
      extension so far.  The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
@@ -3430,7 +3430,7 @@
 
   *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
      initialised value as BN_new().
-     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -3449,7 +3449,7 @@
      some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
      maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
      in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
-     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf M?ller]
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
      that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
@@ -3516,7 +3516,7 @@
      [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
 
   *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
-     [G?tz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell at trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
+     [G??tz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell at trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
 
   *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
      control of the error stack.
@@ -4231,7 +4231,7 @@
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Undo Cygwin change.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
      Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
@@ -4264,11 +4264,11 @@
      [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
 
   *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
      prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
-     [Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> via Lutz J?nicke, resolves #1014]
+     [Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> via Lutz J??nicke, resolves #1014]
 
   *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -4730,7 +4730,7 @@
      pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
      the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
      data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
-     [G?tz Babin-Ebell <babinebell at trustcenter.de>]
+     [G??tz Babin-Ebell <babinebell at trustcenter.de>]
 
   *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
      [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com>]
@@ -6835,7 +6835,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) BN_sqr() bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis at cavium.com>]
+     [Ulf M??ller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis at cavium.com>]
 
   *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
      so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
@@ -6995,7 +6995,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Fix OAEP check.
-     [Ulf M?ller, Bodo M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller, Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
      RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
@@ -7257,10 +7257,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Use better test patterns in bntest.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
  
   *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
      [Bodo Moeller]
@@ -7405,14 +7405,14 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
      BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
-     [Bodo M?ller]
+     [Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Add DSO method for VMS.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
   *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
      wrong sign.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
      packages.  The default package contains applications, application
@@ -7430,7 +7430,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
      random number < q in the DSA library.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'.  This disables the default
      behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
@@ -7696,7 +7696,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
      Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
      Random Numbers.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
      DSA key.
@@ -7916,7 +7916,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
      rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
@@ -7948,7 +7948,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
      RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
@@ -8037,7 +8037,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
+     [Ulf M??ller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
       the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow at DEMENTIA.ORG>]
 
   *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
@@ -8138,7 +8138,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Rolf Haberrecker <rolf at suse.de>]
 
   *) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
      [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
@@ -8157,7 +8157,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
      case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
      assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
@@ -8187,14 +8187,14 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
-     [Ulf M?ller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
+     [Ulf M??ller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
       pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33 at cornell.edu>]
 
   *) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>.  New functions
      RAND_egd() and RAND_status().  In the command line application,
      the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
      or -rand.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
      Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
@@ -8227,7 +8227,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
         #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
         #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
      defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
-     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo M?ller]
+     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
      record layer.
@@ -8278,17 +8278,17 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
      bits.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
      [Andy Polyakov]
 
   *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
      equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
      options to produce them.
@@ -8296,11 +8296,11 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
      get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
      for p == 0.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
      include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
@@ -8324,7 +8324,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
      use void * instead of char * in lhash.
-     [Ulf M?ller] 
+     [Ulf M??ller] 
 
   *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
      (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
@@ -8369,13 +8369,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
      bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
      SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
      the comments.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
      made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
@@ -8385,25 +8385,25 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
      by stat().  RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
      to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
-     [Ulf M?ller, Bodo M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller, Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
      used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
      BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
      BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
      Rabin-Miller iterations.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
      DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
      (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
      "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
@@ -8459,7 +8459,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
      as a shared library without RSA.  Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
      NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. 
-     [Kris Kennaway <kris at hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Kris Kennaway <kris at hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
      has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
@@ -8468,7 +8468,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
      RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
      (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
      3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
@@ -8498,7 +8498,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, 
      unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
@@ -9332,7 +9332,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
      delete an unused file.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
      since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
@@ -9421,7 +9421,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      worked.
 
   *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
-     [Ulf M?ller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling at tislabs.com>]
+     [Ulf M??ller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling at tislabs.com>]
 
   *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
      RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
@@ -9538,7 +9538,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Ben Laurie]
 
   *) DES library cleanups.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
      used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
@@ -9581,7 +9581,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Christian Forster <fo at hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
 
   *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
      File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
@@ -9694,7 +9694,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
      -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
@@ -9751,10 +9751,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Ben Laurie]
 
   *) Support Borland C++ builder.
-     [Janez Jere <jj at void.si>, modified by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Janez Jere <jj at void.si>, modified by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support Mingw32.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -9763,7 +9763,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
 
   *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Update HPUX configuration.
      [Anonymous]
@@ -9796,7 +9796,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) OAEP decoding bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
      David Harris.
@@ -9819,21 +9819,21 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
 
   *) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
      extension adding in x509 utility.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
      prototypes.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
      by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
@@ -9862,7 +9862,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
      8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
@@ -9880,13 +9880,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
 
   *) Change functions to ANSI C.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix typos in error codes.
-     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf M?ller]
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -9923,7 +9923,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New Configure option "rsaref".
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
      [Bodo Moeller]
@@ -9971,7 +9971,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
      the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Tweaks to Configure
      [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
@@ -9981,11 +9981,11 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
      The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
   
   *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
      SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
@@ -10524,7 +10524,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
       Hagino <itojun at kame.net>]
 
   *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
-     [Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
      functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
@@ -10534,7 +10534,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
-     [Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
      [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
@@ -10681,7 +10681,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
      was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
-     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
      [Ben Laurie]
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
index 451d0e0..60286ec 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 # the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
 # register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
 # Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
-# better performance on most recent ?-archs...
+# better performance on most recent ??-archs...
 #
 # Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
 # up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
 $speed_limit=512;	# chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
 			# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
 $small_footprint=1;	# $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
-			# recent ?-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
+			# recent ??-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
 			# I favor compact code to minimize cache
 			# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
 			# in real-life applications...
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ sub enctransform()
 # Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
 # x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
 # Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
-# ?-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
+# ??-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
 # better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
 # eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
 # minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
index 8f529c9..72381a7 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 # referred below, which improves ECDH and ECDSA verify benchmarks
 # by 18-40%.
 #
-# C?mara, D.; Gouv?a, C. P. L.; L?pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# C??mara, D.; Gouv??a, C. P. L.; L??pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
 # Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
 # 
 # http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ ___
 ################
 # void	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
 #	BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
-#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0?b1b0
+#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0??b1b0
 {
 $code.=<<___;
 .global	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	$mask,#7<<2
 	sub	sp,sp,#32		@ allocate tab[8]
 
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1?b1
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1??b1
 	str	$lo,[$ret,#8]
 	str	$hi,[$ret,#12]
 
@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 eor	r2,r2,$a
 	eor	$b,$b,r3
 	 eor	$a,$a,r2
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0?b0
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0??b0
 	str	$lo,[$ret]
 	str	$hi,[$ret,#4]
 
 	eor	$a,$a,r2
 	eor	$b,$b,r3
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)?(b1+b0)
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)??(b1+b0)
 ___
 @r=map("r$_",(6..9));
 $code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
index 951abc5..c0cee82 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8:
 // I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
 // (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
 // cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
-// clause in Itanium ?-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
+// clause in Itanium ??-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
 // highly appreciated.
 //
 // On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
index cd9f13e..9d18d40 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
@@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___
 if ($SIZE_T==8) {
 my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
 $code.=<<___;
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1?b1
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1??b1
 	stmg	$lo,$hi,16($rp)
 
 	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0?b0
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0??b0
 	stmg	$lo,$hi,0($rp)
 
 	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	xg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	xg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	lmg	@r[0], at r[3],0($rp)
 
 	xgr	$lo,$hi
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
index 808a1e5..b579530 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 # the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
 # code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
 # and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
-# from one benchmark and ?-arch to another. Below are interval values
+# from one benchmark and ??-arch to another. Below are interval values
 # for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
 # code:
 #
@@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&push	("edi");
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1?b1
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1??b1
 	&movq	("mm7",$R);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0?b0
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0??b0
 	&movq	("mm6",$R);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
 	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	&pxor	($R,"mm7");
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(0));
-	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)-a1?b1-a0?b0
+	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)-a1??b1-a0??b0
 
 	&movq	($A,$R);
 	&psllq	($R,32);
@@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) {
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1?b1
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1??b1
 	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
 	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0?b0
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0??b0
 	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
 	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
 
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
 	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 
 	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(0));
 		 @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
index d548886..d77dc43 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
 # undef mul_add
 
 /*-
- * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath ?-code;
+ * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath ??-code;
  * "g"(0)               let the compiler to decide where does it
  *                      want to keep the value of zero;
  */
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
index 226c66c..42bbec2 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
 # the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
 # for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
-# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and ?-arch to another.
+# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and ??-arch to another.
 # Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
 # [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
 # 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
@@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm4
 	movdqa		%xmm1,%xmm5
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1?b1
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1??b1
 	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm4
 	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm5
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0?b0
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0??b0
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	xorps		%xmm0,%xmm4
-	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)-a0?b0-a1?b1
+	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)-a0??b0-a1??b1
 	movdqa		%xmm4,%xmm5
 	pslldq		\$8,%xmm4
 	psrldq		\$8,%xmm5
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	\$0xf,$mask
 	mov	$a1,$a
 	mov	$b1,$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# a1?b1
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a1??b1
 	mov	$lo,16(%rsp)
 	mov	$hi,24(%rsp)
 
 	mov	48(%rsp),$a
 	mov	64(%rsp),$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# a0?b0
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a0??b0
 	mov	$lo,0(%rsp)
 	mov	$hi,8(%rsp)
 
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	56(%rsp),$b
 	xor	48(%rsp),$a
 	xor	64(%rsp),$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 ___
 	@r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
 $code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
index 77fbf34..21f877a 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 # processes one byte in 8.45 cycles, A9 - in 10.2, Snapdragon S4 -
 # in 9.33.
 #
-# C?mara, D.; Gouv?a, C. P. L.; L?pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# C??mara, D.; Gouv??a, C. P. L.; L??pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
 # Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
 # 
 # http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@@ -432,12 +432,12 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
 	veor		$IN,$Xl			@ inp^=Xi
 .Lgmult_neon:
 ___
-	&clmul64x64	($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo");	# H.lo?Xi.lo
+	&clmul64x64	($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo");	# H.lo??Xi.lo
 $code.=<<___;
 	veor		$IN#lo,$IN#lo,$IN#hi	@ Karatsuba pre-processing
 ___
-	&clmul64x64	($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo");	# (H.lo+H.hi)?(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
-	&clmul64x64	($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi");	# H.hi?Xi.hi
+	&clmul64x64	($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo");	# (H.lo+H.hi)??(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	&clmul64x64	($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi");	# H.hi??Xi.hi
 $code.=<<___;
 	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xl		@ Karatsuba post-processing
 	veor		$Xm,$Xm,$Xh
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
index 0365e0f..5bc2870 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ gcm_init_vis3:
 	or	$V,%lo(0xA0406080),$V
 	or	%l0,%lo(0x20C0E000),%l0
 	sllx	$V,32,$V
-	or	%l0,$V,$V		! (0xE0?i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+	or	%l0,$V,$V		! (0xE0??i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
 	stx	$V,[%i0+16]
 
 	ret
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
 
 	mov	0xE1,%l7
 	sllx	%l7,57,$xE1		! 57 is not a typo
-	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0?i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0??i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
 
 	xor	$Hhi,$Hlo,$Hhl		! Karatsuba pre-processing
 	xmulx	$Xlo,$Hlo,$C0
@@ -411,9 +411,9 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
 	xmulx	$Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
 
 	sll	$C0,3,$sqr
-	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ?0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
+	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ??0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
 	xor	$C0,$sqr,$sqr
-	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0?0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
+	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0??0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
 
 	xor	$C0,$C1,$C1		! Karatsuba post-processing
 	xor	$Xlo,$C2,$C2
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
 	xor	$Xhi,$C2,$C2
 	xor	$Xhi,$C1,$C1
 
-	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ?0xE1<<1<<56
+	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ??0xE1<<1<<56
 	 xor	$C0,$C2,$C2
 	xmulx	$C1,$xE1,$C0
 	 xor	$C1,$C3,$C3
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
 
 	mov	0xE1,%l7
 	sllx	%l7,57,$xE1		! 57 is not a typo
-	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0?i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
+	ldx	[$Htable+16],$V		! (0xE0??i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
 
 	and	$inp,7,$shl
 	andn	$inp,7,$inp
@@ -490,9 +490,9 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
 	xmulx	$Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
 
 	sll	$C0,3,$sqr
-	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ?0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
+	srlx	$V,$sqr,$sqr		! ??0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
 	xor	$C0,$sqr,$sqr
-	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0?0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
+	sllx	$sqr,57,$sqr		! ($C0??0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
 
 	xor	$C0,$C1,$C1		! Karatsuba post-processing
 	xor	$Xlo,$C2,$C2
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
 	xor	$Xhi,$C2,$C2
 	xor	$Xhi,$C1,$C1
 
-	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ?0xE1<<1<<56
+	xmulxhi	$C0,$xE1,$Xlo		! ??0xE1<<1<<56
 	 xor	$C0,$C2,$C2
 	xmulx	$C1,$xE1,$C0
 	 xor	$C1,$C3,$C3
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
index 23a5527..0269169 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ $S=12;		# shift factor for rem_4bit
 # effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
 # Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
 # rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
-# on contemporary ?-archs.
+# on contemporary ??-archs.
 {
     my $cnt;
     my $rem_4bit = "eax";
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
index 6e656ca..5a7ce39 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
@@ -576,15 +576,15 @@ $code.=<<___ if (0 || (&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi)&&0));
 	# experimental alternative. special thing about is that there
 	# no dependency between the two multiplications... 
 	mov		\$`0xE1<<1`,%eax
-	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10	# ((7..0)?0xE0)&0xff
+	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10	# ((7..0)??0xE0)&0xff
 	mov		\$0x07,%r11d
 	movq		%rax,$T1
 	movq		%r10,$T2
 	movq		%r11,$T3		# borrow $T3
 	pand		$Xi,$T3
-	pshufb		$T3,$T2			# ($Xi&7)?0xE0
+	pshufb		$T3,$T2			# ($Xi&7)??0xE0
 	movq		%rax,$T3
-	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Xi,$T1		# ?(0xE1<<1)
+	pclmulqdq	\$0x00,$Xi,$T1		# ??(0xE1<<1)
 	pxor		$Xi,$T2
 	pslldq		\$15,$T2
 	paddd		$T2,$T2			# <<(64+56+1)
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	je		.Lskip4x
 
 	sub		\$0x30,$len
-	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax	# ((7..0)?0xE0)&0xff
+	mov		\$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax	# ((7..0)??0xE0)&0xff
 	movdqu		0x30($Htbl),$Hkey3
 	movdqu		0x40($Htbl),$Hkey4
 
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
index e76a58c..71457cf 100755
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
@@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ $code=<<___;
 	 le?vperm	$IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask
 	vxor		$zero,$zero,$zero
 
-	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo?Xi.lo
-	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi?Xi.lo+H.lo?Xi.hi
-	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi?Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo??Xi.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi??Xi.lo+H.lo??Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi??Xi.hi
 
 	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st phase
 
@@ -178,11 +178,11 @@ $code=<<___;
 .align	5
 Loop:
 	 subic		$len,$len,16
-	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo?Xi.lo
+	vpmsumd		$Xl,$IN,$Hl		# H.lo??Xi.lo
 	 subfe.		r0,r0,r0		# borrow?-1:0
-	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi?Xi.lo+H.lo?Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xm,$IN,$H		# H.hi??Xi.lo+H.lo??Xi.hi
 	 and		r0,r0,$len
-	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi?Xi.hi
+	vpmsumd		$Xh,$IN,$Hh		# H.hi??Xi.hi
 	 add		$inp,$inp,r0
 
 	vpmsumd		$t2,$Xl,$xC2		# 1st phase
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
index 0b9cd73..0886d21 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
@@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ gcm_gmult_v8:
 #endif
 	vext.8		$IN,$t1,$t1,#8
 
-	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo?Xi.lo
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo??Xi.lo
 	veor		$t1,$t1,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
-	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi?Xi.hi
-	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)?(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi??Xi.hi
+	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)??(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
 
 	vext.8		$t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8		@ Karatsuba post-processing
 	veor		$t2,$Xl,$Xh
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 #endif
 	vext.8		$In,$t1,$t1,#8
 	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xl		@ I[i]^=Xi
-	vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H?Ii+1
+	vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H??Ii+1
 	veor		$t1,$t1,$In		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
 	vpmull2.p64	$Xhn,$H,$In
 	b		.Loop_mod2x_v8
@@ -235,14 +235,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .Loop_mod2x_v8:
 	vext.8		$t2,$IN,$IN,#8
 	subs		$len,$len,#32		@ is there more data?
-	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.lo?Xi.lo
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.lo??Xi.lo
 	cclr		$inc,lo			@ is it time to zero $inc?
 
 	 vpmull.p64	$Xmn,$Hhl,$t1
 	veor		$t2,$t2,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
-	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.hi?Xi.hi
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H2,$IN		@ H^2.hi??Xi.hi
 	veor		$Xl,$Xl,$Xln		@ accumulate
-	vpmull2.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t2		@ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)?(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t2		@ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)??(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
 	 vld1.64	{$t0},[$inp],$inc	@ load [rotated] I[i+2]
 
 	veor		$Xh,$Xh,$Xhn
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 vext.8		$In,$t1,$t1,#8
 	 vext.8		$IN,$t0,$t0,#8
 	veor		$Xl,$Xm,$t2
-	 vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H?Ii+1
+	 vpmull.p64	$Xln,$H,$In		@ H??Ii+1
 	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xh		@ accumulate $IN early
 
 	vext.8		$t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8		@ 2nd phase of reduction
@@ -291,10 +291,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	veor		$IN,$IN,$Xl		@ inp^=Xi
 	veor		$t1,$t0,$t2		@ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi
 
-	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo?Xi.lo
+	vpmull.p64	$Xl,$H,$IN		@ H.lo??Xi.lo
 	veor		$t1,$t1,$IN		@ Karatsuba pre-processing
-	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi?Xi.hi
-	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)?(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
+	vpmull2.p64	$Xh,$H,$IN		@ H.hi??Xi.hi
+	vpmull.p64	$Xm,$Hhl,$t1		@ (H.lo+H.hi)??(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
 
 	vext.8		$t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8		@ Karatsuba post-processing
 	veor		$t2,$Xl,$Xh
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
index 75750db..20722d3 100755
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 # achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference.
 # If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than
 # RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25%
-# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU ?-arch detection
+# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU ??-arch detection
 # is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be
 # preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance].
 
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
index 4895eb3..e0b5d83 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@
 # switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
 # comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
 # 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
-# pair of ?-ops, and it's the additional ?-ops, two per round, that
+# pair of ??-ops, and it's the additional ??-ops, two per round, that
 # make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
-# as single ?-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
+# as single ??-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
 # equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
 # cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
 # to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
index 6462e45..e907714 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 # SHA256 block transform for x86. September 2007.
 #
 # Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
-# 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some ?-archs, but
+# 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some ??-archs, but
 # it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
 #
 # May 2012.
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
index e96ec00..2f6a202 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 #
 # IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
 # performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
-# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer ?-archs improvement varies from 15%
+# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer ??-archs improvement varies from 15%
 # to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
 # code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
 # code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even
diff --git a/crypto/sparccpuid.S b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
index eea2006..7b12ec2 100644
--- a/crypto/sparccpuid.S
+++ b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
 			fmovs	%f1,%f3
 			fmovs	%f0,%f2
 
-	add	%fp,BIAS,%i0	! return pointer to caller?s top of stack
+	add	%fp,BIAS,%i0	! return pointer to caller??s top of stack
 
 	ret
 	restore
diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
index c584e5b..7725951 100644
--- a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
+++ b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 # table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
 # minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
 # channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
-# gap among different ?-archs is smaller.
+# gap among different ??-archs is smaller.
 #
 # Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
 # whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
index fe0d806..48ac095 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
  * (richard at levitte.org)
  */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H?gskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H??gskolan
  * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
  * All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
index 350b398..43fd362 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
  * (richard at levitte.org)
  */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H?gskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H??gskolan
  * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
  * All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/demos/easy_tls/README b/demos/easy_tls/README
index 816a580..ee89dfb 100644
--- a/demos/easy_tls/README
+++ b/demos/easy_tls/README
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ As noted above, easy_tls.c will be changed to become a library one
 day, which means that future revisions will not be fully compatible to
 the current version.
 
-Bodo M?ller <bodo at openssl.org>
+Bodo M??ller <bodo at openssl.org>
diff --git a/util/mkrc.pl b/util/mkrc.pl
index 0ceadcf..83ee6a4 100755
--- a/util/mkrc.pl
+++ b/util/mkrc.pl
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ BEGIN
             VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
             // Optional:
             //VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
-            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright ? 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright ? 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
+            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright ?? 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright ?? 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
             //VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
             //VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
             //VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"
diff --git a/util/toutf8.sh b/util/toutf8.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a4254b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/toutf8.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+#
+# Very simple script to detect and convert files that we want to re-encode to UTF8
+
+git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD | \
+    while read F; do
+	charset=`file -bi "$F" | sed -e 's|.*charset=||'`
+	if [ "$charset" != "utf-8" -a "$charset" != "binary" -a "$charset" != "us-ascii" ]; then
+	    iconv -f ISO-8859-1 -t UTF8 < "$F" > "$F.utf8" && \
+		( cmp -s "$F" "$F.utf8" || \
+			( echo "$F"
+			  mv "$F" "$F.iso-8859-1"
+			  mv "$F.utf8" "$F"
+			)
+		)
+	fi
+    done

From levitte at openssl.org  Mon Jul 13 23:19:17 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2015 23:19:17 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436829557.359772.883.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  a027bba22a095c9a71d1e8b55a786bd0d483f581 (commit)
       via  13e742a4393a7353437926db03e09f23766311dc (commit)
      from  2794dec7b21f4faf5095008d3dd9743f41cc19ad (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a027bba22a095c9a71d1e8b55a786bd0d483f581
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 01:16:17 2015 +0200

    Conversion to UTF-8 where needed
    
    This leaves behind files with names ending with '.iso-8859-1'.  These
    should be safe to remove.  If something went wrong when re-encoding,
    there will be some files with names ending with '.utf8' left behind.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit 13e742a4393a7353437926db03e09f23766311dc
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 13 16:50:16 2015 +0200

    Small script to re-encode files that need it to UTF-8
    
    This requires 'iconv' and that 'file' can take the options '-b' and '-i'.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit f608b4064d58ca4dfdfdfc921308b51cb96205e2)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                         | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl       |   6 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl     |  24 +++---
 crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S            |   2 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl     |   6 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl       |  16 ++--
 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c      |   2 +-
 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl    |  16 ++--
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl |   6 +-
 crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl   |   2 +-
 crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl    |   2 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl      |   4 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl    |   2 +-
 crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl    |   2 +-
 crypto/sparccpuid.S             |   2 +-
 crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl   |   2 +-
 crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c          |   2 +-
 crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c         |   2 +-
 demos/easy_tls/README           |   2 +-
 util/mkrc.pl                    |   2 +-
 util/toutf8.sh                  |  17 ++++
 21 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 util/toutf8.sh

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 38ae89f..c2aba4b 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@
      callbacks.
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
-     independently by Hanno B?ck.
+     independently by Hanno B??ck.
      (CVE-2015-1789)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
 
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
      (CVE-2015-1790)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
 
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
 
      This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
      (CVE-2015-0289)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
 
@@ -144,10 +144,10 @@
      servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
      a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
 
-     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K?sper
+     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K??sper
      (OpenSSL development team).
      (CVE-2015-0293)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
 
@@ -292,12 +292,12 @@
       version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
       version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
       sanity and breaks all known clients.
-      [David Benjamin, Emilia K?sper]
+      [David Benjamin, Emilia K??sper]
 
    *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
       early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
       renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
-      [Emilia K?sper]
+      [Emilia K??sper]
 
    *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
       ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@
       Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
       was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
       ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
-      [Emilia K?sper]
+      [Emilia K??sper]
 
  Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
 
@@ -388,10 +388,10 @@
      with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
      ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
 
-     Thanks to Felix Gr?bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+     Thanks to Felix Gr??bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
      issue.
      (CVE-2014-3510)
-     [Emilia K?sper]
+     [Emilia K??sper]
 
   *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
      to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@
      properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
      Denial of Service attack.
 
-     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam?ki (Codenomicon) for
+     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam??ki (Codenomicon) for
      discovering and researching this issue.
      (CVE-2014-5139)
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
 
      Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
      (CVE-2014-3508)
-     [Emilia K?sper, and Steve Henson]
+     [Emilia K??sper, and Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
      for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
@@ -470,15 +470,15 @@
      client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
      code on a vulnerable client or server.
 
-     Thanks to J?ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
-     [J?ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+     Thanks to J??ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [J??ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
      are subject to a denial of service attack.
 
-     Thanks to Felix Gr?bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     Thanks to Felix Gr??bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
      this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
-     [Felix Gr?bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+     [Felix Gr??bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
      compilation flags.
@@ -557,9 +557,9 @@
      Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
      Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
      (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
-     Emilia K?sper for the initial patch.
+     Emilia K??sper for the initial patch.
      (CVE-2013-0169)
-     [Emilia K?sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+     [Emilia K??sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
      ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@
      EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
      EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
      implementations).
-     [Emilia K?sper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
 
   *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
      all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
 
   *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
-     [Emilia K?sper (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper (Google)]
 
   *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
      interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@
      lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
      BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
      the last update always remained unused).
-     [Emilia K?sper (Google)]
+     [Emilia K??sper (Google)]
 
   *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
      [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
@@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@
 
   *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
      and response verification functionality.
-     [Zolt?n Gl?zik <zglozik at opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+     [Zolt??n Gl??zik <zglozik at opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
 
   *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
      extension so far.  The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
@@ -3001,7 +3001,7 @@
 
   *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
      initialised value as BN_new().
-     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -3020,7 +3020,7 @@
      some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
      maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
      in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
-     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf M?ller]
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
      that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
@@ -3087,7 +3087,7 @@
      [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
 
   *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
-     [G?tz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell at trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
+     [G??tz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell at trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
 
   *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
      control of the error stack.
@@ -3802,7 +3802,7 @@
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Undo Cygwin change.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
      Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
@@ -3835,11 +3835,11 @@
      [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
 
   *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
      prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
-     [Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> via Lutz J?nicke, resolves #1014]
+     [Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> via Lutz J??nicke, resolves #1014]
 
   *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -4301,7 +4301,7 @@
      pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
      the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
      data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
-     [G?tz Babin-Ebell <babinebell at trustcenter.de>]
+     [G??tz Babin-Ebell <babinebell at trustcenter.de>]
 
   *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
      [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com>]
@@ -6406,7 +6406,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) BN_sqr() bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis at cavium.com>]
+     [Ulf M??ller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis at cavium.com>]
 
   *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
      so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
@@ -6566,7 +6566,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Fix OAEP check.
-     [Ulf M?ller, Bodo M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller, Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
      RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
@@ -6828,10 +6828,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Use better test patterns in bntest.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
  
   *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
      [Bodo Moeller]
@@ -6976,14 +6976,14 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
      BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
-     [Bodo M?ller]
+     [Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Add DSO method for VMS.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
   *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
      wrong sign.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
      packages.  The default package contains applications, application
@@ -7001,7 +7001,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
      random number < q in the DSA library.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'.  This disables the default
      behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
@@ -7267,7 +7267,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
      Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
      Random Numbers.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
      DSA key.
@@ -7487,7 +7487,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
      rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
@@ -7519,7 +7519,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
      RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
@@ -7608,7 +7608,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
+     [Ulf M??ller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
       the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow at DEMENTIA.ORG>]
 
   *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
@@ -7709,7 +7709,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Rolf Haberrecker <rolf at suse.de>]
 
   *) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
      [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke at aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
@@ -7728,7 +7728,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
      case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
      assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
@@ -7758,14 +7758,14 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
-     [Ulf M?ller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
+     [Ulf M??ller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
       pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33 at cornell.edu>]
 
   *) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>.  New functions
      RAND_egd() and RAND_status().  In the command line application,
      the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
      or -rand.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
      Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
@@ -7798,7 +7798,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
         #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
         #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
      defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
-     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo M?ller]
+     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
      record layer.
@@ -7849,17 +7849,17 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
      bits.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
      [Andy Polyakov]
 
   *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
      equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
      options to produce them.
@@ -7867,11 +7867,11 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
      get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
      for p == 0.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
      include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
@@ -7895,7 +7895,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
      use void * instead of char * in lhash.
-     [Ulf M?ller] 
+     [Ulf M??ller] 
 
   *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
      (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
@@ -7940,13 +7940,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
      bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
      SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
      the comments.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
      made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
@@ -7956,25 +7956,25 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
      by stat().  RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
      to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
-     [Ulf M?ller, Bodo M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller, Bodo M??ller]
 
   *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
      used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
      BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
      BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
      Rabin-Miller iterations.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
      DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
      (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
      "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
@@ -8030,7 +8030,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
      as a shared library without RSA.  Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
      NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. 
-     [Kris Kennaway <kris at hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Kris Kennaway <kris at hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
      has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
@@ -8039,7 +8039,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
      RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
      (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
      3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
@@ -8069,7 +8069,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, 
      unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
@@ -8903,7 +8903,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
      delete an unused file.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
      since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
@@ -8992,7 +8992,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      worked.
 
   *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
-     [Ulf M?ller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling at tislabs.com>]
+     [Ulf M??ller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling at tislabs.com>]
 
   *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
      RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
@@ -9109,7 +9109,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Ben Laurie]
 
   *) DES library cleanups.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
      used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
@@ -9152,7 +9152,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Christian Forster <fo at hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
 
   *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
      File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
@@ -9265,7 +9265,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
      -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
@@ -9322,10 +9322,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Ben Laurie]
 
   *) Support Borland C++ builder.
-     [Janez Jere <jj at void.si>, modified by Ulf M?ller]
+     [Janez Jere <jj at void.si>, modified by Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support Mingw32.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -9334,7 +9334,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
 
   *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Update HPUX configuration.
      [Anonymous]
@@ -9367,7 +9367,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) OAEP decoding bug fix.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
      David Harris.
@@ -9390,21 +9390,21 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
 
   *) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
      extension adding in x509 utility.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
      prototypes.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
      by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
@@ -9433,7 +9433,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
      8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
@@ -9451,13 +9451,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
 
   *) Change functions to ANSI C.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Fix typos in error codes.
-     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf M?ller]
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer at MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
      [Andy Polyakov <appro at fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -9494,7 +9494,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New Configure option "rsaref".
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
      [Bodo Moeller]
@@ -9542,7 +9542,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
      the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) Tweaks to Configure
      [Niels Poppe <niels at netbox.org>]
@@ -9552,11 +9552,11 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
 
   *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
      The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
-     [Ulf M?ller]
+     [Ulf M??ller]
   
   *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
      SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
@@ -10095,7 +10095,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
       Hagino <itojun at kame.net>]
 
   *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
-     [Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
      functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
@@ -10105,7 +10105,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
-     [Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
      [Anonymous <nobody at replay.com>]
@@ -10252,7 +10252,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
      was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
-     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M?ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
+     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M??ller <ulf at fitug.de>]
 
   *) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
      [Ben Laurie]
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
index 687ed81..51b500d 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 # the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
 # register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
 # Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
-# better performance on most recent ?-archs...
+# better performance on most recent ??-archs...
 #
 # Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
 # up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
 $speed_limit=512;	# chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
 			# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
 $small_footprint=1;	# $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
-			# recent ?-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
+			# recent ??-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
 			# I favor compact code to minimize cache
 			# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
 			# in real-life applications...
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ sub enctransform()
 # Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
 # x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
 # Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
-# ?-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
+# ??-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
 # better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
 # eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
 # minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
index c52e0b7..22ad1f8 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
@@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ $code=<<___;
 .align	5
 mul_1x1_neon:
 	vshl.u64	`&Dlo("q1")`,d16,#8	@ q1-q3 are slided $a
-	vmull.p8	`&Q("d0")`,d16,d17	@ a?bb
+	vmull.p8	`&Q("d0")`,d16,d17	@ a??bb
 	vshl.u64	`&Dlo("q2")`,d16,#16
-	vmull.p8	q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17	@ a<<8?bb
+	vmull.p8	q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17	@ a<<8??bb
 	vshl.u64	`&Dlo("q3")`,d16,#24
-	vmull.p8	q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17	@ a<<16?bb
+	vmull.p8	q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17	@ a<<16??bb
 	vshr.u64	`&Dlo("q1")`,#8
-	vmull.p8	q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17	@ a<<24?bb
+	vmull.p8	q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17	@ a<<24??bb
 	vshl.u64	`&Dhi("q1")`,#24
 	veor		d0,`&Dlo("q1")`
 	vshr.u64	`&Dlo("q2")`,#16
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ___
 ################
 # void	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
 #	BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
-#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0?b1b0
+#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0??b1b0
 
 ($A1,$B1,$A0,$B0,$A1B1,$A0B0)=map("d$_",(18..23));
 
@@ -184,20 +184,20 @@ bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
 
 	vmov	d16,$A1
 	vmov	d17,$B1
-	bl	mul_1x1_neon		@ a1?b1
+	bl	mul_1x1_neon		@ a1??b1
 	vmov	$A1B1,d0
 
 	vmov	d16,$A0
 	vmov	d17,$B0
-	bl	mul_1x1_neon		@ a0?b0
+	bl	mul_1x1_neon		@ a0??b0
 	vmov	$A0B0,d0
 
 	veor	d16,$A0,$A1
 	veor	d17,$B0,$B1
 	veor	$A0,$A0B0,$A1B1
-	bl	mul_1x1_neon		@ (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	bl	mul_1x1_neon		@ (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 
-	veor	d0,$A0			@ (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)-a0?b0-a1?b1
+	veor	d0,$A0			@ (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)-a0??b0-a1??b1
 	vshl.u64 d1,d0,#32
 	vshr.u64 d0,d0,#32
 	veor	$A0B0,d1
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	$mask,#7<<2
 	sub	sp,sp,#32		@ allocate tab[8]
 
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1?b1
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1??b1
 	str	$lo,[$ret,#8]
 	str	$hi,[$ret,#12]
 
@@ -230,13 +230,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 eor	r2,r2,$a
 	eor	$b,$b,r3
 	 eor	$a,$a,r2
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0?b0
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0??b0
 	str	$lo,[$ret]
 	str	$hi,[$ret,#4]
 
 	eor	$a,$a,r2
 	eor	$b,$b,r3
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)?(b1+b0)
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)??(b1+b0)
 ___
 @r=map("r$_",(6..9));
 $code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
index 951abc5..c0cee82 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8:
 // I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
 // (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
 // cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
-// clause in Itanium ?-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
+// clause in Itanium ??-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
 // highly appreciated.
 //
 // On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
index cd9f13e..9d18d40 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
@@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___
 if ($SIZE_T==8) {
 my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
 $code.=<<___;
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1?b1
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1??b1
 	stmg	$lo,$hi,16($rp)
 
 	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0?b0
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0??b0
 	stmg	$lo,$hi,0($rp)
 
 	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	xg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	xg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	lmg	@r[0], at r[3],0($rp)
 
 	xgr	$lo,$hi
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
index 808a1e5..b579530 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 # the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
 # code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
 # and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
-# from one benchmark and ?-arch to another. Below are interval values
+# from one benchmark and ??-arch to another. Below are interval values
 # for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
 # code:
 #
@@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&push	("edi");
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1?b1
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1??b1
 	&movq	("mm7",$R);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0?b0
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0??b0
 	&movq	("mm6",$R);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
 	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	&pxor	($R,"mm7");
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(0));
-	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)-a1?b1-a0?b0
+	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)-a1??b1-a0??b0
 
 	&movq	($A,$R);
 	&psllq	($R,32);
@@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) {
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1?b1
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1??b1
 	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
 	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
 
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0?b0
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0??b0
 	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
 	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
 
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
 	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 
 	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(0));
 		 @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
index 9c5074b..0a5bb28 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 # undef sqr
 
 /*-
- * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath ?-code;
+ * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath ??-code;
  * "g"(0)               let the compiler to decide where does it
  *                      want to keep the value of zero;
  */
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
index 226c66c..42bbec2 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
 # the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
 # for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
-# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and ?-arch to another.
+# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and ??-arch to another.
 # Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
 # [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
 # 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
@@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm4
 	movdqa		%xmm1,%xmm5
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1?b1
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1??b1
 	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm4
 	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm5
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0?b0
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0??b0
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 	xorps		%xmm0,%xmm4
-	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)-a0?b0-a1?b1
+	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)-a0??b0-a1??b1
 	movdqa		%xmm4,%xmm5
 	pslldq		\$8,%xmm4
 	psrldq		\$8,%xmm5
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	\$0xf,$mask
 	mov	$a1,$a
 	mov	$b1,$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# a1?b1
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a1??b1
 	mov	$lo,16(%rsp)
 	mov	$hi,24(%rsp)
 
 	mov	48(%rsp),$a
 	mov	64(%rsp),$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# a0?b0
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a0??b0
 	mov	$lo,0(%rsp)
 	mov	$hi,8(%rsp)
 
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	56(%rsp),$b
 	xor	48(%rsp),$a
 	xor	64(%rsp),$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)?(b0+b1)
+	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)??(b0+b1)
 ___
 	@r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
 $code.=<<___;
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
index d91586e..e46f8e3 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
@@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
 	vdup.8		$xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0]	@ broadcast lowest byte
 .Linner_neon:
 	subs		$cnt,$cnt,#1
-	vmull.p8	$Qlo,$Hlo,$xi		@ H.lo?Xi[i]
-	vmull.p8	$Qhi,$Hhi,$xi		@ H.hi?Xi[i]
+	vmull.p8	$Qlo,$Hlo,$xi		@ H.lo??Xi[i]
+	vmull.p8	$Qhi,$Hhi,$xi		@ H.hi??Xi[i]
 	vext.8		$IN,$zero,#1		@ IN>>=8
 
 	veor		$Z,$Qpost		@ modulo-scheduled part
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
 	vsli.8		$Zo,$T,#1		@ compose the "carry" byte
 	vext.8		$Z,$zero,#1		@ Z>>=8
 
-	vmull.p8	$R,$Zo,$mod		@ "carry"?0xe1
+	vmull.p8	$R,$Zo,$mod		@ "carry"??0xe1
 	vshr.u8		$Zo,$T,#7		@ save Z's bottom bit
 	vext.8		$Qpost,$Qlo,$zero,#1	@ Qlo>>=8
 	veor		$Z,$Qhi
diff --git a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
index 83c727e..2426cd0 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
+++ b/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ $S=12;		# shift factor for rem_4bit
 # effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
 # Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
 # rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
-# on contemporary ?-archs.
+# on contemporary ??-archs.
 {
     my $cnt;
     my $rem_4bit = "eax";
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
index 75750db..20722d3 100755
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 # achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference.
 # If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than
 # RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25%
-# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU ?-arch detection
+# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU ??-arch detection
 # is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be
 # preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance].
 
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
index 1084d22..2b119ff 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@
 # switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
 # comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
 # 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
-# pair of ?-ops, and it's the additional ?-ops, two per round, that
+# pair of ??-ops, and it's the additional ??-ops, two per round, that
 # make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
-# as single ?-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
+# as single ??-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
 # equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
 # cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
 # to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
index 928ec53..52a7c7f 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #     purposes.
 #
 # Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
-# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some ?-archs, but
+# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some ??-archs, but
 # it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
 
 $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
index 7eab6a5..9f8c51e 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 #
 # IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
 # performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
-# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer ?-archs improvement varies from 15%
+# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer ??-archs improvement varies from 15%
 # to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
 # code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
 # code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even
diff --git a/crypto/sparccpuid.S b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
index 0cc247e..c63d5da 100644
--- a/crypto/sparccpuid.S
+++ b/crypto/sparccpuid.S
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
 			fmovs	%f1,%f3
 			fmovs	%f0,%f2
 
-	add	%fp,BIAS,%i0	! return pointer to caller?s top of stack
+	add	%fp,BIAS,%i0	! return pointer to caller??s top of stack
 
 	ret
 	restore
diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
index cb2381c..90c2eca 100644
--- a/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
+++ b/crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 # table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
 # minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
 # channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
-# gap among different ?-archs is smaller.
+# gap among different ??-archs is smaller.
 #
 # Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
 # whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
index fe0d806..48ac095 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
  * (richard at levitte.org)
  */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H?gskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H??gskolan
  * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
  * All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
index 350b398..43fd362 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_pcia.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
  * (richard at levitte.org)
  */
-/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H?gskolan
+/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska H??gskolan
  * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
  * All rights reserved.
  *
diff --git a/demos/easy_tls/README b/demos/easy_tls/README
index 816a580..ee89dfb 100644
--- a/demos/easy_tls/README
+++ b/demos/easy_tls/README
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ As noted above, easy_tls.c will be changed to become a library one
 day, which means that future revisions will not be fully compatible to
 the current version.
 
-Bodo M?ller <bodo at openssl.org>
+Bodo M??ller <bodo at openssl.org>
diff --git a/util/mkrc.pl b/util/mkrc.pl
index 0ceadcf..83ee6a4 100755
--- a/util/mkrc.pl
+++ b/util/mkrc.pl
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ BEGIN
             VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
             // Optional:
             //VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
-            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright ? 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright ? 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
+            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright ?? 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright ?? 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
             //VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
             //VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
             //VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"
diff --git a/util/toutf8.sh b/util/toutf8.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a4254b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/util/toutf8.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+#
+# Very simple script to detect and convert files that we want to re-encode to UTF8
+
+git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD | \
+    while read F; do
+	charset=`file -bi "$F" | sed -e 's|.*charset=||'`
+	if [ "$charset" != "utf-8" -a "$charset" != "binary" -a "$charset" != "us-ascii" ]; then
+	    iconv -f ISO-8859-1 -t UTF8 < "$F" > "$F.utf8" && \
+		( cmp -s "$F" "$F.utf8" || \
+			( echo "$F"
+			  mv "$F" "$F.iso-8859-1"
+			  mv "$F.utf8" "$F"
+			)
+		)
+	fi
+    done

From rsalz at openssl.org  Tue Jul 14 04:57:21 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 04:57:21 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436849841.703678.24308.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  0aa090920e4b36e3225c7f4d95be499c166d9785 (commit)
      from  48f11fd3ec9f218c9c82bc65873fec707cbed0f6 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0aa090920e4b36e3225c7f4d95be499c166d9785
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 00:57:00 2015 -0400

    Add date-posted to EOL notices.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 news/state.wml | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/news/state.wml b/news/state.wml
index 73b93ea..9ae6860 100644
--- a/news/state.wml
+++ b/news/state.wml
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@ We also released version <b>1.0.1p</b> which has the same fixes for
 that branch.
 <br>
 
-<li>We declared <b>1.0.0</b> and <b>0.9.8</b> to be end of life, with
-all updates ending at the end of 2015.
+<li>In 2014, we declared <b>1.0.0</b> and <b>0.9.8</b> to be end of life, with
+all updates ending at the end of 2015. Until then, only security fixes will
+be released for those branches.
 <br>
 
 <li>Our next major release is <b>1.1.0</b>. It is currently in development.

From rsalz at openssl.org  Tue Jul 14 05:33:03 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 05:33:03 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436851983.603491.4044.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4 (commit)
      from  053fa39af62f5b3543ebec8592e4592965b18e26 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4
Author: GitHub User <mancha1 at github.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 15:02:29 2015 -0400

    Missing perldoc markup around < literal
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
index bd6bc86..b3aec96 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
 protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
 
 BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
-number B<rnd> in the range 0 <lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
+number B<rnd> in the range 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
 BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(),
 and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.
 

From rsalz at openssl.org  Tue Jul 14 05:33:22 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 05:33:22 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436852002.335310.6521.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  9e56a32e398efe2da58c65fecea52cf4886e3c3d (commit)
      from  9f0b86c68bb96d49301bbd6473c8235ca05ca06b (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9e56a32e398efe2da58c65fecea52cf4886e3c3d
Author: GitHub User <mancha1 at github.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 15:02:29 2015 -0400

    Missing perldoc markup around < literal
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
index bd6bc86..b3aec96 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
 protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
 
 BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
-number B<rnd> in the range 0 <lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
+number B<rnd> in the range 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
 BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(),
 and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.
 

From rsalz at openssl.org  Tue Jul 14 05:33:37 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 05:33:37 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436852017.344419.8413.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  432785095c6605b70ac97df2add1594e9217939c (commit)
      from  a027bba22a095c9a71d1e8b55a786bd0d483f581 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 432785095c6605b70ac97df2add1594e9217939c
Author: GitHub User <mancha1 at github.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 15:02:29 2015 -0400

    Missing perldoc markup around < literal
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
index 3b2796c..b91231c 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_rand.pod
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic
 protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.
 
 BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
-number B<rnd> in the range 0 <lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
+number B<rnd> in the range 0 E<lt>= B<rnd> E<lt> B<range>.
 BN_pseudo_rand_range() does the same, but is based on BN_pseudo_rand(),
 and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.
 

From rsalz at openssl.org  Tue Jul 14 11:46:41 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 11:46:41 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436874401.258587.16728.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  5b89036c41a009a76cd0e1595dde5001ae157972 (commit)
      from  e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 5b89036c41a009a76cd0e1595dde5001ae157972
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 9 14:54:13 2015 -0400

    Can't use -trusted with -CA{path,file}
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/verify.c       |  8 +++++++-
 doc/apps/verify.pod | 12 ++++++++----
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/apps/verify.c b/apps/verify.c
index a823d58..7fcd32a 100644
--- a/apps/verify.c
+++ b/apps/verify.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ OPTIONS verify_options[] = {
     {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "A directory of trusted certificates"},
     {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"},
     {"untrusted", OPT_UNTRUSTED, '<', "A file of untrusted certificates"},
-    {"trusted", OPT_TRUSTED, '<', "A file of additional trusted certificates"},
+    {"trusted", OPT_TRUSTED, '<', "A file of trusted certificates"},
     {"CRLfile", OPT_CRLFILE, '<',
         "File containing one or more CRL's (in PEM format) to load"},
     {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-',
@@ -180,6 +180,12 @@ int verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
     argc = opt_num_rest();
     argv = opt_rest();
+    if (trustfile && (CAfile || CApath)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "%s: Cannot use -trusted with -CAfile or -CApath\n",
+                   prog);
+        goto end;
+    }
 
     if (!app_load_modules(NULL))
         goto end;
diff --git a/doc/apps/verify.pod b/doc/apps/verify.pod
index 9cc7fcb..b1253da 100644
--- a/doc/apps/verify.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/verify.pod
@@ -182,13 +182,17 @@ behaviour to match that of OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.0.
 
 =item B<-untrusted file>
 
-A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
-in PEM format concatenated together.
+A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain one or more
+certificates in PEM format.
 
 =item B<-trusted file>
 
-A file of additional trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple
-certificates in PEM format concatenated together.
+A file of trusted certificates. The file contain one or more
+certificates in PEM format.
+With this option, no additional (e.g., default) certificate lists
+are consulted. That is, the only trusted issuers are those listed
+in B<file>.
+This option cannot be used with the B<-CAfile> or B<-CApath> options.
 
 =item B<-use_deltas>
 

From levitte at openssl.org  Tue Jul 14 19:08:19 2015
From: levitte at openssl.org (Richard Levitte)
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 19:08:19 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1436900899.539256.22781.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  10c638d6934c96d52236740fb4f0be12f9a68482 (commit)
      from  0aa090920e4b36e3225c7f4d95be499c166d9785 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 10c638d6934c96d52236740fb4f0be12f9a68482
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 21:07:47 2015 +0200

    Don't allow anyone to access any .git folder through the web

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 .htaccess | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/.htaccess b/.htaccess
index 5d5d473..92b86ae 100644
--- a/.htaccess
+++ b/.htaccess
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+RedirectMatch 404 .*/\.git/.*
 
 RewriteEngine on
 

From viktor at openssl.org  Wed Jul 15 05:46:24 2015
From: viktor at openssl.org (Viktor Dukhovni)
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 05:46:24 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436939184.854581.3160.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  0dc41520f2af4bf5493879864303c858feac4573 (commit)
      from  5b89036c41a009a76cd0e1595dde5001ae157972 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0dc41520f2af4bf5493879864303c858feac4573
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 21:26:31 2015 -0400

    Maintain backwards-compatible SSLv23_method macros
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson	<tjh at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 include/openssl/ssl.h | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h b/include/openssl/ssl.h
index 3027617..c394191 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h
+++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h
@@ -1546,11 +1546,9 @@ __owur const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
 __owur const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */
 # endif
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_USE_DEPRECATED
 #define SSLv23_method           TLS_method
 #define SSLv23_server_method    TLS_server_method
 #define SSLv23_client_method    TLS_client_method
-#endif
 
 /* Negotiate highest available SSL/TLS version */
 __owur const SSL_METHOD *TLS_method(void);

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 15 07:32:36 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 07:32:36 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436945556.895793.7310.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  ad282e638b6824325fb83ecf7cde2e7996f52b79 (commit)
      from  0dc41520f2af4bf5493879864303c858feac4573 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit ad282e638b6824325fb83ecf7cde2e7996f52b79
Author: Ernie Hershey <github at ernie.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 23:08:44 2015 -0400

    GH322: Fix typo in generated comment.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 util/mk1mf.pl | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl
index 5161c17..6091a69 100755
--- a/util/mk1mf.pl
+++ b/util/mk1mf.pl
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ $defs= <<"EOF";
 # N.B. You MUST use -j on FreeBSD.
 # This makefile has been automatically generated from the OpenSSL distribution.
 # This single makefile will build the complete OpenSSL distribution and
-# by default leave the 'intertesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
+# by default leave the 'interesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
 # that needs deleting in .${o}tmp.
 # The file was generated by running 'make makefile.one', which
 # does a 'make files', which writes all the environment variables from all

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 15 07:32:57 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 07:32:57 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436945577.659087.8130.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  033b558181680de69ecefe95ba05b76a0db2e253 (commit)
      from  9e56a32e398efe2da58c65fecea52cf4886e3c3d (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 033b558181680de69ecefe95ba05b76a0db2e253
Author: Ernie Hershey <github at ernie.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 23:08:44 2015 -0400

    GH322: Fix typo in generated comment.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit ad282e638b6824325fb83ecf7cde2e7996f52b79)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 util/mk1mf.pl | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl
index 9b8abc0..99652af 100755
--- a/util/mk1mf.pl
+++ b/util/mk1mf.pl
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ $defs= <<"EOF";
 # N.B. You MUST use -j on FreeBSD.
 # This makefile has been automatically generated from the OpenSSL distribution.
 # This single makefile will build the complete OpenSSL distribution and
-# by default leave the 'intertesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
+# by default leave the 'interesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
 # that needs deleting in .${o}tmp.
 # The file was generated by running 'make makefile.one', which
 # does a 'make files', which writes all the environment variables from all

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 15 07:33:32 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 07:33:32 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436945612.876953.8416.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  2507d846e187f35cdf9dbb07611fbe9a161d0f1b (commit)
      from  432785095c6605b70ac97df2add1594e9217939c (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 2507d846e187f35cdf9dbb07611fbe9a161d0f1b
Author: Ernie Hershey <github at ernie.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 23:08:44 2015 -0400

    GH322: Fix typo in generated comment.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit ad282e638b6824325fb83ecf7cde2e7996f52b79)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 util/mk1mf.pl | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl
index 1eee7aa..5b86aa7 100755
--- a/util/mk1mf.pl
+++ b/util/mk1mf.pl
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ EOF
 $defs= <<"EOF";
 # This makefile has been automatically generated from the OpenSSL distribution.
 # This single makefile will build the complete OpenSSL distribution and
-# by default leave the 'intertesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
+# by default leave the 'interesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff
 # that needs deleting in .${o}tmp.
 # The file was generated by running 'make makefile.one', which
 # does a 'make files', which writes all the environment variables from all

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 15 10:49:10 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 10:49:10 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1436957350.475610.16025.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  31d6c0b2b043bad5c63b797a327109eb26ff8d2a (commit)
       via  9e2e7b34eb5db71247403ecd641f580d83da944a (commit)
      from  ad282e638b6824325fb83ecf7cde2e7996f52b79 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 31d6c0b2b043bad5c63b797a327109eb26ff8d2a
Author: mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 15 04:54:28 2015 -0400

    Fix author credit for e5c0bc6
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

commit 9e2e7b34eb5db71247403ecd641f580d83da944a
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 15 04:52:51 2015 -0400

    Revert "Missing perldoc markup around < literal"
    
    This reverts commit e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4.
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 15 10:50:03 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 10:50:03 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1436957403.211261.22225.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  fd9631bbbda626af0407d5c8c188b05c86a25e3d (commit)
       via  405f43bc2a52860d70bfc73bf09cdce74fe7d5b2 (commit)
      from  033b558181680de69ecefe95ba05b76a0db2e253 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit fd9631bbbda626af0407d5c8c188b05c86a25e3d
Author: mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 15 04:54:28 2015 -0400

    Fix author credit for e5c0bc6
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

commit 405f43bc2a52860d70bfc73bf09cdce74fe7d5b2
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 15 04:52:51 2015 -0400

    Revert "Missing perldoc markup around < literal"
    
    This reverts commit e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4.
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 15 10:50:18 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 10:50:18 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1436957418.443088.23934.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  396a2dc07177a14284dba194cb6dfda4f3785681 (commit)
       via  001c957676232d19af4309d877dedb43ef00ac20 (commit)
      from  2507d846e187f35cdf9dbb07611fbe9a161d0f1b (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 396a2dc07177a14284dba194cb6dfda4f3785681
Author: mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 15 04:54:28 2015 -0400

    Fix author credit for e5c0bc6
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

commit 001c957676232d19af4309d877dedb43ef00ac20
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 15 04:52:51 2015 -0400

    Revert "Missing perldoc markup around < literal"
    
    This reverts commit e5c0bc6cc49a23b50a272801c4bd53639c25fca4.
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:

From rsalz at openssl.org  Thu Jul 16 05:07:13 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 05:07:13 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1437023233.880565.2249.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  0bc2f365558ed5980ce87d6b2704ca8649ca2a4a (commit)
      from  31d6c0b2b043bad5c63b797a327109eb26ff8d2a (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0bc2f365558ed5980ce87d6b2704ca8649ca2a4a
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Thu Jul 2 08:49:54 2015 -0400

    Remove obsolete key formats.
    
    Remove support for RSA_NET and Netscape key format (-keyform n).
    
    Also removed documentation of SGC.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/apps.c                |  72 +-------------
 apps/apps.h                |   1 -
 apps/opt.c                 |  14 +--
 apps/rsa.c                 |  13 ---
 apps/x509.c                |  10 --
 crypto/asn1/Makefile       |  16 +---
 crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c     |   3 -
 crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c       | 231 ---------------------------------------------
 crypto/asn1/x_nx509.c      |  72 --------------
 crypto/crypto-lib.com      |   2 +-
 doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod |   4 +-
 include/openssl/asn1.h     |  10 --
 include/openssl/rsa.h      |  16 ----
 test/tx509                 |  18 ----
 util/libeay.num            |  20 ++--
 15 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 482 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 crypto/asn1/x_nx509.c

diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index 3f2c049..80e7777 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -163,12 +163,6 @@ static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
 static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg,
                           const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl);
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
-/* Looks like this stuff is worth moving into separate function */
-static EVP_PKEY *load_netscape_key(BIO *key, const char *file,
-                                   const char *key_descrip, int format);
-#endif
-
 int app_init(long mesgwin);
 
 int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf)
@@ -695,22 +689,7 @@ X509 *load_cert(const char *file, int format,
 
     if (format == FORMAT_ASN1)
         x = d2i_X509_bio(cert, NULL);
-    else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE) {
-        NETSCAPE_X509 *nx;
-        nx = ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_X509), cert, NULL);
-        if (nx == NULL)
-            goto end;
-
-        if ((strncmp(NETSCAPE_CERT_HDR, (char *)nx->header->data,
-                     nx->header->length) != 0)) {
-            NETSCAPE_X509_free(nx);
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading header on certificate\n");
-            goto end;
-        }
-        x = nx->cert;
-        nx->cert = NULL;
-        NETSCAPE_X509_free(nx);
-    } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM)
+    else if (format == FORMAT_PEM)
         x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL,
                                   (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, NULL);
     else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
@@ -803,10 +782,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *load_key(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
                                        (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
                                        &cb_data);
     }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
-    else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE)
-        pkey = load_netscape_key(key, file, key_descrip, format);
-#endif
     else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) {
         if (!load_pkcs12(key, key_descrip,
                          (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data,
@@ -903,10 +878,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
                                    (pem_password_cb *)password_callback,
                                    &cb_data);
     }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
-    else if (format == FORMAT_NETSCAPE)
-        pkey = load_netscape_key(key, file, key_descrip, format);
-#endif
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
     else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB)
         pkey = b2i_PublicKey_bio(key);
@@ -918,47 +889,6 @@ EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
     return (pkey);
 }
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RC4) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
-static EVP_PKEY *load_netscape_key(BIO *key, const char *file,
-                                   const char *key_descrip, int format)
-{
-    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-    BUF_MEM *buf;
-    RSA *rsa;
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    int size, i;
-
-    buf = BUF_MEM_new();
-    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
-    size = 0;
-    if (buf == NULL || pkey == NULL)
-        goto error;
-    for (;;) {
-        if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, size + 1024 * 10))
-            goto error;
-        i = BIO_read(key, &(buf->data[size]), 1024 * 10);
-        size += i;
-        if (i == 0)
-            break;
-        if (i < 0) {
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading %s %s", key_descrip, file);
-            goto error;
-        }
-    }
-    p = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
-    rsa = d2i_RSA_NET(NULL, &p, (long)size, NULL, 0);
-    if (rsa == NULL)
-        goto error;
-    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa);
-    return pkey;
- error:
-    BUF_MEM_free(buf);
-    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-    return NULL;
-}
-#endif                          /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */
-
 static int load_certs_crls(const char *file, int format,
                            const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc,
                            STACK_OF(X509) **pcerts,
diff --git a/apps/apps.h b/apps/apps.h
index b83d4b2..2823cbc 100644
--- a/apps/apps.h
+++ b/apps/apps.h
@@ -532,7 +532,6 @@ void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st);
 # define FORMAT_ASN1     1
 # define FORMAT_TEXT     2
 # define FORMAT_PEM      3
-# define FORMAT_NETSCAPE 4
 # define FORMAT_PKCS12   5
 # define FORMAT_SMIME    6
 # define FORMAT_ENGINE   7
diff --git a/apps/opt.c b/apps/opt.c
index b81cec4..bfb039e 100644
--- a/apps/opt.c
+++ b/apps/opt.c
@@ -256,15 +256,11 @@ int opt_format(const char *s, unsigned long flags, int *result)
         break;
     case 'N':
     case 'n':
-        if (strcmp(s, "NSS") == 0 || strcmp(s, "nss") == 0) {
-            if ((flags & OPT_FMT_NSS) == 0)
-                return opt_format_error(s, flags);
-            *result = FORMAT_NSS;
-        } else {
-            if ((flags & OPT_FMT_NETSCAPE) == 0)
-                return opt_format_error(s, flags);
-            *result = FORMAT_NETSCAPE;
-        }
+        if ((flags & OPT_FMT_NSS) == 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        if (strcmp(s, "NSS") != 0 && strcmp(s, "nss") != 0)
+            return opt_format_error(s, flags);
+        *result = FORMAT_NSS;
         break;
     case 'S':
     case 's':
diff --git a/apps/rsa.c b/apps/rsa.c
index f6961d9..c7ad44b 100644
--- a/apps/rsa.c
+++ b/apps/rsa.c
@@ -352,19 +352,6 @@ int rsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
             i = i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(out, rsa);
         }
     }
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-    else if (outformat == FORMAT_NETSCAPE) {
-        unsigned char *p, *save;
-        int size = i2d_RSA_NET(rsa, NULL, NULL, 0);
-
-        save = p = app_malloc(size, "RSA i2d buffer");
-        assert(private);
-        i2d_RSA_NET(rsa, &p, NULL, 0);
-        BIO_write(out, (char *)save, size);
-        OPENSSL_free(save);
-        i = 1;
-    }
-# endif
     else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM) {
         if (pubout || pubin) {
             if (pubout == 2)
diff --git a/apps/x509.c b/apps/x509.c
index 18e13e7..2fd92f4 100644
--- a/apps/x509.c
+++ b/apps/x509.c
@@ -913,16 +913,6 @@ int x509_main(int argc, char **argv)
             i = PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX(out, x);
         else
             i = PEM_write_bio_X509(out, x);
-    } else if (outformat == FORMAT_NETSCAPE) {
-        NETSCAPE_X509 nx;
-        ASN1_OCTET_STRING hdr;
-
-        hdr.data = (unsigned char *)NETSCAPE_CERT_HDR;
-        hdr.length = strlen(NETSCAPE_CERT_HDR);
-        nx.header = &hdr;
-        nx.cert = x;
-
-        i = ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_X509), out, &nx);
     } else {
         BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad output format specified for outfile\n");
         goto end;
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/Makefile b/crypto/asn1/Makefile
index 66b0ef2..a566dfa 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asn1/Makefile
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ LIBSRC=	a_object.c a_bitstr.c a_utctm.c a_gentm.c a_time.c a_int.c a_octet.c \
 	a_utf8.c a_sign.c a_digest.c a_verify.c a_mbstr.c a_strex.c \
 	x_algor.c x_val.c x_pubkey.c x_sig.c x_req.c x_bignum.c \
 	x_long.c x_x509.c x_x509a.c x_crl.c x_info.c x_spki.c nsseq.c \
-	x_nx509.c d2i_pu.c d2i_pr.c i2d_pu.c i2d_pr.c\
+	d2i_pu.c d2i_pr.c i2d_pu.c i2d_pr.c\
 	t_req.c t_x509.c t_x509a.c t_crl.c t_pkey.c t_spki.c t_bitst.c \
 	tasn_new.c tasn_fre.c tasn_enc.c tasn_dec.c tasn_utl.c tasn_typ.c \
 	tasn_prn.c tasn_scn.c ameth_lib.c \
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ LIBOBJ= a_object.o a_bitstr.o a_utctm.o a_gentm.o a_time.o a_int.o a_octet.o \
 	a_utf8.o a_sign.o a_digest.o a_verify.o a_mbstr.o a_strex.o \
 	x_algor.o x_val.o x_pubkey.o x_sig.o x_req.o x_bignum.o \
 	x_long.o x_x509.o x_x509a.o x_crl.o x_info.o x_spki.o nsseq.o \
-	x_nx509.o d2i_pu.o d2i_pr.o i2d_pu.o i2d_pr.o \
+	d2i_pu.o d2i_pr.o i2d_pu.o i2d_pr.o \
 	t_req.o t_x509.o t_x509a.o t_crl.o t_pkey.o t_spki.o t_bitst.o \
 	tasn_new.o tasn_fre.o tasn_enc.o tasn_dec.o tasn_utl.o tasn_typ.o \
 	tasn_prn.o tasn_scn.o ameth_lib.o \
@@ -793,18 +793,6 @@ x_long.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
 x_long.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
 x_long.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 x_long.o: ../include/internal/cryptlib.h x_long.c
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
-x_nx509.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h x_nx509.c
 x_pkey.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
 x_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 x_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
index b7fbd9d..5dfd21b 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
@@ -169,8 +169,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2), "D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY), "d2i_PrivateKey"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY), "d2i_PublicKey"},
-    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET), "d2i_RSA_NET"},
-    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2), "D2I_RSA_NET_2"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509), "D2I_X509"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF), "D2I_X509_CINF"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY), "d2i_X509_PKEY"},
@@ -182,7 +180,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY), "i2d_EC_PUBKEY"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY), "i2d_PrivateKey"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY), "i2d_PublicKey"},
-    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET), "i2d_RSA_NET"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_RSA_PUBKEY"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I), "LONG_C2I"},
     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT), "OID_MODULE_INIT"},
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c b/crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c
index 1b8c4c0..0c9c4c4 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c
@@ -102,237 +102,6 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY,NETSCAPE_PKEY)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(NETSCAPE_PKEY)
 
-static RSA *d2i_RSA_NET_2(RSA **a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os,
-                          int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                                     int verify), int sgckey);
-
-int i2d_Netscape_RSA(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp,
-                     int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                                int verify))
-{
-    return i2d_RSA_NET(a, pp, cb, 0);
-}
-
-int i2d_RSA_NET(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp,
-                int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                           int verify), int sgckey)
-{
-    int i, j, ret = 0;
-    int rsalen, pkeylen, olen;
-    NETSCAPE_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-    NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY *enckey = NULL;
-    unsigned char buf[256], *zz;
-    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-    if (a == NULL)
-        return (0);
-
-    if ((pkey = NETSCAPE_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    if ((enckey = NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    pkey->version = 0;
-
-    pkey->algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption);
-    if ((pkey->algor->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    pkey->algor->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-
-    rsalen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(a, NULL);
-
-    /*
-     * Fake some octet strings just for the initial length calculation.
-     */
-
-    pkey->private_key->length = rsalen;
-
-    pkeylen = i2d_NETSCAPE_PKEY(pkey, NULL);
-
-    enckey->enckey->digest->length = pkeylen;
-
-    enckey->os->length = 11;    /* "private-key" */
-
-    enckey->enckey->algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rc4);
-    if ((enckey->enckey->algor->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    enckey->enckey->algor->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
-
-    if (pp == NULL) {
-        olen = i2d_NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY(enckey, NULL);
-        NETSCAPE_PKEY_free(pkey);
-        NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY_free(enckey);
-        return olen;
-    }
-
-    /* Since its RC4 encrypted length is actual length */
-    if ((zz = OPENSSL_malloc(rsalen)) == NULL) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    pkey->private_key->data = zz;
-    /* Write out private key encoding */
-    i2d_RSAPrivateKey(a, &zz);
-
-    if ((zz = OPENSSL_malloc(pkeylen)) == NULL) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(enckey->os, "private-key", -1)) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    enckey->enckey->digest->data = zz;
-    i2d_NETSCAPE_PKEY(pkey, &zz);
-
-    /* Wipe the private key encoding */
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(pkey->private_key->data, rsalen);
-
-    if (cb == NULL)
-        cb = EVP_read_pw_string;
-    i = cb((char *)buf, 256, "Enter Private Key password:", 1);
-    if (i != 0) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET, ASN1_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    i = strlen((char *)buf);
-    /* If the key is used for SGC the algorithm is modified a little. */
-    if (sgckey) {
-        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, i, buf, NULL, EVP_md5(), NULL))
-            goto err;
-        memcpy(buf + 16, "SGCKEYSALT", 10);
-        i = 26;
-    }
-
-    if (!EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_rc4(), EVP_md5(), NULL, buf, i, 1, key, NULL))
-        goto err;
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, 256);
-
-    /* Encrypt private key in place */
-    zz = enckey->enckey->digest->data;
-    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, key, NULL))
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, zz, &i, zz, pkeylen))
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, zz + i, &j))
-        goto err;
-
-    ret = i2d_NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY(enckey, pp);
- err:
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY_free(enckey);
-    NETSCAPE_PKEY_free(pkey);
-    return (ret);
-}
-
-RSA *d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
-                      int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                                 int verify))
-{
-    return d2i_RSA_NET(a, pp, length, cb, 0);
-}
-
-RSA *d2i_RSA_NET(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
-                 int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                            int verify), int sgckey)
-{
-    RSA *ret = NULL;
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY *enckey = NULL;
-
-    p = *pp;
-
-    enckey = d2i_NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY(NULL, &p, length);
-    if (!enckey) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET, ASN1_R_DECODING_ERROR);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-
-    if ((enckey->os->length != 11) || (strncmp("private-key",
-                                               (char *)enckey->os->data,
-                                               11) != 0)) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET, ASN1_R_PRIVATE_KEY_HEADER_MISSING);
-        NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY_free(enckey);
-        return NULL;
-    }
-    if (OBJ_obj2nid(enckey->enckey->algor->algorithm) != NID_rc4) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET, ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (cb == NULL)
-        cb = EVP_read_pw_string;
-    if ((ret = d2i_RSA_NET_2(a, enckey->enckey->digest, cb, sgckey)) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    *pp = p;
-
- err:
-    NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY_free(enckey);
-    return ret;
-
-}
-
-static RSA *d2i_RSA_NET_2(RSA **a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os,
-                          int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                                     int verify), int sgckey)
-{
-    NETSCAPE_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-    RSA *ret = NULL;
-    int i, j;
-    unsigned char buf[256];
-    const unsigned char *zz;
-    unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-    i = cb((char *)buf, 256, "Enter Private Key password:", 0);
-    if (i != 0) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2, ASN1_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    i = strlen((char *)buf);
-    if (sgckey) {
-        if (!EVP_Digest(buf, i, buf, NULL, EVP_md5(), NULL))
-            goto err;
-        memcpy(buf + 16, "SGCKEYSALT", 10);
-        i = 26;
-    }
-
-    if (!EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_rc4(), EVP_md5(), NULL, buf, i, 1, key, NULL))
-        goto err;
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, 256);
-
-    if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, key, NULL))
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, os->data, &i, os->data, os->length))
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, &(os->data[i]), &j))
-        goto err;
-    os->length = i + j;
-
-    zz = os->data;
-
-    if ((pkey = d2i_NETSCAPE_PKEY(NULL, &zz, os->length)) == NULL) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2,
-                ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    zz = pkey->private_key->data;
-    if ((ret = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(a, &zz, pkey->private_key->length)) == NULL) {
-        ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2, ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY);
-        goto err;
-    }
- err:
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-    NETSCAPE_PKEY_free(pkey);
-    return (ret);
-}
-
 # endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_RC4 */
 
 #else                           /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_nx509.c b/crypto/asn1/x_nx509.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 5aa0ed5..0000000
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_nx509.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-/* x_nx509.c */
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve at openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing at OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-
-/* Old netscape certificate wrapper format */
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(NETSCAPE_X509) = {
-        ASN1_SIMPLE(NETSCAPE_X509, header, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
-        ASN1_OPT(NETSCAPE_X509, cert, X509)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NETSCAPE_X509)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_X509)
diff --git a/crypto/crypto-lib.com b/crypto/crypto-lib.com
index 5a2694d..f668c1c 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto-lib.com
+++ b/crypto/crypto-lib.com
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ $ LIB_ASN1_1 = "a_object,a_bitstr,a_utctm,a_gentm,a_time,a_int,a_octet,"+ -
 	"a_enum,a_utf8,a_sign,a_digest,a_verify,a_mbstr,a_strex,"+ -
 	"x_algor,x_val,x_pubkey,x_sig,x_req,x_attrib,x_bignum,"+ -
 	"x_long,x_name,x_x509,x_x509a,x_crl,x_info,x_spki,nsseq,"+ -
-	"x_nx509,d2i_pu,d2i_pr,i2d_pu,i2d_pr"
+	"d2i_pu,d2i_pr,i2d_pu,i2d_pr"
 $ LIB_ASN1_2 = "t_req,t_x509,t_x509a,t_crl,t_pkey,t_spki,t_bitst,"+ -
 	"tasn_new,tasn_fre,tasn_enc,tasn_dec,tasn_utl,tasn_typ,"+ -
 	"tasn_prn,tasn_scn,ameth_lib,"+ -
diff --git a/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod b/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod
index 26b327c..d1e6788 100644
--- a/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod
@@ -118,14 +118,12 @@ following PKIX, NS and MS values are meaningful:
  msCodeInd		Microsoft Individual Code Signing (authenticode)
  msCodeCom		Microsoft Commercial Code Signing (authenticode)
  msCTLSign		Microsoft Trust List Signing
- msSGC			Microsoft Server Gated Crypto
  msEFS			Microsoft Encrypted File System
- nsSGC			Netscape Server Gated Crypto
 
 Examples:
 
  extendedKeyUsage=critical,codeSigning,1.2.3.4
- extendedKeyUsage=nsSGC,msSGC
+ extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth,clientAuth
 
 
 =head2 Subject Key Identifier.
diff --git a/include/openssl/asn1.h b/include/openssl/asn1.h
index 06ee036..5b3b7d3 100644
--- a/include/openssl/asn1.h
+++ b/include/openssl/asn1.h
@@ -509,11 +509,6 @@ typedef STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY;
 DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, ASN1_SET_ANY)
 
-typedef struct NETSCAPE_X509_st {
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *header;
-    X509 *cert;
-} NETSCAPE_X509;
-
 /* This is used to contain a list of bit names */
 typedef struct BIT_STRING_BITNAME_st {
     int bitnum;
@@ -797,8 +792,6 @@ const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag);
 
 /* Used to load and write netscape format cert */
 
-DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_X509)
-
 int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s);
 
 int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len);
@@ -1014,8 +1007,6 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2                        153
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY                            154
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY                             155
-# define ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET                               200
-# define ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2                             201
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509                                  156
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF                             157
 # define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY                             159
@@ -1027,7 +1018,6 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 # define ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY                             181
 # define ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY                            163
 # define ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY                             164
-# define ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET                               162
 # define ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY                            165
 # define ASN1_F_LONG_C2I                                  166
 # define ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT                           174
diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h
index 727b9df..9abb2a1 100644
--- a/include/openssl/rsa.h
+++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h
@@ -396,22 +396,6 @@ int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *r, int offset);
 
 int RSA_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *r, int offset);
 
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-int i2d_RSA_NET(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp,
-                int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                           int verify), int sgckey);
-RSA *d2i_RSA_NET(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
-                 int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                            int verify), int sgckey);
-
-int i2d_Netscape_RSA(const RSA *a, unsigned char **pp,
-                     int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                                int verify));
-RSA *d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
-                      int (*cb) (char *buf, int len, const char *prompt,
-                                 int verify));
-# endif
-
 /*
  * The following 2 functions sign and verify a X509_SIG ASN1 object inside
  * PKCS#1 padded RSA encryption
diff --git a/test/tx509 b/test/tx509
index 3185ce1..dc9abc6 100644
--- a/test/tx509
+++ b/test/tx509
@@ -13,42 +13,24 @@ cp $t x509-fff.p
 
 echo "p -> d"
 $cmd -in x509-fff.p -inform p -outform d >x509-f.d || exit 1
-echo "p -> n"
-$cmd -in x509-fff.p -inform p -outform n >x509-f.n || exit 1
 echo "p -> p"
 $cmd -in x509-fff.p -inform p -outform p >x509-f.p || exit 1
 
 echo "d -> d"
 $cmd -in x509-f.d -inform d -outform d >x509-ff.d1 || exit 1
-echo "n -> d"
-$cmd -in x509-f.n -inform n -outform d >x509-ff.d2 || exit 1
 echo "p -> d"
 $cmd -in x509-f.p -inform p -outform d >x509-ff.d3 || exit 1
 
-echo "d -> n"
-$cmd -in x509-f.d -inform d -outform n >x509-ff.n1 || exit 1
-echo "n -> n"
-$cmd -in x509-f.n -inform n -outform n >x509-ff.n2 || exit 1
-echo "p -> n"
-$cmd -in x509-f.p -inform p -outform n >x509-ff.n3 || exit 1
-
 echo "d -> p"
 $cmd -in x509-f.d -inform d -outform p >x509-ff.p1 || exit 1
-echo "n -> p"
-$cmd -in x509-f.n -inform n -outform p >x509-ff.p2 || exit 1
 echo "p -> p"
 $cmd -in x509-f.p -inform p -outform p >x509-ff.p3 || exit 1
 
 cmp x509-fff.p x509-f.p || exit 1
 cmp x509-fff.p x509-ff.p1 || exit 1
-cmp x509-fff.p x509-ff.p2 || exit 1
 cmp x509-fff.p x509-ff.p3 || exit 1
 
-cmp x509-f.n x509-ff.n1 || exit 1
-cmp x509-f.n x509-ff.n2 || exit 1
-cmp x509-f.n x509-ff.n3 || exit 1
 cmp x509-f.p x509-ff.p1 || exit 1
-cmp x509-f.p x509-ff.p2 || exit 1
 cmp x509-f.p x509-ff.p3 || exit 1
 
 /bin/rm -f x509-f.* x509-ff.* x509-fff.*
diff --git a/util/libeay.num b/util/libeay.num
index 4d3642f..731db22 100755
--- a/util/libeay.num
+++ b/util/libeay.num
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ d2i_DSAPublicKey                        731	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
 d2i_DSAparams                           732	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
 d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKAC                      733	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI                       734	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-d2i_Netscape_RSA                        735	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4,RSA
+d2i_Netscape_RSA                        735	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_PKCS7                               736	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_PKCS7_DIGEST                        737	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_PKCS7_ENCRYPT                       738	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ i2d_DSAPublicKey                        834	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
 i2d_DSAparams                           835	EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
 i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKAC                      836	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI                       837	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-i2d_Netscape_RSA                        838	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4,RSA
+i2d_Netscape_RSA                        838	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 i2d_PKCS7                               839	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 i2d_PKCS7_DIGEST                        840	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 i2d_PKCS7_ENCRYPT                       841	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -1816,9 +1816,9 @@ RAND_egd_bytes                          2402	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 X509_REQ_get1_email                     2403	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 X509_get1_email                         2404	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 X509_email_free                         2405	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-i2d_RSA_NET                             2406	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4,RSA
+i2d_RSA_NET                             2406	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_RSA_NET_2                           2407	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
-d2i_RSA_NET                             2408	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4,RSA
+d2i_RSA_NET                             2408	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 DSO_bind_func                           2409	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid                2410	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 sk_new_null                             2411	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -3796,7 +3796,7 @@ CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp                     4176	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_REQ_ext_free                         4177	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free                  4178	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1                      4179	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-d2i_NETSCAPE_X509                       4180	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+d2i_NETSCAPE_X509                       4180	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init            4181	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data                   4182	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_keygen_init                    4183	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -3864,7 +3864,7 @@ ASN1_PCTX_get_nm_flags                  4242	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign                  4243	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 CRYPTO_THREADID_current                 4244	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init                   4245	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-NETSCAPE_X509_free                      4246	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_X509_free                      4246	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 i2b_PVK_bio                             4247	EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4
 EVP_PKEY_print_private                  4248	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 GENERAL_NAME_get0_value                 4249	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -3994,8 +3994,8 @@ WHIRLPOOL_Final                         4370	EXIST::FUNCTION:WHIRLPOOL
 X509_CRL_METHOD_new                     4371	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_DigestSignFinal                     4372	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy              4373	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-NETSCAPE_X509_it                        4374	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
-NETSCAPE_X509_it                        4374	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_X509_it                        4374	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_X509_it                        4374	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_RESP_create_response                 4375	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_get0_algs             4376	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_TST_INFO_get_nonce                   4377	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -4046,7 +4046,7 @@ TS_REQ_get_ext_d2i                      4420	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 GENERAL_NAME_set0_othername             4421	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_TST_INFO_get_ext_count               4422	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_RESP_CTX_get_request                 4423	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-i2d_NETSCAPE_X509                       4424	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+i2d_NETSCAPE_X509                       4424	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine             4425	EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
 EVP_PKEY_meth_set_signctx               4426	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_asn1_copy                      4427	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -4109,7 +4109,7 @@ PKCS7_stream                            4481	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs                   4482	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_CONF_set_def_policy                  4483	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj                4484	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-NETSCAPE_X509_new                       4485	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+NETSCAPE_X509_new                       4485	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_ACCURACY_free                        4486	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 TS_RESP_get_tst_info                    4487	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer                4488	EXIST::FUNCTION:

From steve at openssl.org  Sat Jul 18 13:07:47 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 13:07:47 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1437224867.643264.2817.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  f7d5348710ad4f26a97458b102f0c2854e4a0520 (commit)
      from  0bc2f365558ed5980ce87d6b2704ca8649ca2a4a (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit f7d5348710ad4f26a97458b102f0c2854e4a0520
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 23:19:11 2015 +0100

    Use uint32_t consistently for flags.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/ssl_conf.c |  4 ++--
 ssl/ssl_lib.c  |  2 +-
 ssl/ssl_locl.h | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
 ssl/t1_lib.c   |  4 ++--
 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
index 65ff021..819e730 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
@@ -124,11 +124,11 @@ struct ssl_conf_ctx_st {
     SSL_CTX *ctx;
     SSL *ssl;
     /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX options field or NULL if none */
-    unsigned long *poptions;
+    uint32_t *poptions;
     /* Certificate filenames for each type */
     char *cert_filename[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
     /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX cert_flags or NULL if none */
-    unsigned int *pcert_flags;
+    uint32_t *pcert_flags;
     /* Current flag table being worked on */
     const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl;
     /* Size of table */
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index ceba30f..d20d95b 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 {
     CERT_PKEY *cpk;
     CERT *c = s->cert;
-    int *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
+    uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
     int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign;
     int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export;
     int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 3507d9a..2672918 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
     char *srp_username;
 # endif
-    long flags;
+    uint32_t flags;
 };
 
 /* Extended master secret support */
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st {
      * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which
      * means only SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS.
      */
-    int session_cache_mode;
+    uint32_t session_cache_mode;
     /*
      * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when
      * SSL_new() is called.  This has been put in to make life easier to set
@@ -806,8 +806,8 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st {
      * SSL_new)
      */
 
-    unsigned long options;
-    unsigned long mode;
+    uint32_t options;
+    uint32_t mode;
     long max_cert_list;
 
     struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert;
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st {
                           const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg);
     void *msg_callback_arg;
 
-    int verify_mode;
+    uint32_t verify_mode;
     unsigned int sid_ctx_length;
     unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH];
     /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ struct ssl_st {
      * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to
      * be 'copied' into these ones
      */
-    int mac_flags;
+    uint32_t mac_flags;
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
     EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash;      /* used for mac generation */
     COMP_CTX *compress;         /* compression */
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ struct ssl_st {
      * 0 don't care about verify failure.
      * 1 fail if verify fails
      */
-    int verify_mode;
+    uint32_t verify_mode;
     /* fail if callback returns 0 */
     int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
     /* optional informational callback */
@@ -1077,9 +1077,9 @@ struct ssl_st {
     STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA;
     int references;
     /* protocol behaviour */
-    unsigned long options;
+    uint32_t options;
     /* API behaviour */
-    unsigned long mode;
+    uint32_t mode;
     long max_cert_list;
     int first_packet;
     /* what was passed, used for SSLv3/TLS rollback check */
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
          * SSL session: e.g. appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc.
          * If zero it can't be used at all.
          */
-        int valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+        uint32_t valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
         /*
          * For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms
          * that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of
@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ typedef struct {
      * Per-connection flags relating to this extension type: not used if
      * part of an SSL_CTX structure.
      */
-    unsigned short ext_flags;
+    uint32_t ext_flags;
     custom_ext_add_cb add_cb;
     custom_ext_free_cb free_cb;
     void *add_arg;
@@ -1526,7 +1526,7 @@ typedef struct cert_st {
     int ecdh_tmp_auto;
 # endif
     /* Flags related to certificates */
-    unsigned int cert_flags;
+    uint32_t cert_flags;
     CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
     /*
      * Certificate types (received or sent) in certificate request message.
@@ -1656,7 +1656,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method {
                                    const unsigned char *, size_t,
                                    int use_context);
     /* Various flags indicating protocol version requirements */
-    unsigned int enc_flags;
+    uint32_t enc_flags;
     /* Handshake header length */
     unsigned int hhlen;
     /* Set the handshake header */
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 402047a..f08eb84 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -3459,7 +3459,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
     size_t i;
     const EVP_MD *md;
     const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
-    int *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
+    uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
     CERT *c = s->cert;
     TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
     if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
@@ -3890,7 +3890,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
     int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
     CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
     CERT *c = s->cert;
-    int *pvalid;
+    uint32_t *pvalid;
     unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
     /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
     if (idx != -1) {

From rsalz at openssl.org  Mon Jul 20 05:20:08 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 05:20:08 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1437369608.473983.5201.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  7e5363abe3c00d9db037f464f3c121e194bb5bb6 (commit)
      from  f7d5348710ad4f26a97458b102f0c2854e4a0520 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 7e5363abe3c00d9db037f464f3c121e194bb5bb6
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Fri Apr 24 16:33:34 2015 -0400

    Rewrite crypto/ex_data
    
    Removed ability to set ex_data impl at runtime.  This removed these
    three functions:
        const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation(void);
        int CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *i);
        int CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class(void);
    It is no longer possible to change the ex_data implementation at
    runtime.  (Luckily those functions were never documented :)
    
    Also removed the ability to add new exdata "classes."  We don't believe
    this received much (if any) use, since you can't add it to OpenSSL objects,
    and there are probably better (native) methods for developers to add
    their own extensible data, if they really need that.
    
    Replaced the internal hash table (of per-"class" stacks) with a simple
    indexed array.  Reserved an index for "app" application.
    
    Each API used to take the lock twice; now it only locks once.
    
    Use local stack storage for function pointers, rather than malloc,
    if possible (i.e., number of ex_data items is under a dozen).
    
    Make CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS opaque/internal.
    
    Also fixes RT3710; index zero is reserved.
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/cpt_err.c            |   5 +-
 crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c     |   1 -
 crypto/ex_data.c            | 541 +++++++++++++-------------------------------
 include/openssl/crypto.h    |  45 +---
 include/openssl/engine.h    |   3 -
 include/openssl/safestack.h |  18 --
 include/openssl/symhacks.h  |   6 -
 util/libeay.num             |  10 +-
 8 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 457 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/cpt_err.c b/crypto/cpt_err.c
index a513838..1f9a824 100644
--- a/crypto/cpt_err.c
+++ b/crypto/cpt_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/cpt_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -70,9 +70,12 @@
 # define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO,0,reason)
 
 static ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_functs[] = {
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_dup_ex_data"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_FREE_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_free_ex_data"},
     {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX), "CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index"},
     {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID), "CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid"},
     {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_LOCKID), "CRYPTO_get_new_lockid"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_new_ex_data"},
     {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA), "CRYPTO_set_ex_data"},
     {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_DEF_ADD_INDEX), "DEF_ADD_INDEX"},
     {ERR_FUNC(CRYPTO_F_DEF_GET_CLASS), "DEF_GET_CLASS"},
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
index 06a7018..ae7d1d0 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c
@@ -512,7 +512,6 @@ static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx)
      * would also increase opaqueness.
      */
     fns.static_state = ENGINE_get_static_state();
-    fns.ex_data_fns = CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation();
     CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(&fns.mem_fns.malloc_cb,
                              &fns.mem_fns.realloc_cb, &fns.mem_fns.free_cb);
     fns.lock_fns.lock_locking_cb = CRYPTO_get_locking_callback();
diff --git a/crypto/ex_data.c b/crypto/ex_data.c
index bf5cf29..62d03bb 100644
--- a/crypto/ex_data.c
+++ b/crypto/ex_data.c
@@ -1,33 +1,3 @@
-/* crypto/ex_data.c */
-
-/*
- * Overhaul notes;
- *
- * This code is now *mostly* thread-safe. It is now easier to understand in what
- * ways it is safe and in what ways it is not, which is an improvement. Firstly,
- * all per-class stacks and index-counters for ex_data are stored in the same
- * global LHASH table (keyed by class). This hash table uses locking for all
- * access with the exception of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), which must only be
- * called when no other threads can possibly race against it (even if it was
- * locked, the race would mean it's possible the hash table might have been
- * recreated after the cleanup). As classes can only be added to the hash table,
- * and within each class, the stack of methods can only be incremented, the
- * locking mechanics are simpler than they would otherwise be. For example, the
- * new/dup/free ex_data functions will lock the hash table, copy the method
- * pointers it needs from the relevant class, then unlock the hash table before
- * actually applying those method pointers to the task of the new/dup/free
- * operations. As they can't be removed from the method-stack, only
- * supplemented, there's no race conditions associated with using them outside
- * the lock. The get/set_ex_data functions are not locked because they do not
- * involve this global state at all - they operate directly with a previously
- * obtained per-class method index and a particular "ex_data" variable. These
- * variables are usually instantiated per-context (eg. each RSA structure has
- * one) so locking on read/write access to that variable can be locked locally
- * if required (eg. using the "RSA" lock to synchronise access to a
- * per-RSA-structure ex_data variable if required).
- * [Geoff]
- */
-
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay at cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -141,300 +111,150 @@
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
 
-/* What an "implementation of ex_data functionality" looks like */
-struct st_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL {
-        /*********************/
-    /* GLOBAL OPERATIONS */
-    /* Return a new class index */
-    int (*cb_new_class) (void);
-    /* Cleanup all state used by the implementation */
-    void (*cb_cleanup) (void);
-        /************************/
-    /* PER-CLASS OPERATIONS */
-    /* Get a new method index within a class */
-    int (*cb_get_new_index) (int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
-                             CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
-                             CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-    /* Initialise a new CRYPTO_EX_DATA of a given class */
-    int (*cb_new_ex_data) (int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
-    /* Duplicate a CRYPTO_EX_DATA of a given class onto a copy */
-    int (*cb_dup_ex_data) (int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
-                           CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from);
-    /* Cleanup a CRYPTO_EX_DATA of a given class */
-    void (*cb_free_ex_data) (int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
-};
-
-/* The implementation we use at run-time */
-static const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *impl = NULL;
 
-/*
- * To call "impl" functions, use this macro rather than referring to 'impl'
- * directly, eg. EX_IMPL(get_new_index)(...);
- */
-#define EX_IMPL(a) impl->cb_##a
-
-/* Predeclare the "default" ex_data implementation */
-static int int_new_class(void);
-static void int_cleanup(void);
-static int int_get_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
-                             CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
-                             CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
-static int int_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
-static int int_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
-                           CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from);
-static void int_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad);
-static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL impl_default = {
-    int_new_class,
-    int_cleanup,
-    int_get_new_index,
-    int_new_ex_data,
-    int_dup_ex_data,
-    int_free_ex_data
-};
+typedef struct {
+    long argl;                  /* Arbitary long */
+    void *argp;                 /* Arbitary void * */
+    CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func;
+    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func;
+    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func;
+} CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS;
 
-/*
- * Internal function that checks whether "impl" is set and if not, sets it to
- * the default.
- */
-static void impl_check(void)
-{
-    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    if (!impl)
-        impl = &impl_default;
-    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-}
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS)
 
 /*
- * A macro wrapper for impl_check that first uses a non-locked test before
- * invoking the function (which checks again inside a lock).
+ * State for each class; could just be a typedef, but this allows future
+ * changes.
  */
-#define IMPL_CHECK if(!impl) impl_check();
-
-/* API functions to get/set the "ex_data" implementation */
-const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation(void)
-{
-    IMPL_CHECK return impl;
-}
-
-int CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *i)
-{
-    int toret = 0;
-    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    if (!impl) {
-        impl = i;
-        toret = 1;
-    }
-    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    return toret;
-}
-
-/****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * Interal (default) implementation of "ex_data" support. API functions are
- * further down.
- */
-
-/*
- * The type that represents what each "class" used to implement locally. A
- * STACK of CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS plus a index-counter. The 'class_index' is
- * the global value representing the class that is used to distinguish these
- * items.
- */
-typedef struct st_ex_class_item {
-    int class_index;
+typedef struct {
     STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *meth;
-    int meth_num;
 } EX_CLASS_ITEM;
 
-/* When assigning new class indexes, this is our counter */
-static int ex_class = CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_USER;
-
-/* The global hash table of EX_CLASS_ITEM items */
-DECLARE_LHASH_OF(EX_CLASS_ITEM);
-static LHASH_OF(EX_CLASS_ITEM) *ex_data = NULL;
-
-/* The callbacks required in the "ex_data" hash table */
-static unsigned long ex_class_item_hash(const EX_CLASS_ITEM *a)
-{
-    return a->class_index;
-}
-
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ex_class_item, EX_CLASS_ITEM)
-
-static int ex_class_item_cmp(const EX_CLASS_ITEM *a, const EX_CLASS_ITEM *b)
-{
-    return a->class_index - b->class_index;
-}
-
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ex_class_item, EX_CLASS_ITEM)
+static EX_CLASS_ITEM ex_data[CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT];
 
 /*
- * Internal functions used by the "impl_default" implementation to access the
- * state
+ * Return the EX_CLASS_ITEM from the "ex_data" array that corresponds to
+ * a given class.  On success, *holds the lock.*
  */
-static int ex_data_check(void)
+static EX_CLASS_ITEM *def_get_class(int class_index)
 {
-    int toret = 1;
+    EX_CLASS_ITEM *ip;
+
+    if (class_index < 0 || class_index >= CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_DEF_GET_CLASS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ip = &ex_data[class_index];
     CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    if (!ex_data && (ex_data = lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_new()) == NULL)
-        toret = 0;
-    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    return toret;
+    if (ip->meth == NULL) {
+        ip->meth = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_new_null();
+        /* We push an initial value on the stack because the SSL
+         * "app_data" routines use ex_data index zero.  See RT 3710. */
+        if (ip->meth == NULL
+            || !sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_push(ip->meth, NULL)) {
+            CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_DEF_GET_CLASS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    return ip;
 }
 
-/*
- * This macros helps reduce the locking from repeated checks because the
- * ex_data_check() function checks ex_data again inside a lock.
- */
-#define EX_DATA_CHECK(iffail) if(!ex_data && !ex_data_check()) {iffail}
-
-/* This "inner" callback is used by the callback function that follows it */
-static void def_cleanup_util_cb(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *funcs)
+static void cleanup_cb(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *funcs)
 {
     OPENSSL_free(funcs);
 }
 
 /*
- * This callback is used in lh_doall to destroy all EX_CLASS_ITEM values from
- * "ex_data" prior to the ex_data hash table being itself destroyed. Doesn't
- * do any locking.
+ * Release all "ex_data" state to prevent memory leaks. This can't be made
+ * thread-safe without overhauling a lot of stuff, and shouldn't really be
+ * called under potential race-conditions anyway (it's for program shutdown
+ * after all).
  */
-static void def_cleanup_cb(void *a_void)
+void CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(void)
 {
-    EX_CLASS_ITEM *item = (EX_CLASS_ITEM *)a_void;
-    sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_pop_free(item->meth, def_cleanup_util_cb);
-    OPENSSL_free(item);
-}
+    int i;
 
-/*
- * Return the EX_CLASS_ITEM from the "ex_data" hash table that corresponds to
- * a given class. Handles locking.
- */
-static EX_CLASS_ITEM *def_get_class(int class_index)
-{
-    EX_CLASS_ITEM d, *p, *gen;
-    EX_DATA_CHECK(return NULL;)
-        d.class_index = class_index;
-    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    p = lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_retrieve(ex_data, &d);
-    if (!p) {
-        gen = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gen));
-        if (gen) {
-            gen->class_index = class_index;
-            gen->meth_num = 0;
-            gen->meth = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_new_null();
-            if (!gen->meth)
-                OPENSSL_free(gen);
-            else {
-                /*
-                 * Because we're inside the ex_data lock, the return value
-                 * from the insert will be NULL
-                 */
-                (void)lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_insert(ex_data, gen);
-                p = gen;
-            }
-        }
+    for (i = 0; i < CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT; ++i) {
+        EX_CLASS_ITEM *ip = &ex_data[i];
+
+        sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_pop_free(ip->meth, cleanup_cb);
+        ip->meth = NULL;
     }
-    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    if (!p)
-        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_DEF_GET_CLASS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return p;
 }
 
 /*
- * Add a new method to the given EX_CLASS_ITEM and return the corresponding
- * index (or -1 for error). Handles locking.
+ * Inside an existing class, get/register a new index.
  */
-static int def_add_index(EX_CLASS_ITEM *item, long argl, void *argp,
-                         CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
-                         CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
+                            CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+                            CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
 {
     int toret = -1;
-    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *a = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*a));
-    if (!a) {
-        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_DEF_ADD_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *a;
+    EX_CLASS_ITEM *ip = def_get_class(class_index);
+
+    if (!ip)
         return -1;
+    a = (CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*a));
+    if (!a) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
     }
     a->argl = argl;
     a->argp = argp;
     a->new_func = new_func;
     a->dup_func = dup_func;
     a->free_func = free_func;
-    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    while (sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(item->meth) <= item->meth_num) {
-        if (!sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_push(item->meth, NULL)) {
-            CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_DEF_ADD_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            OPENSSL_free(a);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-    toret = item->meth_num++;
-    (void)sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_set(item->meth, toret, a);
- err:
-    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    return toret;
-}
 
-/**************************************************************/
-/* The functions in the default CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL structure */
+    if (!sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_push(ip->meth, NULL)) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(a);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    toret = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(ip->meth) - 1;
+    (void)sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_set(ip->meth, toret, a);
 
-static int int_new_class(void)
-{
-    int toret;
-    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    toret = ex_class++;
+ err:
     CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
     return toret;
 }
 
-static void int_cleanup(void)
-{
-    EX_DATA_CHECK(return;)
-        lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_doall(ex_data, def_cleanup_cb);
-    lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_free(ex_data);
-    ex_data = NULL;
-    impl = NULL;
-}
-
-static int int_get_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
-                             CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
-                             CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
-    EX_CLASS_ITEM *item = def_get_class(class_index);
-    if (!item)
-        return -1;
-    return def_add_index(item, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func);
-}
-
 /*
+ * Initialise a new CRYPTO_EX_DATA for use in a particular class - including
+ * calling new() callbacks for each index in the class used by this variable
  * Thread-safe by copying a class's array of "CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS" entries
- * in the lock, then using them outside the lock. NB: Thread-safety only
- * applies to the global "ex_data" state (ie. class definitions), not
- * thread-safe on 'ad' itself.
+ * in the lock, then using them outside the lock. Note this only applies
+ * to the global "ex_data" state (ie. class definitions), not 'ad' itself.
  */
-static int int_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
+int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
 {
     int mx, i;
     void *ptr;
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS **storage = NULL;
-    EX_CLASS_ITEM *item = def_get_class(class_index);
-    if (!item)
-        /* error is already set */
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *stack[10];
+    EX_CLASS_ITEM *ip = def_get_class(class_index);
+
+    if (!ip)
         return 0;
+
     ad->sk = NULL;
-    CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    mx = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(item->meth);
+
+    mx = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(ip->meth);
     if (mx > 0) {
-        storage = OPENSSL_malloc(mx * sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *));
-        if (!storage)
-            goto skip;
-        for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
-            storage[i] = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_value(item->meth, i);
+        if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
+            storage = stack;
+        else
+            storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
+        if (storage)
+            for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
+                storage[i] = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_value(ip->meth, i);
     }
- skip:
-    CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    if ((mx > 0) && !storage) {
-        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_INT_NEW_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
+
+    if (mx > 0 && storage == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
     }
     for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
@@ -444,41 +264,50 @@ static int int_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
                                  storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp);
         }
     }
-    OPENSSL_free(storage);
+    if (storage != stack)
+        OPENSSL_free(storage);
     return 1;
 }
 
-/* Same thread-safety notes as for "int_new_ex_data" */
-static int int_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
-                           CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from)
+/*
+ * Duplicate a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling dup() callbacks
+ * for each index in the class used by this variable
+ */
+int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
+                       CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from)
 {
     int mx, j, i;
     char *ptr;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *stack[10];
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS **storage = NULL;
-    EX_CLASS_ITEM *item;
-    if (!from->sk)
-        /* 'to' should be "blank" which *is* just like 'from' */
+    EX_CLASS_ITEM *ip;
+
+    if (from->sk == NULL)
+        /* Nothing to copy over */
         return 1;
-    if ((item = def_get_class(class_index)) == NULL)
+    if ((ip = def_get_class(class_index)) == NULL)
         return 0;
-    CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    mx = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(item->meth);
+
+    mx = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(ip->meth);
     j = sk_void_num(from->sk);
     if (j < mx)
         mx = j;
     if (mx > 0) {
-        storage = OPENSSL_malloc(mx * sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *));
-        if (!storage)
-            goto skip;
-        for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
-            storage[i] = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_value(item->meth, i);
+        if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
+            storage = stack;
+        else
+            storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
+        if (storage)
+            for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
+                storage[i] = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_value(ip->meth, i);
     }
- skip:
-    CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    if ((mx > 0) && !storage) {
-        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_INT_DUP_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
+
+    if (mx > 0 && storage == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
     }
+
     for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
         ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, i);
         if (storage[i] && storage[i]->dup_func)
@@ -486,34 +315,41 @@ static int int_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
                                  storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp);
         CRYPTO_set_ex_data(to, i, ptr);
     }
-    OPENSSL_free(storage);
+    if (storage != stack)
+        OPENSSL_free(storage);
     return 1;
 }
 
-/* Same thread-safety notes as for "int_new_ex_data" */
-static void int_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
+
+/*
+ * Cleanup a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling free() callbacks for
+ * each index in the class used by this variable
+ */
+void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
 {
     int mx, i;
-    EX_CLASS_ITEM *item;
+    EX_CLASS_ITEM *ip;
     void *ptr;
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *stack[10];
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS **storage = NULL;
-    if (ex_data == NULL)
-        return;
-    if ((item = def_get_class(class_index)) == NULL)
+
+    if ((ip = def_get_class(class_index)) == NULL)
         return;
-    CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    mx = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(item->meth);
+
+    mx = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_num(ip->meth);
     if (mx > 0) {
-        storage = OPENSSL_malloc(mx * sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS *));
-        if (!storage)
-            goto skip;
-        for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
-            storage[i] = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_value(item->meth, i);
+        if (mx < (int)OSSL_NELEM(stack))
+            storage = stack;
+        else
+            storage = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*storage) * mx);
+        if (storage)
+            for (i = 0; i < mx; i++)
+                storage[i] = sk_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS_value(ip->meth, i);
     }
- skip:
-    CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
-    if ((mx > 0) && !storage) {
-        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_INT_FREE_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EX_DATA);
+
+    if (mx > 0 && storage == NULL) {
+        CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_FREE_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return;
     }
     for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
@@ -523,79 +359,13 @@ static void int_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
                                   storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp);
         }
     }
-    OPENSSL_free(storage);
+
+    if (storage != stack)
+        OPENSSL_free(storage);
     sk_void_free(ad->sk);
     ad->sk = NULL;
 }
 
-/********************************************************************/
-/*
- * API functions that defer all "state" operations to the "ex_data"
- * implementation we have set.
- */
-
-/*
- * Obtain an index for a new class (not the same as getting a new index
- * within an existing class - this is actually getting a new *class*)
- */
-int CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class(void)
-{
-    IMPL_CHECK return EX_IMPL(new_class) ();
-}
-
-/*
- * Release all "ex_data" state to prevent memory leaks. This can't be made
- * thread-safe without overhauling a lot of stuff, and shouldn't really be
- * called under potential race-conditions anyway (it's for program shutdown
- * after all).
- */
-void CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(void)
-{
-    IMPL_CHECK EX_IMPL(cleanup) ();
-}
-
-/* Inside an existing class, get/register a new index. */
-int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
-                            CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
-                            CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
-{
-    int ret = -1;
-
-    IMPL_CHECK
-        ret = EX_IMPL(get_new_index) (class_index,
-                                      argl, argp, new_func, dup_func,
-                                      free_func);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialise a new CRYPTO_EX_DATA for use in a particular class - including
- * calling new() callbacks for each index in the class used by this variable
- */
-int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
-{
-    IMPL_CHECK return EX_IMPL(new_ex_data) (class_index, obj, ad);
-}
-
-/*
- * Duplicate a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling dup() callbacks
- * for each index in the class used by this variable
- */
-int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
-                       CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from)
-{
-    IMPL_CHECK return EX_IMPL(dup_ex_data) (class_index, to, from);
-}
-
-/*
- * Cleanup a CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable - including calling free() callbacks for
- * each index in the class used by this variable
- */
-void CRYPTO_free_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
-{
-    IMPL_CHECK EX_IMPL(free_ex_data) (class_index, obj, ad);
-}
-
 /*
  * For a given CRYPTO_EX_DATA variable, set the value corresponding to a
  * particular index in the class used by this variable
@@ -607,20 +377,18 @@ int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, void *val)
     if (ad->sk == NULL) {
         if ((ad->sk = sk_void_new_null()) == NULL) {
             CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return (0);
+            return 0;
         }
     }
-    i = sk_void_num(ad->sk);
 
-    while (i <= idx) {
+    for (i = sk_void_num(ad->sk); i <= idx; ++i) {
         if (!sk_void_push(ad->sk, NULL)) {
             CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return (0);
+            return 0;
         }
-        i++;
     }
     sk_void_set(ad->sk, idx, val);
-    return (1);
+    return 1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -629,10 +397,7 @@ int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, void *val)
  */
 void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx)
 {
-    if (ad->sk == NULL)
-        return (0);
-    else if (idx >= sk_void_num(ad->sk))
-        return (0);
-    else
-        return (sk_void_value(ad->sk, idx));
+    if (ad->sk == NULL || idx >= sk_void_num(ad->sk))
+        return NULL;
+    return sk_void_value(ad->sk, idx);
 }
diff --git a/include/openssl/crypto.h b/include/openssl/crypto.h
index 1bda645..faaf1d5 100644
--- a/include/openssl/crypto.h
+++ b/include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -284,25 +284,9 @@ struct crypto_ex_data_st {
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(void)
 
 /*
- * This stuff is basically class callback functions The current classes are
- * SSL_CTX, SSL, SSL_SESSION, and a few more
- */
-
-typedef struct crypto_ex_data_func_st {
-    long argl;                  /* Arbitary long */
-    void *argp;                 /* Arbitary void * */
-    CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func;
-    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func;
-    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func;
-} CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS;
-
-DECLARE_STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS)
-
-/*
  * Per class, we have a STACK of CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS for each CRYPTO_EX_DATA
  * entry.
  */
-
 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO             0
 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL             1
 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX         2
@@ -319,12 +303,8 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS)
 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ECDH            13
 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_COMP            14
 # define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_STORE           15
-
-/*
- * Dynamically assigned indexes start from this value (don't use directly,
- * use via CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class).
- */
-# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_USER            100
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_APP             16
+# define CRYPTO_EX_INDEX__COUNT          17
 
 /*
  * This is the default callbacks, but we can have others as well: this is
@@ -386,14 +366,6 @@ unsigned long SSLeay(void);
 
 int OPENSSL_issetugid(void);
 
-/* An opaque type representing an implementation of "ex_data" support */
-typedef struct st_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL;
-/* Return an opaque pointer to the current "ex_data" implementation */
-const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation(void);
-/* Sets the "ex_data" implementation to be used (if it's not too late) */
-int CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *i);
-/* Get a new "ex_data" class, and return the corresponding "class_index" */
-int CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class(void);
 /* Within a given class, get/register a new index */
 int CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(int class_index, long argl, void *argp,
                             CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
@@ -611,6 +583,11 @@ int FIPS_mode_set(int r);
 
 void OPENSSL_init(void);
 
+struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result);
+int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int offset_day, long offset_sec);
+int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
+                        const struct tm *from, const struct tm *to);
+
 /*
  * CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal.
  * It takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the
@@ -627,17 +604,15 @@ int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
  */
 void ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void);
 
-struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result);
-int OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(struct tm *tm, int offset_day, long offset_sec);
-int OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
-                        const struct tm *from, const struct tm *to);
-
 /* Error codes for the CRYPTO functions. */
 
 /* Function codes. */
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_DUP_EX_DATA                      110
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_FREE_EX_DATA                     111
 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_EX_NEW_INDEX                 100
 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_DYNLOCKID                103
 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_GET_NEW_LOCKID                   101
+# define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_NEW_EX_DATA                      112
 # define CRYPTO_F_CRYPTO_SET_EX_DATA                      102
 # define CRYPTO_F_DEF_ADD_INDEX                           104
 # define CRYPTO_F_DEF_GET_CLASS                           105
diff --git a/include/openssl/engine.h b/include/openssl/engine.h
index fa1d694..c228487 100644
--- a/include/openssl/engine.h
+++ b/include/openssl/engine.h
@@ -776,7 +776,6 @@ typedef struct st_dynamic_LOCK_fns {
 /* The top-level structure */
 typedef struct st_dynamic_fns {
     void *static_state;
-    const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *ex_data_fns;
     dynamic_MEM_fns mem_fns;
     dynamic_LOCK_fns lock_fns;
 } dynamic_fns;
@@ -834,8 +833,6 @@ typedef int (*dynamic_bind_engine) (ENGINE *e, const char *id,
                 CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(fns->lock_fns.dynlock_create_cb); \
                 CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(fns->lock_fns.dynlock_lock_cb); \
                 CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(fns->lock_fns.dynlock_destroy_cb); \
-                if(!CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation(fns->ex_data_fns)) \
-                        return 0; \
         skip_cbs: \
                 if(!fn(e,id)) return 0; \
                 return 1; }
diff --git a/include/openssl/safestack.h b/include/openssl/safestack.h
index e138bfc..785bec6 100644
--- a/include/openssl/safestack.h
+++ b/include/openssl/safestack.h
@@ -2251,24 +2251,6 @@ DECLARE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(OPENSSL_BLOCK, void)
   LHM_lh_stats_bio(ERR_STRING_DATA,lh,out)
 # define lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_free(lh) LHM_lh_free(ERR_STRING_DATA,lh)
 
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_new() LHM_lh_new(EX_CLASS_ITEM,ex_class_item)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_insert(lh,inst) LHM_lh_insert(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh,inst)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_retrieve(lh,inst) LHM_lh_retrieve(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh,inst)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_delete(lh,inst) LHM_lh_delete(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh,inst)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_doall(lh,fn) LHM_lh_doall(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh,fn)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_doall_arg(lh,fn,arg_type,arg) \
-  LHM_lh_doall_arg(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh,fn,arg_type,arg)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_error(lh) LHM_lh_error(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_num_items(lh) LHM_lh_num_items(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_down_load(lh) LHM_lh_down_load(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_node_stats_bio(lh,out) \
-  LHM_lh_node_stats_bio(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh,out)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_node_usage_stats_bio(lh,out) \
-  LHM_lh_node_usage_stats_bio(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh,out)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_stats_bio(lh,out) \
-  LHM_lh_stats_bio(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh,out)
-# define lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_free(lh) LHM_lh_free(EX_CLASS_ITEM,lh)
-
 # define lh_FUNCTION_new() LHM_lh_new(FUNCTION,function)
 # define lh_FUNCTION_insert(lh,inst) LHM_lh_insert(FUNCTION,lh,inst)
 # define lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(lh,inst) LHM_lh_retrieve(FUNCTION,lh,inst)
diff --git a/include/openssl/symhacks.h b/include/openssl/symhacks.h
index 9785685..3253df8 100644
--- a/include/openssl/symhacks.h
+++ b/include/openssl/symhacks.h
@@ -71,12 +71,6 @@
  */
 # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
 
-/* Hack a long name in crypto/ex_data.c */
-#  undef CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation
-#  define CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation       CRYPTO_get_ex_data_impl
-#  undef CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation
-#  define CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation       CRYPTO_set_ex_data_impl
-
 /* Hack a long name in crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c */
 #  undef ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc
 #  define ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc        ASN1_STRING_set_def_mask_asc
diff --git a/util/libeay.num b/util/libeay.num
index 731db22..a82db68 100755
--- a/util/libeay.num
+++ b/util/libeay.num
@@ -2328,8 +2328,8 @@ X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate                 2837	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OCSP_BASICRESP_free                     2838	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OCSP_BASICRESP_add1_ext_i2d             2839	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 d2i_KRB5_AUTHENTBODY                    2840	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
-CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation       2841	EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:
-CRYPTO_set_ex_data_impl                 2841	EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_set_ex_data_impl                 2841	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation       2841	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 KRB5_ENCDATA_new                        2842	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 DSO_up_ref                              2843	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OCSP_crl_reason_str                     2844	EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -2559,7 +2559,7 @@ AES_encrypt                             3033	EXIST::FUNCTION:AES
 OCSP_REQUEST_new                        3034	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 ASN1_ANY_it                             3035	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
 ASN1_ANY_it                             3035	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
-CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class                3036	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class                3036	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 _ossl_old_des_ncbc_encrypt              3037	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 i2d_KRB5_TKTBODY                        3038	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 EC_POINT_clear_free                     3039	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
@@ -2676,8 +2676,8 @@ USERNOTICE_it                           3132	EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIA
 USERNOTICE_it                           3132	EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
 OCSP_REQINFO_new                        3133	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext                  3134	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation       3135	EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:
-CRYPTO_get_ex_data_impl                 3135	EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_get_ex_data_impl                 3135	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
+CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation       3135	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 ASN1_item_pack                          3136	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA                        3137	NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
 X509_PURPOSE_set                        3138	EXIST::FUNCTION:

From steve at openssl.org  Tue Jul 21 13:03:02 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 13:03:02 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1437483782.484824.19443.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  3d9ebc373f6c95df1d4b079d73f3ab0194c57621 (commit)
       via  429261d0d836fa44213eae99abbf19dbb6194daf (commit)
      from  7e5363abe3c00d9db037f464f3c121e194bb5bb6 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 3d9ebc373f6c95df1d4b079d73f3ab0194c57621
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 14:19:38 2015 +0100

    Update demo.
    
    Use new SSL_CONF options in demo. Add intermediate and root CAs and
    update all to use SHA256.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

commit 429261d0d836fa44213eae99abbf19dbb6194daf
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 14 14:18:37 2015 +0100

    SSL_CONF additions.
    
    Add support for loading verify and chain stores in SSL_CONF.
    
    Commands to set verify mode and client CA names.
    
    Add documentation.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 demos/bio/accept.cnf     |   6 ++
 demos/bio/intca.pem      |  23 +++++++
 demos/bio/root.pem       |  22 +++++++
 demos/bio/server.pem     |  21 +++----
 doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod |  27 ++++++++
 ssl/ssl_conf.c           | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 6 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 demos/bio/intca.pem
 create mode 100644 demos/bio/root.pem

diff --git a/demos/bio/accept.cnf b/demos/bio/accept.cnf
index e4acea7..5a2ef45 100644
--- a/demos/bio/accept.cnf
+++ b/demos/bio/accept.cnf
@@ -11,3 +11,9 @@ ECDHParameters = Automatic
 SignatureAlgorithms = RSA+SHA512:ECDSA+SHA512 
 Certificate=server.pem
 PrivateKey=server.pem
+ChainCAFile=root.pem
+VerifyCAFile=root.pem
+
+# Request certificate
+VerifyMode=Request
+ClientCAFile=root.pem
diff --git a/demos/bio/intca.pem b/demos/bio/intca.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3551ea9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/demos/bio/intca.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/demos/bio/root.pem b/demos/bio/root.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bd0e9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/demos/bio/root.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIDtjCCAp6gAwIBAgIJAKkg71CjIAovMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMGgxCzAJBgNV
+BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT
+VElORyBQVVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgUm9vdCBD
+QTAeFw0xNDAyMjMxMzA1MTNaFw0yNDAyMjExMzA1MTNaMGgxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVL
+MRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVTVElORyBQ
+VVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgUm9vdCBDQTCCASIw
+DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANMaarigKGOra5Mc/LrhOkcmHzDs
+vkYL7dfaaht8fLBKRTYwzSBvO9x54koTWjq7HkbaxkYAg3HnDTkNCyzkGKNdM89H
+q/PtGIFFlceQIOat3Kjd05Iw3PtLEWTDjT6FMA9Mkjk/XbpmycqRIwNKtgICoFsG
+juIpc4P31kxK7i3ri+JnlyvVmRZjJxrheJB0qHGXilrOVDPOliDn//jXbcyzXemu
+R8KgAeQM4IIs9jYHJOgHrTItIpwa9wNTEp9KCGkO6xr20NkKyDp6XRyd+hmnUB7r
+77WTptvKPFFTjTDFqEtcif9U2kVkCfn2mSRO8noCbVH++fuR8LMWlD99gt8CAwEA
+AaNjMGEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFIwZD9dCMXcFBuHTsZ/rOft4cTpFMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FIwZD9dCMXcFBuHTsZ/rOft4cTpFMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDgYDVR0PAQH/
+BAQDAgEGMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4IBAQCsoxVi49anYZ1aI/2rVJ5bvEd3ZvGn
+wx1Y+l75SQVYU2qX9CHNBVg1t8reIBN8yPEfBM1WcFPEg7Vy3zFaklMPm/oYXwVI
+/lX/LsfPUxdnQmONxLw4x/0booN1LV/dtRcebewUSqog6W9Z2fbTEe6srIBE4M5G
+Wa943lthlmQM6HzlU4D606PQ3zQbX08mue4eqQB813r4uSoI1MpGLqxkziBRFGGN
+T4VNYp8DeSVr3jHjNBmKCAPZxJIYElnLEK027OG00RH7sF7SGFDNsCjN1NmCvuRz
+9AHnjVIBNzIvI3uiOn9tngRDXBRIcUBsdYG19tal8yWBgrr9SdlqFy/Y
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/demos/bio/server.pem b/demos/bio/server.pem
index d0fc265..ef0d22a 100644
--- a/demos/bio/server.pem
+++ b/demos/bio/server.pem
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 subject= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = Test Server Cert
 issuer= C = UK, O = OpenSSL Group, OU = FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY, CN = OpenSSL Test Intermediate CA
 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIID5zCCAs+gAwIBAgIJALnu1NlVpZ6zMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMHAxCzAJBgNV
+MIIDpTCCAo2gAwIBAgIJAK8ArbvjIOQlMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMHAxCzAJBgNV
 BAYTAlVLMRYwFAYDVQQKDA1PcGVuU1NMIEdyb3VwMSIwIAYDVQQLDBlGT1IgVEVT
 VElORyBQVVJQT1NFUyBPTkxZMSUwIwYDVQQDDBxPcGVuU1NMIFRlc3QgSW50ZXJt
-ZWRpYXRlIENBMB4XDTExMTIwODE0MDE0OFoXDTIxMTAxNjE0MDE0OFowZDELMAkG
+ZWRpYXRlIENBMB4XDTE1MDcxNDEzMjIwNVoXDTI1MDUyMjEzMjIwNVowZDELMAkG
 A1UEBhMCVUsxFjAUBgNVBAoMDU9wZW5TU0wgR3JvdXAxIjAgBgNVBAsMGUZPUiBU
 RVNUSU5HIFBVUlBPU0VTIE9OTFkxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFRlc3QgU2VydmVyIENlcnQw
 ggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDzhPOSNtyyRspmeuUpxfNJ
@@ -13,15 +13,14 @@ R7bfSdI/+qIQt8KXRH6HNG1t8ou0VSvWId5TS5Dq/er5ODUr9OaaDva7EquHIcMv
 vPQGuI+OEAcnleVCy9HVEIySrO4P3CNIicnGkwwiAud05yUAq/gPXBC1hTtmlPD7
 TVcGVSEiJdvzqqlgv02qedGrkki6GY4S7GjZxrrf7Foc2EP+51LJzwLQx3/JfrCU
 41NEWAsu/Sl0tQabXESN+zJ1pDqoZ3uHMgpQjeGiE0olr+YcsSW/tJmiU9OiAr8R
-AgMBAAGjgY8wgYwwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBeAwLAYJYIZI
-AYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRlMB0GA1UdDgQW
-BBSCvM8AABPR9zklmifnr9LvIBturDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ2w2yI55X+sL3szj49
-hqshgYfa2jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAqb1NV0B0/pbpK9Z4/bNjzPQLTRLK
-WnSNm/Jh5v0GEUOE/Beg7GNjNrmeNmqxAlpqWz9qoeoFZax+QBpIZYjROU3TS3fp
-yLsrnlr0CDQ5R7kCCDGa8dkXxemmpZZLbUCpW2Uoy8sAA4JjN9OtsZY7dvUXFgJ7
-vVNTRnI01ghknbtD+2SxSQd3CWF6QhcRMAzZJ1z1cbbwGDDzfvGFPzJ+Sq+zEPds
-xoVLLSetCiBc+40ZcDS5dV98h9XD7JMTQfxzA7mNGv73JoZJA6nFgj+ADSlJsY/t
-JBv+z1iQRueoh9Qeee+ZbRifPouCB8FDx+AltvHTANdAq0t/K3o+pplMVA==
+AgMBAAGjTjBMMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgXgMCwGCWCGSAGG
++EIBDQQfFh1PcGVuU1NMIEdlbmVyYXRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZTANBgkqhkiG9w0B
+AQsFAAOCAQEAq8v8dvU3Xskb7q5LKbLXxTIF6owFs5uLk2k2msEAQzX7SrYFZwdE
+5e33S71rpDbXiJjyD4Yj0Av5yeRlW0YVFlBZAwgPn29CDCD6+DeQ7AwtXvJhcq9e
+llTLpB1EuXC5UCerQmq99wmfTrK0q4hgK7/5c7mcoD7V1iOEvxI2kmG6ukIupbKi
+P1TNVVET1kPhRG1dFP9rge7j2ssY3/H+j3jlAJnwQQoYg+YCZ6g0atjOrqvywAy3
+5E2d9LPF3TKw2mf4mAxjU6hPDOk0tiMS6g1xdHyeTftPXfN8Gli0T0LpNpy5a24B
+dLPqZEpj0kXT8gTYEROX7tq9gYwpe6FVKw==
 -----END CERTIFICATE-----
 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
 MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA84TzkjbcskbKZnrlKcXzSSgi07n+4N7kOM7uIhzpkTuU0HIv
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
index dbdacd1..16b368a 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod
@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ context. This option is only supported if certificate operations
 are permitted. Note: if no B<PrivateKey> option is set then a private key is
 not loaded unless the B<SSL_CONF_FLAG_REQUIRE_PRIVATE> is set.
 
+=item B<ChainCAFile>, B<ChainCAPath>, B<VerifyCAFile>, B<VerifyCAPath>
+
+These options indicate a file or directory used for building certificate
+chains or verifying certificate chains. These options are only supported
+if certificate operations are permitted.
+
 =item B<ServerInfoFile>
 
 Attempts to use the file B<value> in the "serverinfo" extension using the
@@ -306,6 +312,27 @@ B<UnsafeLegacyServerConnect> permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation
 for OpenSSL clients only. Equivalent to B<SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT>.
 Set by default.
 
+=item B<VerifyMode>
+
+The B<value> argument is a comma separated list of flags to set.
+
+B<Peer> enables peer verification: for clients only.
+
+B<Request> requests but does not require a certificate from the client.
+Servers only.
+
+B<Require> requests and requires a certificate from the client: an error
+occurs if the client does not present a certificate. Servers only.
+
+B<Once> requests a certificate from a client only on the initial connection:
+not when renegotiating. Servers only.
+
+=item B<ClientCAFile>, B<ClientCAPath>
+
+A file or directory of certificates in PEM format whose names are used as the
+set of acceptable names for client CAs. Servers only. This option is only
+supported if certificate operations are permitted.
+
 =back
 
 =head1 SUPPORTED COMMAND TYPES
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
index 819e730..4160566 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
@@ -86,8 +86,14 @@ typedef struct {
 
 /* Sense of name is inverted e.g. "TLSv1" will clear SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 */
 #define SSL_TFLAG_INV   0x1
-/* Flags refers to cert_flags not options */
-#define SSL_TFLAG_CERT  0x2
+/* Mask for type of flag referred to */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_TYPE_MASK 0xf00
+/* Flag is for options */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_OPTION    0x000
+/* Flag is for cert_flags */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_CERT      0x100
+/* Flag is for verify mode */
+#define SSL_TFLAG_VFY       0x200
 /* Option can only be used for clients */
 #define SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT
 /* Option can only be used for servers */
@@ -107,6 +113,11 @@ typedef struct {
 #define SSL_FLAG_TBL_CERT(str, flag) \
         {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_CERT|SSL_TFLAG_BOTH, flag}
 
+#define SSL_FLAG_VFY_CLI(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_VFY | SSL_TFLAG_CLIENT, flag}
+#define SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV(str, flag) \
+        {str, (int)(sizeof(str) - 1), SSL_TFLAG_VFY | SSL_TFLAG_SERVER, flag}
+
 /*
  * Opaque structure containing SSL configuration context.
  */
@@ -129,30 +140,46 @@ struct ssl_conf_ctx_st {
     char *cert_filename[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
     /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX cert_flags or NULL if none */
     uint32_t *pcert_flags;
+    /* Pointer to SSL or SSL_CTX verify_mode or NULL if none */
+    uint32_t *pvfy_flags;
     /* Current flag table being worked on */
     const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl;
     /* Size of table */
     size_t ntbl;
+    /* Client CA names */
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *canames;
 };
 
 static void ssl_set_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int name_flags,
                            unsigned long option_value, int onoff)
 {
+    unint32_t *pflags;
     if (cctx->poptions == NULL)
         return;
     if (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_INV)
         onoff ^= 1;
-    if (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_CERT) {
-        if (onoff)
-            *cctx->pcert_flags |= option_value;
-        else
-            *cctx->pcert_flags &= ~option_value;
-    } else {
-        if (onoff)
-            *cctx->poptions |= option_value;
-        else
-            *cctx->poptions &= ~option_value;
+    switch (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_TYPE_MASK) {
+
+    case SSL_TFLAG_CERT:
+        pflags = cctx->pcert_flags;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_TFLAG_VFY:
+        pflags =  cctx->pvfy_flags;
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_TFLAG_OPTION:
+        pflags = cctx->poptions;
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        return;
+
     }
+    if (onoff)
+        *pflags |= option_value;
+    else
+        *pflags &= ~option_value;
 }
 
 static int ssl_match_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const ssl_flag_tbl *tbl,
@@ -335,6 +362,22 @@ static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
     return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
 }
 
+static int cmd_VerifyMode(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    static const ssl_flag_tbl ssl_vfy_list[] = {
+        SSL_FLAG_VFY_CLI("Peer", SSL_VERIFY_PEER),
+        SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Request", SSL_VERIFY_PEER),
+        SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Require",
+                         SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT),
+        SSL_FLAG_VFY_SRV("Once", SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)
+    };
+    if (value == NULL)
+        return -3;
+    cctx->tbl = ssl_vfy_list;
+    cctx->ntbl = OSSL_NELEM(ssl_vfy_list);
+    return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
+}
+
 static int cmd_Certificate(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
 {
     int rv = 1;
@@ -378,6 +421,64 @@ static int cmd_ServerInfoFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
     return rv > 0;
 }
 
+static int do_store(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
+                    const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int verify_store)
+{
+    CERT *cert;
+    X509_STORE **st;
+    if (cctx->ctx)
+        cert = cctx->ctx->cert;
+    else if (cctx->ssl)
+        cert = cctx->ssl->cert;
+    else
+        return 1;
+    st = verify_store ? &cert->verify_store : &cert->chain_store;
+    if (*st == NULL) {
+        *st = X509_STORE_new();
+        if (*st == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return X509_STORE_load_locations(*st, CAfile, CApath) > 0;
+}
+
+static int cmd_ChainCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return do_store(cctx, NULL, value, 0);
+}
+
+static int cmd_ChainCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return do_store(cctx, value, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int cmd_VerifyCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return do_store(cctx, NULL, value, 1);
+}
+
+static int cmd_VerifyCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    return do_store(cctx, value, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+static int cmd_ClientCAFile(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    if (cctx->canames == NULL)
+        cctx->canames = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+    if (cctx->canames == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(cctx->canames, value);
+}
+
+static int cmd_ClientCAPath(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
+{
+    if (cctx->canames == NULL)
+        cctx->canames = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+    if (cctx->canames == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(cctx->canames, value);
+}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 static int cmd_DHParameters(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
 {
@@ -452,6 +553,7 @@ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_cmds[] = {
     SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(CipherString, "cipher", 0),
     SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Protocol, NULL, 0),
     SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(Options, NULL, 0),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD_STRING(VerifyMode, NULL, 0),
     SSL_CONF_CMD(Certificate, "cert", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
                  SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
     SSL_CONF_CMD(PrivateKey, "key", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
@@ -459,6 +561,20 @@ static const ssl_conf_cmd_tbl ssl_conf_cmds[] = {
     SSL_CONF_CMD(ServerInfoFile, NULL,
                  SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
                  SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ChainCAPath, "chainCApath", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ChainCAFile, "chainCAfile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(VerifyCAPath, "verifyCApath", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(VerifyCAFile, "verifyCAfile", SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ClientCAFile, NULL,
+                 SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE),
+    SSL_CONF_CMD(ClientCAPath, NULL,
+                 SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
+                 SSL_CONF_TYPE_DIR),
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     SSL_CONF_CMD(DHParameters, "dhparam",
                  SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CERTIFICATE,
@@ -666,10 +782,12 @@ SSL_CONF_CTX *SSL_CONF_CTX_new(void)
         ret->ctx = NULL;
         ret->poptions = NULL;
         ret->pcert_flags = NULL;
+        ret->pvfy_flags = NULL;
         ret->tbl = NULL;
         ret->ntbl = 0;
         for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
             ret->cert_filename[i] = NULL;
+        ret->canames = NULL;
     }
     return ret;
 }
@@ -695,6 +813,15 @@ int SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx)
             }
         }
     }
+    if (cctx->canames) {
+        if (cctx->ssl)
+            SSL_set_client_CA_list(cctx->ssl, cctx->canames);
+        else if (cctx->ctx)
+            SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(cctx->ctx, cctx->canames);
+        else
+            sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free);
+        cctx->canames = NULL;
+    }
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -706,6 +833,7 @@ void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx)
             OPENSSL_free(cctx->cert_filename[i]);
         OPENSSL_free(cctx->prefix);
         OPENSSL_free(cctx);
+        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free);
     }
 }
 
@@ -745,9 +873,11 @@ void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL *ssl)
     if (ssl) {
         cctx->poptions = &ssl->options;
         cctx->pcert_flags = &ssl->cert->cert_flags;
+        cctx->pvfy_flags = &ssl->verify_mode;
     } else {
         cctx->poptions = NULL;
         cctx->pcert_flags = NULL;
+        cctx->pvfy_flags = NULL;
     }
 }
 
@@ -758,8 +888,10 @@ void SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
     if (ctx) {
         cctx->poptions = &ctx->options;
         cctx->pcert_flags = &ctx->cert->cert_flags;
+        cctx->pvfy_flags = &ctx->verify_mode;
     } else {
         cctx->poptions = NULL;
         cctx->pcert_flags = NULL;
+        cctx->pvfy_flags = NULL;
     }
 }

From steve at openssl.org  Tue Jul 21 13:35:09 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 13:35:09 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1437485709.969849.31231.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  4445704f912495227e9e99835e94219d7e79684c (commit)
       via  4fdf17a0ec8abe758723b9ff4dac85b8134e9ebf (commit)
      from  3d9ebc373f6c95df1d4b079d73f3ab0194c57621 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 4445704f912495227e9e99835e94219d7e79684c
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 21 14:27:10 2015 +0100

    free names before context
    
    Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>

commit 4fdf17a0ec8abe758723b9ff4dac85b8134e9ebf
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 21 14:16:09 2015 +0100

    typo
    
    Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/ssl_conf.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_conf.c b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
index 4160566..5c320cb 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_conf.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_conf.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ struct ssl_conf_ctx_st {
 static void ssl_set_option(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, unsigned int name_flags,
                            unsigned long option_value, int onoff)
 {
-    unint32_t *pflags;
+    uint32_t *pflags;
     if (cctx->poptions == NULL)
         return;
     if (name_flags & SSL_TFLAG_INV)
@@ -832,8 +832,8 @@ void SSL_CONF_CTX_free(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx)
         for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
             OPENSSL_free(cctx->cert_filename[i]);
         OPENSSL_free(cctx->prefix);
-        OPENSSL_free(cctx);
         sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(cctx->canames, X509_NAME_free);
+        OPENSSL_free(cctx);
     }
 }
 

From stevem at openssl.org  Wed Jul 22 12:55:35 2015
From: stevem at openssl.org (Steve Marquess)
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 12:55:35 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1437569735.274201.2713.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  ecd59b75a820b416eb5fcf8a0b06e4eb1aea01e6 (commit)
      from  10c638d6934c96d52236740fb4f0be12f9a68482 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit ecd59b75a820b416eb5fcf8a0b06e4eb1aea01e6
Author: Steve Marquess <marquess at openssl.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 22 08:55:17 2015 -0400

    Update references to private label validations

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 docs/fips/fipsnotes.wml    | 26 +++++++++-----------------
 docs/fips/privatelabel.wml | 13 ++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/fips/fipsnotes.wml b/docs/fips/fipsnotes.wml
index 21df9c8..5ce62c8 100644
--- a/docs/fips/fipsnotes.wml
+++ b/docs/fips/fipsnotes.wml
@@ -53,22 +53,16 @@ The OSF would really prefer to work on open source based validations of benefit
 to the OpenSSL user community at large, but financial support for that objective
 is intermittent at best.  On the other hand many vendors are interested in private label
 validations and the OSF will assist in such efforts on a paid basis.  We've done enough
-of these to be very cost competitive, and for uncomplicated validations we will work
-on a fixed price basis.  A routine private label validation on a single commodity
-platform can cost as little as
-<a href="privatelabel.html">US$35,000</a>.
-Contact the <a href="../../support/funding/support-contact.html">OSF</a> for more information.
+of these to be very cost competitive, and for uncomplicated validations we typically work
+on a fixed price basis.
+
 <p>
-<font color="#cc3333">Update:</font> In collaboration with an accredited CMVP testing laboratory we were through
-December 2012 offering a
-cost effective turnkey <a href="privatelabel.html">validation package</a> for routine private label validations.
-However, due to some changes in
-<a href="http://www.opensslfoundation.com/fips/ig95.html">CMVP requirements</a> 
-introduced in 2013 the current OpenSSL FIPS Object Module
-code base can no longer be readily be validated. We are still adding new
+<font color="#cc3333">Update:</font> As of 2015 we are no longer performing
+<a href="privatelabel.html">private label</a> validations.
+We are still adding new
 platforms to the 
  <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm#1747">#1747</a>
-validation.
+or related validations.
 
 <h2>Current Validations</h2>
 
@@ -84,10 +78,8 @@ And did we mention the <a href="UserGuide.pdf">User Guide</a>?
 <a name="transition">
 <font color="#cc3333">Important Note:</font>
 </a>
-Due to changes in the FIPS 140-2 validation requirements the current v1.2 Module is 
-no longer be a suitable model for private label validations in its current form past the year 2010.  See the NIST <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/notices.html">Notices</a>,
-<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/key_mgmt/documents/Transitioning_CryptoAlgos_070209.pdf">discussion paper</a> and
-<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-131/draft-sp800-131_spd-june2010.pdf">SP 800-131</a>.
+Due to changes in the FIPS 140-2 validation requirements the current v2.0 Module is 
+no longer a suitable model for private label validations in its current form past the year 2014.
 <p>
 
 <h2>Upcoming Validations</h2>
diff --git a/docs/fips/privatelabel.wml b/docs/fips/privatelabel.wml
index 9d8a9b9..fa32d81 100644
--- a/docs/fips/privatelabel.wml
+++ b/docs/fips/privatelabel.wml
@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@
 If you haven't already, please read our <a href="fipsnotes.html">FIPS 140-2 Notes</a> page.
 
 <p>
-<font color="#cc3333">IMPORTANT NOTE:&nbsp;</font>The recent addition of
-<a href="http://opensslfoundation.com/fips/ig95.html">new formal requirements</a> has potentially
-complicated new private label validations, but as of August 2013 it appears such validations
-are again feasible. We'll be more certain of this once we've actually obtained a validation under
-the new rules.
+<font color="#cc3333">IMPORTANT NOTE:&nbsp;</font>The addition of
+multiple new formal requirements since the #1747 validation was first approved in 2012, and
+recent unfavorable experiences with increasingly unpredictable outcomes from the validation process, have increased
+to the point where private label validations are no longer economically feasible for a small
+organization of limited means; the risk doesn't justify the substantial investment of time and money required
+to pursue new validations. As of 2015 we are no longer performing any private label validations.
+<p>
+The rest of this page is of historical interest only.
 
 <h2>What It Is</h2>
 

From stevem at openssl.org  Wed Jul 22 14:56:47 2015
From: stevem at openssl.org (Steve Marquess)
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 14:56:47 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1437577007.388920.21126.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  4d8018b9656624bd4afdb7afa0db6ff1ed62fcca (commit)
      from  ecd59b75a820b416eb5fcf8a0b06e4eb1aea01e6 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 4d8018b9656624bd4afdb7afa0db6ff1ed62fcca
Author: Steve Marquess <marquess at openssl.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 22 10:56:14 2015 -0400

    Note change letter updates are still possible.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 docs/fips/privatelabel.wml | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/fips/privatelabel.wml b/docs/fips/privatelabel.wml
index fa32d81..81d2e0c 100644
--- a/docs/fips/privatelabel.wml
+++ b/docs/fips/privatelabel.wml
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ multiple new formal requirements since the #1747 validation was first approved i
 recent unfavorable experiences with increasingly unpredictable outcomes from the validation process, have increased
 to the point where private label validations are no longer economically feasible for a small
 organization of limited means; the risk doesn't justify the substantial investment of time and money required
-to pursue new validations. As of 2015 we are no longer performing any private label validations.
+to pursue new validations. As of 2015 we are no longer performing any private label validations. The addition of
+new platforms to the existing #1747 or <a href="http://openssl.com/fips/ransom.html">comparable</a> validations
+is still possible and those validation actions are still being performed.
 <p>
 The rest of this page is of historical interest only.
 

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 22 18:43:15 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 18:43:15 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1437590595.462610.18071.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  9f040d6decca7930e978784c917f731e5c45e8f0 (commit)
      from  4445704f912495227e9e99835e94219d7e79684c (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9f040d6decca7930e978784c917f731e5c45e8f0
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 22 06:44:50 2015 -0400

    Some cleanups for crypto/bn
    
    Create bn_free_d utility routine and use it.
    Fix RT3950
    Also a missing cleanse, from Loganaden Velvindron (loganaden at gmail.com),
    who noticed it in a Cloudflare patch.
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/bn/bn_add.c  |  3 ++-
 crypto/bn/bn_lib.c  | 32 +++++++++++++++-----------------
 crypto/bn/bn_mont.c |  4 +++-
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_add.c b/crypto/bn/bn_add.c
index a446686..0bfc3cc 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_add.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_add.c
@@ -222,7 +222,8 @@ int BN_usub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
                 break;
         }
     }
-    memcpy(rp, ap, sizeof(*rp) * dif);
+    if (dif)
+        memcpy(rp, ap, sizeof(*rp) * dif);
 
     r->top = max;
     r->neg = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index b5f827a..f10f44a 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -223,6 +223,15 @@ int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a)
     return ((i * BN_BITS2) + BN_num_bits_word(a->d[i]));
 }
 
+static void bn_free_d(BIGNUM *a)
+{
+    if (BN_get_flags(a,BN_FLG_SECURE))
+        OPENSSL_secure_free(a->d);
+    else
+        OPENSSL_free(a->d);
+}
+
+
 void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a)
 {
     int i;
@@ -232,15 +241,11 @@ void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a)
     bn_check_top(a);
     if (a->d != NULL) {
         OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
-        if (!(BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))) {
-            if (BN_get_flags(a,BN_FLG_SECURE))
-                OPENSSL_secure_free(a->d);
-            else
-                OPENSSL_free(a->d);
-        }
+        if (!BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))
+            bn_free_d(a);
     }
     i = BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_MALLOCED);
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(a, sizeof(BIGNUM));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(a, sizeof(*a));
     if (i)
         OPENSSL_free(a);
 }
@@ -251,12 +256,7 @@ void BN_free(BIGNUM *a)
         return;
     bn_check_top(a);
     if (!BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))
-    if ((a->d != NULL) && !(BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA))) {
-        if (BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_SECURE))
-            OPENSSL_secure_free(a->d);
-        else
-            OPENSSL_free(a->d);
-    }
+        bn_free_d(a);
     if (a->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
         OPENSSL_free(a);
     else {
@@ -399,10 +399,8 @@ BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *b, int words)
         if (!a)
             return NULL;
         if (b->d) {
-            if (BN_get_flags(b,BN_FLG_SECURE))
-                OPENSSL_secure_free(b->d);
-            else
-                OPENSSL_free(b->d);
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(b->d, b->dmax * sizeof(b->d[0]));
+            bn_free_d(b);
         }
         b->d = a;
         b->dmax = words;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index c869101..e3955fe 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -196,7 +196,9 @@ static int BN_from_montgomery_word(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *r, BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     rp = r->d;
 
     /* clear the top words of T */
-    memset(&rp[r->top], 0, sizeof(*rp) * (max - r->top));
+    i = max - r->top;
+    if (i)
+        memset(&rp[r->top], 0, sizeof(*rp) * i);
 
     r->top = max;
     n0 = mont->n0[0];

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul 23 01:52:53 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 01:52:53 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1437616373.458383.1281.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  8a00dbd83e24b00f24429ae57f56102916c8704f (commit)
      from  9f040d6decca7930e978784c917f731e5c45e8f0 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 8a00dbd83e24b00f24429ae57f56102916c8704f
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 22 16:11:55 2015 +0100

    Document shared sigalgs functions.
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod

diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16f7d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_get_shared_sigalgs.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_get_shared_sigalgs, SSL_get_sigalgs - get supported signature algorithms
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                            int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+                            unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash);
+
+ int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+                     int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+                     unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() returns information about the shared signature
+algorithms supported by peer B<s>. The parameter B<idx> indicates the index
+of the shared signature algorithm to return starting from zero. The signature
+algorithm NID is written to B<*psign>, the hash NID to B<*phash> and the
+sign and hash NID to B<*psignhash>. The raw signature and hash values
+are written to B<*rsig> and B<*rhash>.
+
+SSL_get_sigalgs() is similar to SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() except it returns
+information about all signature algorithms supported by B<s> in the order
+they were sent by the peer.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() and SSL_get_sigalgs() return the number of
+signature algorithms or B<0> if the B<idx> parameter is out of range.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions are typically called for debugging purposes (to report
+the peer's preferences) or where an application wants finer control over
+certificate selection. Most applications will rely on internal handling
+and will not need to call them.
+
+If an application is only interested in the highest preference shared
+signature algorithm it can just set B<idx> to zero.
+
+Any or all of the parameters B<psign>, B<phash>, B<psignhash>, B<rsig> or
+B<rhash> can be set to B<NULL> if the value is not required. By setting
+them all to B<NULL> and setting B<idx> to zero the total number of
+signature algorithms can be determined: which can be zero.
+
+These functions must be called after the peer has sent a list of supported
+signature algorithms: after a client hello (for servers) or a certificate
+request (for clients). They can (for example) be called in the certificate
+callback.
+
+Only TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 currently support signature algorithms. If these
+functions are called on an earlier version of TLS or DTLS zero is returned.
+
+The shared signature algorithms returned by SSL_get_shared_sigalgs() are
+ordered according to configuration and peer preferences.
+
+The raw values correspond to the on the wire form as defined by RFC5246 et al.
+The NIDs are OpenSSL equivalents. For example if the peer sent sha256(4) and
+rsa(1) then B<*rhash> would be 4, B<*rsign> 1, B<*phash> NID_sha256, B<*psig>
+NID_rsaEncryption and B<*psighash> NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption.
+
+If a signature algorithm is not recognised the corresponsing NIDs
+will be set to B<NID_undef>. This may be because the value is not supported
+or is not an appropriate combination (for example MD5 and DSA).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(3)|SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(3)>,
+L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>
+
+=cut

From emilia at openssl.org  Thu Jul 23 12:24:48 2015
From: emilia at openssl.org (Emilia Kasper)
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 12:24:48 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1437654288.573655.23366.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  4102d1a5034aea9cf3b070534bc97f5cee2f2296 (commit)
      from  fd9631bbbda626af0407d5c8c188b05c86a25e3d (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 4102d1a5034aea9cf3b070534bc97f5cee2f2296
Author: Emilia Kasper <emilia at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 23 13:20:21 2015 +0200

    rsaz_exp.h: align license with the rest of the contribution
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit f4ee22be03bb8318b1e0f00e116be231ba12fdef)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h b/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
index 33361de..229e181 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
@@ -1,32 +1,44 @@
-/******************************************************************************
-* Copyright(c) 2012, Intel Corp.
-* Developers and authors:
-* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)
-* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel
-* (2) University of Haifa, Israel
+/*****************************************************************************
+*                                                                            *
+*  Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation                                     *
+*                                                                            *
+*  All rights reserved.                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without        *
+*  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are    *
+*  met:                                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright         *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright      *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the    *
+*     documentation and/or other materials provided with the                 *
+*     distribution.                                                          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its         *
+*     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from   *
+*     this software without specific prior written permission.               *
+*                                                                            *
+*                                                                            *
+*  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY          *
+*  EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE         *
+*  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR        *
+*  PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR            *
+*  CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,     *
+*  EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,       *
+*  PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR        *
+*  PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF    *
+*  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING      *
+*  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS        *
+*  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.              *
+*                                                                            *
 ******************************************************************************
-* LICENSE:
-* This submission to OpenSSL is to be made available under the OpenSSL
-* license, and only to the OpenSSL project, in order to allow integration
-* into the publicly distributed code.
-* The use of this code, or portions of this code, or concepts embedded in
-* this code, or modification of this code and/or algorithm(s) in it, or the
-* use of this code for any other purpose than stated above, requires special
-* licensing.
-******************************************************************************
-* DISCLAIMER:
-* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS AND THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS
-* ``AS IS''. ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
-* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR THE COPYRIGHT
-* OWNERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY,
-* OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
-* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
-* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
-* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
-* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-******************************************************************************/
+* Developers and authors:                                                    *
+* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   *
+* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel            *
+* (2) University of Haifa, Israel                                            *
+*****************************************************************************/
 
 #ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H
 # define RSAZ_EXP_H

From emilia at openssl.org  Thu Jul 23 12:24:48 2015
From: emilia at openssl.org (Emilia Kasper)
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 12:24:48 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1437654288.663064.23388.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  f4ee22be03bb8318b1e0f00e116be231ba12fdef (commit)
      from  8a00dbd83e24b00f24429ae57f56102916c8704f (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit f4ee22be03bb8318b1e0f00e116be231ba12fdef
Author: Emilia Kasper <emilia at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 23 13:20:21 2015 +0200

    rsaz_exp.h: align license with the rest of the contribution
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h b/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
index 33361de..229e181 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
@@ -1,32 +1,44 @@
-/******************************************************************************
-* Copyright(c) 2012, Intel Corp.
-* Developers and authors:
-* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)
-* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel
-* (2) University of Haifa, Israel
+/*****************************************************************************
+*                                                                            *
+*  Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation                                     *
+*                                                                            *
+*  All rights reserved.                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without        *
+*  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are    *
+*  met:                                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright         *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright      *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the    *
+*     documentation and/or other materials provided with the                 *
+*     distribution.                                                          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its         *
+*     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from   *
+*     this software without specific prior written permission.               *
+*                                                                            *
+*                                                                            *
+*  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY          *
+*  EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE         *
+*  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR        *
+*  PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR            *
+*  CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,     *
+*  EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,       *
+*  PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR        *
+*  PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF    *
+*  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING      *
+*  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS        *
+*  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.              *
+*                                                                            *
 ******************************************************************************
-* LICENSE:
-* This submission to OpenSSL is to be made available under the OpenSSL
-* license, and only to the OpenSSL project, in order to allow integration
-* into the publicly distributed code.
-* The use of this code, or portions of this code, or concepts embedded in
-* this code, or modification of this code and/or algorithm(s) in it, or the
-* use of this code for any other purpose than stated above, requires special
-* licensing.
-******************************************************************************
-* DISCLAIMER:
-* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS AND THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS
-* ``AS IS''. ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
-* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR THE COPYRIGHT
-* OWNERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY,
-* OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
-* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
-* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
-* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
-* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-******************************************************************************/
+* Developers and authors:                                                    *
+* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   *
+* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel            *
+* (2) University of Haifa, Israel                                            *
+*****************************************************************************/
 
 #ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H
 # define RSAZ_EXP_H

From stevem at openssl.org  Fri Jul 24 16:25:10 2015
From: stevem at openssl.org (Steve Marquess)
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 16:25:10 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1437755110.223293.16198.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  67bec773be58e202d6e725174526cb7aa03f5e01 (commit)
      from  4d8018b9656624bd4afdb7afa0db6ff1ed62fcca (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 67bec773be58e202d6e725174526cb7aa03f5e01
Author: Steve Marquess <marquess at openssl.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 24 12:24:49 2015 -0400

    Fix typos

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 about/binaries.wml | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/about/binaries.wml b/about/binaries.wml
index 0f55b0f..21b745f 100644
--- a/about/binaries.wml
+++ b/about/binaries.wml
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 <p>Some people have offered to provide OpenSSL binary distributions for
 selected operating systems.  The condition to get a link here is that the
-link is stable and can provide continues support for OpenSSL for a while.</p>
+link is stable and can provide continued support for OpenSSL for a while.</p>
 
 <p>Note: many Linux distributions come with pre-compiled OpenSSL packages.
 Those are already well-known among the users of said distributions, and
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ packages.</p>
 <ul>
     <item name="OpenSSL for Windows"
           info="Pre-compiled Win32/64 libraries without external dependencies to the Microsoft Visual Studio
-Runtime DLLs, expect for the system provided msvcrt.dll"
+Runtime DLLs, except for the system provided msvcrt.dll"
           url="http://indy.fulgan.com/SSL/">
 </ul>
 

From kurt at openssl.org  Fri Jul 24 17:57:22 2015
From: kurt at openssl.org (Kurt Roeckx)
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 17:57:22 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1437760642.606710.7862.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  c21a779e67328ae7b1e5037631f82bb91a532887 (commit)
      from  67bec773be58e202d6e725174526cb7aa03f5e01 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit c21a779e67328ae7b1e5037631f82bb91a532887
Author: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be>
Date:   Fri Jul 24 19:56:34 2015 +0200

    Fix CVE-2014-3569 affected versions (again)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 news/vulnerabilities.xml | 52 ------------------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 52 deletions(-)

diff --git a/news/vulnerabilities.xml b/news/vulnerabilities.xml
index 49d0038..9a41b1e 100644
--- a/news/vulnerabilities.xml
+++ b/news/vulnerabilities.xml
@@ -1163,60 +1163,8 @@ the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
 
   <issue public="20141021">
     <cve name="2014-3569"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8a"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8b"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8c"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8d"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8e"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8f"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8g"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8h"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8i"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8j"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8k"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8l"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8m"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8n"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8o"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8p"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8q"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8r"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8s"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8t"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8u"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8v"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8w"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8x"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8y"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8za"/>
-    <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8zb"/>
     <affects base="0.9.8" version="0.9.8zc"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0a"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0b"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0c"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0d"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0e"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0f"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0g"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0i"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0j"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0k"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0l"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0m"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0n"/>
     <affects base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0o"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1a"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1b"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1c"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1d"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1e"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1f"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1g"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1h"/>
-    <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1i"/>
     <affects base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1j"/>
     <fixed base="1.0.1" version="1.0.1k" date="20150108"/>
     <fixed base="1.0.0" version="1.0.0p" date="20150108"/>

From matt at openssl.org  Mon Jul 27 14:05:18 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 14:05:18 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438005918.791085.25938.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  57787ac81444938a876f185cdd73875c8f53e208 (commit)
      from  f4ee22be03bb8318b1e0f00e116be231ba12fdef (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 57787ac81444938a876f185cdd73875c8f53e208
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 21 00:02:39 2015 +0100

    Remove support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
    
    This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could
    only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it
    directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified.
    
    Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to
    ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears
    any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag
    after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite
    unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely
    undocumented).
    
    The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client
    side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished
    message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send
    application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message.
    
    This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
    There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the
    implementation of ssl3_write:
    
    	/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
    	 * last handshake message in the same packet as the first
    	 * use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
    	 * session-id reuse */
    
    It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing
    is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay.
    
    This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well
    as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                |  6 ++++++
 include/openssl/ssl3.h |  4 ++--
 ssl/d1_clnt.c          | 22 ++--------------------
 ssl/s3_clnt.c          | 16 ++--------------
 ssl/s3_lib.c           | 44 +-------------------------------------------
 ssl/ssl_locl.h         |  1 -
 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index a06b1e4..1526aec 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@
  _______________
 
  Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0  [xx XXX xxxx]
+  *) Dropped support for the SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED flag. This SSLeay
+     era flag was never set throughout the codebase (only read). Also removed
+     SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER which was only used if
+     SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED was also set.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
   *) Changed the default name options in the "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509"
      to be "oneline" instead of "compat".
      [Richard Levitte]
diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl3.h b/include/openssl/ssl3.h
index d56105e..43df925 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/include/openssl/ssl3.h
@@ -360,10 +360,10 @@ extern "C" {
 # define SSL3_CT_NUMBER                  9
 
 # define SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS       0x0001
-# define SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED        0x0002
-# define SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER                   0x0004
+
 /* Removed from OpenSSL 1.1.0 */
 # define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG              0x0
+
 # define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY             0x0010
 /*
  * Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 8940abc..fde0def 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -604,8 +604,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
                 goto end;
             s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
 
-            /* clear flags */
-            s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
             if (s->hit) {
                 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -614,17 +612,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
                     s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
                 }
 #endif
-                if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
-                    s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
-                    if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
-                        s->d1->next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
-                        s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CW_WRITE_SOCK;
-                    }
-#endif
-                    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-                    s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
-                }
             } else {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
                 /*
@@ -711,13 +698,8 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
             /* clean a few things up */
             ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
 
-            /*
-             * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
-             * buffering now
-             */
-            if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
-                ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-            /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+            /* Remove the buffering */
+            ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
 
             s->init_num = 0;
             s->renegotiate = 0;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 1a925a7..04af851 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -518,15 +518,8 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
                 goto end;
             s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
 
-            /* clear flags */
-            s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
             if (s->hit) {
                 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
-                if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
-                    s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-                    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-                    s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
-                }
             } else {
                 /*
                  * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
@@ -589,13 +582,8 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
             BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
             s->init_buf = NULL;
 
-            /*
-             * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
-             * buffering now
-             */
-            if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
-                ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-            /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+            /* remove the buffering */
+            ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
 
             s->init_num = 0;
             s->renegotiate = 0;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 54c902d..8b7c52a 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -4131,54 +4131,12 @@ int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s)
 
 int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
 {
-    int ret, n;
-
-#if 0
-    if (s->shutdown & SSL_SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
-        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-        return (0);
-    }
-#endif
     clear_sys_error();
     if (s->s3->renegotiate)
         ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
 
-    /*
-     * This is an experimental flag that sends the last handshake message in
-     * the same packet as the first use data - used to see if it helps the
-     * TCP protocol during session-id reuse
-     */
-    /* The second test is because the buffer may have been removed */
-    if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER) && (s->wbio == s->bbio)) {
-        /* First time through, we write into the buffer */
-        if (s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret == 0) {
-            ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len);
-            if (ret <= 0)
-                return (ret);
-
-            s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = ret;
-        }
-
-        s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
-        n = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-        if (n <= 0)
-            return (n);
-        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
-        /* We have flushed the buffer, so remove it */
-        ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-        s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
-
-        ret = s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret;
-        s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
-    } else {
-        ret = s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
+    return s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
                                          buf, len);
-        if (ret <= 0)
-            return (ret);
-    }
-
-    return (ret);
 }
 
 static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 2672918..1cdcb8b 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -1184,7 +1184,6 @@ struct ssl_st {
 
 typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
     long flags;
-    int delay_buf_pop_ret;
     int read_mac_secret_size;
     unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     int write_mac_secret_size;

From matt at openssl.org  Mon Jul 27 15:59:03 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 15:59:03 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1438012743.299998.25846.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  728432aed0f8e0c8b86df0724c9fde76659bc54b (commit)
       via  8e75dcf58705dbf29f37bfa9725ef6cde49c0c8a (commit)
      from  396a2dc07177a14284dba194cb6dfda4f3785681 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 728432aed0f8e0c8b86df0724c9fde76659bc54b
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 27 13:30:43 2015 +0100

    Fix SSL_set_session_ticket_ext when used with SSLv23_method
    
    The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext can be used to set custom session
    ticket data passed in the initial ClientHello. This can be particularly
    useful for EAP-FAST. However, when using SSLv23_method, the session does
    not get created until the ServerHello has been received. The extension code
    will only add the SessionTicket data to the ClientHello if a session already
    exists. Therefore SSL_set_session_ticket_ext has no impact when used in
    conjunction with SSLv23_method. The solution is to simply create the session
    during creation of the ClientHello instead of waiting for the ServerHello.
    
    This commit fixes the test failure introduced by the previous commit.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

commit 8e75dcf58705dbf29f37bfa9725ef6cde49c0c8a
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 27 12:04:47 2015 +0100

    Add test for SSL_set_session_ticket_ext
    
    The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext sets the ticket data to be sent in
    the ClientHello. This is useful for EAP-FAST. This commit adds a test to
    ensure that when this function is called the expected ticket data actually
    appears in the ClientHello.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/Makefile          |   2 +-
 ssl/clienthellotest.c | 218 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 ssl/s23_clnt.c        |  19 ++---
 ssl/ssl3.h            |   2 +
 test/Makefile         |  39 ++++++++-
 5 files changed, 261 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 ssl/clienthellotest.c

diff --git a/ssl/Makefile b/ssl/Makefile
index 29d9e45..ad14abb 100644
--- a/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/ssl/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ KRB5_INCLUDES=
 CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
 
 GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
-TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c
+TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c
 APPS=
 
 LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
diff --git a/ssl/clienthellotest.c b/ssl/clienthellotest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a00a7ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/clienthellotest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN      2
+#define SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN      1
+#define CIPHERS_LEN_LEN         2
+#define COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN     1
+#define EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN      2
+#define EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN      2
+#define EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN      2
+
+
+#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS                         2
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for TLS1.2
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2      0
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG      1
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL *con;
+    BIO *rbio;
+    BIO *wbio;
+    BIO *err;
+    long len;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    unsigned char *dataend;
+    char *dummytick = "Hello World!";
+    unsigned int tmplen;
+    unsigned int type;
+    unsigned int size;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    int currtest = 0;
+
+    SSL_library_init();
+    SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    /*
+     * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets
+     * produced when we try to connect
+     */
+    for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) {
+        testresult = 0;
+        if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2) {
+            ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_2_method());
+        } else {
+            ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+        }
+        con = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+        rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+        SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+        if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+                || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+            if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick)))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) {
+            /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+        dataend = data + len;
+
+        /* Skip the record header */
+        data += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        /* Skip the handshake message header */
+        data += SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        /* Skip client version and random */
+        data += CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+        if (data + SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip session id */
+        tmplen = *data;
+        data += SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + CIPHERS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip ciphers */
+        tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+        data += CIPHERS_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip compression */
+        tmplen = *data;
+        data += COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Extensions len */
+        tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+        data += EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN;
+        if (data + tmplen > dataend)
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Loop through all extensions */
+        while (tmplen > EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN) {
+            type = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+            data += EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN;
+            size = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+            data += EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN;
+            if (data + size > dataend)
+                goto end;
+
+            if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+                if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+                        || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+                    if (size == strlen(dummytick)
+                            && memcmp(data, dummytick, size) == 0) {
+                        /* Ticket data is as we expected */
+                        testresult = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n");
+                    }
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            tmplen -= EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN + size;
+            data += size;
+        }
+
+ end:
+        SSL_free(con);
+        SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+        if (!testresult) {
+            printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ERR_free_strings();
+    ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+    EVP_cleanup();
+    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
+
+    return testresult?0:1;
+}
diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 3766567..fc344b9 100644
--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -373,12 +373,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
     buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
     if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
-#if 0
-        /* don't reuse session-id's */
+        /*
+         * Since we're sending s23 client hello, we're not reusing a session, as
+         * we'd be using the method from the saved session instead
+         */
         if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
-            return (-1);
+            return -1;
         }
-#endif
 
         p = s->s3->client_random;
         if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
@@ -439,9 +440,6 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
             /*
              * put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse)
              */
-#if 0
-            s->session->session_id_length = 0;
-#endif
             s2n(0, d);
 
             if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
@@ -784,13 +782,6 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
     }
     s->init_num = 0;
 
-    /*
-     * Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not reusing a
-     * session-id
-     */
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
-        goto err;
-
     return (SSL_connect(s));
  err:
     return (-1);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
index 2dd5462..e9b1170 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ extern "C" {
 # define SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE                    32
 # define SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH                   5
 
+# define SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH                   4
+
 # ifndef SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
  /*
   * Some will argue that this increases memory footprint, but it's not
diff --git a/test/Makefile b/test/Makefile
index eca1400..522af50 100644
--- a/test/Makefile
+++ b/test/Makefile
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ ASN1TEST=	asn1test
 HEARTBEATTEST=  heartbeat_test
 CONSTTIMETEST=  constant_time_test
 VERIFYEXTRATEST=	verify_extra_test
+CLIENTHELLOTEST=	clienthellotest
 
 TESTS=		alltests
 
@@ -78,7 +79,8 @@ EXE=	$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)  $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)
 	$(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
-	$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+	$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
 # $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
@@ -91,7 +93,8 @@ OBJ=	$(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o  $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
 	$(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
 	$(BFTEST).o  $(SSLTEST).o  $(DSATEST).o  $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
 	$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o \
-	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
+	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o \
+	$(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
 
 SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(MD2TEST).c  $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
@@ -101,7 +104,8 @@ SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
 	$(BFTEST).c  $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c   $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
 	$(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
-	$(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c
+	$(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c \
+	$(CLIENTHELLOTEST).c
 
 EXHEADER= 
 HEADER=	$(EXHEADER)
@@ -144,7 +148,8 @@ alltests: \
 	test_enc test_x509 test_rsa test_crl test_sid \
 	test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \
 	test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
-	test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_heartbeat test_constant_time test_verify_extra
+	test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_heartbeat test_constant_time test_verify_extra \
+	test_clienthello
 
 test_evp:
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
@@ -339,6 +344,10 @@ test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 	@echo $(START) $@
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
 
+test_clienthello: $(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	@echo $(START) $@
+	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)
+
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
@@ -510,6 +519,9 @@ $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
 $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
 	@target=$(VERIFYEXTRATEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
 
+$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
+	@target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
 #$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
 #	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
 
@@ -555,6 +567,25 @@ bntest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 bntest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h bntest.c
 casttest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/cast.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 casttest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h casttest.c
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+clienthellotest.o: clienthellotest.c
 constant_time_test.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h
 constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h constant_time_test.c

From matt at openssl.org  Mon Jul 27 15:59:15 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 15:59:15 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1438012755.329282.26115.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  f0348c842e75a77f643e7d34cb88609145b2d320 (commit)
       via  09368c044b4a0dfe694e4905cb13e9a293efd78d (commit)
      from  4102d1a5034aea9cf3b070534bc97f5cee2f2296 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit f0348c842e75a77f643e7d34cb88609145b2d320
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 27 13:30:43 2015 +0100

    Fix SSL_set_session_ticket_ext when used with SSLv23_method
    
    The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext can be used to set custom session
    ticket data passed in the initial ClientHello. This can be particularly
    useful for EAP-FAST. However, when using SSLv23_method, the session does
    not get created until the ServerHello has been received. The extension code
    will only add the SessionTicket data to the ClientHello if a session already
    exists. Therefore SSL_set_session_ticket_ext has no impact when used in
    conjunction with SSLv23_method. The solution is to simply create the session
    during creation of the ClientHello instead of waiting for the ServerHello.
    
    This commit fixes the test failure introduced by the previous commit.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

commit 09368c044b4a0dfe694e4905cb13e9a293efd78d
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 27 12:04:47 2015 +0100

    Add test for SSL_set_session_ticket_ext
    
    The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext sets the ticket data to be sent in
    the ClientHello. This is useful for EAP-FAST. This commit adds a test to
    ensure that when this function is called the expected ticket data actually
    appears in the ClientHello.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/Makefile          |   2 +-
 ssl/clienthellotest.c | 218 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 ssl/s23_clnt.c        |  19 ++---
 test/Makefile         |  38 ++++++++-
 4 files changed, 258 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 ssl/clienthellotest.c

diff --git a/ssl/Makefile b/ssl/Makefile
index 42f1af5..7b90fb0 100644
--- a/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/ssl/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ KRB5_INCLUDES=
 CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
 
 GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
-TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c
+TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c
 APPS=
 
 LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
diff --git a/ssl/clienthellotest.c b/ssl/clienthellotest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a00a7ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/clienthellotest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN      2
+#define SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN      1
+#define CIPHERS_LEN_LEN         2
+#define COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN     1
+#define EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN      2
+#define EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN      2
+#define EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN      2
+
+
+#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS                         2
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for TLS1.2
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2      0
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG      1
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL *con;
+    BIO *rbio;
+    BIO *wbio;
+    BIO *err;
+    long len;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    unsigned char *dataend;
+    char *dummytick = "Hello World!";
+    unsigned int tmplen;
+    unsigned int type;
+    unsigned int size;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    int currtest = 0;
+
+    SSL_library_init();
+    SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    /*
+     * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets
+     * produced when we try to connect
+     */
+    for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) {
+        testresult = 0;
+        if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2) {
+            ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_2_method());
+        } else {
+            ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+        }
+        con = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+        rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+        SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+        if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+                || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+            if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick)))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) {
+            /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+        dataend = data + len;
+
+        /* Skip the record header */
+        data += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        /* Skip the handshake message header */
+        data += SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        /* Skip client version and random */
+        data += CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+        if (data + SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip session id */
+        tmplen = *data;
+        data += SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + CIPHERS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip ciphers */
+        tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+        data += CIPHERS_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip compression */
+        tmplen = *data;
+        data += COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Extensions len */
+        tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+        data += EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN;
+        if (data + tmplen > dataend)
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Loop through all extensions */
+        while (tmplen > EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN) {
+            type = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+            data += EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN;
+            size = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+            data += EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN;
+            if (data + size > dataend)
+                goto end;
+
+            if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+                if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+                        || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+                    if (size == strlen(dummytick)
+                            && memcmp(data, dummytick, size) == 0) {
+                        /* Ticket data is as we expected */
+                        testresult = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n");
+                    }
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            tmplen -= EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN + size;
+            data += size;
+        }
+
+ end:
+        SSL_free(con);
+        SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+        if (!testresult) {
+            printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ERR_free_strings();
+    ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+    EVP_cleanup();
+    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
+
+    return testresult?0:1;
+}
diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index e4e707c..acbbe31 100644
--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -375,12 +375,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
     buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
     if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
-#if 0
-        /* don't reuse session-id's */
+        /*
+         * Since we're sending s23 client hello, we're not reusing a session, as
+         * we'd be using the method from the saved session instead
+         */
         if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
-            return (-1);
+            return -1;
         }
-#endif
 
         p = s->s3->client_random;
         if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
@@ -445,9 +446,6 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
             /*
              * put in the session-id length (zero since there is no reuse)
              */
-#if 0
-            s->session->session_id_length = 0;
-#endif
             s2n(0, d);
 
             if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG)
@@ -796,13 +794,6 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
     }
     s->init_num = 0;
 
-    /*
-     * Since, if we are sending a ssl23 client hello, we are not reusing a
-     * session-id
-     */
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
-        goto err;
-
     return (SSL_connect(s));
  err:
     return (-1);
diff --git a/test/Makefile b/test/Makefile
index e695073..80aeccf 100644
--- a/test/Makefile
+++ b/test/Makefile
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ ASN1TEST=	asn1test
 HEARTBEATTEST=  heartbeat_test
 CONSTTIMETEST=  constant_time_test
 VERIFYEXTRATEST=	verify_extra_test
+CLIENTHELLOTEST=	clienthellotest
 
 TESTS=		alltests
 
@@ -81,7 +82,8 @@ EXE=	$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)  $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)
 	$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
-	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+	$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
 # $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
@@ -94,7 +96,8 @@ OBJ=	$(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o  $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
 	$(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
 	$(BFTEST).o  $(SSLTEST).o  $(DSATEST).o  $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
 	$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
-	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
+	$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o \
+	$(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
 
 SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(MD2TEST).c  $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
@@ -104,7 +107,8 @@ SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
 	$(BFTEST).c  $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c   $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
 	$(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
-	$(V3NAMETEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c
+	$(V3NAMETEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c \
+	$(CLIENTHELLOTEST).c
 
 EXHEADER= 
 HEADER=	testutil.h $(EXHEADER)
@@ -148,7 +152,7 @@ alltests: \
 	test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \
 	test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
 	test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_ocsp test_v3name test_heartbeat \
-	test_constant_time test_verify_extra
+	test_constant_time test_verify_extra test_clienthello
 
 test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
@@ -353,6 +357,10 @@ test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 	@echo $(START) $@
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
 
+test_clienthello: $(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	@echo $(START) $@
+	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)
+
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
@@ -527,6 +535,9 @@ $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
 $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
 	@target=$(VERIFYEXTRATEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
 
+$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
+	@target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
 #$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
 #	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
 
@@ -572,6 +583,25 @@ bntest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 bntest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h bntest.c
 casttest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/cast.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 casttest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h casttest.c
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+clienthellotest.o: clienthellotest.c
 constant_time_test.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h
 constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h constant_time_test.c

From matt at openssl.org  Mon Jul 27 15:59:24 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 15:59:24 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438012764.299072.26378.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  3b848c642cdbca17c686c95b8fd655e5b1f5df2a (commit)
      from  57787ac81444938a876f185cdd73875c8f53e208 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 3b848c642cdbca17c686c95b8fd655e5b1f5df2a
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jul 27 12:04:47 2015 +0100

    Add test for SSL_set_session_ticket_ext
    
    The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext sets the ticket data to be sent in
    the ClientHello. This is useful for EAP-FAST. This commit adds a test to
    ensure that when this function is called the expected ticket data actually
    appears in the ClientHello.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 test/Makefile          |  35 +++++++-
 test/clienthellotest.c | 218 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 249 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/clienthellotest.c

diff --git a/test/Makefile b/test/Makefile
index d9aa750..2e699dc 100644
--- a/test/Makefile
+++ b/test/Makefile
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ V3NAMETEST=	v3nametest
 HEARTBEATTEST=  heartbeat_test
 CONSTTIMETEST=  constant_time_test
 VERIFYEXTRATEST=	verify_extra_test
+CLIENTHELLOTEST=	clienthellotest
 
 TESTS=		alltests
 
@@ -85,7 +86,8 @@ EXE=	$(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT)  $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)
 	$(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SECMEMTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
 	$(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(P5_CRPT2_TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
-	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+	$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
 # $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 
@@ -99,7 +101,7 @@ OBJ=	$(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o  $(ECDSATEST).o $(ECDHTEST).o $(IDEATEST).o \
 	$(BFTEST).o  $(SSLTEST).o  $(DSATEST).o  $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
 	$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
 	$(GOST2814789TEST).o $(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(P5_CRPT2_TEST).o \
-	$(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o testutil.o
+	$(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o testutil.o
 
 SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(MD2TEST).c  $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
@@ -110,7 +112,7 @@ SRC=	$(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c  $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
 	$(BFTEST).c  $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c   $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
 	$(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(V3NAMETEST).c \
 	$(GOST2814789TEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(P5_CRPT2_TEST).c \
-	$(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c testutil.c
+	$(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).c testutil.c
 
 HEADER=	testutil.h
 
@@ -151,7 +153,7 @@ alltests: \
 	test_ige test_jpake test_secmem \
 	test_srp test_cms test_v3name test_ocsp \
 	test_gost2814789 test_heartbeat test_p5_crpt2 \
-	test_constant_time test_verify_extra
+	test_constant_time test_verify_extra test_clienthello
 
 test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt
 	@echo $(START) $@
@@ -404,6 +406,10 @@ test_verify_extra: $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT)
 	@echo $(START) $@
 	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(VERIFYEXTRATEST)
 
+test_clienthello: $(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+	@echo $(START) $@
+	../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)
+
 update: local_depend
 	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
 
@@ -594,6 +600,9 @@ $(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CONSTTIMETEST).o
 $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o
 	@target=$(VERIFYEXTRATEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
 
+$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
+	@target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
 #$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
 #	$(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
 
@@ -627,6 +636,24 @@ bntest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 bntest.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h bntest.c
 casttest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/cast.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 casttest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h casttest.c
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+clienthellotest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+clienthellotest.o: clienthellotest.c
 constant_time_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/internal/constant_time_locl.h
 constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
 constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h constant_time_test.c
diff --git a/test/clienthellotest.c b/test/clienthellotest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acc56f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/clienthellotest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core at openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay at cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh at cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+
+#define CLIENT_VERSION_LEN      2
+#define SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN      1
+#define CIPHERS_LEN_LEN         2
+#define COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN     1
+#define EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN      2
+#define EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN      2
+#define EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN      2
+
+
+#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS                         2
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for TLS1.2
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2      0
+
+/*
+ * Test that explicitly setting ticket data results in it appearing in the
+ * ClientHello for a negotiated SSL/TLS version
+ */
+#define TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG      1
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ctx;
+    SSL *con;
+    BIO *rbio;
+    BIO *wbio;
+    BIO *err;
+    long len;
+    unsigned char *data;
+    unsigned char *dataend;
+    char *dummytick = "Hello World!";
+    unsigned int tmplen;
+    unsigned int type;
+    unsigned int size;
+    int testresult = 0;
+    int currtest = 0;
+
+    SSL_library_init();
+    SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+    CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    /*
+     * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets
+     * produced when we try to connect
+     */
+    for (; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) {
+        testresult = 0;
+        if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2) {
+            ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_2_method());
+        } else {
+            ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
+        }
+        con = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+        rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+        SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
+        SSL_set_connect_state(con);
+
+        if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+                || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+            if (!SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick, strlen(dummytick)))
+                goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_connect(con) > 0) {
+            /* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
+        dataend = data + len;
+
+        /* Skip the record header */
+        data += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        /* Skip the handshake message header */
+        data += SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        /* Skip client version and random */
+        data += CLIENT_VERSION_LEN + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+        if (data + SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip session id */
+        tmplen = *data;
+        data += SESSION_ID_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + CIPHERS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip ciphers */
+        tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+        data += CIPHERS_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Skip compression */
+        tmplen = *data;
+        data += COMPRESSION_LEN_LEN + tmplen;
+        if (data + EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN > dataend)
+            goto end;
+        /* Extensions len */
+        tmplen = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+        data += EXTENSIONS_LEN_LEN;
+        if (data + tmplen > dataend)
+            goto end;
+
+        /* Loop through all extensions */
+        while (tmplen > EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN) {
+            type = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+            data += EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN;
+            size = ((*data) << 8) | *(data + 1);
+            data += EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN;
+            if (data + size > dataend)
+                goto end;
+
+            if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+                if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_TLS_1_2
+                        || currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
+                    if (size == strlen(dummytick)
+                            && memcmp(data, dummytick, size) == 0) {
+                        /* Ticket data is as we expected */
+                        testresult = 1;
+                    } else {
+                        printf("Received session ticket is not as expected\n");
+                    }
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+
+            tmplen -= EXTENSION_TYPE_LEN + EXTENSION_SIZE_LEN + size;
+            data += size;
+        }
+
+ end:
+        SSL_free(con);
+        SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+        if (!testresult) {
+            printf("ClientHello test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ERR_free_strings();
+    ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+    EVP_cleanup();
+    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
+
+    return testresult?0:1;
+}

From steve at openssl.org  Tue Jul 28 15:56:58 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2015 15:56:58 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438099018.796978.10998.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  14815a99d5fc625a5b8d730b05528f1f7b5d9ef7 (commit)
       via  797a89a15aff6af1a3bb458987cce7fbddef1ff0 (commit)
       via  431f458dfc41874b64ebe6145c9ed5358c9f505c (commit)
      from  3b848c642cdbca17c686c95b8fd655e5b1f5df2a (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 14815a99d5fc625a5b8d730b05528f1f7b5d9ef7
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 23 13:30:32 2015 +0100

    Document signature algorithm setting functions.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 797a89a15aff6af1a3bb458987cce7fbddef1ff0
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sat Jun 21 20:13:37 2014 +0100

    Add some OCSP documentation.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 431f458dfc41874b64ebe6145c9ed5358c9f505c
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jul 23 14:57:42 2015 +0100

    Allow any order for signature algorithm string.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod          | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod           |  78 +++++++++++++++++++++
 doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod   |  73 ++++++++++++++++++++
 doc/crypto/OCSP_response_find_status.pod | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod      |  57 ++++++++++++++++
 doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod          | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod         | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 ssl/t1_lib.c                             |  32 +++++----
 8 files changed, 655 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod
 create mode 100644 doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod
 create mode 100644 doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod
 create mode 100644 doc/crypto/OCSP_response_find_status.pod
 create mode 100644 doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod
 create mode 100644 doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod
 create mode 100644 doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod

diff --git a/doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod b/doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..563fed3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/crypto/OCSP_REQUEST_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+=pod
+
+OCSP_REQUEST_new, OCSP_REQUEST_free, OCSP_request_add0_id, OCSP_request_sign,
+OCSP_request_add1_cert, OCSP_request_onereq_count,
+OCSP_request_onereq_get0 - OCSP request functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ OCSP_REQUEST *OCSP_REQUEST_new(void);
+ void OCSP_REQUEST_free(OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+
+ OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_add0_id(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_CERTID *cid);
+
+ int OCSP_request_sign(OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                       X509 *signer, EVP_PKEY *key, const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                       STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
+
+ int OCSP_request_add1_cert(OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509 *cert);
+
+ int OCSP_request_onereq_count(OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+ OCSP_ONEREQ *OCSP_request_onereq_get0(OCSP_REQUEST *req, int i);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_REQUEST_new() allocates and returns an empty B<OCSP_REQUEST> structure.
+
+OCSP_REQUEST_free() frees up the request structure B<req>.
+
+OCSP_request_add0_id() adds certificate ID B<cid> to B<req>. It returns
+the B<OCSP_ONEREQ> structure added so an application can add additional
+extensions to the request. The B<id> parameter B<MUST NOT> be freed up after
+the operation.
+
+OCSP_request_sign() signs OCSP request B<req> using certificate
+B<signer>, private key B<key>, digest B<dgst> and additional certificates
+B<certs>. If the B<flags> option B<OCSP_NOCERTS> is set then no certificates
+will be included in the request.
+
+OCSP_request_add1_cert() adds certificate B<cert> to request B<req>. The
+application is responsible for freeing up B<cert> after use.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_count() returns the total number of B<OCSP_ONEREQ>
+structures in B<req>.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_get0() returns an internal pointer to the B<OCSP_ONEREQ>
+contained in B<req> of index B<i>. The index value B<i> runs from 0 to
+OCSP_request_onereq_count(req) - 1.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_REQUEST_new() returns an empty B<OCSP_REQUEST> structure or B<NULL> if
+an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_request_add0_id() returns the B<OCSP_ONEREQ> structure containing B<cid>
+or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_request_sign() and OCSP_request_add1_cert() return 1 for success and 0
+for failure.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_count() returns the total number of B<OCSP_ONEREQ>
+structures in B<req>.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_get0() returns a pointer to an B<OCSP_ONEREQ> structure
+or B<NULL> if the index value is out or range.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+An OCSP request structure contains one or more B<OCSP_ONEREQ> structures
+corresponding to each certificate.
+
+OCSP_request_onereq_count() and OCSP_request_onereq_get0() are mainly used by
+OCSP responders.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLE
+
+Create an B<OCSP_REQUEST> structure for certificate B<cert> with issuer
+B<issuer>:
+
+ OCSP_REQUEST *req;
+ OCSP_ID *cid;
+
+ req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
+ if (req == NULL)
+    /* error */
+ cid = OCSP_cert_to_id(EVP_sha1(), cert, issuer);
+ if (cid == NULL)
+    /* error */
+
+ if (OCSP_REQUEST_add0_id(req, cid) == NULL)
+    /* error */
+
+  /* Do something with req, e.g. query responder */
+
+ OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)|OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>,
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)|OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)|OCSP_response_find_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)|OCSP_response_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)|OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod b/doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2eab1d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/crypto/OCSP_cert_to_id.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+=pod
+
+OCSP_cert_to_id, OCSP_cert_id_new, OCSP_CERTID_free, OCSP_id_issuer_cmp,
+OCSP_id_cmp, OCSP_id_get0_info - OCSP certificate ID utility functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_to_id(const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                              X509 *subject, X509 *issuer);
+
+ OCSP_CERTID *OCSP_cert_id_new(const EVP_MD *dgst,
+                               X509_NAME *issuerName,
+                               ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerKey,
+                               ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber);
+
+ void OCSP_CERTID_free(OCSP_CERTID *id);
+
+ int OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b);
+ int OCSP_id_cmp(OCSP_CERTID *a, OCSP_CERTID *b);
+
+ int OCSP_id_get0_info(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **piNameHash, ASN1_OBJECT **pmd,
+                       ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pikeyHash,
+                       ASN1_INTEGER **pserial, OCSP_CERTID *cid);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_cert_to_id() creates and returns a new B<OCSP_CERTID> structure using
+message digest B<dgst> for certificate B<subject> with issuer B<issuer>. If
+B<dgst> is B<NULL> then SHA1 is used.
+
+OCSP_cert_id_new() creates and returns a new B<OCSP_CERTID> using B<dgst> and
+issuer name B<issuerName>, issuer key hash B<issuerKey> and serial number
+B<serialNumber>.
+
+OCSP_CERTID_free() frees up B<id>.
+
+OCSP_id_cmp() compares B<OCSP_CERTID> B<a> and B<b>.
+
+OCSP_id_issuer_cmp() compares only the issuer name of B<OCSP_CERTID> B<a> and B<b>.
+
+OCSP_id_get0_info() returns the issuer name hash, hash OID, issuer key hash and
+serial number contained in B<cid>. If any of the values are not required the
+corresponding parameter can be set to B<NULL>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_cert_to_id() and OCSP_cert_id_new() return either a pointer to a valid
+B<OCSP_CERTID> structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_id_cmp() and OCSP_id_issuer_cmp() returns zero for a match and non-zero
+otherwise.
+
+OCSP_CERTID_free() does not return a value.
+
+OCSP_id_get0_info() returns 1 for sucess and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+OCSP clients will typically only use OCSP_cert_to_id() or OCSP_cert_id_new():
+the other functions are used by responder applications.
+
+The values returned by OCSP_id_get0_info() are internal pointers and B<MUST
+NOT> be freed up by an application: they will be freed when the corresponding
+B<OCSP_CERTID> structure is freed.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)|OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>,
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)|OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)|OCSP_response_find_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)|OCSP_response_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)|OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod b/doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fe3197
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/crypto/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+=pod
+
+OCSP_request_add1_nonce, OCSP_basic_add1_nonce, OCSP_check_nonce, OCSP_copy_nonce - OCSP nonce functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ int OCSP_request_add1_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, unsigned char *val, int len);
+ int OCSP_basic_add1_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, unsigned char *val, int len);
+ int OCSP_copy_nonce(OCSP_BASICRESP *resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+ int OCSP_check_nonce(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *resp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce of value B<val> and length B<len> to
+OCSP request B<req>. If B<val> is B<NULL> a random nonce is used. If B<len>
+is zero or negative a default length will be used (currently 16 bytes).
+
+OCSP_basic_add1_nonce() is identical to OCSP_request_add1_nonce() except
+it adds a nonce to OCSP basic response B<resp>.
+
+OCSP_check_nonce() compares the nonce value in B<req> and B<resp>.
+
+OCSP_copy_nonce() copys any nonce value present in B<req> to B<resp>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_request_add1_nonce() and OCSP_basic_add1_nonce() return 1 for success
+and 0 for failure.
+
+OCSP_copy_nonce() returns 1 if a nonce was successfully copied, 2 if no nonce
+was present in B<req> and 0 if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_check_nonce() returns the result of the nonce comparison between B<req>
+and B<resp>. The return value indicates the result of the comparison.  If
+nonces are present and equal 1 is returned. If the nonces are absent 2 is
+returned. If a nonce is present in the response only 3 is returned. If nonces
+are present and unequal 0 is returned. If the nonce is present in the request
+only then -1 is returned.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+For most purposes the nonce value in a request is set to a random value so
+the B<val> parameter in OCSP_request_add1_nonce() is usually NULL.
+
+An OCSP nonce is typically added to an OCSP request to thwart replay attacks
+by checking the same nonce value appears in the response.
+
+Some responders may include a nonce in all responses even if one is not
+supplied.
+
+Some responders cache OCSP responses and do not sign each response for
+performance reasons. As a result they do not support nonces.
+
+The return values of OCSP_check_nonce() can be checked to cover each case.  A
+positive return value effectively indicates success: nonces are both present
+and match, both absent or present in the response only. A non-zero return
+additionally covers the case where the nonce is present in the request only:
+this will happen if the responder doesn't support nonces. A zero return value
+indicates present and mismatched nonces: this should be treated as an error
+condition.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)|OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>,
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)|OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)|OCSP_response_find_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)|OCSP_response_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)|OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_find_status.pod b/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_find_status.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f4666a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_find_status.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+=pod
+
+OCSP_resp_find_status, OCSP_resp_count, OCSP_resp_get0, OCSP_resp_find, OCSP_single_get0_status, OCSP_check_validity - OCSP reponse utility functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ int OCSP_resp_find_status(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int *status,
+                           int *reason,
+                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
+                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
+                           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd);
+
+ int OCSP_resp_count(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+ OCSP_SINGLERESP *OCSP_resp_get0(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, int idx);
+ int OCSP_resp_find(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_CERTID *id, int last);
+ int OCSP_single_get0_status(OCSP_SINGLERESP *single, int *reason,
+                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **revtime,
+                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **thisupd,
+                             ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **nextupd);
+
+ int OCSP_check_validity(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *thisupd,
+                         ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *nextupd,
+                         long sec, long maxsec);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_resp_find_status() searches B<bs> for an OCSP response for B<id>. If it is
+successful the fields of the response are returned in B<*status>, B<*reason>,
+B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd>.  The B<*status> value will be one of
+B<V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD>, B<V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED> or
+B<V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN>. The B<*reason> and B<*revtime> fields are only
+set if the status is B<V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED>. If set the B<*reason> field
+will be set to the revocation reason which will be one of
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_NOSTATUS>, B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED>,
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_KEYCOMPROMISE>, B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CACOMPROMISE>,
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_AFFILIATIONCHANGED>, B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_SUPERSEDED>,
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CESSATIONOFOPERATION>,
+B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD> or B<OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL>.
+
+OCSP_resp_count() returns the number of B<OCSP_SINGLERESP> structures in B<bs>.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0() returns the B<OCSP_SINGLERESP> structure in B<bs>
+corresponding to index B<idx>. Where B<idx> runs from 0 to
+OCSP_resp_count(bs) - 1.
+
+OCSP_resp_find() searches B<bs> for B<id> and returns the index of the first
+matching entry after B<last> or starting from the beginning if B<last> is -1.
+
+OCSP_single_get0_status() extracts the fields of B<single> in B<*reason>,
+B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd>.
+
+OCSP_check_validity() checks the validity of B<thisupd> and B<nextupd> values
+which will be typically obtained from OCSP_resp_find_status() or
+OCSP_single_get0_status(). If B<sec> is non-zero it indicates how many seconds
+leeway should be allowed in the check. If B<maxsec> is positive it indicates
+the maximum age of B<thisupd> in seconds.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_resp_find_status() returns 1 if B<id> is found in B<bs> and 0 otherwise.
+
+OCSP_resp_count() returns the total number of B<OCSP_SINGLERESP> fields in
+B<bs>.
+
+OCSP_resp_get0() returns a pointer to an B<OCSP_SINGLERESP> structure or
+B<NULL> if B<idx> is out of range.
+
+OCSP_resp_find() returns the index of B<id> in B<bs> (which may be 0) or -1 if
+B<id> was not found.
+
+OCSP_single_get0_status() returns the status of B<single> or -1 if an error
+occurred.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Applications will typically call OCSP_resp_find_status() using the certificate
+ID of interest and then check its validity using OCSP_check_validity(). They
+can then take appropriate action based on the status of the certificate.
+
+An OCSP response for a certificate contains B<thisUpdate> and B<nextUpdate>
+fields. Normally the current time should be between these two values. To
+account for clock skew the B<maxsec> field can be set to non-zero in
+OCSP_check_validity(). Some responders do not set the B<nextUpdate> field, this
+would otherwise mean an ancient response would be considered valid: the
+B<maxsec> parameter to OCSP_check_validity() can be used to limit the permitted
+age of responses.
+
+The values written to B<*revtime>, B<*thisupd> and B<*nextupd> by
+OCSP_resp_find_status() and OCSP_single_get0_status() are internal pointers
+which B<MUST NOT> be freed up by the calling application. Any or all of these
+parameters can be set to NULL if their value is not required.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)|OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>,
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)|OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>,
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)|OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)|OCSP_response_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)|OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod b/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7121872
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/crypto/OCSP_response_status.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+=pod
+
+OCSP_response_status, OCSP_response_get1_basic, OCSP_response_create,
+OCSP_RESPONSE_free - OCSP response functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ int OCSP_response_status(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+ OCSP_BASICRESP *OCSP_response_get1_basic(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_response_create(int status, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs);
+ void OCSP_RESPONSE_free(OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+OCSP_response_status() returns the OCSP response status of B<resp>. It returns
+one of the values: B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL>,
+B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST>,
+B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR>, B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_TRYLATER>
+B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED>, or B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED>.
+
+OCSP_response_get1_basic() decodes and returns the B<OCSP_BASICRESP> structure
+contained in B<resp>. 
+
+OCSP_response_create() creates and returns an B<OCSP_RESPONSE> structure for
+B<status> and optionally including basic response B<bs>.
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE_free() frees up OCSP reponse B<resp>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE_status() returns a status value.
+
+OCSP_response_get1_basic() returns an B<OCSP_BASICRESP> structure pointer or
+B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_response_create() returns an B<OCSP_RESPONSE> structure pointer or B<NULL>
+if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_RESPONSE_free() does not return a value.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+OCSP_response_get1_basic() is only called if the status of a response is
+B<OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)|OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)|OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)|OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)|OCSP_response_find_status(3)>
+L<OCSP_sendreq_new(3)|OCSP_sendreq_new(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod b/doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cab11f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/crypto/OCSP_sendreq_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OCSP_sendreq_new, OCSP_sendreq_nbio, OCSP_REQ_CTX_free,
+OCSP_set_max_response_length, OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header,
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req, OCSP_sendreq_bio - OCSP responder query functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+
+ OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                                int maxline);
+
+ int OCSP_sendreq_nbio(OCSP_RESPONSE **presp, OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx);
+
+ void OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx);
+
+ void OCSP_set_max_response_length(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, unsigned long len);
+
+ int OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx,
+                              const char *name, const char *value);
+
+ int OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx, OCSP_REQUEST *req);
+
+ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *io, const char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+                                 int maxline);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The function OCSP_sendreq_new() returns an B<OCSP_CTX> structure using the
+responder B<io>, the URL path B<path>, the OCSP request B<req> and with a
+response header maximum line length of B<maxline>. If B<maxline> is zero a
+default value of 4k is used. The OCSP request B<req> may be set to B<NULL>
+and provided later if required.
+
+OCSP_sendreq_nbio() performs non-blocking I/O on the OCSP request context
+B<rctx>. When the operation is complete it returns the response in B<*presp>.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_free() frees up the OCSP context B<rctx>.
+
+OCSP_set_max_response_length() sets the maximum reponse length for B<rctx>
+to B<len>. If the response exceeds this length an error occurs. If not
+set a default value of 100k is used.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() adds header B<name> with value B<value> to the
+context B<rctx>. It can be called more than once to add multiple headers.
+It B<MUST> be called before any calls to OCSP_sendreq_nbio(). The B<req>
+parameter in the initial to OCSP_sendreq_new() call MUST be set to B<NULL> if
+additional headers are set.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req() sets the OCSP request in B<rctx> to B<req>. This
+function should be called after any calls to OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header().
+
+OCSP_sendreq_bio() performs an OCSP request using the responder B<io>, the URL
+path B<path>, the OCSP request B<req> and with a response header maximum line
+length of B<maxline>. If B<maxline> is zero a default value of 4k is used.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OCSP_sendreq_new() returns a valid B<OCSP_REQ_CTX> structure or B<NULL> if
+an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_sendreq_nbio() returns B<1> if the operation was completed successfully,
+B<-1> if the operation should be retried and B<0> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() and OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req() return B<1> for success
+and B<0> for failure.
+
+OCSP_sendreq_bio() returns the B<OCSP_RESPONSE> structure sent by the
+responder or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+OCSP_REQ_CTX_free() and OCSP_set_max_response_length() do not return values.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+These functions only perform a minimal HTTP query to a responder. If an
+application wishes to support more advanced features it should use an
+alternative more complete HTTP library.
+
+Currently only HTTP POST queries to responders are supported.
+
+The arguments to OCSP_sendreq_new() correspond to the components of the URL.
+For example if the responder URL is B<http://ocsp.com/ocspreq> the BIO
+B<io> should be connected to host B<ocsp.com> on port 80 and B<path>
+should be set to B<"/ocspreq">
+
+The headers added with OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header() are of the form
+"B<name>: B<value>" or just "B<name>" if B<value> is B<NULL>. So to add
+a Host header for B<ocsp.com> you would call:
+
+ OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(ctx, "Host", "ocsp.com");
+
+If OCSP_sendreq_nbio() indicates an operation should be retried the
+corresponding BIO can be examined to determine which operation (read or
+write) should be retried and appropriate action taken (for example a select()
+call on the underlying socket).
+
+OCSP_sendreq_bio() does not support retries and so cannot handle non-blocking
+I/O efficiently. It is retained for compatibility and its use in new
+applications is not recommended.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<crypto(3)|crypto(3)>,
+L<OCSP_cert_to_id(3)|OCSP_cert_to_id(3)>,
+L<OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)|OCSP_request_add1_nonce(3)>,
+L<OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)|OCSP_REQUEST_new(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_find_status(3)|OCSP_response_find_status(3)>,
+L<OCSP_response_status(3)|OCSP_response_status(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b263160
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs, SSL_set1_sigalgs, SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list,
+SSL_set1_sigalgs_list, SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs,
+SSL_set1_client_sigalgs, SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list,
+SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list - set supported signature algorithms
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *slist, long slistlen);
+ long SSL_set1_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const int *slist, long slistlen);
+ long SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
+ long SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str);
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const int *slist, long slistlen);
+ long SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const int *slist, long slistlen);
+ long SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
+ long SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs() and SSL_set1_sigalgs() set the supported signature
+algorithms for B<ctx> or B<ssl>. The array B<slist> of length B<slistlen>
+must consist of pairs of NIDs corresponding to digest and public key
+algorithms.
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_sigalgs_list() set the supported
+signature algorithms for B<ctx> or B<ssl>. The B<str> parameter
+must be a null terminated string consisting or a colon separated list of
+public key algorithms and digests separated by B<+>.
+
+SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_client_sigalgs(),
+SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_client_sigalgs_list() set
+signature algorithms related to client authentication, otherwise they are
+identical to SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(), SSL_set1_sigalgs(),
+SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list() and SSL_set1_sigalgs_list().
+
+All these functions are implemented as macros. The signature algorithm
+parameter (integer array or string) is not freed: the application should
+free it, if necessary.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If an application wishes to allow the setting of signature algorithms
+as one of many user configurable options it should consider using the more
+flexible SSL_CONF API instead.
+
+The signature algorithms set by a client are used directly in the supported
+signature algorithm in the client hello message.
+
+The supported signature algorithms set by a server are not sent to the
+client but are used to determine the set of shared signature algorithms
+and (if server preferences are set with SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+their order.
+
+The client authentication signature algorithms set by a server are sent
+in a certificate request message if client authentication is enabled,
+otherwise they are unused.
+
+Similarly client authentication signature algorithms set by a client are
+used to determined the set of client authentication shared signature
+algorithms.
+
+Signature algorithms will neither be advertised nor used if the security level
+prohibits them (for example SHA1 if the security level is 4 or more).
+
+Currently the NID_md5, NID_sha1, NID_sha224, NID_sha256, NID_sha384 and
+NID_sha512 digest NIDs are supported and the public key algorithm NIDs
+EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_DSA and EVP_PKEY_EC.
+
+The short or long name values for digests can be used in a string (for
+example "MD5", "SHA1", "SHA224", "SHA256", "SHA384", "SHA512") and
+the public key algorithm strings "RSA", "DSA" or "ECDSA".
+
+The use of MD5 as a digest is strongly discouraged due to security weaknesses.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Set supported signature algoritms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA
+using an array:
+
+    const int slist[] = {NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA};
+
+    SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, 4);
+
+Set supported signature algoritms to SHA256 with ECDSA and SHA256 with RSA
+using a string:
+
+    SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, "ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA256");
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+All these functions return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(3)|SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(3)>,
+L<SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)|SSL_CONF_CTX_new(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index f08eb84..e593654 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -3739,12 +3739,27 @@ typedef struct {
     int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
 } sig_cb_st;
 
+static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
+{
+    if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
+        *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+    } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
+        *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+    } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
+        *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+    } else {
+        *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
+        if (*phash == NID_undef)
+            *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
+    }
+}
+
 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
 {
     sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
     size_t i;
     char etmp[20], *p;
-    int sig_alg, hash_alg;
+    int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
     if (elem == NULL)
         return 0;
     if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
@@ -3761,19 +3776,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
     if (!*p)
         return 0;
 
-    if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0)
-        sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
-    else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0)
-        sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
-    else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0)
-        sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
-    else
-        return 0;
+    get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
+    get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
 
-    hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
-    if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
-        hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
-    if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+    if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
         return 0;
 
     for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 29 14:38:10 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 14:38:10 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438180690.944258.8869.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  932af1617e277904bcca6e47729a420bba39785b (commit)
      from  14815a99d5fc625a5b8d730b05528f1f7b5d9ef7 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 932af1617e277904bcca6e47729a420bba39785b
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Tue Jul 28 12:41:36 2015 -0400

    Tweak README about rt and bug reporting.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 README | 33 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README b/README
index 6e7bc73..40c2e83 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -137,17 +137,23 @@
 
  Email the report to:
 
-    openssl-bugs at openssl.org
+    rt at openssl.org
 
- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up.  (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list.  Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security at openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
 
- Note that mail to openssl-bugs at openssl.org is recorded in the public
- request tracker database (see https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html
- for details) and also forwarded to a public mailing list. Confidential
- mail may be sent to openssl-security at openssl.org (PGP key available from
- the key servers).
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt at openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.
 
  HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
  ----------------------------
@@ -164,11 +170,10 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+ (see http://openssl.org/about/codingstyle.txt) and compile without
+ warnings using the --strict-warnings flag.  OpenSSL compiles on many
+ varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
 
  Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
  if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt at bis.doc.gov

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 29 14:38:30 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 14:38:30 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1438180710.569623.9710.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  6b7d872e819449a19ea428386f25e90e5eaedc29 (commit)
      from  f0348c842e75a77f643e7d34cb88609145b2d320 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 6b7d872e819449a19ea428386f25e90e5eaedc29
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Tue Jul 28 12:41:36 2015 -0400

    Tweak README about rt and bug reporting.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 932af1617e277904bcca6e47729a420bba39785b)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 README | 33 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README b/README
index ae17fb4..b6ffe9b 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -137,17 +137,23 @@
 
  Email the report to:
 
-    openssl-bugs at openssl.org
+    rt at openssl.org
 
- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up.  (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list.  Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security at openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
 
- Note that mail to openssl-bugs at openssl.org is recorded in the public
- request tracker database (see https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html
- for details) and also forwarded to a public mailing list. Confidential
- mail may be sent to openssl-security at openssl.org (PGP key available from
- the key servers).
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt at openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.
 
  HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
  ----------------------------
@@ -164,11 +170,10 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+ (see http://openssl.org/about/codingstyle.txt) and compile without
+ warnings using the --strict-warnings flag.  OpenSSL compiles on many
+ varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
 
  Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
  if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt at bis.doc.gov

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 29 14:39:21 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 14:39:21 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1438180761.847259.10098.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  372e74903e8e0553f507215cea544ff6805fdda3 (commit)
      from  728432aed0f8e0c8b86df0724c9fde76659bc54b (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 372e74903e8e0553f507215cea544ff6805fdda3
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Tue Jul 28 12:41:36 2015 -0400

    Tweak README about rt and bug reporting.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 932af1617e277904bcca6e47729a420bba39785b)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 README | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README b/README
index c3db93a..e851aff 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -164,16 +164,23 @@
  Report the bug to the OpenSSL project via the Request Tracker
  (http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html) by mail to:
 
-    openssl-bugs at openssl.org
+    rt at openssl.org
 
- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up.  (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list.  Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security at openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
 
- Note that mail to openssl-bugs at openssl.org is recorded in the publicly
- readable request tracker database and is forwarded to a public
- mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to openssl-security at openssl.org
- (PGP key available from the key servers).
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt at openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.
 
  HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
  ----------------------------
@@ -190,11 +197,10 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+ (see http://openssl.org/about/codingstyle.txt) and compile without
+ warnings using the --strict-warnings flag.  OpenSSL compiles on many
+ varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
 
  Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
  if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt at bis.doc.gov

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 29 14:40:21 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 14:40:21 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1438180821.921408.10406.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  9e2b04b677243b49d53cb008b0011f92bdd8d665 (commit)
      from  1fb21ac4a9c45000de32b44463b3fbdff8e06bc6 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9e2b04b677243b49d53cb008b0011f92bdd8d665
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Tue Jul 28 12:41:36 2015 -0400

    Tweak README about rt and bug reporting.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 932af1617e277904bcca6e47729a420bba39785b)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 README | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README b/README
index 2556b8c..1a70b7f 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -164,16 +164,23 @@
  Report the bug to the OpenSSL project via the Request Tracker
  (http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html) by mail to:
 
-    openssl-bugs at openssl.org
+    rt at openssl.org
 
- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up.  (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list.  Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security at openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
 
- Note that mail to openssl-bugs at openssl.org is recorded in the publicly
- readable request tracker database and is forwarded to a public
- mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to openssl-security at openssl.org
- (PGP key available from the key servers).
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt at openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.
 
  HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
  ----------------------------
@@ -190,11 +197,10 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+ (see http://openssl.org/about/codingstyle.txt) and compile without
+ warnings using the --strict-warnings flag.  OpenSSL compiles on many
+ varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
 
  Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
  if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt at bis.doc.gov

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 29 14:40:49 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 14:40:49 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_0_9_8-stable update
Message-ID: <1438180849.306818.10695.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_0_9_8-stable has been updated
       via  a95168889f5e9fc67aa946b95510cb712761d841 (commit)
      from  1ac4693c38bc39de8656470413d2cd53cf453de3 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a95168889f5e9fc67aa946b95510cb712761d841
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Tue Jul 28 12:41:36 2015 -0400

    Tweak README about rt and bug reporting.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 932af1617e277904bcca6e47729a420bba39785b)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 README | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README b/README
index 5ca30cf..4827753 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -164,16 +164,23 @@
  Report the bug to the OpenSSL project via the Request Tracker
  (http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html) by mail to:
 
-    openssl-bugs at openssl.org
+    rt at openssl.org
 
- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up.  (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list.  Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security at openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
 
- Note that mail to openssl-bugs at openssl.org is recorded in the publicly
- readable request tracker database and is forwarded to a public
- mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to openssl-security at openssl.org
- (PGP key available from the key servers).
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt at openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.
 
  HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
  ----------------------------
@@ -190,11 +197,10 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+ (see http://openssl.org/about/codingstyle.txt) and compile without
+ warnings using the --strict-warnings flag.  OpenSSL compiles on many
+ varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
 
  Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
  if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt at bis.doc.gov

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 29 20:13:49 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 20:13:49 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [web]  master update
Message-ID: <1438200829.412835.15349.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  7396e9b0e72bece0d79baa53e1459e8bdeb5cb76 (commit)
      from  c21a779e67328ae7b1e5037631f82bb91a532887 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 7396e9b0e72bece0d79baa53e1459e8bdeb5cb76
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 16:13:35 2015 -0400

    update RT/bug email stuff

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 support/rt.wml | 28 +++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/support/rt.wml b/support/rt.wml
index a10d09d..c3a705c 100644
--- a/support/rt.wml
+++ b/support/rt.wml
@@ -5,15 +5,13 @@
 
 <h1>OpenSSL Request Tracker</h1>
 
-The OpenSSL project has set up a request tracker at
+We have set up a request tracker at
 <a href="http://rt.openssl.org/">http://rt.openssl.org/</a>
 offering read-only access using the account <tt>guest</tt> with the
 password <tt>guest</tt>.
 
-The username and password can also be specified in the URL for example:
-<a href="http://rt.openssl.org/?user=guest&pass=guest&">http://rt.openssl.org/?user=guest&amp;pass=guest</a>.
-
-A link to a specific bug can be created using for example:
+The username and password can also be specified in the URL, as can a link
+to a specific bug.  For example:
 <a href="http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?user=guest&pass=guest&id=1">
 http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?user=guest&amp;pass=guest&amp;id=1</a>
 
@@ -25,17 +23,20 @@ of new or open bugs and requests.
 
 <h2>Sending a Request</h2>
 
-New requests must be sent by email to
+To create a new bug or enhancement request, send email to
 <a href="mailto:rt at openssl.org">rt at openssl.org</a>, clearly indicating
 the type of request (bug report, patch, contribution, enhancement request,
 ...) the operating system and version of OpenSSL affected.
+If you have a patch or diff, please send it as an attachment, and not
+inline in the message body.
 
 The easiest way to respond to an existing request is to reply to the relevant
-message in <tt>openssl-dev at openssl.org</tt> and making sure you include
-<tt>rt at openssl.org</tt> in the list of recipients.
-
-If you do not have a copy of the existing request then you can create a new
-email including the ID in the subject line. For example to reply to ID #9999
+message in <tt>openssl-dev at openssl.org</tt>. To help avoid duplicate copies,
+edit the recipient list so that only
+<tt>rt at openssl.org</tt> is listed and remove any quoted material.
+You can also create a new email by having the subject line start with a
+special prefix.
+For example to reply to ID #9999
 you'd send a message to <tt>rt at openssl.org</tt> including <tt>[openssl.org #9999]</tt> in the subject.
 
 <h2>Gateways</h2>
@@ -44,10 +45,11 @@ Incoming requests are added to the request tracker. The request tracker
 automatically forwards incoming requests to the
 <tt>openssl-dev at openssl.org</tt>
 mailing list for information of the community and public discussion.
-Replys sent to <tt>rt at openssl.org</tt> keeping the ticket in the
+Replies sent to <tt>rt at openssl.org</tt> keeping the ticket in the
 subject line unchanged will be recorded and added to the ticket by the
 request tracker, then forwarded to <tt>openssl-dev at openssl.org</tt>.
 
 <h2>Request Tracker Software</h2>
+
 The request tracker is using the RT software, available from
-<a href="http://www.fsck.com/projects/rt/">http://www.fsck.com/projects/rt/</a>.
+<a href="http://www.bestpractical.com/rt/">http://www.bestpractical.com/rt/</a>.

From rsalz at openssl.org  Wed Jul 29 20:59:07 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 20:59:07 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438203547.581155.28329.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  5bb17d1b3cb1a02d1e48ad0810105f1b501b0532 (commit)
      from  932af1617e277904bcca6e47729a420bba39785b (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 5bb17d1b3cb1a02d1e48ad0810105f1b501b0532
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 16:55:08 2015 -0400

    RT3639: Add -no_comp description to online help
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/apps.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/apps/apps.h b/apps/apps.h
index 2823cbc..f2dc812 100644
--- a/apps/apps.h
+++ b/apps/apps.h
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ void unbuffer(FILE *fp);
         {"no_tls1_1", OPT_S_NOTLS1_1, '-' }, \
         {"no_tls1_2", OPT_S_NOTLS1_2, '-' }, \
         {"bugs", OPT_S_BUGS, '-' }, \
-        {"no_comp", OPT_S_NOCOMP, '-' }, \
+        {"no_comp", OPT_S_NOCOMP, '-', "Don't use SSL/TLS-level compression" }, \
         {"ecdh_single", OPT_S_ECDHSINGLE, '-' }, \
         {"no_ticket", OPT_S_NOTICKET, '-' }, \
         {"serverpref", OPT_S_SERVERPREF, '-' }, \

From rsalz at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 01:21:15 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 01:21:15 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438219275.419041.27465.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  fa4629b6a2518d202fd051f228c3d8770682b3be (commit)
      from  5bb17d1b3cb1a02d1e48ad0810105f1b501b0532 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit fa4629b6a2518d202fd051f228c3d8770682b3be
Author: Martin Vejnar <Martin.Vejnar at avg.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 17:28:19 2015 -0400

    RT3774: double-free in DSA
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index 73dd158..0002e08 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
     ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))

From rsalz at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 01:21:42 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 01:21:42 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1438219302.326141.28281.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  374fd385c2347b965c3490aa1c10025e1339d265 (commit)
      from  6b7d872e819449a19ea428386f25e90e5eaedc29 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 374fd385c2347b965c3490aa1c10025e1339d265
Author: Martin Vejnar <Martin.Vejnar at avg.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 17:28:19 2015 -0400

    RT3774: double-free in DSA
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit fa4629b6a2518d202fd051f228c3d8770682b3be)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index 2a5cd71..c40e177 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
     ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))

From rsalz at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 01:21:53 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 01:21:53 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1438219313.773847.28528.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  721cbae7e63deb865f7cd8ac01ab5d0e99c2f69e (commit)
      from  372e74903e8e0553f507215cea544ff6805fdda3 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 721cbae7e63deb865f7cd8ac01ab5d0e99c2f69e
Author: Martin Vejnar <Martin.Vejnar at avg.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 17:28:19 2015 -0400

    RT3774: double-free in DSA
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit fa4629b6a2518d202fd051f228c3d8770682b3be)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index a2840ea..6ddef45 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
     ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))

From rsalz at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 01:22:03 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 01:22:03 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1438219323.494927.28763.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  86fecb23df64a87dc9833f8d88f7c3f9c704f6b9 (commit)
      from  9e2b04b677243b49d53cb008b0011f92bdd8d665 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 86fecb23df64a87dc9833f8d88f7c3f9c704f6b9
Author: Martin Vejnar <Martin.Vejnar at avg.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 17:28:19 2015 -0400

    RT3774: double-free in DSA
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit fa4629b6a2518d202fd051f228c3d8770682b3be)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index 9fdce81..1dd373d 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
     ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 09:23:44 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:23:44 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438248224.976140.31476.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  5e8b24dbfb98ed7c5b355cb6a959906a418e264b (commit)
      from  fa4629b6a2518d202fd051f228c3d8770682b3be (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 5e8b24dbfb98ed7c5b355cb6a959906a418e264b
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 23:20:56 2015 +0100

    Fix write failure handling in DTLS1.2
    
    The DTLS code is supposed to drop packets if we try to write them out but
    the underlying BIO write buffers are full. ssl3_write_pending() contains
    an incorrect test for DTLS that controls this. The test only checks for
    DTLS1 so DTLS1.2 does not correctly clear the internal OpenSSL buffer which
    can later cause an assert to be hit. This commit changes the test to cover
    all DTLS versions.
    
    RT#3967
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
index 79d3c21..d6e922c 100644
--- a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
+++ b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
             s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
             return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
         } else if (i <= 0) {
-            if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
                 /*
                  * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
                  * using a datagram service

From matt at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 09:24:08 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 09:24:08 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1438248248.083299.32496.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  9e43fe9a2bd38f06385b5b721f7c4b3ff0e4163f (commit)
      from  374fd385c2347b965c3490aa1c10025e1339d265 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9e43fe9a2bd38f06385b5b721f7c4b3ff0e4163f
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 23:20:56 2015 +0100

    Fix write failure handling in DTLS1.2
    
    The DTLS code is supposed to drop packets if we try to write them out but
    the underlying BIO write buffers are full. ssl3_write_pending() contains
    an incorrect test for DTLS that controls this. The test only checks for
    DTLS1 so DTLS1.2 does not correctly clear the internal OpenSSL buffer which
    can later cause an assert to be hit. This commit changes the test to cover
    all DTLS versions.
    
    RT#3967
    
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 5e8b24dbfb98ed7c5b355cb6a959906a418e264b)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/s3_pkt.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 603c285..3798902 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
             s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
             return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
         } else if (i <= 0) {
-            if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
                 /*
                  * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
                  * using a datagram service

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 13:35:12 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 13:35:12 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1438263312.245427.27666.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  d0c9a90640c8902fef3eb74e8ef05227f8e7dcb7 (commit)
      from  9e43fe9a2bd38f06385b5b721f7c4b3ff0e4163f (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit d0c9a90640c8902fef3eb74e8ef05227f8e7dcb7
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 16:16:02 2015 +0100

    use X9.31 keygen by default in FIPS mode
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 2465fbd..7f7dca3 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 # include <openssl/fips.h>
+extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+                                         BN_GENCB *cb);
 #endif
 
 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
         return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     if (FIPS_mode())
-        return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+        return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 #endif
     return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 }

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 13:37:17 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 13:37:17 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1438263437.082091.28532.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  5030cc69ffd6137d3d3f2b221c3313042940c1fd (commit)
      from  721cbae7e63deb865f7cd8ac01ab5d0e99c2f69e (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 5030cc69ffd6137d3d3f2b221c3313042940c1fd
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 16:16:02 2015 +0100

    use X9.31 keygen by default in FIPS mode
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit d0c9a90640c8902fef3eb74e8ef05227f8e7dcb7)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 2465fbd..7f7dca3 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 # include <openssl/fips.h>
+extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
+                                         BN_GENCB *cb);
 #endif
 
 static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
         return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
     if (FIPS_mode())
-        return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
+        return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 #endif
     return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
 }

From steve at openssl.org  Thu Jul 30 14:37:58 2015
From: steve at openssl.org (Dr. Stephen Henson)
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2015 14:37:58 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438267078.198293.16652.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  3df16cc2e27f75eac2c0991248b0c294e2c847b5 (commit)
       via  a784665e52735f77a64d01216d7535834278c27c (commit)
       via  a3f7ff2b2d1b1267cdf0bbce2374ebe149ed264a (commit)
       via  69a3a9f5d9c018eee97b4127c40bc9903c03cce4 (commit)
       via  b2f8ab8681d4c9bba3b516672689e86e83b41e53 (commit)
       via  23237159f76933a898d4da1ee67de704350e1ca9 (commit)
       via  5516fcc0c9dad543aee4c9bf849d759bb58a0644 (commit)
       via  ea6114c6d0e31e3d6d8897d753afeadec33ddeee (commit)
       via  f40ecbc37c4be64eb4203792a55b2ecaebe83cf7 (commit)
       via  2a1a04e131749a6aec280d53dfda86b595de55b3 (commit)
       via  8a0a12e5bf78e6f2e501d3af86c675498e6c7552 (commit)
       via  85269210ff39eabd1f898716f1e9bbcd2d0b8be2 (commit)
       via  7689082b7199b91aa2df5d3e481abcca480e9d7e (commit)
       via  12053a81c875473355e441d00ac81ed3c501dc9b (commit)
       via  adc5506adf4f4cb2719026354a8512e3a7807f8a (commit)
       via  13be69f3e67f8b974183e6fff6d12d9a841ee97f (commit)
       via  526f94ad68345a18559ee334e03d7f31c96f47d6 (commit)
       via  fe5eef3a3b3e6844394d976a182d88225c59ddb5 (commit)
       via  332a251fd7cca28b1cc34d5ddf26272a352f5299 (commit)
       via  8baac6a224ec194036b43e47b36b642248257b56 (commit)
       via  dcbd50608a44277f84f2a9323726a84f6f9d68ca (commit)
       via  0096d8f7e01d2c0616f9a916145b62a2d8d7acdf (commit)
       via  64651d3984ca24c48538a2a109c446fd684aa248 (commit)
      from  5e8b24dbfb98ed7c5b355cb6a959906a418e264b (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 3df16cc2e27f75eac2c0991248b0c294e2c847b5
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 28 16:13:29 2015 +0100

    cleanse psk_identity on error
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit a784665e52735f77a64d01216d7535834278c27c
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jul 28 16:04:53 2015 +0100

    Free and cleanse pms on error
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit a3f7ff2b2d1b1267cdf0bbce2374ebe149ed264a
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sat Jul 11 01:17:36 2015 +0100

    Don't request certificates for any PSK ciphersuite
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 69a3a9f5d9c018eee97b4127c40bc9903c03cce4
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jun 30 19:14:58 2015 +0100

    CAMELLIA PSK ciphersuites from RFC6367
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit b2f8ab8681d4c9bba3b516672689e86e83b41e53
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jun 29 14:20:01 2015 +0100

    Add PSK ciphersuites to docs
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 23237159f76933a898d4da1ee67de704350e1ca9
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jun 29 12:17:21 2015 +0100

    Update CHANGES
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 5516fcc0c9dad543aee4c9bf849d759bb58a0644
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Jun 29 00:44:39 2015 +0100

    Add RFC4785 ciphersuites
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit ea6114c6d0e31e3d6d8897d753afeadec33ddeee
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:05:47 2015 +0100

    Add RFC4279, RFC5487 and RFC5489 ciphersuites.
    
    Note: some of the RFC4279 ciphersuites were originally part of PR#2464.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit f40ecbc37c4be64eb4203792a55b2ecaebe83cf7
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 16:55:00 2015 +0100

    Initial new PSK ciphersuite defines
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 2a1a04e131749a6aec280d53dfda86b595de55b3
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 16:50:53 2015 +0100

    Add full PSK trace support
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 8a0a12e5bf78e6f2e501d3af86c675498e6c7552
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 16:58:00 2015 +0100

    PSK premaster secret derivation.
    
    Move PSK premaster secret algorithm to ssl_generate_master secret so
    existing key exchange code can be used and modified slightly to add
    the PSK wrapping structure.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 85269210ff39eabd1f898716f1e9bbcd2d0b8be2
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:23:13 2015 +0100

    Extended PSK server support.
    
    Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK server side.
    
    Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages
    are only sent when required.
    
    Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now include an
    identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK
    client key exchange message expects PSK identity and requests key for
    all PSK key exchange ciphersuites.
    
    Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 7689082b7199b91aa2df5d3e481abcca480e9d7e
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:15:10 2015 +0100

    Extended PSK client support.
    
    Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK client side.
    
    Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages
    are only expected when required.
    
    Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now expects an
    identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK
    client key exchange message requests PSK identity and key for all PSK
    key exchange ciphersuites and includes identity in message.
    
    Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 12053a81c875473355e441d00ac81ed3c501dc9b
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 23:18:59 2015 +0100

    PSK PRF correction.
    
    For SHA384 PRF PSK ciphersuites we have to switch to default PRF for
    TLS < 1.2
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit adc5506adf4f4cb2719026354a8512e3a7807f8a
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:01:52 2015 +0100

    Make auto DH work with DHEPSK
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 13be69f3e67f8b974183e6fff6d12d9a841ee97f
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Jun 30 16:39:41 2015 +0100

    Check for kECDH with extensions.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 526f94ad68345a18559ee334e03d7f31c96f47d6
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:02:56 2015 +0100

    Enable PSK if corresponding mask set.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit fe5eef3a3b3e6844394d976a182d88225c59ddb5
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:01:07 2015 +0100

    Disable all PSK if no callback.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 332a251fd7cca28b1cc34d5ddf26272a352f5299
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:09:54 2015 +0100

    Disable unsupported PSK algorithms
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 8baac6a224ec194036b43e47b36b642248257b56
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:07:41 2015 +0100

    new PSK text constants
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit dcbd50608a44277f84f2a9323726a84f6f9d68ca
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 17:10:27 2015 +0100

    New PSK aliases.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 0096d8f7e01d2c0616f9a916145b62a2d8d7acdf
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 16:54:06 2015 +0100

    New PSK keyex text constants
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 64651d3984ca24c48538a2a109c446fd684aa248
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date:   Sun Jun 28 16:52:40 2015 +0100

    fields for PSK key, new constants
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                |   8 +
 doc/apps/ciphers.pod   |  77 ++++-
 include/openssl/ssl.h  |   3 +
 include/openssl/tls1.h | 125 +++++++-
 ssl/s3_clnt.c          | 222 ++++++-------
 ssl/s3_lib.c           | 831 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 ssl/s3_srvr.c          | 256 ++++++++-------
 ssl/ssl_ciph.c         |  22 +-
 ssl/ssl_lib.c          |   6 +
 ssl/ssl_locl.h         |  13 +
 ssl/t1_lib.c           |   6 +-
 ssl/t1_trce.c          |  49 ++-
 12 files changed, 1316 insertions(+), 302 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 1526aec..c5be241 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -3,6 +3,14 @@
  _______________
 
  Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0  [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+  *) Rewrite PSK to support ECDHE_PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK. Add ciphersuites
+     from RFC4279, RFC4785, RFC5487, RFC5489.
+
+     Thanks to Christian J. Dietrich and Giuseppe D'Angelo for the
+     original RSA_PSK patch.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Dropped support for the SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED flag. This SSLeay
      era flag was never set throughout the codebase (only read). Also removed
      SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER which was only used if
diff --git a/doc/apps/ciphers.pod b/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
index c2d40ac..d7b7bea 100644
--- a/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/ciphers.pod
@@ -329,7 +329,16 @@ cipher suites using GOST 28147-89 MAC B<instead of> HMAC.
 
 =item B<PSK>
 
-cipher suites using pre-shared keys (PSK).
+all cipher suites using pre-shared keys (PSK).
+
+=item B<kPSK>, B<kECDHEPSK>, B<kDHEPSK>, B<kRSAPSK>
+
+cipher suites using PSK key exchange, ECDHE_PSK, DHE_PSK or RSA_PSK.
+
+=item B<aPSK>
+
+cipher suites using PSK authentication (currently all PSK modes apart from
+RSA_PSK).
 
 =item B<SUITEB128>, B<SUITEB128ONLY>, B<SUITEB192>
 
@@ -585,10 +594,68 @@ Note: these ciphers can also be used in SSL v3.
 
 =head2 Pre shared keying (PSK) ciphersuites
 
- TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                  PSK-RC4-SHA
- TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA             PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
- TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA              PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
- TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA              PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+ PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                         PSK-NULL-SHA
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                     DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                     RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA
+
+ PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                      PSK-RC4-SHA
+ PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA                 PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                  PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                  PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                  DHE-PSK-RC4-SHA
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA             DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA              DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA              DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                  RSA-PSK-RC4-SHA
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA             RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA              RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA              RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256               PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384               PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256           DHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384           DHE-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256           RSA-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384           RSA-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256               PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384               PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384
+ PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                      PSK-NULL-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                      PSK-NULL-SHA384
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256           DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384           DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                  DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                  DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256           RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384           RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                  RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA256
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                  RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA384
+ PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256               PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384               PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
+
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384         ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                   ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384
+
+ PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256          PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384          PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
+
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256
+ ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384
 
 =head1 NOTES
 
diff --git a/include/openssl/ssl.h b/include/openssl/ssl.h
index c394191..6b6560d 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h
+++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h
@@ -204,6 +204,9 @@ extern "C" {
 # define SSL_TXT_kEECDH          "kEECDH"/* alias for kECDHE */
 # define SSL_TXT_kECDHE          "kECDHE"
 # define SSL_TXT_kPSK            "kPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK         "kRSAPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK       "kECDHEPSK"
+# define SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK         "kDHEPSK"
 # define SSL_TXT_kGOST           "kGOST"
 # define SSL_TXT_kSRP            "kSRP"
 
diff --git a/include/openssl/tls1.h b/include/openssl/tls1.h
index a172af3..1eef9cc 100644
--- a/include/openssl/tls1.h
+++ b/include/openssl/tls1.h
@@ -409,6 +409,45 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA                0x0300008C
 # define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA                0x0300008D
 
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                0x0300008E
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           0x0300008F
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            0x03000090
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            0x03000091
+
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA                0x03000092
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA           0x03000093
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA            0x03000094
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA            0x03000095
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from 5487 */
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256             0x030000A8
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384             0x030000A9
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         0x030000AA
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         0x030000AB
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256         0x030000AC
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384         0x030000AD
+
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256             0x030000AE
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384             0x030000AF
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                    0x030000B0
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                    0x030000B1
+
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         0x030000B2
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384         0x030000B3
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                0x030000B4
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                0x030000B5
+
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256         0x030000B6
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384         0x030000B7
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                0x030000B8
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                0x030000B9
+
+/* NULL PSK ciphersuites from RFC4785 */
+
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                       0x0300002C
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                   0x0300002D
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                   0x0300002E
+
 /* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
 
 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                    0x0300002F
@@ -480,10 +519,6 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256             0x030000A6
 # define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384             0x030000A7
 
-/* TLS v1.2 PSK GCM ciphersuites from RFC5487 */
-# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256             0x030000A8
-# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384             0x030000A9
-
 /* TLS 1.2 Camellia SHA-256 ciphersuites from RFC5932 */
 # define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256                0x030000BA
 # define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256             0x030000BB
@@ -565,6 +600,21 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        0x0300C031
 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        0x0300C032
 
+/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC5489 */
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA              0x0300C033
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA         0x0300C034
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA          0x0300C035
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA          0x0300C036
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256       0x0300C037
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384       0x0300C038
+
+/* NULL PSK ciphersuites from RFC4785 */
+
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                 0x0300C039
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256              0x0300C03A
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384              0x0300C03B
+
 /* Camellia-CBC ciphersuites from RFC6367 */
 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0300C072
 # define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0x0300C073
@@ -575,6 +625,15 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    0x0300C078
 # define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    0x0300C079
 
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256         0x0300C094
+# define TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384         0x0300C095
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     0x0300C096
+# define TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     0x0300C097
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     0x0300C098
+# define TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     0x0300C099
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   0x0300C09A
+# define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   0x0300C09B
+
 /*
  * XXX Backward compatibility alert: Older versions of OpenSSL gave some DHE
  * ciphers names with "EDH" instead of "DHE".  Going forward, we should be
@@ -589,6 +648,10 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA     "EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
 # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               "DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
 
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                      "PSK-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                  "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                  "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA"
+
 /* AES ciphersuites from RFC3268 */
 # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA                   "AES128-SHA"
 # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA                "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA"
@@ -641,6 +704,38 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA               "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
 # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA               "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
 
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               "DHE-PSK-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          "DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           "DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           "DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               "RSA-PSK-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          "RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           "RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           "RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+
+/* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5487 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            "PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            "PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        "DHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        "DHE-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256        "RSA-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384        "RSA-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256            "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384            "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256                   "PSK-NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384                   "PSK-NULL-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        "DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384        "DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256               "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384               "DHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        "RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384        "RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256               "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384               "RSA-PSK-NULL-SHA384"
+
 /* SRP ciphersuite from RFC 5054 */
 # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          "SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
 # define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      "SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
@@ -682,6 +777,15 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256           "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256"
 # define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256               "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256"
 
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256               "PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384               "PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256           "DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384           "DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256           "RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384           "RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256         "ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384         "ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
+
 /* SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162 */
 # define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA                      "SEED-SHA"
 # define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA                   "DH-DSS-SEED-SHA"
@@ -744,6 +848,19 @@ SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB,(void (*)(void))cb)
 # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            "PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
 # define TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            "PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
 
+/* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA               "ECDHE-PSK-RC4-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA          "ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA           "ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA           "ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256        "ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384        "ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384"
+
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                  "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256               "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA256"
+# define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384               "ECDHE-PSK-NULL-SHA384"
+
 /* Camellia-CBC ciphersuites from RFC6367 */
 # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256"
 # define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384"
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 04af851..080dbf0 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -331,10 +331,8 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 
             /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
             /* or PSK */
-            if (!
-                (s->s3->tmp.
-                 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
-                    && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+            if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+                    (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
                 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
                 if (ret <= 0)
                     goto end;
@@ -1414,7 +1412,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
          * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
          * ciphersuite.
          */
-        if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
+        if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
             al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
             goto f_err;
@@ -1447,8 +1445,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
     al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-    if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-        char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+    /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
+    if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
 
         param_len = 2;
         if (param_len > n) {
@@ -1475,23 +1473,24 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
         param_len += i;
 
-        /*
-         * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
-         * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
-         * so create a NULL-terminated string.
-         */
-        memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
-        memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
         OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-        s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
-        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
-            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto f_err;
+        if (i != 0) {
+            s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+            if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+                al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
         }
 
         p += i;
         n -= param_len;
+    }
+
+    /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
     } else
 #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -1661,7 +1660,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
     if (0) ;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-    else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+    else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
         if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
             goto err;
@@ -1742,7 +1741,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-    else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+    else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
         EC_GROUP *ngroup;
         const EC_GROUP *group;
 
@@ -1945,8 +1944,8 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             }
         }
     } else {
-        /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
-        if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+        /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
+        if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
             /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
             if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
                 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
@@ -2329,6 +2328,9 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 {
     unsigned char *p;
     int n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
+#endif
     unsigned long alg_k;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
     unsigned char *q;
@@ -2344,17 +2346,93 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif
     unsigned char *pms = NULL;
     size_t pmslen = 0;
+    alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
     if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
         p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
 
-        alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+            int psk_err = 1;
+            /*
+             * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
+             * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
+             * strnlen.
+             */
+            char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+            size_t identitylen;
+            unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+            size_t psklen;
+
+            if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+
+            psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+                                            identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+                                            psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+            if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto psk_err;
+            } else if (psklen == 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+                goto psk_err;
+            }
+
+            OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+            s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+
+            if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+                goto memerr;
+            }
+
+            s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+
+            identitylen = strlen(identity);
+            if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto psk_err;
+            }
+            OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+            s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+            if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+                goto memerr;
+            }
+
+            s2n(identitylen, p);
+            memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
+            pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
+            p += identitylen;
+            psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+            if (psk_err != 0) {
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+            n = 0;
+        } else
+#endif
 
         /* Fool emacs indentation */
         if (0) {
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-        else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+        else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
             RSA *rsa;
             pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
             pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
@@ -2414,7 +2492,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-        else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+        else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
             DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
             if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
                 dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp;
@@ -2493,7 +2571,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-        else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+        else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
             const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
             EC_KEY *tkey;
             int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
@@ -2781,88 +2859,16 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             }
         }
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-        else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-            /*
-             * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
-             * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
-             * strnlen.
-             */
-            char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
-            size_t identity_len;
-            unsigned char *t = NULL;
-            unsigned int psk_len = 0;
-            int psk_err = 1;
-
-            n = 0;
-            if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                       SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
-                goto err;
-            }
-
-            memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
-            /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
-            pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
-            pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
-            if (!pms)
-                goto memerr;
-
-            psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
-                                             identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
-                                             pms, pmslen);
-            if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                goto psk_err;
-            } else if (psk_len == 0) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                       SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-                goto psk_err;
-            }
-            /* Change pmslen to real length */
-            pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
-            identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
-            identity_len = strlen(identity);
-            if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                       ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                goto psk_err;
-            }
-            /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
-            t = pms;
-            memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
-            s2n(psk_len, t);
-            memset(t, 0, psk_len);
-            t += psk_len;
-            s2n(psk_len, t);
-
-            OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-            s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
-            if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                goto psk_err;
-            }
-
-            s2n(identity_len, p);
-            memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
-            n = 2 + identity_len;
-            psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
-            OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
-            if (psk_err != 0) {
-                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-                goto err;
-            }
-        }
-#endif
         else {
             ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             goto err;
         }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        n += pskhdrlen;
+#endif
+
         if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
             ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -2876,7 +2882,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
     n = ssl_do_write(s);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
     /* Check for SRP */
-    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
         /*
          * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
          * srp_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
@@ -2900,7 +2906,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
             pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
         }
-        if (pms == NULL) {
+        if (pms == NULL && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
             ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto err;
@@ -2924,6 +2930,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
     EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
     EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+    s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+#endif
     s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
@@ -3261,7 +3271,7 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
     }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-    if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
         if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
             !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 8b7c52a..0fc0881 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -600,6 +600,53 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
      112,
      168,
      },
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    /* Cipher 2C */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    /* Cipher 2D */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+    /* Cipher 2E */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+#endif
 
 /* New AES ciphersuites */
 /* Cipher 2F */
@@ -1253,6 +1300,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    /* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 4279 */
     /* Cipher 8A */
     {
      1,
@@ -1316,6 +1364,134 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
      256,
      256,
      },
+
+    /* Cipher 8E */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher 8F */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher 90 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher 91 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher 92 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher 93 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher 94 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher 95 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
@@ -1597,55 +1773,312 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
      128,
      },
 
-    /* Cipher A7 */
+    /* Cipher A7 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHE,
+     SSL_aNULL,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_TLSV1_2,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    /* PSK ciphersuites from RFC5487 */
+
+    /* Cipher A8 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_TLSV1_2,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher A9 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_TLSV1_2,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher AA */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_TLSV1_2,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher AB */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_TLSV1_2,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher AC */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_TLSV1_2,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher AD */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256GCM,
+     SSL_AEAD,
+     SSL_TLSV1_2,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher AE */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher AF */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher B0 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher B1 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher B2 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher B3 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher B4 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher B5 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher B6 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher B7 */
     {
      1,
-     TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-     TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-     SSL_kDHE,
-     SSL_aNULL,
-     SSL_AES256GCM,
-     SSL_AEAD,
-     SSL_TLSV1_2,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
      SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
      SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
      256,
      256,
      },
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-    /* Cipher A8 */
+
+    /* Cipher B8 */
     {
      1,
-     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-     SSL_kPSK,
-     SSL_aPSK,
-     SSL_AES128GCM,
-     SSL_AEAD,
-     SSL_TLSV1_2,
-     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
-     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
-     128,
-     128,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
      },
 
-    /* Cipher A9 */
+    /* Cipher B9 */
     {
      1,
-     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
-     SSL_kPSK,
-     SSL_aPSK,
-     SSL_AES256GCM,
-     SSL_AEAD,
-     SSL_TLSV1_2,
-     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
      SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
-     256,
-     256,
+     0,
+     0,
      },
-
-#endif
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
     /* TLS 1.2 Camellia SHA-256 ciphersuites from RFC5932 */
@@ -2669,6 +3102,151 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
      256,
      },
 
+    /* PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */
+    /* Cipher C033 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_RC4,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher C034 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_3DES,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     112,
+     168,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher C035 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher C036 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher C037 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher C038 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_AES256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher C039 */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA1,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher C03A */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+
+    /* Cipher C03B */
+    {
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_eNULL,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     0,
+     0,
+     },
+
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
     {                           /* Cipher C072 */
      1,
@@ -2784,6 +3362,120 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
 # endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
+    {                           /* Cipher C094 */
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128},
+
+    {                           /* Cipher C095 */
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256},
+
+    {                           /* Cipher C096 */
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128},
+
+    {                           /* Cipher C097 */
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256},
+
+    {                           /* Cipher C098 */
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128},
+
+    {                           /* Cipher C099 */
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kRSAPSK,
+     SSL_aRSA,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256},
+
+    {                           /* Cipher C09A */
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA128,
+     SSL_SHA256,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
+     128,
+     128},
+
+    {                           /* Cipher C09B */
+     1,
+     TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
+     SSL_kECDHEPSK,
+     SSL_aPSK,
+     SSL_CAMELLIA256,
+     SSL_SHA384,
+     SSL_TLSV1,
+     SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
+     SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
+     256,
+     256},
+#endif
+
 #ifdef TEMP_GOST_TLS
 /* Cipher FF00 */
     {
@@ -3933,7 +4625,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
         /* with PSK there must be server callback set */
-        if ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+        if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
             continue;
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 
@@ -4217,13 +4909,19 @@ int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s)
 /*
  * If we are using default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch to new SHA256 PRF and
  * handshake macs if required.
+ *
+ * If PSK and using SHA384 for TLS < 1.2 switch to default.
  */
 long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
 {
     long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
-    if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
-        && alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF))
-        return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+    if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF) {
+        if (alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF))
+            return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+    } else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) {
+        if (alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384))
+            return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF;
+    }
     return alg2;
 }
 
@@ -4253,13 +4951,56 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, int len)
 int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen,
                                int free_pms)
 {
-    s->session->master_key_length =
-        s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,
-                                                    pms, pmslen);
-    if (free_pms)
-        OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
-    else
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+    if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+        unsigned char *pskpms, *t;
+        size_t psklen = s->s3->tmp.psklen;
+        size_t pskpmslen;
+
+        /* create PSK premaster_secret */
+
+        /* For plain PSK "other_secret" is psklen zeroes */
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+            pmslen = psklen;
+
+        pskpmslen = 4 + pmslen + psklen;
+        pskpms = OPENSSL_malloc(pskpmslen);
+        if (pskpms == NULL) {
+            s->session->master_key_length = 0;
+            goto err;
+        }
+        t = pskpms;
+        s2n(pmslen, t);
+        if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+            memset(t, 0, pmslen);
+        else
+            memcpy(t, pms, pmslen);
+        t += pmslen;
+        s2n(psklen, t);
+        memcpy(t, s->s3->tmp.psk, psklen);
+
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, psklen);
+        s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+        s->session->master_key_length =
+            s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                        s->session->master_key,
+                                                        pskpms, pskpmslen);
+        OPENSSL_clear_free(pskpms, pskpmslen);
+    } else
+#endif
+        s->session->master_key_length =
+            s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                                        s->session->master_key,
+                                                        pms, pmslen);
+
+    err:
+    if (pms) {
+        if (free_pms)
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+        else
+            OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
+    }
     if (s->server == 0)
         s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
     return s->session->master_key_length >= 0;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index cbe80eb..72deedc 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -403,10 +403,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
         case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
             /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
             /* normal PSK or SRP */
-            if (!
-                (s->s3->tmp.
-                 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
-&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+            if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+                 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
                 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
                 if (ret <= 0)
                     goto end;
@@ -446,7 +444,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                  * provided
                  */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-                || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+                /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
+                || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+                /* For other PSK always send SKE */
+                || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
                 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
@@ -502,7 +503,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                     * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
                     * are omitted
                     */
-                   || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+                   || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
                 /* no cert request */
                 skip = 1;
                 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
@@ -1722,6 +1723,19 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
         r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
         n = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+            /*
+             * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
+             */
+            n += 2;
+            if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+                n += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+        }
+        /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
+        if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+        } else
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
         if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
             rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
@@ -1752,7 +1766,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         } else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-        if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
+        if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
             if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
                 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
                 if (dhp == NULL) {
@@ -1817,7 +1831,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         } else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-        if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
+        if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
             const EC_GROUP *group;
 
             ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
@@ -1933,7 +1947,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
              * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
              * structure.
              */
-            n = 4 + encodedlen;
+            n += 4 + encodedlen;
 
             /*
              * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
@@ -1945,14 +1959,6 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             r[3] = NULL;
         } else
 #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-        if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
-            /*
-             * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
-             */
-            n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-        } else
-#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
         if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
             if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
@@ -1984,8 +1990,8 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 n += 2 + nr[i];
         }
 
-        if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
-            && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+        if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
+            && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
             if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
                 == NULL) {
                 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -2003,6 +2009,20 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
         d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+            /* copy PSK identity hint */
+            if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) {
+                s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+                strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
+                        strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+                p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+            } else {
+                s2n(0, p);
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+
         for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
             if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
@@ -2016,7 +2036,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-        if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
+        if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
             /*
              * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
              * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
@@ -2038,16 +2058,6 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         }
 #endif
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-        if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
-            /* copy PSK identity hint */
-            s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
-            strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
-                    strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
-            p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-        }
-#endif
-
         /* not anonymous */
         if (pkey != NULL) {
             /*
@@ -2249,8 +2259,94 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
     alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
+    if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+        unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+        size_t psklen;
+        if (n < 2) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        n2s(p, i);
+        if (i + 2 > n) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+
+        if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
+                                         psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+        if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto f_err;
+        } else if (psklen == 0) {
+            /*
+             * PSK related to the given identity not found
+             */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                   SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+            al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+        s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+
+        if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+
+        n -= i + 2;
+        p += i;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+        /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
+        if (n != 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
+        if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-    if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
         unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
         int decrypt_len;
         unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
@@ -2389,13 +2485,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
     } else
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-    if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
         int idx = -1;
         EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
         if (n > 1) {
             n2s(p, i);
         } else {
-            if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+            if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
                 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
@@ -2483,7 +2579,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-    if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+    if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
         int ret = 1;
         int field_size = 0;
         const EC_KEY *tkey;
@@ -2526,7 +2622,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         if (n == 0L) {
             /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
 
-            if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+            if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
                 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                        SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
@@ -2612,92 +2708,6 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
         return (ret);
     } else
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-    if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
-        unsigned char *t = NULL;
-        unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
-        unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
-        int psk_err = 1;
-        char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
-        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
-        n2s(p, i);
-        if (n != i + 2) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-            goto psk_err;
-        }
-        if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                   SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-            goto psk_err;
-        }
-        if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                   SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
-            goto psk_err;
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
-         */
-        memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
-        memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
-        psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
-                                         psk_or_pre_ms,
-                                         sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
-        OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, sizeof(tmp_id));
-
-        if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            goto psk_err;
-        } else if (psk_len == 0) {
-            /*
-             * PSK related to the given identity not found
-             */
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-                   SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
-            al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
-            goto psk_err;
-        }
-
-        /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
-        pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
-        t = psk_or_pre_ms;
-        memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
-        s2n(psk_len, t);
-        memset(t, 0, psk_len);
-        t += psk_len;
-        s2n(psk_len, t);
-
-        OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
-        s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
-        if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto psk_err;
-        }
-
-        OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
-        s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
-        if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
-            s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto psk_err;
-        }
-
-        if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len, 0)) {
-            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            goto f_err;
-        }
-        psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
-        if (psk_err != 0) {
-            OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
-            goto f_err;
-        }
-    } else
-#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
     if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
         int param_len;
@@ -2820,6 +2830,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
     EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
     BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+    s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+#endif
     s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
     return (-1);
 }
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 7f932b0..da64301 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -314,6 +314,9 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
      0, 0, 0},
 
     {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, 0, SSL_kSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, 0, SSL_kGOST, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
 
@@ -342,7 +345,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
     {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
-    {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
+    {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, 0, SSL_PSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, 0, SSL_kSRP, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
 
     /* symmetric encryption aliases */
@@ -492,22 +495,22 @@ void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
     disabled_auth_mask = 0;
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA;
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK;
     disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aRSA;
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
     disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS;
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHE;
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK;
     disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDH;
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHr;
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHEPSK;
     disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA | SSL_aECDH;
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
-    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kPSK;
+    disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK;
     disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK;
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -1626,6 +1629,15 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
     case SSL_kPSK:
         kx = "PSK";
         break;
+    case SSL_kRSAPSK:
+        kx = "RSAPSK";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kECDHEPSK:
+        kx = "ECDHEPSK";
+        break;
+    case SSL_kDHEPSK:
+        kx = "DHEPSK";
+        break;
     case SSL_kSRP:
         kx = "SRP";
         break;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index d20d95b..5a0ec8a 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2112,6 +2112,12 @@ void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
     mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
     emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
     emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+    if (mask_k & SSL_kRSA)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kRSAPSK;
+    if (mask_k & SSL_kDHE)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kDHEPSK;
+    if (mask_k & SSL_kECDHE)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kECDHEPSK;
 #endif
 
     s->s3->tmp.mask_k = mask_k;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 1cdcb8b..c75219b 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -315,6 +315,14 @@
 /* SRP */
 # define SSL_kSRP        0x00000400L
 
+# define SSL_kRSAPSK             0x00000800L
+# define SSL_kECDHEPSK           0x00001000L
+# define SSL_kDHEPSK             0x00002000L
+
+/* all PSK */
+
+#define SSL_PSK     (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kDHEPSK)
+
 /* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */
 /* RSA auth */
 # define SSL_aRSA                0x00000001L
@@ -1269,6 +1277,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
         /* Temporary storage for premaster secret */
         unsigned char *pms;
         size_t pmslen;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        /* Temporary storage for PSK key */
+        unsigned char *psk;
+        size_t psklen;
+#endif
         /*
          * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature
          * algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index e593654..47abf2b 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
     /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
     if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
         s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
-        s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+        s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
     }
 #endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
 
             alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
             alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-            if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
+            if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
                  || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
                 using_ecc = 1;
                 break;
@@ -4165,7 +4165,7 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
     int dh_secbits = 80;
     if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
         return DH_get_1024_160();
-    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
         if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
             dh_secbits = 128;
         else
diff --git a/ssl/t1_trce.c b/ssl/t1_trce.c
index 40c5beb..74d157d 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_trce.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_trce.c
@@ -928,6 +928,18 @@ static int ssl_get_keyex(const char **pname, SSL *ssl)
         *pname = "PSK";
         return SSL_kPSK;
     }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kRSAPSK) {
+        *pname = "RSAPSK";
+        return SSL_kRSAPSK;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kDHEPSK) {
+        *pname = "DHEPSK";
+        return SSL_kDHEPSK;
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHEPSK) {
+        *pname = "ECDHEPSK";
+        return SSL_kECDHEPSK;
+    }
     if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
         *pname = "SRP";
         return SSL_kSRP;
@@ -948,9 +960,15 @@ static int ssl_print_client_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
     id = ssl_get_keyex(&algname, ssl);
     BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
     BIO_printf(bio, "KeyExchangeAlgorithm=%s\n", algname);
+    if (id & SSL_PSK) {
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2,
+                              "psk_identity", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+    }
     switch (id) {
 
     case SSL_kRSA:
+    case SSL_kRSAPSK:
         if (TLS1_get_version(ssl) == SSL3_VERSION) {
             ssl_print_hex(bio, indent + 2,
                           "EncyptedPreMasterSecret", msg, msglen);
@@ -971,6 +989,7 @@ static int ssl_print_client_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
             break;
         }
     case SSL_kDHE:
+    case SSL_kDHEPSK:
         if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_Yc", 2, &msg, &msglen))
             return 0;
         break;
@@ -983,19 +1002,14 @@ static int ssl_print_client_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
             break;
         }
     case SSL_kECDHE:
+    case SSL_kECDHEPSK:
         if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "ecdh_Yc", 1, &msg, &msglen))
             return 0;
         break;
 
-    case SSL_kPSK:
-        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2,
-                              "psk_identity", 2, &msg, &msglen))
-            return 0;
-        break;
-
     }
 
-    return 1;
+    return !msglen;
 }
 
 static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
@@ -1006,6 +1020,11 @@ static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
     id = ssl_get_keyex(&algname, ssl);
     BIO_indent(bio, indent, 80);
     BIO_printf(bio, "KeyExchangeAlgorithm=%s\n", algname);
+    if (id & SSL_PSK) {
+        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2,
+                              "psk_identity_hint", 2, &msg, &msglen))
+            return 0;
+    }
     switch (id) {
         /* Should never happen */
     case SSL_kDHd:
@@ -1027,6 +1046,7 @@ static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
         break;
 
     case SSL_kDHE:
+    case SSL_kDHEPSK:
         if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_p", 2, &msg, &msglen))
             return 0;
         if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "dh_g", 2, &msg, &msglen))
@@ -1036,6 +1056,7 @@ static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
         break;
 
     case SSL_kECDHE:
+    case SSL_kECDHEPSK:
         if (msglen < 1)
             return 0;
         BIO_indent(bio, indent + 2, 80);
@@ -1054,17 +1075,19 @@ static int ssl_print_server_keyex(BIO *bio, int indent, SSL *ssl,
             msglen -= 3;
             if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2, "point", 1, &msg, &msglen))
                 return 0;
+        } else {
+            BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN CURVE PARAMETER TYPE %d\n", msg[0]);
+            return 0;
         }
         break;
 
     case SSL_kPSK:
-        if (!ssl_print_hexbuf(bio, indent + 2,
-                              "psk_identity_hint", 2, &msg, &msglen))
-            return 0;
-        /* No signature */
-        return 1;
+    case SSL_kRSAPSK:
+        break;
     }
-    return ssl_print_signature(bio, indent, ssl, &msg, &msglen);
+    if (!(id & SSL_PSK))
+        ssl_print_signature(bio, indent, ssl, &msg, &msglen);
+    return !msglen;
 }
 
 static int ssl_print_certificate(BIO *bio, int indent,

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 15:07:33 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:07:33 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438355253.645854.22529.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  119ab03aea4850297b2a886f067ae74ab3fba86e (commit)
      from  3df16cc2e27f75eac2c0991248b0c294e2c847b5 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 119ab03aea4850297b2a886f067ae74ab3fba86e
Author: Nicholas Cooper <qza22c5l at gmail.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 21:44:59 2015 -0400

    RT3959: Fix misleading comment
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 include/openssl/dh.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/openssl/dh.h b/include/openssl/dh.h
index e0f4b57..f1de53d 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct dh_st {
     BIGNUM *p;
     BIGNUM *g;
     long length;                /* optional */
-    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x */
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x % p */
     BIGNUM *priv_key;           /* x */
     int flags;
     BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 15:09:08 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:09:08 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1438355348.051278.23549.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  602af7d01da82dc6c45946572f531bcbe9ebbf47 (commit)
      from  d0c9a90640c8902fef3eb74e8ef05227f8e7dcb7 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 602af7d01da82dc6c45946572f531bcbe9ebbf47
Author: Nicholas Cooper <qza22c5l at gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 31 11:08:18 2015 -0400

    RT3959: Fix misleading comment
    
    Manual cherry-pick from main branch, since the header file
    moved in master.
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/dh/dh.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh.h b/crypto/dh/dh.h
index 0502f1a..b177673 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh.h
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh.h
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct dh_st {
     BIGNUM *p;
     BIGNUM *g;
     long length;                /* optional */
-    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x */
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x % p */
     BIGNUM *priv_key;           /* x */
     int flags;
     BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 15:12:02 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:12:02 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438355522.295386.24585.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  902c6b95a3a3dbf7e5e3dd4b11ec58300ccb8a97 (commit)
      from  119ab03aea4850297b2a886f067ae74ab3fba86e (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 902c6b95a3a3dbf7e5e3dd4b11ec58300ccb8a97
Author: Adam Eijdenberg <eijdenberg at google.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 21:42:14 2015 -0400

    RT3961: Fix switch/case errors in flag parsing
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/genrsa.c  | 1 +
 apps/pkeyutl.c | 1 +
 apps/req.c     | 1 -
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/apps/genrsa.c b/apps/genrsa.c
index bb8437f..1fea351 100644
--- a/apps/genrsa.c
+++ b/apps/genrsa.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ int genrsa_main(int argc, char **argv)
             break;
         case OPT_OUT:
             outfile = opt_arg();
+            break;
         case OPT_ENGINE:
             e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0);
             break;
diff --git a/apps/pkeyutl.c b/apps/pkeyutl.c
index 4c267c1..741dd64 100644
--- a/apps/pkeyutl.c
+++ b/apps/pkeyutl.c
@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
             break;
         case OPT_REV:
             rev = 1;
+            break;
         case OPT_ENCRYPT:
             pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT;
             break;
diff --git a/apps/req.c b/apps/req.c
index b3220ba..a16febd 100644
--- a/apps/req.c
+++ b/apps/req.c
@@ -344,7 +344,6 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
         case OPT_NO_ASN1_KLUDGE:
             kludge = 0;
             break;
-            multirdn = 1;
         case OPT_DAYS:
             days = atoi(opt_arg());
             break;

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 15:14:04 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:14:04 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438355644.481286.26490.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  e46bcca25e85a361d3ce8431ec5ccc2382ee5569 (commit)
      from  902c6b95a3a3dbf7e5e3dd4b11ec58300ccb8a97 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit e46bcca25e85a361d3ce8431ec5ccc2382ee5569
Author: Adam Eijdenberg <eijdenberg at google.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 21:38:22 2015 -0400

    RT3962: Check accept_count only if not unlimited
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/ocsp.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/apps/ocsp.c b/apps/ocsp.c
index b6397b8..44f5841 100644
--- a/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -666,7 +666,8 @@ int ocsp_main(int argc, char **argv)
 
     /* If running as responder don't verify our own response */
     if (cbio) {
-        if (--accept_count <= 0) {
+        /* If not unlimited, see if we took all we should. */
+        if (accept_count != -1 && --accept_count <= 0) {
             ret = 0;
             goto end;
         }

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 15:15:49 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:15:49 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438355749.322842.27365.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  be0c03618a53fc539761eb5f0e300d68554f85c9 (commit)
      from  e46bcca25e85a361d3ce8431ec5ccc2382ee5569 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit be0c03618a53fc539761eb5f0e300d68554f85c9
Author: Adam Eijdenberg <eijdenberg at google.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 21:34:35 2015 -0400

    RT3963: Allow OCSP stapling with -rev and -www
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/s_server.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index 3143078..a1fcb6e 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -1871,6 +1871,14 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
         if (ctx2)
             SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx2, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
     }
+    if (s_tlsextstatus) {
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb);
+        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp);
+        if (ctx2) {
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx2, cert_status_cb);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx2, &tlscstatp);
+        }
+    }
 
     BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n");
     (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
@@ -1989,10 +1997,6 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
             SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb);
             SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out);
         }
-        if (s_tlsextstatus) {
-            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb);
-            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp);
-        }
 
         if (context
                 && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con,

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 15:19:53 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 15:19:53 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438355993.351245.28557.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  898ea7b855541b5809e25944c8dada7b50775fd3 (commit)
      from  be0c03618a53fc539761eb5f0e300d68554f85c9 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 898ea7b855541b5809e25944c8dada7b50775fd3
Author: Kai Engert <kaie at kuix.de>
Date:   Wed Jul 29 17:41:00 2015 -0400

    RT3742: Add xmpp_server to s_client.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 apps/s_client.c       | 9 +++++++--
 doc/apps/s_client.pod | 7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index 559cf70..a5fddca 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -513,7 +513,8 @@ OPTIONS s_client_options[] = {
     {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "Just use TLSv1"},
     {"starttls", OPT_STARTTLS, 's',
      "Use the STARTTLS command before starting TLS"},
-    {"xmpphost", OPT_XMPPHOST, 's', "Host to use with \"-starttls xmpp\""},
+    {"xmpphost", OPT_XMPPHOST, 's',
+     "Host to use with \"-starttls xmpp[-server]\""},
     {"rand", OPT_RAND, 's',
      "Load the file(s) into the random number generator"},
     {"sess_out", OPT_SESS_OUT, '>', "File to write SSL session to"},
@@ -608,6 +609,7 @@ typedef enum PROTOCOL_choice {
     PROTO_FTP,
     PROTO_TELNET,
     PROTO_XMPP,
+    PROTO_XMPP_SERVER,
     PROTO_CONNECT
 } PROTOCOL_CHOICE;
 
@@ -617,6 +619,7 @@ static OPT_PAIR services[] = {
     {"imap", PROTO_IMAP},
     {"ftp", PROTO_FTP},
     {"xmpp", PROTO_XMPP},
+    {"xmpp-server", PROTO_XMPP_SERVER},
     {"telnet", PROTO_TELNET},
     {NULL}
 };
@@ -1548,11 +1551,13 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
         }
         break;
     case PROTO_XMPP:
+    case PROTO_XMPP_SERVER:
         {
             int seen = 0;
             BIO_printf(sbio, "<stream:stream "
                        "xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' "
-                       "xmlns='jabber:client' to='%s' version='1.0'>",
+                       "xmlns='jabber:%s' to='%s' version='1.0'>",
+                       starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP ? "client" : "server",
                        xmpphost ? xmpphost : host);
             seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
             mbuf[seen] = 0;
diff --git a/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
index 12a6ef7..e91b9f1 100644
--- a/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
@@ -288,12 +288,13 @@ command for more information.
 
 send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication.
 B<protocol> is a keyword for the intended protocol.  Currently, the only
-supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", "ftp" and "xmpp".
+supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", "ftp", "xmpp",
+and "xmpp-server".
 
 =item B<-xmpphost hostname>
 
-This option, when used with "-starttls xmpp", specifies the host for the
-"to" attribute of the stream element.
+This option, when used with "-starttls xmpp" or "-starttls xmpp-server",
+specifies the host for the "to" attribute of the stream element.
 If this option is not specified, then the host specified with "-connect"
 will be used.
 

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 16:29:47 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 16:29:47 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438360187.696710.11959.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  740ceb5b0c844f1fe9b96983cc175d19795e7aa0 (commit)
      from  898ea7b855541b5809e25944c8dada7b50775fd3 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 740ceb5b0c844f1fe9b96983cc175d19795e7aa0
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at akamai.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 31 11:52:57 2015 -0400

    Various doc fixes from GH pull requests
    
    Thanks folks:
            348 Benjamin Kaduk
            317 Christian Brueffer
            254 Erik Tews
            253 Erik Tews
            219 Carl Mehner
            155 (ghost)
            95 mancha
            51 DominikNeubauer
    
    Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                        |  2 +-
 README                         |  2 +-
 apps/s_client.c                |  2 +-
 doc/HOWTO/keys.txt             |  5 ++---
 doc/apps/pkcs12.pod            |  2 +-
 doc/apps/req.pod               | 11 +++++------
 doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod |  2 +-
 doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod    |  2 +-
 doc/crypto/engine.pod          | 10 +++++-----
 9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index c5be241..cd75e0b 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@
      [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
 
   *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
-     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.  Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
      [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
 
   *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
diff --git a/README b/README
index 40c2e83..13464f2 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 
  OpenSSL 1.1.0-dev
 
- Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
  All rights reserved.
 
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index a5fddca..f4132c8 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ OPTIONS s_client_options[] = {
      "SRP username into second ClientHello message"},
     {"srp_moregroups", OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, '-',
      "Tolerate other than the known g N values."},
-    {"srp_strength", OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, 'p', "Minimal mength in bits for N"},
+    {"srp_strength", OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, 'p', "Minimal length in bits for N"},
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
     {"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's',
diff --git a/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt b/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
index 7ae2a3a..ba0314f 100644
--- a/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
+++ b/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
@@ -40,9 +40,8 @@ consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon.
 
 3. To generate a DSA key
 
-A DSA key can be used for signing only.  This is important to keep
-in mind to know what kind of purposes a certificate request with a
-DSA key can really be used for.
+A DSA key can be used for signing only.  It is important to
+know what a certificate request with a DSA key can really be used for.
 
 Generating a key for the DSA algorithm is a two-step process.  First,
 you have to generate parameters from which to generate the key:
diff --git a/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod b/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
index 8e0d917..7449848 100644
--- a/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ key is encrypted using triple DES and the certificate using 40 bit RC2.
 
 these options allow the algorithm used to encrypt the private key and
 certificates to be selected. Any PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 PBE algorithm name
-can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a a cipher name
+can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a cipher name
 (as output by the B<list-cipher-algorithms> command is specified then it
 is used with PKCS#5 v2.0. For interoperability reasons it is advisable to only
 use PKCS#12 algorithms.
diff --git a/doc/apps/req.pod b/doc/apps/req.pod
index 9e8e1ab..2ce2bca 100644
--- a/doc/apps/req.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/req.pod
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ B<openssl> B<req>
 [B<-keygen_engine id>]
 [B<-[digest]>]
 [B<-config filename>]
-[B<-subj arg>]
 [B<-multivalue-rdn>]
 [B<-x509>]
 [B<-days n>]
@@ -506,16 +505,16 @@ Examine and verify certificate request:
 
 Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it:
 
- openssl genrsa -out key.pem 1024
+ openssl genrsa -out key.pem 2048
  openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem
 
 The same but just using req:
 
- openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+ openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
 
 Generate a self signed root certificate:
 
- openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
 
 Example of a file pointed to by the B<oid_file> option:
 
@@ -531,7 +530,7 @@ expansion:
 Sample configuration file prompting for field values:
 
  [ req ]
- default_bits		= 1024
+ default_bits		= 2048
  default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
  distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
  attributes		= req_attributes
@@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ Sample configuration containing all field values:
  RANDFILE		= $ENV::HOME/.rnd
 
  [ req ]
- default_bits		= 1024
+ default_bits		= 2048
  default_keyfile 	= keyfile.pem
  distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
  attributes		= req_attributes
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index 6d897da..3dfc55d 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() initializes cipher contex B<ctx>.
 EVP_EncryptInit_ex() sets up cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
 with cipher B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized
 before calling this function. B<type> is normally supplied
-by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
+by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
 default implementation is used. B<key> is the symmetric key to use
 and B<iv> is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes
 used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
index 7d793e1..19112a5 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ encrypted using this key.
 
 EVP_SealInit() initializes a cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
 with cipher B<type> using a random secret key and IV. B<type> is normally
-supplied by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
+supplied by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
 using one or more public keys, this allows the same encrypted data to be
 decrypted using any of the corresponding private keys. B<ek> is an array of
 buffers where the public key encrypted secret key will be written, each buffer
diff --git a/doc/crypto/engine.pod b/doc/crypto/engine.pod
index 5eb065c..7f6cd43 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/engine.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/engine.pod
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ to use the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is a guarantee
 that the structure can not be deallocated until the reference is released.
 
 However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the ENGINE is
-initiliased and able to use any of its cryptographic
+initialised and able to use any of its cryptographic
 implementations. Indeed it's quite possible that most ENGINEs will not
 initialise at all in typical environments, as ENGINEs are typically used to
 support specialised hardware. To use an ENGINE's functionality, you need a
@@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference
 implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid
 difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two
 kinds of reference independently. If you have a functional reference to an
-ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised ready to
-perform cryptographic operations and will remain uninitialised
+ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised and
+is ready to perform cryptographic operations, and will remain initialised
 until after you have released your reference.
 
 I<Structural references>
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ I<Using a specific ENGINE implementation>
 Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin
 to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of
 OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be
-used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operation, otherwise
+used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operations, otherwise
 OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code
 illustrates how to approach this;
 
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ I<Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations>
 
 Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations
 bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by
-OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialise,
+OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialised,
 it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work;
 
  /* Load all bundled ENGINEs into memory and make them visible */

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 16:35:32 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 16:35:32 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1438360532.948036.20003.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  b68fa4d19ee68640f18d8eea4249eb0191a07694 (commit)
      from  602af7d01da82dc6c45946572f531bcbe9ebbf47 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit b68fa4d19ee68640f18d8eea4249eb0191a07694
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 31 12:34:24 2015 -0400

    Various doc fixes from GH pull requests
    
    Thanks, folks!
            348 Benjamin Kaduk
            317 Christian Brueffer
            254 Erik Tews
            253 Erik Tews
            219 Carl Mehner
            155 (ghost)
            95 mancha
            51 DominikNeubauer
    
    (Manually picked from 59c554b36e39256ac2cfc34dca052453e10c6d9c)
    Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                        |  2 +-
 README                         |  2 +-
 doc/HOWTO/keys.txt             |  5 ++---
 doc/apps/pkcs12.pod            |  2 +-
 doc/apps/req.pod               | 11 +++++------
 doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod |  2 +-
 doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod    |  2 +-
 doc/crypto/engine.pod          | 10 +++++-----
 8 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 27cf65e..2760606 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -914,7 +914,7 @@
      [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
 
   *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
-     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.  Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
      [mancha <mancha1 at zoho.com>]
 
   *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
diff --git a/README b/README
index b6ffe9b..2bdbfea 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 
  OpenSSL 1.0.2e-dev
 
- Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
  All rights reserved.
 
diff --git a/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt b/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
index 7ae2a3a..ba0314f 100644
--- a/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
+++ b/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
@@ -40,9 +40,8 @@ consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon.
 
 3. To generate a DSA key
 
-A DSA key can be used for signing only.  This is important to keep
-in mind to know what kind of purposes a certificate request with a
-DSA key can really be used for.
+A DSA key can be used for signing only.  It is important to
+know what a certificate request with a DSA key can really be used for.
 
 Generating a key for the DSA algorithm is a two-step process.  First,
 you have to generate parameters from which to generate the key:
diff --git a/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod b/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
index 8e0d917..7449848 100644
--- a/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/pkcs12.pod
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ key is encrypted using triple DES and the certificate using 40 bit RC2.
 
 these options allow the algorithm used to encrypt the private key and
 certificates to be selected. Any PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 PBE algorithm name
-can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a a cipher name
+can be used (see B<NOTES> section for more information). If a cipher name
 (as output by the B<list-cipher-algorithms> command is specified then it
 is used with PKCS#5 v2.0. For interoperability reasons it is advisable to only
 use PKCS#12 algorithms.
diff --git a/doc/apps/req.pod b/doc/apps/req.pod
index df68cb0..cb06b53 100644
--- a/doc/apps/req.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/req.pod
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ B<openssl> B<req>
 [B<-keygen_engine id>]
 [B<-[digest]>]
 [B<-config filename>]
-[B<-subj arg>]
 [B<-multivalue-rdn>]
 [B<-x509>]
 [B<-days n>]
@@ -506,16 +505,16 @@ Examine and verify certificate request:
 
 Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it:
 
- openssl genrsa -out key.pem 1024
+ openssl genrsa -out key.pem 2048
  openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem
 
 The same but just using req:
 
- openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+ openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
 
 Generate a self signed root certificate:
 
- openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
+ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
 
 Example of a file pointed to by the B<oid_file> option:
 
@@ -531,7 +530,7 @@ expansion:
 Sample configuration file prompting for field values:
 
  [ req ]
- default_bits		= 1024
+ default_bits		= 2048
  default_keyfile 	= privkey.pem
  distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
  attributes		= req_attributes
@@ -572,7 +571,7 @@ Sample configuration containing all field values:
  RANDFILE		= $ENV::HOME/.rnd
 
  [ req ]
- default_bits		= 1024
+ default_bits		= 2048
  default_keyfile 	= keyfile.pem
  distinguished_name	= req_distinguished_name
  attributes		= req_attributes
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index fb6036f..c69e6a6 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() initializes cipher contex B<ctx>.
 EVP_EncryptInit_ex() sets up cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
 with cipher B<type> from ENGINE B<impl>. B<ctx> must be initialized
 before calling this function. B<type> is normally supplied
-by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
+by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). If B<impl> is NULL then the
 default implementation is used. B<key> is the symmetric key to use
 and B<iv> is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes
 used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
index 7d793e1..19112a5 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ encrypted using this key.
 
 EVP_SealInit() initializes a cipher context B<ctx> for encryption
 with cipher B<type> using a random secret key and IV. B<type> is normally
-supplied by a function such as EVP_des_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
+supplied by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). The secret key is encrypted
 using one or more public keys, this allows the same encrypted data to be
 decrypted using any of the corresponding private keys. B<ek> is an array of
 buffers where the public key encrypted secret key will be written, each buffer
diff --git a/doc/crypto/engine.pod b/doc/crypto/engine.pod
index f5ab1c3..48741ee 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/engine.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/engine.pod
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ to use the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is a guarantee
 that the structure can not be deallocated until the reference is released.
 
 However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the ENGINE is
-initiliased and able to use any of its cryptographic
+initialised and able to use any of its cryptographic
 implementations. Indeed it's quite possible that most ENGINEs will not
 initialise at all in typical environments, as ENGINEs are typically used to
 support specialised hardware. To use an ENGINE's functionality, you need a
@@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference
 implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid
 difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two
 kinds of reference independently. If you have a functional reference to an
-ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised ready to
-perform cryptographic operations and will remain uninitialised
+ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised and
+is ready to perform cryptographic operations, and will remain initialised
 until after you have released your reference.
 
 I<Structural references>
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ I<Using a specific ENGINE implementation>
 Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin
 to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of
 OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be
-used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operation, otherwise
+used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operations, otherwise
 OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code
 illustrates how to approach this;
 
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ I<Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations>
 
 Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations
 bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by
-OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialise,
+OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialised,
 it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work;
 
  /* Load all bundled ENGINEs into memory and make them visible */

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 17:33:57 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 17:33:57 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Message-ID: <1438364037.374366.27039.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  a5e26349f73de74019892eb9e592965e633fe7d5 (commit)
      from  b68fa4d19ee68640f18d8eea4249eb0191a07694 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a5e26349f73de74019892eb9e592965e633fe7d5
Author: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden at gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 31 13:20:16 2015 -0400

    Clear BN-mont values when free'ing it.
    
    From a CloudFlare patch.
    
    Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/bn/bn_mont.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index aadd5db..aafd1b8 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     if (mont == NULL)
         return;
 
-    BN_free(&(mont->RR));
-    BN_free(&(mont->N));
-    BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
     if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
         OPENSSL_free(mont);
 }

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 17:38:23 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 17:38:23 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438364303.365098.27578.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  1a586b3942de1c0bd64203d09385d5e74f499d8d (commit)
      from  740ceb5b0c844f1fe9b96983cc175d19795e7aa0 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1a586b3942de1c0bd64203d09385d5e74f499d8d
Author: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden at gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 31 13:20:16 2015 -0400

    Clear BN-mont values when free'ing it.
    
    From a CloudFlare patch.
    
    Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/bn/bn_mont.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index e3955fe..1580e97 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -339,9 +339,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     if (mont == NULL)
         return;
 
-    BN_free(&(mont->RR));
-    BN_free(&(mont->N));
-    BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
     if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
         OPENSSL_free(mont);
 }

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 17:38:53 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 17:38:53 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Message-ID: <1438364333.411315.28350.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  1a9a506cfbb3a57215dae72aadab8943b977bcf7 (commit)
      from  5030cc69ffd6137d3d3f2b221c3313042940c1fd (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1a9a506cfbb3a57215dae72aadab8943b977bcf7
Author: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden at gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 31 13:20:16 2015 -0400

    Clear BN-mont values when free'ing it.
    
    From a CloudFlare patch.
    
    Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 1a586b3942de1c0bd64203d09385d5e74f499d8d)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/bn/bn_mont.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index aadd5db..aafd1b8 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     if (mont == NULL)
         return;
 
-    BN_free(&(mont->RR));
-    BN_free(&(mont->N));
-    BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
     if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
         OPENSSL_free(mont);
 }

From rsalz at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 17:39:08 2015
From: rsalz at openssl.org (Rich Salz)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 17:39:08 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable update
Message-ID: <1438364348.504810.28617.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_0-stable has been updated
       via  895c1b79dd7a76caea46d3185c8c2d3a27506b9d (commit)
      from  86fecb23df64a87dc9833f8d88f7c3f9c704f6b9 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 895c1b79dd7a76caea46d3185c8c2d3a27506b9d
Author: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden at gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 31 13:20:16 2015 -0400

    Clear BN-mont values when free'ing it.
    
    From a CloudFlare patch.
    
    Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 1a586b3942de1c0bd64203d09385d5e74f499d8d)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/bn/bn_mont.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
index bab8dfe..61c70f0 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -427,9 +427,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     if (mont == NULL)
         return;
 
-    BN_free(&(mont->RR));
-    BN_free(&(mont->N));
-    BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
     if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
         OPENSSL_free(mont);
 }

From matt at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 19:34:02 2015
From: matt at openssl.org (Matt Caswell)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 19:34:02 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438371242.370052.9917.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  e1e088ec7f2f33c4c4ad31312d62c536441d4358 (commit)
      from  1a586b3942de1c0bd64203d09385d5e74f499d8d (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit e1e088ec7f2f33c4c4ad31312d62c536441d4358
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 25 14:12:25 2015 +0100

    Remove erroneous server_random filling
    
    Commit e481f9b90b164 removed OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT from the code.
    
    Previously if OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT *was not* defined then the server random was
    filled during getting of the ClientHello. If it *was* defined then the
    server random would be filled in ssl3_send_server_hello(). Unfortunately in
    commit e481f9b90b164 the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT guards were removed but *both*
    server random fillings were left in. This could cause problems for session
    ticket callbacks.
    
    Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/s3_srvr.c | 11 ++++-------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 72deedc..718ca2c 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1580,19 +1580,16 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
     if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
         buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 
-        p = s->s3->server_random;
-        if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
-            s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
-            return -1;
-        }
-
         /* Do the message type and length last */
         d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
 
         *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
         *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
 
-        /* Random stuff */
+        /*
+         * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
+         * ssl3_get_client_hello()
+         */
         memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
         p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 

From ben at openssl.org  Fri Jul 31 19:50:40 2015
From: ben at openssl.org (Ben Laurie)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2015 19:50:40 +0000
Subject: [openssl-commits] [openssl]  master update
Message-ID: <1438372240.211993.12320.nullmailer@dev.openssl.org>

The branch master has been updated
       via  34750dc25d74e3db4c1ba43cd219d3f4825e4c65 (commit)
      from  e1e088ec7f2f33c4c4ad31312d62c536441d4358 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 34750dc25d74e3db4c1ba43cd219d3f4825e4c65
Author: Ben Laurie <ben at links.org>
Date:   Fri Jul 31 09:49:20 2015 +0100

    Only define PAGE_SIZE if not already defined.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/sec_mem.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/sec_mem.c b/crypto/sec_mem.c
index 5bf8baa..a630cbc 100644
--- a/crypto/sec_mem.c
+++ b/crypto/sec_mem.c
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@
 #define LOCK()      CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC)
 #define UNLOCK()    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_MALLOC)
 #define CLEAR(p, s) OPENSSL_cleanse(p, s)
-#define PAGE_SIZE    4096
+#ifndef PAGE_SIZE
+# define PAGE_SIZE    4096
+#endif
 
 #ifdef IMPLEMENTED
 size_t secure_mem_used;