[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Viktor Dukhovni
viktor at openssl.org
Sun Apr 3 15:38:30 UTC 2016
The branch master has been updated
via bb3bdf0507ac5c9713a7e99d8652085b2f150b06 (commit)
via fbb82a60dcbe820714a246ab3e7617eaf3a7b656 (commit)
via 70dd3c6593d87e4cbb56b485717cb2cfff730f3e (commit)
from 0f1ef63bf1708fbbb1ab248d455f619ce2d5b1ac (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit bb3bdf0507ac5c9713a7e99d8652085b2f150b06
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
Date: Sun Mar 20 04:12:52 2016 -0400
make update
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
commit fbb82a60dcbe820714a246ab3e7617eaf3a7b656
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
Date: Fri Mar 18 22:09:41 2016 -0400
Move peer chain security checks into x509_vfy.c
A new X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() function sets the
authentication security level. For verification of SSL peers, this
is automatically set from the SSL security level. Otherwise, for
now, the authentication security level remains at (effectively) 0
by default.
The new "-auth_level" verify(1) option is available in all the
command-line tools that support the standard verify(1) options.
New verify(1) tests added to check enforcement of chain signature
and public key security levels. Also added new tests of enforcement
of the verify_depth limit.
Updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
commit 70dd3c6593d87e4cbb56b485717cb2cfff730f3e
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
Date: Sat Feb 27 14:17:28 2016 -0500
Tidy up x509_vfy callback handling
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
apps/apps.h | 8 +-
apps/opt.c | 5 +
crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h | 4 +-
crypto/x509/x509_lu.c | 4 +-
crypto/x509/x509_txt.c | 6 +
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 661 ++++++++++++----------
crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c | 17 +
doc/apps/cms.pod | 5 +-
doc/apps/ocsp.pod | 7 +-
doc/apps/s_client.pod | 5 +-
doc/apps/s_server.pod | 5 +-
doc/apps/smime.pod | 5 +-
doc/apps/ts.pod | 21 +-
doc/apps/verify.pod | 24 +-
doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 42 +-
include/openssl/x509_vfy.h | 7 +-
ssl/ssl_cert.c | 25 +-
test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem | 15 +
test/certs/ca-cert-768i.pem | 15 +
test/certs/{ca+anyEKU.pem => ca-cert-md5-any.pem} | 16 +-
test/certs/{ca-cert.pem => ca-cert-md5.pem} | 16 +-
test/certs/ca-key-768.pem | 13 +
test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem | 16 +
test/certs/{ee-cert2.pem => ee-cert-768i.pem} | 15 +-
test/certs/{ee-cert.pem => ee-cert-md5.pem} | 16 +-
test/certs/ee-key-768.pem | 13 +
test/certs/mkcert.sh | 10 +-
test/certs/root-cert-768.pem | 11 +
test/certs/{root-cert.pem => root-cert-md5.pem} | 16 +-
test/certs/root-key-768.pem | 13 +
test/certs/setup.sh | 30 +
test/recipes/25-test_verify.t | 48 +-
util/libcrypto.num | 2 +
33 files changed, 714 insertions(+), 402 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem
create mode 100644 test/certs/ca-cert-768i.pem
copy test/certs/{ca+anyEKU.pem => ca-cert-md5-any.pem} (54%)
copy test/certs/{ca-cert.pem => ca-cert-md5.pem} (54%)
create mode 100644 test/certs/ca-key-768.pem
create mode 100644 test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem
copy test/certs/{ee-cert2.pem => ee-cert-768i.pem} (50%)
copy test/certs/{ee-cert.pem => ee-cert-md5.pem} (56%)
create mode 100644 test/certs/ee-key-768.pem
create mode 100644 test/certs/root-cert-768.pem
copy test/certs/{root-cert.pem => root-cert-md5.pem} (53%)
create mode 100644 test/certs/root-key-768.pem
diff --git a/apps/apps.h b/apps/apps.h
index 434ca54..a310dd2 100644
--- a/apps/apps.h
+++ b/apps/apps.h
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ void wait_for_async(SSL *s);
OPT_V_POLICY_PRINT, OPT_V_CHECK_SS_SIG, OPT_V_TRUSTED_FIRST, \
OPT_V_SUITEB_128_ONLY, OPT_V_SUITEB_128, OPT_V_SUITEB_192, \
OPT_V_PARTIAL_CHAIN, OPT_V_NO_ALT_CHAINS, OPT_V_NO_CHECK_TIME, \
+ OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL, \
OPT_V__LAST
# define OPT_V_OPTIONS \
@@ -187,8 +188,10 @@ void wait_for_async(SSL *s);
{ "purpose", OPT_V_PURPOSE, 's', \
"certificate chain purpose"}, \
{ "verify_name", OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME, 's', "verification policy name"}, \
- { "verify_depth", OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH, 'p', \
- "chain depth limit"}, \
+ { "verify_depth", OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH, 'n', \
+ "chain depth limit" }, \
+ { "auth_level", OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL, 'n', \
+ "chain authentication security level" }, \
{ "attime", OPT_V_ATTIME, 'M', "verification epoch time" }, \
{ "verify_hostname", OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME, 's', \
"expected peer hostname" }, \
@@ -235,6 +238,7 @@ void wait_for_async(SSL *s);
case OPT_V_PURPOSE: \
case OPT_V_VERIFY_NAME: \
case OPT_V_VERIFY_DEPTH: \
+ case OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL: \
case OPT_V_ATTIME: \
case OPT_V_VERIFY_HOSTNAME: \
case OPT_V_VERIFY_EMAIL: \
diff --git a/apps/opt.c b/apps/opt.c
index af994bb..462894a 100644
--- a/apps/opt.c
+++ b/apps/opt.c
@@ -526,6 +526,11 @@ int opt_verify(int opt, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
if (i >= 0)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(vpm, i);
break;
+ case OPT_V_VERIFY_AUTH_LEVEL:
+ i = atoi(opt_arg());
+ if (i >= 0)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(vpm, i);
+ break;
case OPT_V_ATTIME:
if (!opt_imax(opt_arg(), &t))
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h b/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h
index ad29ec3..603c177 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct X509_VERIFY_PARAM_st {
int purpose; /* purpose to check untrusted certificates */
int trust; /* trust setting to check */
int depth; /* Verify depth */
+ int auth_level; /* Security level for chain verification */
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies; /* Permissible policies */
/* Peer identity details */
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *hosts; /* Set of acceptable names */
@@ -81,7 +82,8 @@ struct X509_VERIFY_PARAM_st {
size_t iplen; /* Length of IP address */
};
-int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet);
+/* No error callback if depth < 0 */
+int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth);
/* a sequence of these are used */
struct x509_attributes_st {
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
index 3b0daf1..f9802c5 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
}
/* If certificate matches all OK */
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, obj.data.x509)) {
- if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, obj.data.x509, 1)) {
+ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, obj.data.x509, -1)) {
*issuer = obj.data.x509;
return 1;
}
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
* match if no certificate time is OK.
*/
- if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, *issuer, 1))
+ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, *issuer, -1))
break;
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index f7f27e9..8a9a7f0 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
return ("IP address mismatch");
case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
return ("No matching DANE TLSA records");
+ case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
+ return ("EE certificate key too weak");
+ case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
+ return ("CA certificate key too weak");
+ case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
+ return ("CA signature digest algorithm too weak");
default:
/* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index ffa211b..10fbeef 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
+static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
+static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
@@ -190,6 +192,66 @@ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
return xtmp;
}
+/*-
+ * Inform the verify callback of an error.
+ * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
+ * B<depth>.
+ * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
+ * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
+ */
+static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
+{
+ ctx->error_depth = depth;
+ ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
+ if (err != X509_V_OK)
+ ctx->error = err;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
+ * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
+ * number.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
+ */
+static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+{
+ ctx->error = err;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+ int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+
+ if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+
+ /*
+ * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
+ * check the security of issuer keys.
+ */
+ if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
+ verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
+ * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
+ */
+ if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
+ verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int err;
@@ -201,6 +263,7 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
(ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
+ (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
(ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0 ||
(ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
@@ -210,9 +273,7 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->flags);
if (err != X509_V_OK) {
- ctx->error = err;
- ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
- if ((ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) == 0)
+ if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
return ok;
}
@@ -265,6 +326,11 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
+ /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
+ if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
+ !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
+ return 0;
+
/*
* If dane->trecs is an empty stack, we'll fail, since the user enabled
* DANE. If none of the TLSA records were usable, and it makes sense to
@@ -279,20 +345,19 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
*/
-
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
int i;
- X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
+
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
- issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
- rv = issuer;
- if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
- break;
- }
+ X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+
+ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
+ continue;
+ if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1))
+ return issuer;
}
- return rv;
+ return NULL;
}
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
@@ -401,10 +466,7 @@ static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
break;
}
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
- ctx->error_depth = depth;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
}
/*
@@ -453,17 +515,13 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
return 0;
}
if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
return 0;
}
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
@@ -494,24 +552,16 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ret = 1;
break;
}
- if (ret == 0) {
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
- if (purpose > 0) {
- if (!check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
- return 0;
- }
+ if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
+ return 0;
+ /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
+ if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
+ return 0;
/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
&& (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
&& (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
return 0;
}
/* Increment path length if not self issued */
@@ -524,10 +574,8 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
return 0;
}
proxy_path_length++;
@@ -540,11 +588,13 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- X509 *x;
- int i, j, rv;
+ int i;
+
/* Check name constraints for all certificates */
for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ int j;
+
/* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
continue;
@@ -556,15 +606,12 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+
if (nc) {
- rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
- if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
- ctx->error = rv;
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
+ int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
+ return 0;
}
}
}
@@ -573,10 +620,7 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
{
- ctx->error = errcode;
- ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
- ctx->error_depth = 0;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
}
static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
@@ -618,7 +662,7 @@ static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
{
- int i, ok = 0;
+ int i;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509 *mx;
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
@@ -698,11 +742,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
rejected:
- ctx->error_depth = i;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
@@ -742,17 +782,18 @@ static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- int ok = 0, cnum = 0;
- unsigned int last_reasons = 0;
- cnum = ctx->error_depth;
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+ int ok = 0;
+ int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
+
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
- last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+ unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
+
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
if (ctx->get_crl)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
@@ -762,22 +803,21 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
*/
if (!ok) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- goto err;
+ ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
+ goto done;
}
ctx->current_crl = crl;
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
if (!ok)
- goto err;
+ goto done;
if (dcrl) {
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
if (!ok)
- goto err;
+ goto done;
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
if (!ok)
- goto err;
+ goto done;
} else
ok = 1;
@@ -785,7 +825,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ok != 2) {
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
if (!ok)
- goto err;
+ goto done;
}
X509_CRL_free(crl);
@@ -797,18 +837,16 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* so exit loop.
*/
if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- goto err;
+ ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
+ goto done;
}
}
- err:
+ done:
X509_CRL_free(crl);
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
return ok;
-
}
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
@@ -817,6 +855,7 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
+
if (notify)
ctx->current_crl = crl;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
@@ -830,16 +869,14 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
if (i == 0) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
return 0;
}
if (i > 0) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
return 0;
}
@@ -849,16 +886,14 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
if (i == 0) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
return 0;
}
/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
return 0;
}
}
@@ -1138,6 +1173,7 @@ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
int ret;
+
/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
if (ctx->parent)
return 0;
@@ -1153,12 +1189,10 @@ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
/* Verify CRL issuer */
ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
-
if (ret <= 0)
goto err;
/* Check chain is acceptable */
-
ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
@@ -1315,10 +1349,10 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+
reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
&issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
-
if (ok)
goto done;
@@ -1335,7 +1369,6 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
done:
-
/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
if (crl) {
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
@@ -1345,7 +1378,6 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
*pdcrl = dcrl;
return 1;
}
-
return 0;
}
@@ -1354,13 +1386,12 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
{
X509 *issuer = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
- int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
- cnum = ctx->error_depth;
- chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+
/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
if (ctx->current_issuer)
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
-
/*
* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
* certificate in chain.
@@ -1370,120 +1401,85 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
else {
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
- if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
+ return 0;
}
- if (issuer) {
- /*
- * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
- */
- if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
- /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
- if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
- !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
+ if (issuer == NULL)
+ return 1;
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
+ /*
+ * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
+ */
+ if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+ /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+ !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
+ return 0;
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
- if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
- }
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
+ return 0;
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
+ check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
+ return 0;
- }
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
- ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
+ !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
+ return 0;
- /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
- ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
+ /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
- if (!ikey) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- } else {
- int rv;
- rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
- if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
- ctx->error = rv;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
- /* Verify CRL signature */
- if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
+ if (!ikey &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
+ return 0;
- ok = 1;
+ if (ikey) {
+ int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
- err:
- return ok;
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
+ return 0;
+ /* Verify CRL signature */
+ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
- int ok;
X509_REVOKED *rev;
+
/*
* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
* critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
- * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
+ * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
* change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- return 0;
- }
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
+ !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
+ return 0;
/*
- * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
- * is not removeFromCRL.
+ * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
+ * reason is not removeFromCRL.
*/
if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
return 2;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
+ if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
return 0;
}
@@ -1522,18 +1518,16 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
- /*
- * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
- */
- X509 *x;
int i;
+
+ /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
continue;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
return 0;
}
return 1;
@@ -1558,7 +1552,14 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return 1;
}
-int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
+/*-
+ * Check certificate validity times.
+ * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
+ * the validation status.
+ *
+ * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
@@ -1571,55 +1572,30 @@ int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
ptime = NULL;
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
- if (i == 0) {
- if (quiet)
- return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i > 0) {
- if (quiet)
- return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
+ if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
+ X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
+ return 0;
+ if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
+ return 0;
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
- if (i == 0) {
- if (quiet)
- return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (i < 0) {
- if (quiet)
- return 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
- return 0;
- }
-
+ if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
+ X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
+ return 0;
+ if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
+ return 0;
return 1;
}
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- int ok = 0, n;
- X509 *xs, *xi;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-
- n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- ctx->error_depth = n;
- xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ X509 *xs;
/*
* With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
@@ -1639,16 +1615,12 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
xs = xi;
goto check_cert;
}
- if (n <= 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
- ctx->current_cert = xi;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- goto end;
- } else {
- n--;
- ctx->error_depth = n;
- xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
- }
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
+ n--;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
}
/*
@@ -1656,50 +1628,47 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
*/
while (n >= 0) {
- ctx->error_depth = n;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
/*
- * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
- * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
- * time.
+ * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
+ * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
+ * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
+ * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
*/
if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
- ctx->current_cert = xi;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
+ return 0;
} else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
- ctx->current_cert = xs;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
+ X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
+ return 0;
}
}
check_cert:
- ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ /* Calls verify callback as needed */
+ if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
+ return 0;
- /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+ /*
+ * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
+ * is retained.
+ */
ctx->current_issuer = xi;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
- if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
+ return 0;
- n--;
- if (n >= 0) {
+ if (--n >= 0) {
xi = xs;
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
}
}
- ok = 1;
- end:
- return ok;
+ return 1;
}
int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
@@ -2662,10 +2631,7 @@ static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
if (err == X509_V_OK)
return 1;
- ctx->current_cert = cert;
- ctx->error_depth = 0;
- ctx->error = err;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
}
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
@@ -2696,8 +2662,10 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
if (matched > 0) {
+ /* Callback invoked as needed */
if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
return 0;
+ /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
@@ -2714,10 +2682,7 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
return 0;
- ctx->current_cert = cert;
- ctx->error_depth = 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
}
/*
@@ -2727,6 +2692,19 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return verify_chain(ctx);
}
+/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
+static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
+ int ok;
+
+ ctx->chain = NULL;
+ ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
+ ctx->chain = saved_chain;
+
+ return ok;
+}
+
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
@@ -2806,12 +2784,19 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
- * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When
- * we exceed the depth limit, we simulate absence of a match.
+ * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
+ * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
+ * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
+ *
+ * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
+ * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
+ * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
+ * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
+ * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
+ * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
+ * would be a-priori too long.
*/
if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
- STACK_OF(X509) *hide = ctx->chain;
-
i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
/*
@@ -2833,10 +2818,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
- /* Suppress duplicate suppression */
- ctx->chain = NULL;
- ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
- ctx->chain = hide;
+ ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0) {
trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
@@ -2963,12 +2945,12 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
- xtmp = (depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
/*
* Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
* and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
*/
+ xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
if (xtmp == NULL) {
search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
if (may_trusted)
@@ -2976,23 +2958,21 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
continue;
}
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
+ /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
+ (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
search = 0;
continue;
}
- X509_up_ref(x);
+
+ X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
++ctx->num_untrusted;
ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
/*
- * Not strictly necessary, but saves cycles looking at the same
- * certificates over and over.
- */
- (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, x);
-
- /*
* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
*/
switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
@@ -3021,25 +3001,84 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
return 1;
case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ /* Callback already issued */
return 0;
case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
default:
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
- ctx->error_depth = num-1;
if (num > depth)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
- else if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
- (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH;
- else if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
- else if (ss)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
- else if (ctx->num_untrusted == num)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
- else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
+ (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
+ if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
+ if (ss)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
+ if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
+ }
+}
+
+static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
+static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
+ * ``ctx``.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
+ int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
+
+ /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (level <= 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
+ level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
+ * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
+ * self-signed or otherwise).
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+ int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert);
+ int mdnid = NID_undef;
+ int secbits = -1;
+ int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
+
+ if (level <= 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
+ level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
+
+ /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
+ if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+
+ /* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
+ if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL)
+ secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
}
+
+ return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
index 41b0fde..4a0bed0 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ static void x509_verify_param_zero(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
param->inh_flags = 0;
param->flags = 0;
param->depth = -1;
+ param->auth_level = -1; /* -1 means unset, 0 is explicit */
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(param->policies, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
param->policies = NULL;
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(param->hosts, str_free);
@@ -245,6 +246,7 @@ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *dest,
x509_verify_param_copy(purpose, 0);
x509_verify_param_copy(trust, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT);
x509_verify_param_copy(depth, -1);
+ x509_verify_param_copy(auth_level, -1);
/* If overwrite or check time not set, copy across */
@@ -368,6 +370,11 @@ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth)
param->depth = depth;
}
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int auth_level)
+{
+ param->auth_level = auth_level;
+}
+
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t)
{
param->check_time = t;
@@ -493,6 +500,11 @@ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
return param->depth;
}
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+{
+ return param->auth_level;
+}
+
const char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
return param->name;
@@ -515,6 +527,7 @@ static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
0, /* purpose */
0, /* trust */
100, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
NULL, /* policies */
vpm_empty_id},
{
@@ -525,6 +538,7 @@ static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, /* purpose */
X509_TRUST_EMAIL, /* trust */
-1, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
NULL, /* policies */
vpm_empty_id},
{
@@ -535,6 +549,7 @@ static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, /* purpose */
X509_TRUST_EMAIL, /* trust */
-1, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
NULL, /* policies */
vpm_empty_id},
{
@@ -545,6 +560,7 @@ static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, /* purpose */
X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, /* trust */
-1, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
NULL, /* policies */
vpm_empty_id},
{
@@ -555,6 +571,7 @@ static const X509_VERIFY_PARAM default_table[] = {
X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, /* purpose */
X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, /* trust */
-1, /* depth */
+ -1, /* auth_level */
NULL, /* policies */
vpm_empty_id}
};
diff --git a/doc/apps/cms.pod b/doc/apps/cms.pod
index 36e6b3c..42c3514 100644
--- a/doc/apps/cms.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/cms.pod
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ B<openssl> B<cms>
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
[B<-verify_depth num>]
[B<-verify_email email>]
[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
@@ -475,8 +476,8 @@ B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
-B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>,
-B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
Set various certificate chain validation options. See the
L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
diff --git a/doc/apps/ocsp.pod b/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
index be195bc..c796fd5 100644
--- a/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/ocsp.pod
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
[B<-verify_depth num>]
[B<-verify_email email>]
[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
@@ -197,11 +198,11 @@ B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
-B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>,
-B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
Set different certificate verification options.
-See L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+See L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
=item B<-verify_other file>
diff --git a/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
index 1873293..881fbcf 100644
--- a/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
[B<-verify_depth num>]
[B<-verify_email email>]
[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
@@ -229,8 +230,8 @@ B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
-B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>,
-B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
Set various certificate chain validation options. See the
L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
diff --git a/doc/apps/s_server.pod b/doc/apps/s_server.pod
index 25e5444..08554f4 100644
--- a/doc/apps/s_server.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/s_server.pod
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
[B<-verify_depth num>]
[B<-verify_return_error>]
[B<-verify_email email>]
@@ -234,8 +235,8 @@ B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
-B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>,
-B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
Set different peer certificate verification options.
See the L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
diff --git a/doc/apps/smime.pod b/doc/apps/smime.pod
index 418d8fa..e6323ad 100644
--- a/doc/apps/smime.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/smime.pod
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ B<openssl> B<smime>
[B<-trusted_first>]
[B<-no_alt_chains>]
[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-auth_level num>]
[B<-verify_depth num>]
[B<-verify_email email>]
[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
@@ -307,8 +308,8 @@ B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>,
B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>,
B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>,
B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>,
-B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>,
-B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
+B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>,
+B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict>
Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
L<verify(1)> manual page for details.
diff --git a/doc/apps/ts.pod b/doc/apps/ts.pod
index 93ea9e0..e64e5fc 100644
--- a/doc/apps/ts.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/ts.pod
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ I<verify options:>
[-suiteB_192]
[-trusted_first]
[-use_deltas]
+[-auth_level num]
[-verify_depth num]
[-verify_email email]
[-verify_hostname hostname]
@@ -371,17 +372,15 @@ all intermediate CA certificates unless the response includes them.
=item I<verify options>
-The options [-attime timestamp], [-check_ss_sig], [-crl_check],
-[-crl_check_all], [-explicit_policy], [-extended_crl],
-[-ignore_critical], [-inhibit_any], [-inhibit_map],
-[-issuer_checks], [-no_alt_chains], [-no_check_time],
-[-partial_chain], [-policy arg], [-policy_check],
-[-policy_print], [-purpose purpose], [-suiteB_128],
-[-suiteB_128_only], [-suiteB_192], [-trusted_first],
-[-use_deltas], [-verify_depth num], [-verify_email email],
-[-verify_hostname hostname], [-verify_ip ip], [-verify_name name],
-and [-x509_strict] can be used to control timestamp verification.
-See L<verify(1)>.
+The options B<-attime timestamp>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>,
+B<-crl_check_all>, B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>,
+B<-inhibit_any>, B<-inhibit_map>, B<-issuer_checks>, B<-no_alt_chains>,
+B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>, B<-policy_check>,
+B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_128_only>,
+B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>, B<-auth_level>,
+B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>,
+B<-verify_name>, and B<-x509_strict> can be used to control timestamp
+verification. See L<verify(1)>.
=back
diff --git a/doc/apps/verify.pod b/doc/apps/verify.pod
index ecde35f..96d6be4 100644
--- a/doc/apps/verify.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/verify.pod
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ B<openssl> B<verify>
[B<-trusted file>]
[B<-use_deltas>]
[B<-verbose>]
+[B<-auth_level level>]
[B<-verify_depth num>]
[B<-verify_email email>]
[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
@@ -227,9 +228,30 @@ Enable support for delta CRLs.
Print extra information about the operations being performed.
+=item B<-auth_level level>
+
+Set the certificate chain authentication security level to B<level>.
+The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and
+public key strength when verifying certificate chains.
+For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
+must meet the specified security B<level>.
+The signature algorithm security level is enforced for all the certificates in
+the chain except for the chain's I<trust anchor>, which is either directly
+trusted or validated by means other than its signature.
+See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
+levels.
+The default security level is -1, or "not set".
+At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
+Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
+interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
+shorter than 1024 bits.
+
=item B<-verify_depth num>
-Limit the maximum depth of the certificate chain to B<num> certificates.
+Limit the certificate chain to B<num> intermediate CA certificates.
+A maximal depth chain can have up to B<num+2> certificates, since neither the
+end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the
+B<-verify_depth> limit.
=item B<-verify_email email>
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
index 6fb33ed..04f5215 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
@@ -2,15 +2,16 @@
=head1 NAME
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc - X509 verification parameters
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc - X509 verification parameters
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
- int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, unsigned long flags);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ unsigned long flags);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- unsigned long flags);
+ unsigned long flags);
unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
@@ -19,13 +20,17 @@ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ge
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
- ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
+ ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies);
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
+ int auth_level);
+ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *name, size_t namelen);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
@@ -71,8 +76,32 @@ policy set is cleared. The B<policies> parameter can be B<NULL> to clear
an existing policy set.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth() sets the maximum verification depth to B<depth>.
-That is the maximum number of untrusted CA certificates that can appear in a
+That is the maximum number of intermediate CA certificates that can appear in a
chain.
+A maximal depth chain contains 2 more certificates than the limit, since
+neither the end-entity ceritificate nor the trust-anchor count against this
+limit.
+Thus a B<depth> limit of 0 only allows the end-entity certificate to be signed
+directly by the trust-anchor, while with a B<depth> limit of 1 there can be one
+intermediate CA certificate between the trust-anchor and the end-entity
+certificate.
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() sets the authentication security level to
+B<auth_level>.
+The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and public
+key strength when verifying certificate chains.
+For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
+must meet the specified security level.
+The signature algorithm security level is not enforced for the chain's I<trust
+anchor> certificate, which is either directly trusted or validated by means other
+than its signature.
+See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
+levels.
+The default security level is -1, or "not set".
+At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
+Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
+interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
+shorter than 1024 bits.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host() sets the expected DNS hostname to
B<name> clearing any previously specified host name or names. If
@@ -139,6 +168,9 @@ values.
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth() returns the current verification depth.
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level() returns the current authentication security
+level.
+
=head1 VERIFICATION FLAGS
The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags
diff --git a/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h b/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
index e883349..093b0f3 100644
--- a/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
@@ -355,7 +355,10 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
# define X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH 64
/* DANE TLSA errors */
# define X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH 65
-
+/* security level errors */
+# define X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL 66
+# define X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL 67
+# define X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK 68
/* Certificate verify flags */
@@ -552,6 +555,7 @@ unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust);
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
+void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int auth_level);
void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
@@ -574,6 +578,7 @@ int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *ipasc);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
+int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
const char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_name(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 4081ebe..24ac352 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -494,6 +494,12 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
return (0);
}
param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx);
+ /*
+ * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some
+ * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto
+ * and PKI authentication.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s));
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
@@ -520,17 +526,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
- else {
+ else
i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
-# if 0
- /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
-# endif
- if (i > 0)
- i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1);
- }
s->verify_result = ctx.error;
sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
@@ -894,12 +891,18 @@ int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
* ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
* the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
*/
- X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ (void) X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
ERR_clear_error();
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0);
if (i != 1) {
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+#if 0
+ /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+#endif
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem b/test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c8ff29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/ca-cert-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICRDCCASygAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDMyMDA2MjcyN1oYDzIxMTYwMzIxMDYyNzI3WjANMQswCQYDVQQD
+DAJDQTB8MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA2sAMGgCYQC3wNLc1A9gAjz1H94ozPrLOhE2
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+FKrzei/LKJop6yShiJupKskW0ZQcMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslT
+nE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAFr4hjVtLuZz
+gxLILAOREEtanckfnapUrhTLukog9Q8uzqMUE+YDEhkcP4YAVjcab6HaXrbcxXsn
+zn+v+GPszD9G3doGbUjuwEEAHz+k/9sjsn8QAGw/XslYhd5dktaRRCqaTNiWT+Ks
+xKntAsgXcgWNIpvGikzTB/W7IrjIV8/S1JjLABtoY88tFUX81Ohr3bFFsRc9EHVS
+MtGnEwfoBOSlCUjaTWBNHHi1HstK9sG2SNT/nhN1HATk/aiCiQRKr/bm6ezPC2If
+6mRidaNiQN8+vzvtn86BqtRJOEi8jj5CBax6IqwfE+lDZIwT7H9C9Cu8Yp4mTM0x
+wwzRDnFVisM=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ca-cert-768i.pem b/test/certs/ca-cert-768i.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acc432f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/ca-cert-768i.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICSjCCAdSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDMyMDA2MjcyN1oYDzIxMTYwMzIxMDYyNzI3WjANMQswCQYDVQQD
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+j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz
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+YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc
+ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9
+CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G
+A1UdIwQYMBaAFFjzE/eu8wvKwzb2aODw52C+0gLVMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJ
+KoZIhvcNAQELBQADYQCZM1sSpIyjyuGirBYvezFryUq5EyZiME3HIHJ7AbmquPtE
+LcoE8lwxEYXl7OTbLZHxIKkt6+WX2TL/0yshJLq/42nh5DZwyug7fIITmkzmzidF
+rbnl7fIop7OJX/kELbY=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ca+anyEKU.pem b/test/certs/ca-cert-md5-any.pem
similarity index 54%
copy from test/certs/ca+anyEKU.pem
copy to test/certs/ca-cert-md5-any.pem
index 36ed837..7c2b53f 100644
--- a/test/certs/ca+anyEKU.pem
+++ b/test/certs/ca-cert-md5-any.pem
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIC7DCCAdSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
-IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjANMQswCQYDVQQD
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DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd
j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz
n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc
ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9
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-IM9ox88wYKWynanPbra4n0zhepooKt+naeY2HLR8UgwT6sTi0Yfld9mjytA8/DP6
-AcqtIDDf60vNI00sgxjgZqofVayA9KShzIPzjBec4zI1sg5YzoSNyH28VXFstEpi
-8CVtmRYQHhc2gDI9MGge4sHRYwaIFkegzpwcEUnp6tTVe9ZvHawgsXF/rCGfH4M6
-uNO0D+9Md1bdW7382yOtWbkyibsugqnfBYCUH6hAhDlfYzpba2Smb0roc6Crq7HR
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+x97jzKey5phEwRD/4fJ+PCml9eE/SNzBV0xKSDq4qQYvSJ3GF6KCATVlr0bDzQJZ
+yTY3FeNoy+K7Mb0rHtsGru60C/Ft1dl9uiJ+yKXMiCxPcDjYb+95mA9QJ1kXfR8J
+JVfeKhEEK+QIVpz/37aQ4jx/zbGblFsruALK22aLnpgrfUzrsYQ8W8T/DV2dV1ra
+4wHz/QtlE4isInOaK2+pvXwyGar+1/s3+VxXEiPlZ7IwCDAGBgRVHSUA
-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ca-cert.pem b/test/certs/ca-cert-md5.pem
similarity index 54%
copy from test/certs/ca-cert.pem
copy to test/certs/ca-cert-md5.pem
index f6bc233..be564dd 100644
--- a/test/certs/ca-cert.pem
+++ b/test/certs/ca-cert-md5.pem
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIC7DCCAdSgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
-IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjANMQswCQYDVQQD
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DAJDQTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAJadpD0ASxxfxsvd
j9IxsogVzMSGLFziaYuE9KejU9+R479RifvwfBANO62sNWJ19X//9G5UjwWmkiOz
n1k50DkYsBBA3mJzik6wjt/c58lBIlSEgAgpvDU8ht8w3t20JP9+YqXAeugqFj/W
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ YW5INvDAAwcF1nzlEf0Y6Eot03IMNyg2MTE4hehxjdgCSci8GYnFirE/ojXqqpAc
ZGh7r2dqWgZUD1Dh+bT2vjrUzj8eTH3GdzI+oljt29102JIUaqj3yzRYkah8FLF9
CLNNsUcCAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLQRM/HX4l73U54gIhBPhga/H8leMB8G
A1UdIwQYMBaAFI71Ja8em2uEPXyAmslTnE1y96NSMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJ
-KoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBADnZ9uXGAdwfNC3xuERIlBwgLROeBRGgcfHWdXZB/tWk
-IM9ox88wYKWynanPbra4n0zhepooKt+naeY2HLR8UgwT6sTi0Yfld9mjytA8/DP6
-AcqtIDDf60vNI00sgxjgZqofVayA9KShzIPzjBec4zI1sg5YzoSNyH28VXFstEpi
-8CVtmRYQHhc2gDI9MGge4sHRYwaIFkegzpwcEUnp6tTVe9ZvHawgsXF/rCGfH4M6
-uNO0D+9Md1bdW7382yOtWbkyibsugqnfBYCUH6hAhDlfYzpba2Smb0roc6Crq7HR
-5HpEYY6qEir9wFMkD5MZsWrNRGRuzd5am82J+aaHz/4=
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+x97jzKey5phEwRD/4fJ+PCml9eE/SNzBV0xKSDq4qQYvSJ3GF6KCATVlr0bDzQJZ
+yTY3FeNoy+K7Mb0rHtsGru60C/Ft1dl9uiJ+yKXMiCxPcDjYb+95mA9QJ1kXfR8J
+JVfeKhEEK+QIVpz/37aQ4jx/zbGblFsruALK22aLnpgrfUzrsYQ8W8T/DV2dV1ra
+4wHz/QtlE4isInOaK2+pvXwyGar+1/s3+VxXEiPlZ7I=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ca-key-768.pem b/test/certs/ca-key-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7aea5ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/ca-key-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIB5QIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAc8wggHLAgEAAmEAt8DS3NQPYAI89R/e
+KMz6yzoRNkfHOkUI5FCACwjrsPMW2VfgBA0qj9dQcPDFc75qZLEfbNYnSYSzroMD
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+ZlBrg1vDsW/yn02NZzvT6xT/kvzFhQVw1i8B0YyB8wPao3f2ZxPkAfeoAAECMQDa
+6VkNYlHgPOlTtwU1WYUirFczpipQsuk/lIf7B3+rVRUHoAE4nbeIRJgkKZaJEAEC
+MQDW4pYsyN79HEqFpOFlfsrERw3y4hLRXGeHxbfJFdAe7SUfNj28ZI2EPFE0DJhX
+RUkCMA39M2+jhM/rlI2A+Jg8LEHW+YuXZsTZagZiG35zMDlmqn1eQDW5/mx61a4Z
+6kDAAQIwIlbZWtTK1bX0rsC3iEmny4/zSbIZAb37iXXuNcM3nAmXmhJH8Vg8STp+
+W4v7uE6JAjEAwiB9wCVwG4UhvKNQ4Wd2mfJiKZQNF4rL4ID0g+Wk6kX67c7u2hfH
+sSaluw9nM91s
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..794f93c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIICeDCCAWCgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
+Fw0xNjAzMjAwNjI3MjdaGA8yMTE2MDMyMTA2MjcyN1owGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy
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+pRe9B7tiEuzu3iCD4kKB0yxgUCSsF0u1KbHSUNe2H5bBJC21c2eLZh6U54y014nL
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+PCQqIqxUIegfS3f5
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert2.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-768i.pem
similarity index 50%
copy from test/certs/ee-cert2.pem
copy to test/certs/ee-cert-768i.pem
index b6ad976..d6532fb 100644
--- a/test/certs/ee-cert2.pem
+++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-768i.pem
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
-Fw0xNjAxMTUwODE5NDlaGA8yMTE2MDExNjA4MTk0OVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy
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YYWu3tssD9Vz++K3qBt6dWAr1H08c3a1rt6TL38kkG3JHPSKOM2fooAWVsu0LLuT
5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l
@@ -8,12 +8,9 @@ Dz9mjsI2oBH/wFk1/Ukc3RxCMwZ4rgQ4I+XndWfTlK1aqUAfrFkQ9QzBZK1KxMY1
U7OWaoIbFYvRmavknm+UqtKW5Vf7jJFkijwkFsbSGb6CYBM7YrDtPh2zyvlr3zG5
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+TIlMnfePzYTc3BnfxZj82Mny
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ee-cert.pem b/test/certs/ee-cert-md5.pem
similarity index 56%
copy from test/certs/ee-cert.pem
copy to test/certs/ee-cert-md5.pem
index 05d2318d..8c26422 100644
--- a/test/certs/ee-cert.pem
+++ b/test/certs/ee-cert-md5.pem
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIDIDCCAgigAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADANMQswCQYDVQQDDAJDQTAg
-Fw0xNjAxMTUwODE5NDlaGA8yMTE2MDExNjA4MTk0OVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOc2Vy
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5Rcf/w3GQ/4xNPgo2HXpo7uIgu+jcuJTYgVFTeAxl++qnRDSWA2eBp4yuxsIVl1l
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ ep5LR2inKcc/SuIiJ7TvkGPX79ByST5brbkb1Ctvhmjd1XMSuEPJ3EEPoqNGT4tn
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+yKJlaXRlm/I1nQdUQ0G5Bk2Tp/QGoJCtJ25XsoIbnCs0tIbpQllTdLsRQmOussAP
+NvdwbKtAAolgMAxH9pl1Mc6OIo2e8405EWs1jvGEMgE0IFAY
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/ee-key-768.pem b/test/certs/ee-key-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d44f85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/ee-key-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/mkcert.sh b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
index 99e7d2a..ec2e374 100755
--- a/test/certs/mkcert.sh
+++ b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
#
DAYS=36525
+if [ -z "$OPENSSL_SIGALG" ]; then
+ OPENSSL_SIGALG=sha256
+fi
+
stderr_onerror() {
(
err=$("$@" >&3 2>&1) || {
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ req() {
local errs
stderr_onerror \
- openssl req -new -sha256 -key "${key}.pem" \
+ openssl req -new -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -key "${key}.pem" \
-config <(printf "[req]\n%s\n%s\n[dn]\nCN=%s\n" \
"prompt = no" "distinguished_name = dn" "${cn}")
}
@@ -63,7 +67,7 @@ req_nocn() {
key "$key"
stderr_onerror \
- openssl req -new -sha256 -subj / -key "${key}.pem" \
+ openssl req -new -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -subj / -key "${key}.pem" \
-config <(printf "[req]\n%s\n[dn]\nCN_default =\n" \
"distinguished_name = dn")
}
@@ -73,7 +77,7 @@ cert() {
local exts=$1; shift
stderr_onerror \
- openssl x509 -req -sha256 -out "${cert}.pem" \
+ openssl x509 -req -"${OPENSSL_SIGALG}" -out "${cert}.pem" \
-extfile <(printf "%s\n" "$exts") "$@"
}
diff --git a/test/certs/root-cert-768.pem b/test/certs/root-cert-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4392ef0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/root-cert-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/root-cert.pem b/test/certs/root-cert-md5.pem
similarity index 53%
copy from test/certs/root-cert.pem
copy to test/certs/root-cert-md5.pem
index 21ffa4d..b6ed10c 100644
--- a/test/certs/root-cert.pem
+++ b/test/certs/root-cert-md5.pem
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
-IENBMCAXDTE2MDExNTA4MTk0OVoYDzIxMTYwMTE2MDgxOTQ5WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
+MIIC8TCCAdmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290
+IENBMCAXDTE2MDMyMDA2MjcyN1oYDzIxMTYwMzIxMDYyNzI3WjASMRAwDgYDVQQD
DAdSb290IENBMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA4eYA9Qa8
oEY4eQ8/HnEZE20C3yubdmv8rLAh7daRCEI7pWM17FJboKJKxdYAlAOXWj25ZyjS
feMhXKTtxjyNjoTRnVTDPdl0opZ2Z3H5xhpQd7P9eO5b4OOMiSPCmiLsPtQ3ngfN
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ MUjRhipqVSZ66As2Tpex4KTJ2lxpSwOACFaDox+yKrjBTP7FsU3UwAGq7b7OJb3u
aa32B81uK6GJVPVo65gJ7clgZsszYkoDsGjWDqtfwTVVfv1G7rrr3Laio+2Ff3ff
tWgiQ35mJCOvxQIDAQABo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3
o1IwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUjvUlrx6ba4Q9fICayVOcTXL3o1IwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB
-/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAyRRJx27WYOogPXZpPfAMt8ptapr/ugLWGLlw
-bzKySoyLpoV2/YNAvTAGB90iFq6x/ujjrK41/ES0p3v38/Qfuxo24gcZgc/oYLV2
-UqR+uGCx68p2OWLYctBsARtYWOEgPhHFb9aVxcOQKyZHtivDX0wLGX+nqZoHX9IY
-mc0sbpRBRMzxRsChbzD5re9kZ5NrgkjA6DJ7jYh2GitOM6oIU3Dd9+pk3bCEkFUg
-Ry9qN/k+AyeqH1Qcb5LU+MTmlw8bmyzmMOBZgdegtO4HshcBMO054KSB3WSfBPDO
-bEhZ0vm/lw63TGi88yIMtlkmcU2g0RKpeQI96G6QeqHyKF3p8A==
+/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOCAQEAwSTZo97psLqiNmgvCC/Z51F3S9bFKPjGK4dc
+Kqh8pMJsb8DnfGlPnsYXq/0oPcBThTRGZDqTeZa0ms8G+g4GS21TPF7lmvVJUJhz
+GRLJxX7TYB8xriSJ15DwZgGmEGPfzmoIq27nwrO4TRAi0TCLdw01XZwiq2V7anl+
+jrIpJPDuaT3oBqnGTMZ5IoaQq2TX8PS/ZW6icJiRmXLMp/HUycKpDUshiuARR5Mi
+UOzX8IHwn76Zj6z1R8xW9j1WcEycFYevTMaRuS6hnYagiSaAytIQU8hgMR4AWodM
+NFYv5t9rguJnimGUGMMBIYXnPNE2kaoq9qCVgjuC14gWU0kq6Q==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/root-key-768.pem b/test/certs/root-key-768.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ecdcd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/root-key-768.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIB5AIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAc4wggHKAgEAAmEAue2pKTZhWeE1qUCK
+QDa25I68dQpVImWqMqbOVQ8j6BAXIFbG3JB3B6kjzu2XwRbWKfYiI543j1b461U6
+UGIzHCqL8FwGW1NttKuVGmhIo4fpXvMhe9+yqPBawOLftXXFAgMBAAECYH1FP4Bg
+/16Lepg6v+tb8gY0lY1WFN5EGVRfRw3QUaT9kldboEjjnQ8wSswVEPYr56IHZ8mH
+Or8LtJVrB3fjriq5vNOt7lRscuV7IcVtOyVWu5+MoJmO67Q2vRJXLWTdAQIxANtp
+AiqObXo8vyT+EDcOEW104PfKNVh/4fhyrDwAk/yTcxkv4dcnuTykeLPvkXq4cQIx
+ANjvQa+9LubMy3N1uXIbWWsiEBi4BdNK+xuppJ2puckaiQU42Mfmw/Nj4LMEJLfc
+lQIwCYcv3uU8f9hvfI3D6oAj5Zrzwg737hXvnDhunlRwGMHWd7uKlStWcfm6fCXl
+LW0hAjEAneK0egVEp3IR+PyLdcL194UZFgSJKNj/nYiAaMdokjcf1o8jJ4qKvw/I
+MEIpvy9pAjAzaFHKRugCN01V2dgXYYGL8+zkcwG4ehDXH1XEs4v8r3WtHBPPKED6
+AemfAQJLvh8=
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/test/certs/setup.sh b/test/certs/setup.sh
index 9606c77..f341046 100755
--- a/test/certs/setup.sh
+++ b/test/certs/setup.sh
@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ openssl x509 -in root-nonca.pem -trustout \
openssl x509 -in root-nonca.pem -trustout \
-addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out nroot+anyEKU.pem
+# Root CA security level variants:
+# MD5 self-signature
+OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-cert-md5
+# 768-bit key
+OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \
+./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key-768 root-cert-768
+
# primary client-EKU root: croot-cert
# trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU
#
@@ -97,6 +105,18 @@ openssl x509 -in ca-nonca.pem -trustout \
openssl x509 -in ca-nonca.pem -trustout \
-addtrust serverAuth -out nca+anyEKU.pem
+# Intermediate CA security variants:
+# MD5 issuer signature,
+OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-cert-md5 root-key root-cert
+openssl x509 -in ca-cert-md5.pem -trustout \
+ -addtrust anyExtendedKeyUsage -out ca-cert-md5-any.pem
+# Issuer has 768-bit key
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key ca-cert-768i root-key-768 root-cert-768
+# CA has 768-bit key
+OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \
+./mkcert.sh genca "CA" ca-key-768 ca-cert-768 root-key root-cert
+
# client intermediate ca: cca-cert
# trust variants: +serverAuth, -serverAuth, +clientAuth, -clientAuth
#
@@ -152,3 +172,13 @@ openssl x509 -in ee-client.pem -trustout \
-addtrust clientAuth -out ee+clientAuth.pem
openssl x509 -in ee-client.pem -trustout \
-addreject clientAuth -out ee-clientAuth.pem
+
+# Leaf cert security level variants
+# MD5 issuer signature
+OPENSSL_SIGALG=md5 \
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert-md5 ca-key ca-cert
+# 768-bit issuer key
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-cert-768i ca-key-768 ca-cert-768
+# 768-bit leaf key
+OPENSSL_KEYBITS=768 \
+./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key-768 ee-cert-768 ca-key ca-cert
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
index d4131cc..e025739 100644
--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ setup("test_verify");
sub verify {
my ($cert, $purpose, $trusted, $untrusted, @opts) = @_;
- my @args = qw(openssl verify -purpose);
+ my @args = qw(openssl verify -auth_level 1 -purpose);
my @path = qw(test certs);
push(@args, "$purpose", @opts);
for (@$trusted) { push(@args, "-trusted", srctop_file(@path, "$_.pem")) }
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ sub verify {
run(app([@args]));
}
-plan tests => 83;
+plan tests => 101;
# Canonical success
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@@ -214,3 +214,47 @@ ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee+clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"accept direct match with client trust");
ok(!verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee-clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"reject direct match with client mistrust");
+
+# Security level tests
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
+ "accept RSA 2048 chain at auth level 2");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "3"),
+ "reject RSA 2048 root at auth level 3");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-768"], ["ca-cert-768i"], "-auth_level", "0"),
+ "accept RSA 768 root at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-768"], ["ca-cert-768i"]),
+ "reject RSA 768 root at auth level 1");
+ok(verify("ee-cert-768i", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-768"], "-auth_level", "0"),
+ "accept RSA 768 intermediate at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert-768i", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-768"]),
+ "reject RSA 768 intermediate at auth level 1");
+ok(verify("ee-cert-768", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "0"),
+ "accept RSA 768 leaf at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert-768", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+ "reject RSA 768 leaf at auth level 1");
+#
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert-md5"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "2"),
+ "accept md5 self-signed TA at auth level 2");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["ca-cert-md5-any"], [], "-auth_level", "2"),
+ "accept md5 intermediate TA at auth level 2");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-md5"], "-auth_level", "0"),
+ "accept md5 intermediate at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert-md5"]),
+ "reject md5 intermediate at auth level 1");
+ok(verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-auth_level", "0"),
+ "accept md5 leaf at auth level 0");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert-md5", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
+ "reject md5 leaf at auth level 1");
+
+# Depth tests, note the depth limit bounds the number of CA certificates
+# between the trust-anchor and the leaf, so, for example, with a root->ca->leaf
+# chain, depth = 1 is sufficient, but depth == 0 is not.
+#
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-verify_depth", "2"),
+ "accept chain with verify_depth 2");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-verify_depth", "1"),
+ "accept chain with verify_depth 1");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], "-verify_depth", "0"),
+ "accept chain with verify_depth 0");
+ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["ca-cert-md5-any"], [], "-verify_depth", "0"),
+ "accept md5 intermediate TA with verify_depth 0");
diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
index 6268a86..e1ca4ef 100644
--- a/util/libcrypto.num
+++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -4122,3 +4122,5 @@ DSA_meth_new 3987 1_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
DSA_meth_set_flags 3988 1_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
DSA_meth_get_sign_setup 3989 1_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
DSA_get0_engine 3990 1_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level 3991 1_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level 3992 1_1_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
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