[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Matt Caswell
matt at openssl.org
Thu Aug 25 10:44:19 UTC 2016
The branch master has been updated
via 647ac8d3d7143e3721d55e1f57730b6f26e72fc9 (commit)
via 0fe17491c34848db3cbb39c1841099161b4b449f (commit)
from cc069067075d77c7a61e44a253aec917d0b6a2f5 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 647ac8d3d7143e3721d55e1f57730b6f26e72fc9
Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
Date: Wed Aug 24 18:55:51 2016 +0100
Support broken PKCS#12 key generation.
OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 didn't convert non-ASCII
UTF8 PKCS#12 passwords to Unicode correctly.
To correctly decrypt older files, if MAC verification fails
with the supplied password attempt to use the broken format
which is compatible with earlier versions of OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
commit 0fe17491c34848db3cbb39c1841099161b4b449f
Author: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Date: Wed Aug 24 18:54:10 2016 +0100
Don't switch password formats using global state.
To avoid possible race conditions don't switch password format using
global state in crypto/pkcs12
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
apps/pkcs12.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++----
crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c | 18 +----------------
crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h | 10 ----------
crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c | 52 ++----------------------------------------------
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
diff --git a/apps/pkcs12.c b/apps/pkcs12.c
index f8806b9..93489d6 100644
--- a/apps/pkcs12.c
+++ b/apps/pkcs12.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
int noprompt = 0;
char *passinarg = NULL, *passoutarg = NULL, *passarg = NULL;
char *passin = NULL, *passout = NULL, *inrand = NULL, *macalg = NULL;
- char *cpass = NULL, *mpass = NULL;
+ char *cpass = NULL, *mpass = NULL, *badpass = NULL;
const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *prog;
int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0;
ENGINE *e = NULL;
@@ -539,9 +539,27 @@ int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (!twopass)
cpass = NULL;
} else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, mpass, -1)) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Mac verify error: invalid password?\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- goto end;
+ /*
+ * May be UTF8 from previous version of OpenSSL:
+ * convert to a UTF8 form which will translate
+ * to the same Unicode password.
+ */
+ unsigned char *utmp;
+ int utmplen;
+ utmp = OPENSSL_asc2uni(mpass, -1, NULL, &utmplen);
+ if (utmp == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ badpass = OPENSSL_uni2utf8(utmp, utmplen);
+ OPENSSL_free(utmp);
+ if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, badpass, -1)) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Mac verify error: invalid password?\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: using broken algorithm\n");
+ if (!twopass)
+ cpass = badpass;
+ }
}
}
@@ -559,6 +577,7 @@ int pkcs12_main(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_free(in);
BIO_free_all(out);
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(canames);
+ OPENSSL_free(badpass);
OPENSSL_free(passin);
OPENSSL_free(passout);
return (ret);
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
index d30aab3..feef9d1 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crpt.c
@@ -17,16 +17,6 @@ void PKCS12_PBE_add(void)
{
}
-#undef PKCS12_key_gen
-/*
- * See p12_multi.c:PKCS12_verify_mac() for details...
- */
-extern int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *salt, int slen,
- int id, int iter, int n,
- unsigned char *out,
- const EVP_MD *md_type);
-
int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
@@ -41,13 +31,7 @@ int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type);
- if (PKCS12_key_gen == NULL || en_de)
- /*
- * Default to UTF-8, but force it in encrypt case.
- */
- pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
- else
- pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
+ pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
if (cipher == NULL)
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h
index 9a27f2f..0b52f1e 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_lcl.h
@@ -41,13 +41,3 @@ struct pkcs12_bag_st {
ASN1_TYPE *other; /* Secret or other bag */
} value;
};
-
-#undef PKCS12_key_gen
-/*
- * See p12_multi.c:PKCS12_verify_mac() for details...
- */
-extern int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *salt, int slen,
- int id, int iter, int n,
- unsigned char *out,
- const EVP_MD *md_type);
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index 325da0c..d6b8919 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -66,32 +66,6 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen,
return 1;
}
-#undef PKCS12_key_gen
-/*
- * |PKCS12_key_gen| is used to convey information about old-style broken
- * password being used to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen in decrypt cases. Workflow
- * is if PKCS12_verify_mac notes that password encoded with compliant
- * PKCS12_key_gen_utf8 conversion subroutine isn't right, while encoded
- * with legacy non-compliant one is, then it sets |PKCS12_key_gen| to
- * legacy PKCS12_key_gen_asc conversion subroutine, which is then picked
- * by PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen. This applies to reading data. Written data
- * on the other hand is protected with standard-compliant encoding, i.e.
- * in backward-incompatible manner. Note that formally the approach is
- * not MT-safe. Rationale is that in order to access PKCS#12 files from
- * MT or even production application, you would be required to convert
- * data to correct interoperable format. In which case this variable
- * won't have to change. Conversion would have to be done with pkcs12
- * utility, which is not MT, and hence can tolerate it. In other words
- * goal is not to make this heuristic approach work in general case,
- * but in one specific one, apps/pkcs12.c.
- */
-int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *salt, int slen,
- int id, int iter, int n,
- unsigned char *out,
- const EVP_MD *md_type) = NULL;
-
-
/* Generate a MAC */
static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
@@ -111,8 +85,6 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
- pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
- if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes)) {
@@ -187,30 +159,10 @@ int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
return 0;
}
X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
- if (maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
+ if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
return 0;
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0) {
- if (pass == NULL)
- return 0;
- /*
- * In order to facilitate accessing old data retry with
- * old-style broken password ...
- */
- if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
- PKCS12_key_gen_asc)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
- || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
- return 0;
- else
- PKCS12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_asc;
- /*
- * ... and if suceeded, pass it on to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen.
- */
- }
return 1;
}
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