[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Viktor Dukhovni
viktor at openssl.org
Fri Feb 5 15:54:54 UTC 2016
The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
via a3baa171053547488475709c7197592c66e427cf (commit)
from 093d20a8cb74e64d627fcd03532ba6b3150f1d1f (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a3baa171053547488475709c7197592c66e427cf
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
Date: Tue Feb 2 04:35:27 2016 -0500
Fix missing ok=0 with locally blacklisted CAs
Also in X509_verify_cert() avoid using "i" not only as a loop
counter, but also as a trust outcome and as an error ordinal.
Finally, make sure that all "goto end" jumps return an error, with
"end" renamed to "err" accordingly.
[ The 1.1.0 version of X509_verify_cert() is major rewrite,
which addresses these issues in a more systemic way. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 0429767..4d34dba 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int num, j, retry;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+ int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ int err;
+
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
return -1;
@@ -216,7 +219,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
}
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
@@ -225,7 +229,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
&& (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
}
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
@@ -249,7 +254,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
/*
* If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
* again later.
@@ -266,7 +271,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (xtmp != NULL) {
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
}
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
@@ -314,7 +320,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
bad_chain = 1;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
} else {
/*
* We have a match: replace certificate with store
@@ -347,25 +353,26 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
if (ok == 0)
break;
x = xtmp;
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ok = 0;
- goto end;
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
}
num++;
}
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
- i = check_trust(ctx);
+ if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+ /* Callback already issued */
+ ok = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* If explicitly rejected error */
- if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
- goto end;
/*
* If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
* chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
@@ -373,14 +380,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* chain checking
*/
retry = 0;
- if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
+ if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
&& !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
&& !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
while (j-- > 1) {
xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
/* Check if we found an alternate chain */
if (ok > 0) {
/*
@@ -410,7 +417,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
* and set bad_chain == 1
*/
- if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
+ if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
@@ -431,26 +438,26 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
bad_chain = 1;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
}
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
/* Check name constraints */
ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
ok = check_id(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
@@ -462,16 +469,16 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
- i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
- ctx->param->flags);
- if (i != X509_V_OK) {
- ctx->error = i;
+ err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->flags);
+ if (err != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->error = err;
ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
}
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
@@ -480,25 +487,28 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
else
ok = internal_verify(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
#endif
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
if (0) {
- end:
+ err:
+ /* Ensure we return an error */
+ if (ok > 0)
+ ok = 0;
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
}
if (sktmp != NULL)
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