[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Viktor Dukhovni
viktor at openssl.org
Mon Feb 8 19:46:33 UTC 2016
The branch master has been updated
via c0a445a9f279d8c4a519b58e52a50112f2341070 (commit)
from 2d9a9d8aac9c365cd36c072b72cba2525e63c454 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit c0a445a9f279d8c4a519b58e52a50112f2341070
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
Date: Sun Feb 7 19:07:57 2016 -0500
Suppress DANE TLSA reflection when verification fails
As documented both SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
are expected to return a negative match depth and nothing else when
verification fails. However, this only happened when verification
failed during chain construction. Errors in verification of the
constructed chain did not have the intended effect on these functions.
This commit updates the functions to check for verify_result ==
X509_V_OK, and no longer erases any accumulated match information
when chain construction fails. Sophisticated developers can, with
care, use SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK) to "peek" at TLSA
info even when verification fail. They must of course first check
and save the real error, and restore the original error as quickly
as possible. Hiding by default seems to be the safer interface.
Introduced X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH code to signal failure to find
matching TLSA records. Previously reported via X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED.
This also changes the "-brief" output from s_client to include
verification results and TLSA match information.
Mentioned session resumption in code example in SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3).
Also mentioned that depths returned are relative to the verified chain
which is now available via SSL_get0_verified_chain(3).
Added a few more test-cases to danetest, that exercise the new
code.
Resolved thread safety issue in use of static buffer in
X509_verify_cert_error_string().
Fixed long-stating issue in apps/s_cb.c which always sets verify_error
to either X509_V_OK or "chain to long", code elsewhere (e.g.
s_time.c), seems to expect the actual error. [ The new chain
construction code is expected to correctly generate "chain
too long" errors, so at some point we need to drop the
work-arounds, once SSL_set_verify_depth() is also fixed to
propagate the depth to X509_STORE_CTX reliably. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
apps/s_apps.h | 1 +
apps/s_cb.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++-
apps/s_client.c | 16 +---
crypto/x509/x509_txt.c | 10 ++-
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 8 +-
doc/apps/s_client.pod | 9 +-
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod | 30 ++++++-
include/openssl/x509_vfy.h | 2 +
ssl/ssl_lib.c | 4 +-
test/certs/mkcert.sh | 2 +-
test/danetest.c | 8 ++
test/danetest.in | 178 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
12 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/apps/s_apps.h b/apps/s_apps.h
index e9b6f40..8e12c21 100644
--- a/apps/s_apps.h
+++ b/apps/s_apps.h
@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc);
void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc);
int args_excert(int option, SSL_EXCERT **pexc);
int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc);
+void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio);
void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s);
#ifdef HEADER_SSL_H
int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str,
diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c
index 096471a8..30c9147 100644
--- a/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (verify_depth >= depth) {
if (!verify_return_error)
ok = 1;
- verify_error = X509_V_OK;
+ verify_error = err;
} else {
ok = 0;
verify_error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
@@ -1086,6 +1086,80 @@ static void print_raw_cipherlist(SSL *s)
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
}
+/*
+ * Hex encoder for TLSA RRdata, not ':' delimited.
+ */
+static char *hexencode(const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
+ char *out;
+ char *cp;
+ size_t outlen = 2 * len + 1;
+ int ilen = (int) outlen;
+
+ if (outlen < len || ilen < 0 || outlen != (size_t)ilen) {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %" PRIu64 "-byte buffer too large to hexencode\n",
+ opt_getprog(), (uint64_t)len);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ cp = out = app_malloc(ilen, "TLSA hex data buffer");
+
+ while (ilen-- > 0) {
+ *cp++ = hex[(*data >> 4) & 0x0f];
+ *cp++ = hex[*data++ & 0x0f];
+ }
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return out;
+}
+
+void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio)
+{
+ int mdpth;
+ EVP_PKEY *mspki;
+ long verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(s);
+
+ if (verify_err == X509_V_OK) {
+ const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(s);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Verification: OK\n");
+ if (peername != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername);
+ } else {
+ const char *reason = X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err);
+
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Verification error: %s\n", reason);
+ }
+
+ if ((mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki)) >= 0) {
+ uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
+ const unsigned char *data = NULL;
+ size_t dlen = 0;
+ char *hexdata;
+
+ mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, &data, &dlen);
+
+ /*
+ * The TLSA data field can be quite long when it is a certificate,
+ * public key or even a SHA2-512 digest. Because the initial octets of
+ * ASN.1 certificates and public keys contain mostly boilerplate OIDs
+ * and lengths, we show the last 12 bytes of the data instead, as these
+ * are more likely to distinguish distinct TLSA records.
+ */
+#define TLSA_TAIL_SIZE 12
+ if (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE)
+ hexdata = hexencode(data + dlen - TLSA_TAIL_SIZE, TLSA_TAIL_SIZE);
+ else
+ hexdata = hexencode(data, dlen);
+ BIO_printf(bio, "DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s%s %s at depth %d\n",
+ usage, selector, mtype,
+ (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) ? "..." : "", hexdata,
+ (mspki != NULL) ? "signed the certificate" :
+ mdpth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate",
+ mdpth);
+ OPENSSL_free(hexdata);
+ }
+}
+
void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
@@ -1100,12 +1174,14 @@ void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s)
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
if (peer) {
int nid;
+
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Peer certificate: ");
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(peer),
0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid))
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+ print_verify_detail(s, bio_err);
} else
BIO_puts(bio_err, "No peer certificate\n");
X509_free(peer);
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index 39e3e48..8fe1612 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -2461,9 +2461,6 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
X509_NAME *xn;
int i;
- int mdpth;
- EVP_PKEY *mspki;
- const char *peername;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion;
#endif
@@ -2525,18 +2522,7 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)),
BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s)));
}
- if ((mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki)) >= 0) {
- uint8_t usage, selector, mtype;
- mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, NULL, NULL);
- BIO_printf(bio, "DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s at depth %d\n",
- usage, selector, mtype,
- (mspki != NULL) ? "TA public key verified certificate" :
- mdpth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate",
- mdpth);
- }
- if (SSL_get_verify_result(s) == X509_V_OK &&
- (peername = SSL_get0_peername(s)) != NULL)
- BIO_printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername);
+ print_verify_detail(s, bio);
BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_session_reused(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
index 0e48064..884c3af 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_txt.c
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@
const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
{
- static char buf[100];
-
switch ((int)n) {
case X509_V_OK:
return ("ok");
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
+ return ("unspecified certificate verification error");
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
return ("unable to get issuer certificate");
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
@@ -202,9 +202,11 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
return ("Email address mismatch");
case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
return ("IP address mismatch");
+ case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
+ return ("No matching DANE TLSA records");
default:
- BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "error number %ld", n);
- return (buf);
+ /* Printing an error number into a static buffer is not thread-safe */
+ return ("unknown certificate verification error");
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 113c116..f8b9b50 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -2631,7 +2631,7 @@ static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
continue;
- /* Clear PKIX-?? matches that failed to panned out to a full chain */
+ /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
X509_free(dane->mcert);
dane->mcert = NULL;
@@ -2711,7 +2711,7 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
@@ -3026,7 +3026,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
else if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
(!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH;
else if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
else if (ss)
@@ -3035,8 +3035,6 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
else
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
- if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
- dane_reset(dane);
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
}
diff --git a/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
index 1cd04dd..394c649 100644
--- a/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+++ b/doc/apps/s_client.pod
@@ -202,18 +202,17 @@ fields that specify the usage, selector, matching type and associated
data, with the last of these encoded in hexadecimal. Optional
whitespace is ignored in the associated data field. For example:
- $ openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.example.com:25 \
+ $ openssl s_client -brief -starttls smtp \
+ -connect smtp.example.com:25 \
-dane_tlsa_domain smtp.example.com \
-dane_tlsa_rrdata "2 1 1
B111DD8A1C2091A89BD4FD60C57F0716CCE50FEEFF8137CDBEE0326E 02CF362B" \
-dane_tlsa_rrdata "2 1 1
60B87575447DCBA2A36B7D11AC09FB24A9DB406FEE12D2CC90180517 616E8A18"
- CONNECTED(00000003)
...
- DANE TLSA 2 1 1 matched TA certificate at depth 1
+ Verification: OK
Verified peername: smtp.example.com
- ...
- Verify return code: 0 (ok)
+ DANE TLSA 2 1 1 ...ee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 matched TA certificate at depth 1
...
=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>,
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
index a9c24e1..36e9699 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ the matched DANE trust-anchor after successful connection completion.
The return value is negative if DANE verification failed (or was not enabled),
0 if an EE TLSA record directly matched the leaf certificate, or a positive
number indicating the depth at which a TA record matched an issuer certificate.
+The complete verified chain can be retrieved via L<SSL_get0_verified_chain(3)>.
+The return value is an index into this verified chain, rather than the list of
+certificates sent by the peer as returned by L<SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(3)>.
If the B<mcert> argument is not B<NULL> and a TLSA record matched a chain
certificate, a pointer to the matching certificate is returned via B<mcert>.
@@ -203,9 +206,27 @@ the lifetime of the SSL connection.
SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, cb);
}
+ /*
+ * Load any saved session for resumption, making sure that the previous
+ * session applied the same security and authentication requirements that
+ * would be expected of a fresh connection.
+ */
+
/* Perform SSL_connect() handshake and handle errors here */
- if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
+ if (SSL_session_resumed(ssl)) {
+ if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
+ /*
+ * Resumed session was originally verified, this connection is
+ * authenticated.
+ */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Resumed session was not originally verified, this connection is not
+ * authenticated.
+ */
+ }
+ } else if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(ssl);
EVP_PKEY *mspki = NULL;
@@ -260,12 +281,15 @@ L<SSL_set_hostflags(3)>,
L<SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(3)>,
L<SSL_set_verify(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)>,
-L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
+L<SSL_get0_verified_chain(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(3)>,
+L<SSL_get_verify_result(3)>,
L<SSL_connect(3)>,
L<SSL_get0_peername(3)>,
-L<EVP_get_digestbyname(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
L<X509_up_ref(3)>,
L<X509_free(3)>,
+L<EVP_get_digestbyname(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_up_ref(3)>,
L<EVP_PKEY_free(3)>
diff --git a/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h b/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
index 4e458d2..2ed1e4c 100644
--- a/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+++ b/include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
@@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
# define X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH 62
# define X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH 63
# define X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH 64
+/* DANE TLSA errors */
+# define X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH 65
/* The application is not happy */
# define X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION 50
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index aac2392..fc72d39 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki)
{
struct dane_st *dane = &s->dane;
- if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
return -1;
if (dane->mtlsa) {
if (mcert)
@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
{
struct dane_st *dane = &s->dane;
- if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
+ if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
return -1;
if (dane->mtlsa) {
if (usage)
diff --git a/test/certs/mkcert.sh b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
index d5870c7..7b892d2 100755
--- a/test/certs/mkcert.sh
+++ b/test/certs/mkcert.sh
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ key() {
args=(-algorithm "$alg")
case $alg in
rsa) args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:$bits );;
- ecdsa) args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:$bits")
+ ec) args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:$bits")
args=("${args[@]}" -pkeyopt ec_param_enc:named_curve);;
*) printf "Unsupported key algorithm: %s\n" "$alg" >&2; return 1;;
esac
diff --git a/test/danetest.c b/test/danetest.c
index cad751f..b9ccd40 100644
--- a/test/danetest.c
+++ b/test/danetest.c
@@ -413,7 +413,15 @@ static int test_tlsafile(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *basename,
ok = verify_chain(ssl, chain);
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
err = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
+ /*
+ * Peek under the hood, normally TLSA match data is hidden when
+ * verification fails, we can obtain any suppressed data by setting the
+ * verification result to X509_V_OK before looking.
+ */
+ SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK);
mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(ssl, NULL, NULL);
+ /* Not needed any more, but lead by example and put the error back. */
+ SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, err);
SSL_free(ssl);
if (ok < 0) {
diff --git a/test/danetest.in b/test/danetest.in
index a9a01c0..7db0400 100644
--- a/test/danetest.in
+++ b/test/danetest.in
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 5
-1 1 27 -1
+1 1 65 -1
3 0 1 588FD5F414E3327EAFE3169DC040AE161247D1296BF38304AB9CF464850A1366
subject=
issuer=
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 6
-1 1 27 -1
+1 1 65 -1
3 1 1 05C66146D7909EAE2379825F6D0F5284146B79598DA12E403DC29C33147CF33F
subject=
issuer=
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 7
-1 1 27 -1
+1 1 65 -1
3 0 2 42BEE929852C8063A0D619B53D0DD35703BBAD2FC25F2055F737C7A14DDFEA544491F8C00F50FA083BD0AD1B5C98529994FF811BBA5E5170CC6EE9F3ED5563E2
subject=
issuer=
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ yBKzbWcWMavIefhyAiEAsIia0rOBTuZL3dWn9qmN6kPLQ1BJRpy1CkQEy97uH9Y=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 8
-1 1 27 -1
+1 1 65 -1
3 1 2 D91A3E5DC34879CD77AD1E989F56FA78FACADF05EF8D445EDF5652BD58EE392C87C02F84C0119D62309041F2D5128A73399DF25D1F47BCD497357EAF1A1009A4
subject=
issuer=
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
# 33
# Missing intermediate CA
-1 1 20 -1
+1 1 20 0
1 0 1 BEDC04764CECAE80AEE454D332758F50847DCA424216466E4012E0DEAE1F2E5F
subject= /CN=example.com
issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB
# 35
# Wrong leaf digest
-1 3 27 -1
+1 3 65 -1
1 0 2 F756CCD61F3CA50D017653911701CA0052AF0B29E273DD263DD23643D86D4369D03686BD1369EF54BB2DC2DAE3CE4F05AF39D54648F94D54AA86B259AEAD9924
subject= /CN=example.com
issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
# 36
# Wrong intermediate digest
-1 2 27 -1
+1 2 65 -1
0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBE
subject= /CN=example.com
issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
# 37
# Wrong root digest
-1 2 27 -1
+1 2 65 -1
0 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3D
subject= /CN=example.com
issuer= /CN=Issuer CA
@@ -1370,7 +1370,7 @@ GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
## -- Mixed usage cases
# 38
-# DANE-EE beats DANE-TA
+# DANE-EE(3) beats DANE-TA(2)
1 3 0 0
3 1 2 CB861AF6DDED185EE04472A9092052CCC735120C34785E72C996C94B122EBA6F329BE630B1B4C6E2756E7A75392C21E253C6AEACC31FD45FF4595DED375FAF62
2 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E
@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 39
-# DANE-TA depth 1 beats DANE-TA depth 2
+# DANE-TA(2) depth 1 beats DANE-TA(2) depth 2
1 3 0 1
2 1 2 1F484106F765B6F1AC483CC509CDAD36486A83D1BA115F562516F407C1109303658408B455824DA0785A252B205DBEECB1AFB5DB869E8AAC242091B63F258F05
2 1 2 5F414D4D7BFDF22E39952D9F46C51370FDD050F10C55B4CDB42E40FA98611FDE23EEE9B23315EE1ECDB198C7419E9A2D6742860E4806AF45164507799C3B452E
@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 40
-# DANE-TA depth 2 beats PKIX-TA depth 1
+# DANE-TA(2) depth 2 beats PKIX-TA(0) depth 1
1 3 0 2
2 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C
0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBD
@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 41
-# DANE-TA depth 2 beats PKIX-EE depth 0
+# DANE-TA(2) depth 2 beats PKIX-EE depth 0
1 3 0 2
2 0 1 FE7C8E01110627A782765E468D8CB4D2CC7907EAC4BA5974CD92B540ED2AAC3C
0 0 1 0DAA76425A1FC398C55A643D5A2485AE4CC2B64B9515A75054722B2E83C31BBD
@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@ vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 42
-# DANE-TA Full(0) root "from DNS":
+# DANE-TA(2) Full(0) root "from DNS":
1 2 0 2
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
subject= /CN=example.com
@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 43
-# DANE-TA Full(0) intermediate "from DNS":
+# DANE-TA(2) Full(0) intermediate "from DNS":
1 1 0 1
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
subject= /CN=example.com
@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 44
-# DANE-TA(3) SPKI(1) Full(0) intermediate "from DNS":
+# DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) intermediate "from DNS":
1 1 0 0
2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200047D4BAE18B49F5DC69D0A3C85C66A3E2119DE92CFAD081FAD55C12D510EC97B6C00E13695A8D9713548FE60DF15573390433E2A1BD92DB4B7AA016EC6185DC5AF
subject= /CN=example.com
@@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@ GoTXBNutM50ph9QYUtxZNvISlHBjkRGB
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# 45
-# DANE-TA(3) SPKI(1) Full(0) root "from DNS":
+# DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0) root "from DNS":
1 2 0 1
2 1 0 3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03010703420004D1DA578FD18FB86456B0D91B5656BDD68D4DDBD250E337571127C75E0560F41D0AF91BFAF8805F80C28C026A14D4FE8C30A9673B9EC0C05A84AA810D1341B76C
subject= /CN=example.com
@@ -1673,3 +1673,149 @@ AgNJADBGAiEAgx3NiC2oeF1Q5BAgiYwCSIed3fctcB0dwd5r4IFVtD4CIQC4Sy+1
GcTNPLx5FgPUSI93B1l9t5gNnBc+f90OzXyjCA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+# 46
+# Mismatched name "example.org", should still succeed given a
+# DANE-EE(3) match.
+1 3 0 0
+3 1 1 ee1477190203f5d8b4767f4451b89e7367cdec7f6965a4988227983562ac8270
+subject= CN = example.org
+issuer= CN = CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:47 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:47 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:13 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:13 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD
+Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC
+CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ
+ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb
++/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw
+RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo
+7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = Root CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:38:48 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:38:48 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI
+Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl
+sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1
+42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER
+fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 47
+# Mismatched name "example.org", should fail despite a DANE-TA(2)
+# match for the intermediate CA.
+1 3 62 1
+2 1 1 946af0956378efaba7ee1bbedc17af110ea8de19c079a98e77398724a3708a1f
+subject= CN = example.org
+issuer= CN = CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:47 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:47 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:13 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:13 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD
+Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC
+CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ
+ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb
++/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw
+RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo
+7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = Root CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:38:48 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:38:48 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI
+Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl
+sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1
+42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER
+fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+# 48
+# Mismatched name "example.org", should fail despite a DANE-TA(2)
+# match for the root CA.
+1 3 62 2
+2 1 1 34474f2fbc39da44dfbd11215bdafadf9507406c04de1f65dbd2a1bc4f2165cc
+subject= CN = example.org
+issuer= CN = CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:47 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:47 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBkDCCATWgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAOMQwwCgYDVQQDDANDQTIwIBcN
+MTYwMjA2MjIzOTQ3WhgPMjExNjAyMDcyMjM5NDdaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMMC2V4YW1w
+bGUub3JnMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE/YCEn0pxClPTvpjioxU4
+ajopRa4j/6XTqxy9zqn1AcMCiVWp6j22B6RpLmKEHoRHQxFzebd2juTXIDq81CID
+z6N6MHgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOrSA+2YKXa5KR6k0687CZuhai5OMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
+FLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYB
+BQUHAwEwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIh
+AKSsLwlidPiSrgda6XWihov4D4KHu6ZX3ZAAZ2uiBAefAiEArCq5WiO3Zeunl0Ct
+PyDiaL1QKbJ7lnqPQCS1o8xn+RI=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:39:13 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:39:13 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBYjCCAQigAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM5MTNaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzkxM1owDjEMMAoGA1UEAwwD
+Q0EyMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEYr6zgBxpsxA31IFiGyb6uaGC
+CQdNMyJfDgqCihsU1eOEuauzXO7tydCbjfRmhqQK1EGd254IjcGY+37tZEbvPKNQ
+ME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLTY4vqgjcQ01aCcB8AYVbUhEU7VMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFBRb
++/qrntsksembakoZTwTZk8AXMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAw
+RQIgX2fmMykyiuryf1AeKyc1j8HgmM8u/nyQfJnTCwvYUcECIQC6JHd3ybV9eJQo
+7sfr/jV+rRlZY2iaRv160BWYd82L7g==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+subject= CN = Root CA2
+issuer= CN = Root CA2
+notBefore=Feb 6 22:38:48 2016 GMT
+notAfter=Feb 7 22:38:48 2116 GMT
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjATMREwDwYDVQQDDAhSb290IENB
+MjAgFw0xNjAyMDYyMjM4NDhaGA8yMTE2MDIwNzIyMzg0OFowEzERMA8GA1UEAwwI
+Um9vdCBDQTIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATlTxAPKteg+L1LmxMl
+sbAFMxj6/322nR5RRGeF07KZRBFPaFZLgwZ1DuNrwM3wxxNdUyoZ6iAyDmwNf3K1
+42/Uo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwHwYDVR0jBBgw
+FoAUFFv7+que2ySx6ZtqShlPBNmTwBcwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQD
+AgNJADBGAiEAumhPWZ37swl10awM/amX+jv0UlUyJBf8RGA6QMG5bwICIQDbinER
+fEevg+GOsr1P6nNMCAsQd9NwsvTQ+jm+TBArWQ==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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