[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Viktor Dukhovni
viktor at openssl.org
Wed Jan 20 23:59:54 UTC 2016
The branch master has been updated
via 6e32825631bea414c3fc70d16bbb413dac221722 (commit)
from bd5192b1013b68373c47bdca8d68229906171695 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 6e32825631bea414c3fc70d16bbb413dac221722
Author: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users at dukhovni.org>
Date: Sun Jan 17 16:50:52 2016 -0500
Check Suite-B constraints with EE DANE records
When DANE-EE(3) matches or either of DANE-EE/PKIX-EE fails, we don't
build a chain at all, but rather succeed or fail with just the leaf
certificate. In either case also check for Suite-B violations.
As unlikely as it may seem that anyone would enable both DANE and
Suite-B, we should do what the application asks.
Took the opportunity to eliminate the "cb" variables in x509_vfy.c,
just call ctx->verify_cb(ok, ctx)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 19 +++++++++++++----
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 2521e77..2641d2e 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -398,11 +398,12 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags)
{
int rv, i, sign_nid;
- EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
- unsigned long tflags;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ unsigned long tflags = flags;
+
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
- tflags = flags;
+
/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
@@ -410,6 +411,17 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
} else
i = 0;
+ pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+ /*
+ * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
+ * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
+ * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
+ * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
+ */
+ if (chain == NULL)
+ return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+
if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
/* Correct error depth */
@@ -417,7 +429,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
goto end;
}
- pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
/* Check EE key only */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index ec9c321..c9dd6fa 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -193,7 +193,6 @@ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
int err;
int ok;
@@ -214,7 +213,7 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (err != X509_V_OK) {
ctx->error = err;
ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
- if ((ok = cb(0, ctx)) == 0)
+ if ((ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) == 0)
return ok;
}
@@ -373,11 +372,9 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
- int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
int proxy_path_length = 0;
int purpose;
int allow_proxy_certs;
- cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
@@ -415,7 +412,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@@ -423,7 +420,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@@ -457,7 +454,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ret == 0) {
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@@ -469,7 +466,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@@ -481,7 +478,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@@ -498,7 +495,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@@ -595,7 +592,6 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
int i, ok = 0;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509 *mx;
- int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
int trust;
@@ -676,7 +672,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
@@ -1568,9 +1564,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int ok = 0, n;
X509 *xs, *xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
-
- cb = ctx->verify_cb;
n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
ctx->error_depth = n;
@@ -1597,7 +1590,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (n <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
- ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto end;
} else {
n--;
@@ -1622,13 +1615,13 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
- ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
} else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
- ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@@ -1642,7 +1635,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
ctx->current_issuer = xi;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
- ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
@@ -2584,10 +2577,21 @@ static void dane_reset(struct dane_st *dane)
dane->pdpth = -1;
}
+static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+{
+ int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
+
+ if (err == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ ctx->current_cert = cert;
+ ctx->error_depth = 0;
+ ctx->error = err;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
- int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int matched;
int done;
@@ -2601,9 +2605,11 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
if (matched > 0) {
+ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
+ return 0;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
- return cb(1, ctx);
+ return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
}
if (matched < 0) {
@@ -2615,10 +2621,12 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (done) {
/* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
+ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
+ return 0;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
- return cb(0, ctx);
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
/*
@@ -2631,7 +2639,6 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
- int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb;
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
@@ -2944,6 +2951,6 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
dane_reset(dane);
- return cb(0, ctx);
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
}
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