[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
       via  d168705e11526a4b487640c7cac5b53ee3646cbc (commit)
      from  ac29a0fed67ea1aeba71bad91f48593b644db4fd (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit d168705e11526a4b487640c7cac5b53ee3646cbc
Author: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida at aalto.fi>
Date:   Mon May 23 12:45:25 2016 +0300

    Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
    
    Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
    order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
    implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
    certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
    attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
    
    CVE-2016-2178
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index 9a3772e..01e3d74 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
             goto err;
     while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
-    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-    }
 
     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
@@ -279,9 +276,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
         }
 
         K = &kq;
+
+        BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
     } else {
         K = &k;
     }
+
     DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
                    dsa->method_mont_p);
     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))