[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Rich Salz
rsalz at openssl.org
Wed Jun 29 14:01:24 UTC 2016
The branch master has been updated
via 6b4a77f56e14c002ce3cf960f622682be3b8424b (commit)
via 0485d5406a3b76dd02e73c1c7dcabebe64f9f8a2 (commit)
via 02e112a88579ff2592f34015f73dc85f4ed76ad5 (commit)
via 0517ffc47c79136ba09fb34400e9e26c539615d1 (commit)
via 9d22666eb89af7f4ca5c3d52490b7da89276cf90 (commit)
from cbddeebe49ae024e8debc9ae4f90f22ee15a69e2 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 6b4a77f56e14c002ce3cf960f622682be3b8424b
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 28 22:51:51 2016 +0200
Whitespace cleanup in apps
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
commit 0485d5406a3b76dd02e73c1c7dcabebe64f9f8a2
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 28 22:51:27 2016 +0200
Whitespace cleanup in ssl folder
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
commit 02e112a88579ff2592f34015f73dc85f4ed76ad5
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 28 22:51:01 2016 +0200
Whitespace cleanup in crypto
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
commit 0517ffc47c79136ba09fb34400e9e26c539615d1
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 28 22:50:03 2016 +0200
Whitespace cleanup in docs
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
commit 9d22666eb89af7f4ca5c3d52490b7da89276cf90
Author: FdaSilvaYY <fdasilvayy at gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 28 22:39:55 2016 +0200
Spelling
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
apps/apps.c | 4 ++--
apps/req.c | 2 +-
apps/ts.c | 4 ++--
crypto/aes/aes_core.c | 2 +-
crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c | 10 +++++-----
crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c | 2 +-
crypto/bn/bn_div.c | 2 +-
crypto/bn/bn_exp.c | 2 +-
crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c | 4 ++--
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c | 2 +-
crypto/conf/conf_mod.c | 4 ++--
crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 1 -
crypto/evp/bio_ok.c | 2 +-
crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c | 2 +-
crypto/modes/ocb128.c | 2 +-
crypto/objects/obj_dat.h | 4 ++--
crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 2 +-
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c | 2 +-
crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c | 2 +-
crypto/x509/x509_obj.c | 2 +-
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 2 +-
crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c | 2 +-
doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod | 2 +-
doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod | 2 +-
doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod | 3 ++-
doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod | 2 +-
doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod | 2 +-
doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod | 6 +++---
doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod | 2 +-
doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod | 3 ++-
doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod | 3 ++-
doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod | 2 +-
doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod | 2 +-
doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod | 4 ++--
doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod | 4 ++--
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod | 2 +-
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod | 2 +-
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod | 2 +-
include/openssl/bn.h | 2 +-
include/openssl/buffer.h | 2 +-
include/openssl/err.h | 2 +-
include/openssl/pkcs12.h | 4 ++--
include/openssl/pkcs7.h | 2 +-
include/openssl/srp.h | 2 +-
include/openssl/x509v3.h | 2 +-
ssl/d1_lib.c | 2 +-
ssl/d1_msg.c | 2 +-
ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c | 4 ++--
ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c | 2 +-
ssl/record/record.h | 2 +-
ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c | 2 +-
ssl/ssl_mcnf.c | 4 ++--
ssl/statem/statem_lib.c | 2 +-
ssl/t1_lib.c | 2 +-
test/bioprinttest.c | 4 ++--
test/ecdhtest_cavs.h | 4 ++--
56 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index ec1cfe9..3230425 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ void* app_malloc(int sz, const char *what)
}
/*
- * Initialize or extend, if *certs != NULL, a certificate stack.
+ * Initialize or extend, if *certs != NULL, a certificate stack.
*/
int load_certs(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs, int format,
const char *pass, const char *desc)
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ int load_certs(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs, int format,
}
/*
- * Initialize or extend, if *crls != NULL, a certificate stack.
+ * Initialize or extend, if *crls != NULL, a certificate stack.
*/
int load_crls(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls, int format,
const char *pass, const char *desc)
diff --git a/apps/req.c b/apps/req.c
index 3e6cb07..f1ee951 100644
--- a/apps/req.c
+++ b/apps/req.c
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ int req_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (!nmflag_set)
nmflag = XN_FLAG_ONELINE;
- /* TODO: simplify this as pkey is still always NULL here */
+ /* TODO: simplify this as pkey is still always NULL here */
private = newreq && (pkey == NULL) ? 1 : 0;
if (!app_passwd(passargin, passargout, &passin, &passout)) {
diff --git a/apps/ts.c b/apps/ts.c
index 80f14bd..1ae57d2 100644
--- a/apps/ts.c
+++ b/apps/ts.c
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int ts_main(int argc, char **argv)
if ((in == NULL) || !EXACTLY_ONE(queryfile, data, digest))
goto opthelp;
ret = !verify_command(data, digest, queryfile, in, token_in,
- CApath, CAfile, untrusted,
+ CApath, CAfile, untrusted,
vpmtouched ? vpm : NULL);
}
@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ static X509_STORE *create_cert_store(char *CApath, char *CAfile, X509_VERIFY_PAR
}
}
- if (vpm != NULL)
+ if (vpm != NULL)
X509_STORE_set1_param(cert_ctx, vpm);
return cert_ctx;
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_core.c b/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
index ef0fc51..69be3d8 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_core.c
@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
ROTATE(tp9,24) ^ ROTATE(tpb,8);
#else
- rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+ rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
(tp9 >> 8) ^ (tp9 << 24) ^
(tpb >> 24) ^ (tpb << 8);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c b/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
index dd7e905..95b49bb 100644
--- a/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
+++ b/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ int AES_set_decrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
#else
- rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+ rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
#endif
@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
- /* now do the linear transform using words */
+ /* now do the linear transform using words */
{
int i;
u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
#else
- t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+ t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
#endif
@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
- /* now do the linear transform using words */
+ /* now do the linear transform using words */
{
int i;
u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
#else
- t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+ t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
index 1e17895..4db3df9 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
goto end;
if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
const unsigned char *sp = p;
-
+
ep = p + len;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
goto end;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index eef1b87..0bec12b 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
/*-
- * BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
+ * BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
* zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds.
* Thus:
* dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index d334cf7..e2f0d5e 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
bn_check_top(m);
/*-
- * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
+ * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
* a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery
* exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
* reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
index 1039e76..e1aac13 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
* i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
*
- * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+ * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
* i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
*
- * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+ * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
index 1c41938..8e7f4f5 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, prime_t *mods)
*/
if (is_single_word) {
BN_ULONG size_limit;
-
+
if (bits == BN_BITS2) {
/*
* Shifting by this much has undefined behaviour so we do it a
diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
index d01d20e..31f838e 100644
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static CONF_MODULE *module_add(DSO *dso, const char *name,
static CONF_MODULE *module_find(const char *name);
static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, const char *name, const char *value,
const CONF *cnf);
-static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name,
+static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name,
const char *value);
/* Main function: load modules from a CONF structure */
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static int module_run(const CONF *cnf, const char *name, const char *value,
}
/* Load a module from a DSO */
-static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf,
+static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf,
const char *name, const char *value)
{
DSO *dso = NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index fa74ee7..c592c06 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -284,7 +284,6 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
} else
BN_zero(group->cofactor);
-
/*
* Some groups have an order with
* factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
index 33066e8..7974b96 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static long ok_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp)
{
long ret = 1;
BIO *next;
-
+
next = BIO_next(b);
if (next == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
index be1deaa..0e1ad74 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return -1;
-
+
len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
diff --git a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
index 54a96b8..c3bd13b 100644
--- a/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
+++ b/crypto/modes/ocb128.c
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv,
/*
* Spec says IV is 120 bits or fewer - it allows non byte aligned lengths.
- * We don't support this at this stage
+ * We don't support this at this stage
*/
if ((len > 15) || (len < 1) || (taglen > 16) || (taglen < 1)) {
return -1;
diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
index df03694..be75657 100644
--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
@@ -2314,11 +2314,11 @@ static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID]={
{"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet",
"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet",
NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet,7,&(lvalues[5609]),0},
-
+
{"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet",
"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet",
NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet,7,&(lvalues[5616]),0},
-
+
{"id-GostR3410-94-a","id-GostR3410-94-a",NID_id_GostR3410_94_a,7,
&(lvalues[5623]),0},
{"id-GostR3410-94-aBis","id-GostR3410-94-aBis",
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
index 2402241..bc6bd30 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
BIO_free_all(btmp);
BIO_free_all(etmp);
BIO_free_all(bio);
- return NULL;
+ return NULL;
}
static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index bac7c26..efb16a0 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
/*
* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
* leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
- * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
+ * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
* pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
*
* TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index 21da8aa..0916636 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static char *ts_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
-
+
for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c b/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
index ccec20d..76fb047 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
/*
* Limit to ensure we don't overflow: much greater than
- * anything enountered in practice.
+ * anything encountered in practice.
*/
#define NAME_ONELINE_MAX (1024 * 1024)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 1592084..b400ce4 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -2538,7 +2538,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
/*
* If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
- * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
+ * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
* Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
*/
if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
index be8ca5d..ef1d775 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int X509v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
int i, j, k;
/*
- * Empty extension is cannonical.
+ * Empty extension is canonical.
*/
if (addr == NULL)
return 1;
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod
index 5eb564d..ff23269 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BIO_s_file.pod
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ BIO_seek() returns the same value as the underlying fseek() function:
BIO_tell() returns the current file position.
-BIO_read_filename(), BIO_write_filename(), BIO_append_filename() and
+BIO_read_filename(), BIO_write_filename(), BIO_append_filename() and
BIO_rw_filename() return 1 for success or 0 for failure.
=head1 BUGS
diff --git a/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod b/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod
index 23832b3..d0536cd 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/BN_mod_mul_reciprocal.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
=head1 NAME
-BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, BN_div_recp, BN_RECP_CTX_new,
+BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, BN_div_recp, BN_RECP_CTX_new,
BN_RECP_CTX_free, BN_RECP_CTX_set - modular multiplication using
reciprocal
diff --git a/doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod b/doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod
index 20b9cc7..c9c3628 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/ECPKParameters_print.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
=head1 NAME
-ECPKParameters_print, ECPKParameters_print_fp - Functions for decoding and encoding ASN1 representations of elliptic curve entities
+ECPKParameters_print, ECPKParameters_print_fp - Functions for decoding and
+encoding ASN1 representations of elliptic curve entities
=head1 SYNOPSIS
diff --git a/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod b/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod
index f985104..f2e71e3 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/ERR_remove_state.pod
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Deprecated:
=head1 DESCRIPTION
The functions described here were used to free the error queue
-associated with the current or specificed thread.
+associated with the current or specified thread.
They are now deprecated and do nothing, as the OpenSSL libraries now
normally do all thread initialisation and deinitialisation
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod
index f9b1f6e..6e18ed5 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_CIPHER_meth_new.pod
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and
EVP_DecryptFinal_ex().
EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup() sets the function for B<cipher> to do
-extra cleanup before the method's privata data structure is cleaned
+extra cleanup before the method's private data structure is cleaned
out and freed.
Note that the cleanup function is passed a B<EVP_CIPHER_CTX *>, the
private data structure is then available with
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index 8732f36..093618d 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode, EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param,
-EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding, EVP_enc_null, EVP_des_cbc, EVP_des_ecb,
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding, EVP_enc_null, EVP_des_cbc, EVP_des_ecb,
EVP_des_cfb, EVP_des_ofb, EVP_des_ede_cbc, EVP_des_ede, EVP_des_ede_ofb,
EVP_des_ede_cfb, EVP_des_ede3_cbc, EVP_des_ede3, EVP_des_ede3_ofb,
EVP_des_ede3_cfb, EVP_desx_cbc, EVP_rc4, EVP_rc4_40, EVP_idea_cbc,
@@ -327,11 +327,11 @@ AES with a 256-bit key in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
-=item EVP_des_ede_cbc(), EVP_des_ede(), EVP_des_ede_ofb(), EVP_des_ede_cfb()
+=item EVP_des_ede_cbc(), EVP_des_ede(), EVP_des_ede_ofb(), EVP_des_ede_cfb()
Two key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
-=item EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), EVP_des_ede3(), EVP_des_ede3_ofb(), EVP_des_ede3_cfb()
+=item EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), EVP_des_ede3(), EVP_des_ede3_ofb(), EVP_des_ede3_cfb()
Three key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod
index 6aab174..c15a31e 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_MD_meth_new.pod
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ This copy function is called by EVP_MD_CTX_copy() and
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex().
EVP_MD_meth_set_cleanup() sets the function for B<md> to do extra
-cleanup before the method's privata data structure is cleaned out and
+cleanup before the method's private data structure is cleaned out and
freed.
Note that the cleanup function is passed a B<EVP_MD_CTX *>, the
private data structure is then available with EVP_MD_CTX_md_data().
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
index c9b7fdd..a30450b 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ to PKCS#1 when signing and this structure is expected (and stripped off) when
verifying. If this control is not used with RSA and PKCS#1 padding then the
supplied data is used directly and not encapsulated. In the case of X9.31
padding for RSA the algorithm identifier byte is added or checked and removed
-if this control is called. If it is not called then the first byte of the plaintext buffer is expected to be the algorithm identifier byte.
+if this control is called. If it is not called then the first byte of the plaintext
+buffer is expected to be the algorithm identifier byte.
The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen() macro sets the RSA PSS salt length to
B<len> as its name implies it is only supported for PSS padding. Two special
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod
index 7c9e582..270d635 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_cmp.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
=head1 NAME
-EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters, EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters, EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters, EVP_PKEY_cmp - public key parameter and comparison functions
+EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters, EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters, EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters,
+EVP_PKEY_cmp - public key parameter and comparison functions
=head1 SYNOPSIS
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod
index e062e28..7b8629d 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ executed on SSE2 capable CPU, but under control of OS that does not
enable XMM registers. Historically address of the capability vector copy
was exposed to application through OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(), but not
anymore. Now the only way to affect the capability detection is to set
-OPENSSL_ia32cap envrionment variable prior target application start. To
+OPENSSL_ia32cap environment variable prior target application start. To
give a specific example, on Intel P4 processor 'env
OPENSSL_ia32cap=0x16980010 apps/openssl', or better yet 'env
OPENSSL_ia32cap=~0x1000000 apps/openssl' would achieve the desired
diff --git a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod
index 5d254f7..9760135 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_malloc.pod
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ then the old sensitive data will not be overwritten; rather, a block of
OPENSSL_strdup(), OPENSSL_strndup() and OPENSSL_memdup() are like the
equivalent C functions, except that memory is allocated by calling the
-OPENSSL_malloc() and should be releaed by calling OPENSSL_free().
+OPENSSL_malloc() and should be released by calling OPENSSL_free().
OPENSSL_strlcpy(),
OPENSSL_strlcat() and OPENSSL_strnlen() are equivalents of the common C
diff --git a/doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod b/doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod
index 3c6d2fd..167693d 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/PEM_read.pod
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ for examples.
PEM_read() reads from the file B<fp>, while PEM_read_bio() reads
from the BIO B<bp>.
Both skip any non-PEM data that precedes the start of the next PEM object.
-When an object is successfuly retrieved, the type name from the "----BEGIN
+When an object is successfully retrieved, the type name from the "----BEGIN
<type>-----" is returned via the B<name> argument, any encapsulation headers
are returned in B<header> and the base64-decoded content and its length are
returned via B<data> and B<len> respectively.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ PEM_read() or PEM_read_bio() is encrypted and to retrieve the associated cipher
and IV.
The caller passes a pointer to structure of type B<EVP_CIPHER_INFO> via the
B<cinfo> argument and the B<header> returned via PEM_read() or PEM_read_bio().
-If the call is succesful 1 is retured and the cipher and IV are stored at the
+If the call is successful 1 is returned and the cipher and IV are stored at the
address pointed to by B<cinfo>.
When the header is malformed, or not supported or when the cipher is unknown
or some internal error happens 0 is returned.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod b/doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod
index f6f9be6..89dc875 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/X509V3_get_d2i.pod
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ exist.
B<X509V3_ADD_APPEND> appends a new extension, ignoring whether the extension
already exists.
-B<X509V3_ADD_REPLACE> replaces an extension if it exists otherwise apppends
+B<X509V3_ADD_REPLACE> replaces an extension if it exists otherwise appends
a new extension.
B<X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING> replaces an existing extension if it exists
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ B<X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING> appends a new extension only if the extension does
not already exist. An error B<is not> returned if the extension does already
exist.
-B<X509V3_ADD_DELETE> extension B<nid> is deleted: no new extenion is added.
+B<X509V3_ADD_DELETE> extension B<nid> is deleted: no new extension is added.
If B<X509V3_ADD_SILENT> is ored with B<flags>: any error returned will not
be added to the error queue.
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
index cef109f..7923bf4 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_dane_enable.pod
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ them among the TLSA records used to authenticate peer connections.
In addition, some TLSA records with supported usages may be "unusable" as a
result of invalid or unsupported parameters.
-When a peer has TLSA records, but none are "usable", an opportunistic
+When a peer has TLSA records, but none are "usable", an opportunistic
application must avoid cleartext, but cannot authenticate the peer,
and so should generally proceed with an unauthenticated connection.
Opportunistic applications need to note the return value of each
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod
index e47083c..c199b31 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_new.pod
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ All version-specific methods were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_free(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
-L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)>, L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
+L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)>, L<ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
index b71450a..7ed93ab 100644
--- a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+++ b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ partly left out.)
/* Error. */
}
if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
- /* Error. */
+ /* Error. */
}
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
/* Error. */
diff --git a/include/openssl/bn.h b/include/openssl/bn.h
index 82552b6..c4fca99 100644
--- a/include/openssl/bn.h
+++ b/include/openssl/bn.h
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int BN_get_flags(const BIGNUM *b, int n);
*/
void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags);
-/* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier, */
+/* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier */
int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void);
diff --git a/include/openssl/buffer.h b/include/openssl/buffer.h
index 88409fd..e2e1e5d 100644
--- a/include/openssl/buffer.h
+++ b/include/openssl/buffer.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ extern "C" {
# define BUF_strlcpy(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcpy(dst, src, size)
# define BUF_strlcat(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcat(dst, src, size)
# define BUF_strnlen(str, maxlen) OPENSSL_strnlen(str, maxlen)
-
+
struct buf_mem_st {
size_t length; /* current number of bytes */
char *data;
diff --git a/include/openssl/err.h b/include/openssl/err.h
index b019d0e..9dcd27e 100644
--- a/include/openssl/err.h
+++ b/include/openssl/err.h
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ typedef struct err_state_st {
# define ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR (4|ERR_R_FATAL)
# define ERR_R_DISABLED (5|ERR_R_FATAL)
# define ERR_R_INIT_FAIL (6|ERR_R_FATAL)
-# define ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT (7)
+# define ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT (7)
/*
* 99 is the maximum possible ERR_R_... code, higher values are reserved for
diff --git a/include/openssl/pkcs12.h b/include/openssl/pkcs12.h
index 37d02ae..4c49fb2 100644
--- a/include/openssl/pkcs12.h
+++ b/include/openssl/pkcs12.h
@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(PKCS12_AUTHSAFES)
void PKCS12_PBE_add(void);
int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
-PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert,
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert,
int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);
PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_cert(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, X509 *cert);
diff --git a/include/openssl/pkcs7.h b/include/openssl/pkcs7.h
index 6de664f..6148cec 100644
--- a/include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/openssl/pkcs7.h
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
-/* Under Win32 thes are defined in wincrypt.h */
+/* Under Win32 these are defined in wincrypt.h */
# undef PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL
# undef PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
# endif
diff --git a/include/openssl/srp.h b/include/openssl/srp.h
index 80bcb0d..f2b6ec7 100644
--- a/include/openssl/srp.h
+++ b/include/openssl/srp.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ typedef struct SRP_VBASE_st {
} SRP_VBASE;
/*
- * Internal structure storing N and g pair
+ * Internal structure storing N and g pair
*/
typedef struct SRP_gN_st {
char *id;
diff --git a/include/openssl/x509v3.h b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
index 29b7194..7b0403b 100644
--- a/include/openssl/x509v3.h
+++ b/include/openssl/x509v3.h
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(POLICY_CONSTRAINTS)
GENERAL_NAME *a2i_GENERAL_NAME(GENERAL_NAME *out,
const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type,
+ X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type,
const char *value, int is_nc);
# ifdef HEADER_CONF_H
diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c
index ea1e3d5..a20f30a 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) {
return 0;
}
-
+
if (!ssl3_new(s))
return (0);
if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) {
diff --git a/ssl/d1_msg.c b/ssl/d1_msg.c
index 0757203..ae7aff6 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_msg.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_msg.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
#define USE_SOCKETS
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
+
int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
{
int i;
diff --git a/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c b/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
index 6699d2a..cca5721 100644
--- a/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
+++ b/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
-
+
if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL)
return (0);
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
pqueue *buffered_app_data;
d = rl->d;
-
+
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
diff --git a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
index fa20b35..9461284 100644
--- a/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
+++ b/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
-
+
if (rl->d)
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
}
diff --git a/ssl/record/record.h b/ssl/record/record.h
index cda4eff..9177fb4 100644
--- a/ssl/record/record.h
+++ b/ssl/record/record.h
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ typedef struct record_layer_st {
unsigned char read_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
unsigned char write_sequence[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
-
+
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
} RECORD_LAYER;
diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c
index 72faafe..940b73e 100644
--- a/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c
+++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_buffer.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p;
size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
SSL3_BUFFER *b;
-
+
b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c b/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c
index b92b210..ac9cc95 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_mcnf.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static int ssl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *cmd_lists;
ssl_conf_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md);
cmd_lists = NCONF_get_section(cnf, ssl_conf_section);
- if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmd_lists) <= 0){
+ if (sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmd_lists) <= 0) {
if (cmd_lists == NULL)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_MODULE_INIT, SSL_R_SSL_SECTION_NOT_FOUND);
else
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int ssl_do_config(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
if (rv <= 0) {
if (rv == -2)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_COMMAND);
- else
+ else
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_CONFIG, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
ERR_add_error_data(6, "section=", name, ", cmd=", cmd->cmd,
", arg=", cmd->arg);
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
index 85523da..aab4e76 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
* or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
* so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
*
- * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
+ * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
* TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
* only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
*
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 3e27d65..e938d87 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -3604,7 +3604,7 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
}
/*
- * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
+ * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
*/
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
diff --git a/test/bioprinttest.c b/test/bioprinttest.c
index c69a79c..b2d2622 100644
--- a/test/bioprinttest.c
+++ b/test/bioprinttest.c
@@ -197,12 +197,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
dofptest(test++, 66.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
dofptest(test++, 666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
dofptest(test++, 6666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
- dofptest(test++, 66666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
+ dofptest(test++, 66666.0 + frac, width, prec, &fail);
}
/* Test excessively big number. Should fail */
if (BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%f\n", 2 * (double)ULONG_MAX) != -1) {
- printf("Test %d failed. Unexecpted success return from "
+ printf("Test %d failed. Unexpected success return from "
"BIO_snprintf()\n", test);
fail = 1;
}
diff --git a/test/ecdhtest_cavs.h b/test/ecdhtest_cavs.h
index ab3ac22..fee7011 100644
--- a/test/ecdhtest_cavs.h
+++ b/test/ecdhtest_cavs.h
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
#ifndef ECDHTEST_CAVS_H
#define ECDHTEST_CAVS_H
-/*
+/*
* co-factor ECDH KATs for NIST SP800-56A
* http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/component-testing.html#ECCCDH
- * $ sha256sum KAS_ECC_CDH_PrimitiveTest.txt
+ * $ sha256sum KAS_ECC_CDH_PrimitiveTest.txt
* 456068d3f8aad8ac62a03d19ed3173f00ad51f42b51aeab4753c20f30c01cf23 KAS_ECC_CDH_PrimitiveTest.txt
*/
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