[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  19e1de548eff0b08ba2878b3258aaceead32977b (commit)
      from  57c4b9f6a2f800b41ce2836986fe33640f6c3f8a (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 19e1de548eff0b08ba2878b3258aaceead32977b
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Nov 10 11:49:06 2016 +0000

    Update CHANGES and NEWS
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 NEWS    |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 1fbe3b3..15c9277 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,29 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.2j and 1.0.2k [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results
+
+     There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
+     multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
+     longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
+     and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
+     question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
+     of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
+     transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
+     erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
+     Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
+     presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
+     detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
+     multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
+     share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
+     Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
+
+     This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
+     initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
+     providing reproducible case.
+     (CVE-2016-7055)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
   *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0
      or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to
      prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index d750fb5..efd2dbf 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2j and OpenSSL 1.0.2k [under development]
 
-      o
+      o Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055)
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2i and OpenSSL 1.0.2j [26 Sep 2016]