[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable update
Matt Caswell
matt at openssl.org
Thu Sep 22 10:37:51 UTC 2016
The branch OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable has been updated
via 52a69c480d243f727c8393fb42b9ff9da742c143 (commit)
via 888759a1d38197f29de7227876c3b58fbff8549f (commit)
via 16ec56f0cd6337a2506dce4a1e7ef91e0b7ecb76 (commit)
via ab650f07a0dabc01a4410f8f702c3cea7932da62 (commit)
via 2c0d295e26306e15a92eb23a84a1802005c1c137 (commit)
from 151adf2e5cc23284a059e0f155505006a1c9fad9 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 52a69c480d243f727c8393fb42b9ff9da742c143
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date: Thu Sep 22 11:31:45 2016 +0100
Prepare for 1.0.1v-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
commit 888759a1d38197f29de7227876c3b58fbff8549f
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date: Thu Sep 22 11:30:27 2016 +0100
Prepare for 1.0.1u release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
commit 16ec56f0cd6337a2506dce4a1e7ef91e0b7ecb76
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date: Wed Sep 21 23:20:45 2016 +0100
Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
commit ab650f07a0dabc01a4410f8f702c3cea7932da62
Author: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit at gmail.com>
Date: Mon Sep 19 16:05:53 2016 +0100
Avoid KCI attack for GOST
Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
commit 2c0d295e26306e15a92eb23a84a1802005c1c137
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date: Fri Sep 9 10:08:45 2016 +0100
Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.
CVE-2016-6304
Issue reported by Shi Lei.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
CHANGES | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
NEWS | 16 +++++-
README | 2 +-
crypto/opensslv.h | 6 +-
openssl.spec | 2 +-
ssl/s3_clnt.c | 19 -------
ssl/t1_lib.c | 24 +++++---
7 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index f89b50b..e2edbaf 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -2,12 +2,170 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.1t and 1.0.1u [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.1u and 1.0.1v [xx XXX xxxx]
- *) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack (CVE-2016-2183),
- the DES ciphers were moved from HIGH to MEDIUM.
+ *)
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1t and 1.0.1u [22 Sep 2016]
+
+ *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
+
+ A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+ extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
+ large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded
+ memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
+ Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
+ configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using
+ the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6304)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack, the DES ciphers were moved from
+ HIGH to MEDIUM.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan
+ Leurent (INRIA)
+ (CVE-2016-2183)
[Rich Salz]
+ *) OOB write in MDC2_Update()
+
+ An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or
+ through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous
+ call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check
+ can overflow resulting in a heap corruption.
+
+ The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical
+ on most platforms.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6303)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS
+
+ If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a
+ DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will
+ ultimately crash.
+
+ The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires
+ a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6302)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) OOB write in BN_bn2dec()
+
+ The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word().
+ This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an
+ overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate
+ or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because
+ record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-2182)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio()
+
+ The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is
+ the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount
+ of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are
+ presented.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-2180)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour
+
+ Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
+
+ A common idiom in the codebase is to check limits in the following manner:
+ "p + len > limit"
+
+ Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+ limit == p + SIZE
+
+ "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+ message).
+
+ The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+ defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+ undefined behaviour.
+
+ For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+ provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+ values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken
+ (CVE-2016-2177)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing
+
+ Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+ order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+ implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+ certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+ attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
+
+ This issue was reported by César Pereida (Aalto University), Billy Brumley
+ (Tampere University of Technology), and Yuval Yarom (The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA).
+ (CVE-2016-2178)
+ [César Pereida]
+
+ *) DTLS buffered message DoS
+
+ In a DTLS connection where handshake messages are delivered out-of-order
+ those messages that OpenSSL is not yet ready to process will be buffered
+ for later use. Under certain circumstances, a flaw in the logic means that
+ those messages do not get removed from the buffer even though the handshake
+ has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to
+ remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will
+ be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for
+ a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k
+ to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an
+ attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo.
+ (CVE-2016-2179)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) DTLS replay protection DoS
+
+ A flaw in the DTLS replay attack protection mechanism means that records
+ that arrive for future epochs update the replay protection "window" before
+ the MAC for the record has been validated. This could be exploited by an
+ attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to
+ decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means
+ that all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of
+ service for a specific DTLS connection.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OCAP audit team.
+ (CVE-2016-2181)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Certificate message OOB reads
+
+ In OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier some missing message length checks can result
+ in OOB reads of up to 2 bytes beyond an allocated buffer. There is a
+ theoretical DoS risk but this has not been observed in practice on common
+ platforms.
+
+ The messages affected are client certificate, client certificate request
+ and server certificate. As a result the attack can only be performed
+ against a client or a server which enables client authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ (CVE-2016-6306)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
Changes between 1.0.1s and 1.0.1t [3 May 2016]
*) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 4ae5cb4..7ff2935 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,10 +5,24 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
- Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1t and OpenSSL 1.0.1u [under development]
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1u and OpenSSL 1.0.1v [under development]
o
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1t and OpenSSL 1.0.1u [22 Sep 2016]
+
+ o OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304)
+ o SWEET32 Mitigation (CVE-2016-2183)
+ o OOB write in MDC2_Update() (CVE-2016-6303)
+ o Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS (CVE-2016-6302)
+ o OOB write in BN_bn2dec() (CVE-2016-2182)
+ o OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio() (CVE-2016-2180)
+ o Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour (CVE-2016-2177)
+ o Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing (CVE-2016-2178)
+ o DTLS buffered message DoS (CVE-2016-2179)
+ o DTLS replay protection DoS (CVE-2016-2181)
+ o Certificate message OOB reads (CVE-2016-6306)
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1s and OpenSSL 1.0.1t [3 May 2016]
o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107)
diff --git a/README b/README
index 0947452..9d8e192 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- OpenSSL 1.0.1u-dev
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1v-dev
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index a71ca2c..eb1cdfe 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x10001150L
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x10001160L
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1u-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1v-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1u-dev xx XXX xxxx"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1v-dev xx XXX xxxx"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index e95c7c2..ba3094f 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
Name: openssl
#Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
-Version: 1.0.1u
+Version: 1.0.1v
Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 40ca13d..f033a2b 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -2879,19 +2879,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
goto err;
}
/*
- * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
- (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
- /*
- * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
- * * would be used
- */
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
- /*
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
* data
*/
@@ -2937,12 +2924,6 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
n = msglen + 2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
- /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
- (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
- /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
- }
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 7680491..4bc13ca 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1284,6 +1284,23 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size)
goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
+ * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
+ */
+ sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
+ OCSP_RESPID_free);
+ if (dsize > 0) {
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+ }
+
while (dsize > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
int idsize;
@@ -1303,13 +1320,6 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
goto err;
}
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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