[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Andy Polyakov
appro at openssl.org
Mon Apr 17 19:14:25 UTC 2017
The branch master has been updated
via 786b6a45fbecc068d0fb8b05252a9228e0661c63 (commit)
from 5c8e9d531ba54d26e4bcbe66710c7c75bf0fc4e9 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 786b6a45fbecc068d0fb8b05252a9228e0661c63
Author: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Date: Sat Apr 15 15:53:50 2017 +0200
asn1/a_int.c: clean up asn1_get_int64.
Trouble was that integer negation wasn't producing *formally* correct
result in platform-neutral sense. Formally correct thing to do is
-(int64_t)u, but this triggers undefined behaviour for one value that
would still be representable in ASN.1. The trigger was masked with
(int64_t)(0-u), but this is formally inappropriate for values other
than the problematic one. [Also reorder branches to favour most-likely
paths and harmonize asn1_string_set_int64 with asn1_get_int64].]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3231)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/asn1/a_int.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
index fe700b2..e154343 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_int.c
@@ -229,12 +229,10 @@ static size_t asn1_put_uint64(unsigned char b[sizeof(uint64_t)], uint64_t r)
}
/*
- * Absolute value of INT64_MIN: we can't just use -INT64_MIN as it produces
+ * Absolute value of INT64_MIN: we can't just use -INT64_MIN as gcc produces
* overflow warnings.
*/
-
-#define ABS_INT64_MIN \
- ((uint64_t)INT64_MAX + (uint64_t)(-(INT64_MIN + INT64_MAX)))
+#define ABS_INT64_MIN ((uint64_t)INT64_MAX + (-(INT64_MIN + INT64_MAX)))
/* signed version of asn1_get_uint64 */
static int asn1_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const unsigned char *b, size_t blen,
@@ -244,17 +242,25 @@ static int asn1_get_int64(int64_t *pr, const unsigned char *b, size_t blen,
if (asn1_get_uint64(&r, b, blen) == 0)
return 0;
if (neg) {
- if (r > ABS_INT64_MIN) {
+ if (r <= INT64_MAX) {
+ /* Most significant bit is guaranteed to be clear, negation
+ * is guaranteed to be meaningful in platform-neutral sense. */
+ *pr = -(int64_t)r;
+ } else if (r == ABS_INT64_MIN) {
+ /* This never happens if INT64_MAX == ABS_INT64_MIN, e.g.
+ * on ones'-complement system. */
+ *pr = (int64_t)(0 - r);
+ } else {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64, ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
- *pr = 0 - (uint64_t)r;
} else {
- if (r > INT64_MAX) {
+ if (r <= INT64_MAX) {
+ *pr = (int64_t)r;
+ } else {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_INT64, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
- *pr = (int64_t)r;
}
return 1;
}
@@ -319,7 +325,12 @@ static int asn1_string_set_int64(ASN1_STRING *a, int64_t r, int itype)
a->type = itype;
if (r < 0) {
- off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, -r);
+ /* Most obvious '-r' triggers undefined behaviour for most
+ * common INT64_MIN. Even though below '0 - (uint64_t)r' can
+ * appear two's-complement centric, it does produce correct/
+ * expected result even on one's-complement. This is because
+ * cast to unsigned has to change bit pattern... */
+ off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, 0 - (uint64_t)r);
a->type |= V_ASN1_NEG;
} else {
off = asn1_put_uint64(tbuf, r);
More information about the openssl-commits
mailing list