[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Rich Salz
rsalz at openssl.org
Thu Aug 3 13:42:32 UTC 2017
The branch master has been updated
via 75e2c877650444fb829547bdb58d46eb1297bc1a (commit)
from 67dc995eaf538ea309c6292a1a5073465201f55b (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 75e2c877650444fb829547bdb58d46eb1297bc1a
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
Date: Thu Aug 3 09:23:28 2017 -0400
Switch from ossl_rand to DRBG rand
If RAND_add wraps around, XOR with existing. Add test to drbgtest that
does the wrap-around.
Re-order seeding and stop after first success.
Add RAND_poll_ex()
Use the DF and therefore lower RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. Also, for child DRBG's,
mix in the address as the personalization bits.
Centralize the entropy callbacks, from drbg_lib to rand_lib.
(Conceptually, entropy is part of the enclosing application.)
Thanks to Dr. Matthias St Pierre for the suggestion.
Various code cleanups:
-Make state an enum; inline RANDerr calls.
-Add RAND_POLL_RETRIES (thanks Pauli for the idea)
-Remove most RAND_seed calls from rest of library
-Rename DRBG_CTX to RAND_DRBG, etc.
-Move some code from drbg_lib to drbg_rand; drbg_lib is now only the
implementation of NIST DRBG.
-Remove blocklength
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale at oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4019)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
apps/speed.c | 14 --
crypto/bn/bn_rand.c | 4 -
crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c | 2 +-
crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c | 2 +-
crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c | 1 -
crypto/pem/pem_lib.c | 1 -
crypto/rand/build.info | 2 +-
crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c | 425 +++++++++++++++++--------------
crypto/rand/drbg_rand.c | 324 +++++++++---------------
crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c | 592 --------------------------------------------
crypto/rand/rand_egd.c | 13 +-
crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h | 120 ++++++---
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 136 +++++++++-
crypto/rand/rand_unix.c | 92 ++++---
crypto/rand/rand_vms.c | 4 +-
crypto/rand/rand_win.c | 12 +-
crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c | 10 -
doc/man3/RAND_add.pod | 24 +-
include/internal/rand.h | 64 ++---
include/openssl/ossl_typ.h | 2 +-
include/openssl/rand.h | 10 +
ssl/statem/statem.c | 2 -
test/bntest.c | 3 -
test/build.info | 6 +-
test/dhtest.c | 5 -
test/drbgtest.c | 206 ++++++++-------
test/dsatest.c | 5 -
test/ecdsatest.c | 6 -
test/ectest.c | 5 -
test/randtest.c | 110 --------
test/recipes/05-test_rand.t | 3 +-
test/ssltest_old.c | 4 -
util/libcrypto.num | 3 +-
util/private.num | 1 +
34 files changed, 816 insertions(+), 1397 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
delete mode 100644 test/randtest.c
diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
index 2d943b1..4a2a4a9 100644
--- a/apps/speed.c
+++ b/apps/speed.c
@@ -247,11 +247,6 @@ static double ecdsa_results[EC_NUM][2];
static double ecdh_results[EC_NUM][1];
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
-#endif
-
#ifdef SIGALRM
# if defined(__STDC__) || defined(sgi) || defined(_AIX)
# define SIGRETTYPE void
@@ -2397,9 +2392,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (RAND_status() != 1) {
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
- }
for (testnum = 0; testnum < DSA_NUM; testnum++) {
int st = 0;
if (!dsa_doit[testnum])
@@ -2467,9 +2459,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (RAND_status() != 1) {
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
- }
for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) {
int st = 1;
@@ -2554,9 +2543,6 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
- if (RAND_status() != 1) {
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
- }
for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) {
int ecdh_checks = 1;
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
index a7c7309..0b9e43d 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ static int bnrand(int testing, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
{
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
- time_t tim;
if (bits == 0) {
if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY || bottom != BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)
@@ -40,9 +39,6 @@ static int bnrand(int testing, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
}
/* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */
- time(&tim);
- RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0);
-
if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
index 7de00c7..92d6ae0 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa)
{
DSA_SIG *s;
- RAND_seed(dgst, dlen);
+
s = DSA_do_sign(dgst, dlen, dsa);
if (s == NULL) {
*siglen = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
index d67c485..c7ab0ee 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey)
{
ECDSA_SIG *s;
- RAND_seed(dgst, dlen);
+
s = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst, dlen, kinv, r, eckey);
if (s == NULL) {
*siglen = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c b/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c
index 81bffa6..e61a876 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c
@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY2PKCS8, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRIVATE_KEY_ALGORITHM);
goto error;
}
- RAND_add(p8->pkey->data, p8->pkey->length, 0.0);
return p8;
error:
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
index cfe2fa6..76e0698 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c
@@ -361,7 +361,6 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
#endif
kstr = (unsigned char *)buf;
}
- RAND_add(data, i, 0); /* put in the RSA key. */
OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) <= (int)sizeof(iv));
if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc)) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */
goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/rand/build.info b/crypto/rand/build.info
index f011d78..2591c01 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/build.info
+++ b/crypto/rand/build.info
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
- ossl_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
+ randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_rand.c
diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
index 1588515..e3d97d3 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
@@ -15,53 +15,28 @@
/*
* Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode.
- */
-
-/*
- * Get entropy from the existing callback. This is mainly used for KATs.
- */
-static size_t get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
-{
- if (dctx->get_entropy != NULL)
- return dctx->get_entropy(dctx, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len);
- /* TODO: Get from parent if it exists. */
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Cleanup entropy.
- */
-static void cleanup_entropy(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
-{
- if (dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- dctx->cleanup_entropy(dctx, out, olen);
-}
-
-/*
+ * The RAND_DRBG is OpenSSL's pointer to an instance of the DRBG.
+ *
* The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
* does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
* instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
* lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
* DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
* a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
- *
- * The DRBG_CTX is OpenSSL's opaque pointer to an instance of the
- * DRBG.
*/
/*
- * Set/initialize |dctx| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
+ * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
* Return -2 if the type is not supported, 1 on success and -1 on
* failure.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int nid, unsigned int flags)
+int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int nid, unsigned int flags)
{
int ret = 1;
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
- dctx->flags = flags;
- dctx->nid = nid;
+ drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
+ drbg->flags = flags;
+ drbg->nid = nid;
switch (nid) {
default:
@@ -73,7 +48,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int nid, unsigned int flags)
case NID_aes_128_ctr:
case NID_aes_192_ctr:
case NID_aes_256_ctr:
- ret = ctr_init(dctx);
+ ret = ctr_init(drbg);
break;
}
@@ -84,169 +59,176 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int nid, unsigned int flags)
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The |parent|, if not
- * NULL, will be used to auto-seed this DRBG_CTX as needed.
+ * NULL, will be used to auto-seed this RAND_DRBG as needed.
*/
-DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, DRBG_CTX *parent)
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
- DRBG_CTX *dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx));
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
+ unsigned char *ucp = OPENSSL_zalloc(RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
- if (dctx == NULL) {
+ if (drbg == NULL || ucp == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
-
- dctx->parent = parent;
- if (RAND_DRBG_set(dctx, type, flags) < 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(dctx);
- return NULL;
+ drbg->size = RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
+ drbg->randomness = ucp;
+
+ drbg->parent = parent;
+ if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (parent != NULL) {
+ if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, drbg_entropy_from_parent,
+ drbg_release_entropy,
+ NULL, NULL)
+ /*
+ * Add in our address. Note we are adding the pointer
+ * itself, not its contents!
+ */
+ || !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
+ (unsigned char*)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)))
+ goto err;
}
- return dctx;
+
+ return drbg;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(ucp);
+ OPENSSL_free(drbg);
+ return NULL;
}
/*
- * Uninstantiate |dctx| and free all memory.
+ * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
*/
-void RAND_DRBG_free(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
+void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- if (dctx == NULL)
+ /* The global DRBG is free'd by rand_cleanup_int() */
+ if (drbg == NULL || drbg == &rand_drbg)
return;
- ctr_uninstantiate(dctx);
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, dctx, &dctx->ex_data);
-
- /* Don't free up default DRBG */
- if (dctx == RAND_DRBG_get_default()) {
- memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(DRBG_CTX));
- dctx->nid = 0;
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
- } else {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&dctx->ctr, sizeof(dctx->ctr));
- OPENSSL_free(dctx);
- }
+ ctr_uninstantiate(drbg);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(drbg->randomness, drbg->size);
+ OPENSSL_free(drbg->randomness);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
}
/*
- * Instantiate |dctx|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
+ * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
* |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
{
- size_t entlen = 0, noncelen = 0;
unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
- int r = 0;
+ size_t noncelen = 0, entlen = 0;
- if (perslen > dctx->max_pers) {
- r = RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG;
+ if (perslen > drbg->max_pers) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
+ RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
goto end;
}
- if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED) {
- r = dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
- : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED;
+ if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
+ drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
+ : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
goto end;
}
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
- entlen = get_entropy(dctx, &entropy, dctx->strength,
- dctx->min_entropy, dctx->max_entropy);
- if (entlen < dctx->min_entropy || entlen > dctx->max_entropy) {
- r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY;
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
+ entlen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
+ drbg->min_entropy, drbg->max_entropy);
+ if (entlen < drbg->min_entropy || entlen > drbg->max_entropy) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
- if (dctx->max_nonce > 0 && dctx->get_nonce != NULL) {
- noncelen = dctx->get_nonce(dctx, &nonce,
- dctx->strength / 2,
- dctx->min_nonce, dctx->max_nonce);
-
- if (noncelen < dctx->min_nonce || noncelen > dctx->max_nonce) {
- r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE;
+ if (drbg->max_nonce > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
+ noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
+ drbg->min_nonce, drbg->max_nonce);
+ if (noncelen < drbg->min_nonce || noncelen > drbg->max_nonce) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
goto end;
}
}
- if (!ctr_instantiate(dctx, entropy, entlen,
+ if (!ctr_instantiate(drbg, entropy, entlen,
nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
- r = RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG;
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
goto end;
}
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_READY;
- dctx->reseed_counter = 1;
+ drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
+ drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
end:
- if (entropy != NULL && dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- dctx->cleanup_entropy(dctx, entropy, entlen);
- if (nonce != NULL && dctx->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
- dctx->cleanup_nonce(dctx, nonce, noncelen);
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY)
+ if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy);
+ if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce);
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
return 1;
-
- if (r)
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, r);
return 0;
}
/*
- * Uninstantiate |dctx|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
+ * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
+int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- int ret = ctr_uninstantiate(dctx);
+ int ret = ctr_uninstantiate(drbg);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&dctx->ctr, sizeof(dctx->ctr));
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr));
+ drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
return ret;
}
/*
- * Mix in the specified data to reseed |dctx|.
+ * Mix in the specified data to reseed |drbg|.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
size_t entlen = 0;
- int r = 0;
-
- if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_READY
- && dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_RESEED) {
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR)
- r = RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE;
- else if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
- r = RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED;
- goto end;
+
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
+ return 0;
}
if (adin == NULL)
adinlen = 0;
- else if (adinlen > dctx->max_adin) {
- r = RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
- goto end;
+ else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
- entlen = get_entropy(dctx, &entropy, dctx->strength,
- dctx->min_entropy, dctx->max_entropy);
-
- if (entlen < dctx->min_entropy || entlen > dctx->max_entropy) {
- r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY;
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
+ entlen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
+ drbg->min_entropy, drbg->max_entropy);
+ if (entlen < drbg->min_entropy || entlen > drbg->max_entropy) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
- if (!ctr_reseed(dctx, entropy, entlen, adin, adinlen))
+ if (!ctr_reseed(drbg, entropy, entlen, adin, adinlen))
goto end;
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_READY;
- dctx->reseed_counter = 1;
+ drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
+ drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
end:
- if (entropy != NULL && dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- cleanup_entropy(dctx, entropy, entlen);
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY)
+ if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy);
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
return 1;
- if (r)
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, r);
-
return 0;
}
@@ -255,98 +237,183 @@ end:
* to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
* sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
- int r = 0;
-
- if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_READY
- && dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_RESEED) {
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR)
- r = RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE;
- else if(dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
- r = RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED;
- goto end;
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
+ return 0;
}
-
- if (outlen > dctx->max_request) {
- r = RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG;
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
return 0;
}
- if (adinlen > dctx->max_adin) {
- r = RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
- goto end;
+ if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
- if (dctx->reseed_counter >= dctx->reseed_interval)
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
+ if (drbg->reseed_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
+ drbg->state = DRBG_RESEED;
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_RESEED || prediction_resistance) {
- if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, adin, adinlen)) {
- r = RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR;
- goto end;
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_RESEED || prediction_resistance) {
+ if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
adin = NULL;
adinlen = 0;
}
- if (!ctr_generate(dctx, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
- r = RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR;
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
- goto end;
+ if (!ctr_generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- if (dctx->reseed_counter >= dctx->reseed_interval)
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
+
+ if (drbg->reseed_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
+ drbg->state = DRBG_RESEED;
else
- dctx->reseed_counter++;
+ drbg->reseed_counter++;
return 1;
-
-end:
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, r);
- return 0;
}
/*
- * Set the callbacks for entropy and nonce. Used mainly for the KATs
+ * Set the callbacks for entropy and nonce. We currently don't use
+ * the nonce; that's mainly for the KATs
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
- size_t (*cb_get_entropy)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len),
- void (*cb_cleanup_entropy)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen),
- size_t (*cb_get_nonce)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len),
- void (*cb_cleanup_nonce)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen))
+int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn cb_get_entropy,
+ RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cb_cleanup_entropy,
+ RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn cb_get_nonce,
+ RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cb_cleanup_nonce)
{
- if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
+ if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED)
return 0;
- dctx->get_entropy = cb_get_entropy;
- dctx->cleanup_entropy = cb_cleanup_entropy;
- dctx->get_nonce = cb_get_nonce;
- dctx->cleanup_nonce = cb_cleanup_nonce;
+ drbg->get_entropy = cb_get_entropy;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = cb_cleanup_entropy;
+ drbg->get_nonce = cb_get_nonce;
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce = cb_cleanup_nonce;
return 1;
}
/*
- * Set the reseed interval. Used mainly for the KATs.
+ * Set the reseed interval.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int interval)
+int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int interval)
{
if (interval < 0 || interval > MAX_RESEED)
return 0;
- dctx->reseed_interval = interval;
+ drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
return 1;
}
/*
* Get and set the EXDATA
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx, void *arg)
+int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
+ * global DRBG. They lock.
+ */
+
+static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t chunk;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
+ if (rand_drbg.state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED
+ && RAND_DRBG_instantiate(&rand_drbg, NULL, 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ for ( ; count > 0; count -= chunk, out += chunk) {
+ chunk = count;
+ if (chunk > rand_drbg.max_request)
+ chunk = rand_drbg.max_request;
+ ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(&rand_drbg, out, chunk, 0, NULL, 0);
+ if (!ret)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void drbg_cleanup(void)
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
+ RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(&rand_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
+}
+
+static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
+{
+ unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)buf;
+ unsigned char *out, *end;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_bytes.lock);
+ out = &rand_bytes.buff[rand_bytes.curr];
+ end = &rand_bytes.buff[rand_bytes.size];
+
+ /* Copy whatever fits into the end of the buffer. */
+ for ( ; --num >= 0 && out < end; rand_bytes.curr++)
+ *out++ = *in++;
+
+ /* XOR any the leftover. */
+ while (num > 0) {
+ for (out = rand_bytes.buff; --num >= 0 && out < end; )
+ *out++ ^= *in++;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_bytes.lock);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+{
+ return drbg_add(buf, num, num);
+}
+
+static int drbg_status(void)
{
- return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&dctx->ex_data, idx, arg);
+ int ret;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
+ ret = rand_drbg.state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
+ return ret;
}
-void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx)
+RAND_DRBG rand_drbg; /* The default global DRBG. */
+
+RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
+ drbg_seed,
+ drbg_bytes,
+ drbg_cleanup,
+ drbg_add,
+ drbg_bytes,
+ drbg_status
+};
+
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&dctx->ex_data, idx);
+ return &rand_meth;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_rand.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_rand.c
index 8b30cd8..06f8aff 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/drbg_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_rand.c
@@ -16,37 +16,14 @@
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
/*
- * Mapping of NIST SP 800-90A DRBG to OpenSSL RAND_METHOD.
+ * Implementation of NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG.
*/
-
-/*
- * The default global DRBG and its auto-init/auto-cleanup.
- */
-static DRBG_CTX ossl_drbg;
-
-static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
-
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_drbg_init)
-{
- int st = 1;
-
- ossl_drbg.lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- st &= ossl_drbg.lock != NULL;
- st &= RAND_DRBG_set(&ossl_drbg, NID_aes_128_ctr, 0) == 1;
- return st;
-}
-
-void rand_drbg_cleanup(void)
-{
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(ossl_drbg.lock);
-}
-
-static void inc_128(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx)
+static void inc_128(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
int i;
unsigned char c;
- unsigned char *p = &cctx->V[15];
+ unsigned char *p = &ctr->V[15];
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++, p--) {
c = *p;
@@ -59,7 +36,7 @@ static void inc_128(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx)
}
}
-static void ctr_XOR(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+static void ctr_XOR(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
size_t i, n;
@@ -70,81 +47,81 @@ static void ctr_XOR(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
* Any zero padding will have no effect on the result as we
* are XORing. So just process however much input we have.
*/
- n = inlen < cctx->keylen ? inlen : cctx->keylen;
+ n = inlen < ctr->keylen ? inlen : ctr->keylen;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
- cctx->K[i] ^= in[i];
- if (inlen <= cctx->keylen)
+ ctr->K[i] ^= in[i];
+ if (inlen <= ctr->keylen)
return;
- n = inlen - cctx->keylen;
+ n = inlen - ctr->keylen;
if (n > 16) {
/* Should never happen */
n = 16;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
- cctx->V[i] ^= in[i + cctx->keylen];
+ ctr->V[i] ^= in[i + ctr->keylen];
}
/*
* Process a complete block using BCC algorithm of SP 800-90A 10.3.3
*/
-static void ctr_BCC_block(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx, unsigned char *out,
+static void ctr_BCC_block(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
out[i] ^= in[i];
- AES_encrypt(out, out, &cctx->df_ks);
+ AES_encrypt(out, out, &ctr->df_ks);
}
/*
* Handle several BCC operations for as much data as we need for K and X
*/
-static void ctr_BCC_blocks(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx, const unsigned char *in)
+static void ctr_BCC_blocks(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr, const unsigned char *in)
{
- ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX, in);
- ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX + 16, in);
- if (cctx->keylen != 16)
- ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX + 32, in);
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, in);
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, in);
+ if (ctr->keylen != 16)
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, in);
}
/*
* Initialise BCC blocks: these have the value 0,1,2 in leftmost positions:
* see 10.3.1 stage 7.
*/
-static void ctr_BCC_init(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx)
+static void ctr_BCC_init(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
- memset(cctx->KX, 0, 48);
- memset(cctx->bltmp, 0, 16);
- ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX, cctx->bltmp);
- cctx->bltmp[3] = 1;
- ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX + 16, cctx->bltmp);
- if (cctx->keylen != 16) {
- cctx->bltmp[3] = 2;
- ctr_BCC_block(cctx, cctx->KX + 32, cctx->bltmp);
+ memset(ctr->KX, 0, 48);
+ memset(ctr->bltmp, 0, 16);
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX, ctr->bltmp);
+ ctr->bltmp[3] = 1;
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 16, ctr->bltmp);
+ if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+ ctr->bltmp[3] = 2;
+ ctr_BCC_block(ctr, ctr->KX + 32, ctr->bltmp);
}
}
/*
* Process several blocks into BCC algorithm, some possibly partial
*/
-static void ctr_BCC_update(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx,
+static void ctr_BCC_update(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
if (in == NULL || inlen == 0)
return;
/* If we have partial block handle it first */
- if (cctx->bltmp_pos) {
- size_t left = 16 - cctx->bltmp_pos;
+ if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
+ size_t left = 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos;
/* If we now have a complete block process it */
if (inlen >= left) {
- memcpy(cctx->bltmp + cctx->bltmp_pos, in, left);
- ctr_BCC_blocks(cctx, cctx->bltmp);
- cctx->bltmp_pos = 0;
+ memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, left);
+ ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp);
+ ctr->bltmp_pos = 0;
inlen -= left;
in += left;
}
@@ -152,34 +129,34 @@ static void ctr_BCC_update(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx,
/* Process zero or more complete blocks */
for (; inlen >= 16; in += 16, inlen -= 16) {
- ctr_BCC_blocks(cctx, in);
+ ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, in);
}
/* Copy any remaining partial block to the temporary buffer */
if (inlen > 0) {
- memcpy(cctx->bltmp + cctx->bltmp_pos, in, inlen);
- cctx->bltmp_pos += inlen;
+ memcpy(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, in, inlen);
+ ctr->bltmp_pos += inlen;
}
}
-static void ctr_BCC_final(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx)
+static void ctr_BCC_final(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr)
{
- if (cctx->bltmp_pos) {
- memset(cctx->bltmp + cctx->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - cctx->bltmp_pos);
- ctr_BCC_blocks(cctx, cctx->bltmp);
+ if (ctr->bltmp_pos) {
+ memset(ctr->bltmp + ctr->bltmp_pos, 0, 16 - ctr->bltmp_pos);
+ ctr_BCC_blocks(ctr, ctr->bltmp);
}
}
-static void ctr_df(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx,
+static void ctr_df(RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr,
const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
const unsigned char *in3, size_t in3len)
{
static unsigned char c80 = 0x80;
size_t inlen;
- unsigned char *p = cctx->bltmp;
+ unsigned char *p = ctr->bltmp;
- ctr_BCC_init(cctx);
+ ctr_BCC_init(ctr);
if (in1 == NULL)
in1len = 0;
if (in2 == NULL)
@@ -197,100 +174,100 @@ static void ctr_df(DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx,
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = 0;
- *p = (unsigned char)((cctx->keylen + 16) & 0xff);
- cctx->bltmp_pos = 8;
- ctr_BCC_update(cctx, in1, in1len);
- ctr_BCC_update(cctx, in2, in2len);
- ctr_BCC_update(cctx, in3, in3len);
- ctr_BCC_update(cctx, &c80, 1);
- ctr_BCC_final(cctx);
+ *p = (unsigned char)((ctr->keylen + 16) & 0xff);
+ ctr->bltmp_pos = 8;
+ ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in1, in1len);
+ ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in2, in2len);
+ ctr_BCC_update(ctr, in3, in3len);
+ ctr_BCC_update(ctr, &c80, 1);
+ ctr_BCC_final(ctr);
/* Set up key K */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(cctx->KX, cctx->keylen * 8, &cctx->df_kxks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->KX, ctr->keylen * 8, &ctr->df_kxks);
/* X follows key K */
- AES_encrypt(cctx->KX + cctx->keylen, cctx->KX, &cctx->df_kxks);
- AES_encrypt(cctx->KX, cctx->KX + 16, &cctx->df_kxks);
- if (cctx->keylen != 16)
- AES_encrypt(cctx->KX + 16, cctx->KX + 32, &cctx->df_kxks);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->KX + ctr->keylen, ctr->KX, &ctr->df_kxks);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->KX, ctr->KX + 16, &ctr->df_kxks);
+ if (ctr->keylen != 16)
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->KX + 16, ctr->KX + 32, &ctr->df_kxks);
}
/*
* NB the no-df Update in SP800-90A specifies a constant input length
* of seedlen, however other uses of this algorithm pad the input with
* zeroes if necessary and have up to two parameters XORed together,
- * handle both cases in this function instead.
+ * so we handle both cases in this function instead.
*/
-static void ctr_update(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+static void ctr_update(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *in1, size_t in1len,
const unsigned char *in2, size_t in2len,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen)
{
- DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx = &dctx->ctr;
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
/* ks is already setup for correct key */
- inc_128(cctx);
- AES_encrypt(cctx->V, cctx->K, &cctx->ks);
+ inc_128(ctr);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K, &ctr->ks);
/* If keylen longer than 128 bits need extra encrypt */
- if (cctx->keylen != 16) {
- inc_128(cctx);
- AES_encrypt(cctx->V, cctx->K + 16, &cctx->ks);
+ if (ctr->keylen != 16) {
+ inc_128(ctr);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K + 16, &ctr->ks);
}
- inc_128(cctx);
- AES_encrypt(cctx->V, cctx->V, &cctx->ks);
+ inc_128(ctr);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->V, &ctr->ks);
/* If 192 bit key part of V is on end of K */
- if (cctx->keylen == 24) {
- memcpy(cctx->V + 8, cctx->V, 8);
- memcpy(cctx->V, cctx->K + 24, 8);
+ if (ctr->keylen == 24) {
+ memcpy(ctr->V + 8, ctr->V, 8);
+ memcpy(ctr->V, ctr->K + 24, 8);
}
- if (dctx->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
/* If no input reuse existing derived value */
if (in1 != NULL || nonce != NULL || in2 != NULL)
- ctr_df(cctx, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len);
+ ctr_df(ctr, in1, in1len, nonce, noncelen, in2, in2len);
/* If this a reuse input in1len != 0 */
if (in1len)
- ctr_XOR(cctx, cctx->KX, dctx->seedlen);
+ ctr_XOR(ctr, ctr->KX, drbg->seedlen);
} else {
- ctr_XOR(cctx, in1, in1len);
- ctr_XOR(cctx, in2, in2len);
+ ctr_XOR(ctr, in1, in1len);
+ ctr_XOR(ctr, in2, in2len);
}
- AES_set_encrypt_key(cctx->K, dctx->strength, &cctx->ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->K, drbg->strength, &ctr->ks);
}
-int ctr_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
{
- DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx = &dctx->ctr;
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
- memset(cctx->K, 0, sizeof(cctx->K));
- memset(cctx->V, 0, sizeof(cctx->V));
- AES_set_encrypt_key(cctx->K, dctx->strength, &cctx->ks);
- ctr_update(dctx, ent, entlen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen);
+ memset(ctr->K, 0, sizeof(ctr->K));
+ memset(ctr->V, 0, sizeof(ctr->V));
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(ctr->K, drbg->strength, &ctr->ks);
+ ctr_update(drbg, ent, entlen, pers, perslen, nonce, noncelen);
return 1;
}
-int ctr_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
- ctr_update(dctx, ent, entlen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
+ ctr_update(drbg, ent, entlen, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
-int ctr_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
- DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx = &dctx->ctr;
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
if (adin != NULL && adinlen != 0) {
- ctr_update(dctx, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
/* This means we reuse derived value */
- if (dctx->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
adin = NULL;
adinlen = 1;
}
@@ -299,36 +276,36 @@ int ctr_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
}
for ( ; ; ) {
- inc_128(cctx);
+ inc_128(ctr);
if (outlen < 16) {
/* Use K as temp space as it will be updated */
- AES_encrypt(cctx->V, cctx->K, &cctx->ks);
- memcpy(out, cctx->K, outlen);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, ctr->K, &ctr->ks);
+ memcpy(out, ctr->K, outlen);
break;
}
- AES_encrypt(cctx->V, out, &cctx->ks);
+ AES_encrypt(ctr->V, out, &ctr->ks);
out += 16;
outlen -= 16;
if (outlen == 0)
break;
}
- ctr_update(dctx, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ ctr_update(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
return 1;
}
-int ctr_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
+int ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- memset(&dctx->ctr, 0, sizeof(dctx->ctr));
+ memset(&drbg->ctr, 0, sizeof(drbg->ctr));
return 1;
}
-int ctr_init(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
+int ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- DRBG_CTR_CTX *cctx = &dctx->ctr;
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->ctr;
size_t keylen;
- switch (dctx->nid) {
+ switch (drbg->nid) {
default:
/* This can't happen, but silence the compiler warning. */
return -1;
@@ -343,12 +320,11 @@ int ctr_init(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
break;
}
- cctx->keylen = keylen;
- dctx->strength = keylen * 8;
- dctx->blocklength = 16;
- dctx->seedlen = keylen + 16;
+ ctr->keylen = keylen;
+ drbg->strength = keylen * 8;
+ drbg->seedlen = keylen + 16;
- if (dctx->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) {
/* df initialisation */
static unsigned char df_key[32] = {
0x00,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07,
@@ -357,97 +333,25 @@ int ctr_init(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
0x18,0x19,0x1a,0x1b,0x1c,0x1d,0x1e,0x1f
};
/* Set key schedule for df_key */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(df_key, dctx->strength, &cctx->df_ks);
-
- dctx->min_entropy = cctx->keylen;
- dctx->max_entropy = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
- dctx->min_nonce = dctx->min_entropy / 2;
- dctx->max_nonce = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
- dctx->max_pers = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
- dctx->max_adin = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(df_key, drbg->strength, &ctr->df_ks);
+
+ drbg->min_entropy = ctr->keylen;
+ drbg->max_entropy = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+ drbg->min_nonce = drbg->min_entropy / 2;
+ drbg->max_nonce = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+ drbg->max_pers = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
+ drbg->max_adin = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
} else {
- dctx->min_entropy = dctx->seedlen;
- dctx->max_entropy = dctx->seedlen;
+ drbg->min_entropy = drbg->seedlen;
+ drbg->max_entropy = drbg->seedlen;
/* Nonce not used */
- dctx->min_nonce = 0;
- dctx->max_nonce = 0;
- dctx->max_pers = dctx->seedlen;
- dctx->max_adin = dctx->seedlen;
+ drbg->min_nonce = 0;
+ drbg->max_nonce = 0;
+ drbg->max_pers = drbg->seedlen;
+ drbg->max_adin = drbg->seedlen;
}
- dctx->max_request = 1 << 16;
- dctx->reseed_interval = MAX_RESEED;
+ drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
+ drbg->reseed_interval = MAX_RESEED;
return 1;
}
-
-
-/*
- * The following function tie the DRBG code into the RAND_METHOD
- */
-
-DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_get_default(void)
-{
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_drbg_init, do_ossl_drbg_init))
- return NULL;
- return &ossl_drbg;
-}
-
-static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
-{
- DRBG_CTX *dctx = RAND_DRBG_get_default();
- int ret = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dctx->lock);
- do {
- size_t rcnt;
-
- if (count > (int)dctx->max_request)
- rcnt = dctx->max_request;
- else
- rcnt = count;
- ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, out, rcnt, 0, NULL, 0);
- if (!ret)
- goto err;
- out += rcnt;
- count -= rcnt;
- } while (count);
- ret = 1;
-err:
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dctx->lock);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int drbg_status(void)
-{
- DRBG_CTX *dctx = RAND_DRBG_get_default();
- int ret;
-
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dctx->lock);
- ret = dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY ? 1 : 0;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dctx->lock);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void drbg_cleanup(void)
-{
- DRBG_CTX *dctx = RAND_DRBG_get_default();
-
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dctx->lock);
- RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(dctx);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dctx->lock);
-}
-
-static const RAND_METHOD rand_drbg_meth =
-{
- NULL,
- drbg_bytes,
- drbg_cleanup,
- NULL,
- drbg_bytes,
- drbg_status
-};
-
-const RAND_METHOD *RAND_drbg(void)
-{
- return &rand_drbg_meth;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 063b55b..0000000
--- a/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,592 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS))
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-# include <time.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/async.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <internal/thread_once.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
-
-#define STATE_SIZE 1023
-
-typedef struct ossl_rand_state_st OSSL_RAND_STATE;
-
-struct ossl_rand_state_st {
- size_t num;
- size_t index;
- unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- long md_count[2];
-};
-
-static OSSL_RAND_STATE global_state;
-static double randomness = 0;
-static int initialized = 0;
-static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
-static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key;
-
-/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */
-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-/*
- * access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock;
- * valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set
- */
-static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid;
-
-static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-
-static void rand_thread_cleanup(void *arg)
-{
- OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = arg;
-
- OPENSSL_clear_free(sp, sizeof(*sp));
-}
-
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_rand_init)
-{
- int ret = 1;
-
- OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
- rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- ret &= rand_lock != NULL;
- rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- ret &= rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
- ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&key, rand_thread_cleanup) == 1;
- return ret;
-}
-
-RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
-{
- return &openssl_rand_meth;
-}
-
-static void rand_cleanup(void)
-{
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&global_state, sizeof(global_state));
- randomness = 0;
- initialized = 0;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock);
-}
-
-static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
-{
- int i, j, k, st_idx;
- long md_c[2];
- unsigned char local_md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_MD_CTX *m;
- int do_not_lock;
- int rv = 0;
- OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
-
- if (!num)
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
- *
- * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
- * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
- * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
- * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
- * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
- * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
- * (which is incremented after each use).
- * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
- * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
- * hash function.
- */
-
- m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (m == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
- goto err;
-
- /* check if we already have the lock */
- if (crypto_lock_rand) {
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
- do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
- } else
- do_not_lock = 0;
-
- if (!do_not_lock)
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
- st_idx = sp->index;
-
- /*
- * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
- * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
- * _some_ difference
- */
- md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
- md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
-
- memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md));
-
- /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
- sp->index += num;
- if (sp->index >= STATE_SIZE) {
- sp->index %= STATE_SIZE;
- sp->num = STATE_SIZE;
- } else if (sp->num < STATE_SIZE) {
- if (sp->index > sp->num)
- sp->num = sp->index;
- }
- /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
-
- /*
- * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
- * will use now, but other threads may use them as well
- */
-
- sp->md_count[1] += (num / SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
-
- if (!do_not_lock)
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
-
- for (i = 0; i < num; i += SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
- j = (num - i);
- j = (j > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
- goto err;
- k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
- if (k > 0) {
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j - k))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
- goto err;
- } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j))
- goto err;
-
- /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO EVP_DigestUpdate()! */
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, buf, j))
- goto err;
- /*
- * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
- * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not,
- * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get
- * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very
- * insecure keys.
- */
-
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
- goto err;
- md_c[1]++;
-
- buf = (const char *)buf + j;
-
- for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
- /*
- * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
- * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
- * local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
- * could hurt performance more than necessary given that
- * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
- * random state.
- */
- sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
- if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
- st_idx = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (!do_not_lock)
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
- /*
- * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
- * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
- * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much randomness as fits into
- * md.
- */
- for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(sp->md); k++) {
- sp->md[k] ^= local_md[k];
- }
- if (randomness < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
- randomness += add;
- if (!do_not_lock)
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
-
- rv = 1;
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
- return rv;
-}
-
-static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
-{
- return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
-}
-
-static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
- static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
- int i, j, k;
- size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
- int ok;
- long md_c[2];
- unsigned char local_md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_MD_CTX *m;
- OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
-#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
- pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
-#endif
- time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
- int do_stir_pool = 0;
-/* time value for various platforms */
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
- FILETIME tv;
-# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
- SYSTEMTIME t;
- GetSystemTime(&t);
- SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
-# else
- GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
-# endif
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
- struct timespec tv;
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)
- unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
- tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
-#else
- struct timeval tv;
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
-#endif
-
- if (num <= 0)
- return 1;
-
- m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (m == NULL)
- goto err_mem;
-
- /* round upwards to multiple of SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
- num_ceil =
- (1 + (num - 1) / (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
-
- /*
- * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
- *
- * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
- *
- * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
- * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
- * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
- * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
- * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
- * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
- *
- * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
- * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
- * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
- * global 'md'.
- */
-
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
- goto err_mem;
-
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
- /*
- * We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure
- * we don't pause and cause a deadlock
- */
- ASYNC_block_pause();
-
- /* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
- locking_threadid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
-
- if (!initialized) {
- RAND_poll();
- initialized = 1;
- }
-
- if (!stirred_pool)
- do_stir_pool = 1;
-
- ok = (randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
- if (!ok) {
- /*
- * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
- * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
- * to decrease the randomness estimate. Once we've had enough initial
- * seeding we don't bother to adjust the randomness count, though,
- * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
- * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
- * we have enough randomness. Randomness should be collected in a
- * separate input pool and be transferred to the output pool only
- * when the randomness limit has been reached.
- */
- randomness -= num;
- if (randomness < 0)
- randomness = 0;
- }
-
- if (do_stir_pool) {
- /*
- * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
- * better make sure that the required randomness gets 'evenly
- * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
- * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
- * suitable for this purpose.
- */
-
- int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
- while (n > 0) {
-#if SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
-# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
-#endif
-#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH */
- /*
- * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
- * rand_add expects to have something to hash.
- */
- rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
- n -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- }
- if (ok)
- stirred_pool = 1;
- }
-
- st_idx = sp->index;
- st_num = sp->num;
- md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
- md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
- memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof sp->md);
-
- sp->index += num_ceil;
- if (sp->index > sp->num)
- sp->index %= sp->num;
-
- /*
- * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
- * ours (but other threads may use them too)
- */
-
- sp->md_count[0] += 1;
-
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- ASYNC_unblock_pause();
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
-
- while (num > 0) {
- /* num_ceil -= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 */
- j = (num >= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
- num -= j;
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, EVP_sha1(), NULL))
- goto err;
-#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
- if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
- goto err;
- curr_pid = 0;
- }
-#endif
- if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
- goto err;
- curr_time = 0;
- if (!rand_hw_seed(m))
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
- goto err;
-
- k = (st_idx + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
- if (k > 0) {
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
- goto err;
- } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
- /* may compete with other threads */
- sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
- if (st_idx >= st_num)
- st_idx = 0;
- if (i < j)
- *(buf++) = local_md[i + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
- }
- }
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
- goto err;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
- /*
- * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
- */
- ASYNC_block_pause();
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md))
- || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, sp->md, NULL)) {
- ASYNC_unblock_pause();
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
- goto err;
- }
- ASYNC_unblock_pause();
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
- if (ok)
- return (1);
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
- ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
- "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
- return (0);
- err:
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
- return 0;
- err_mem:
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
- return 0;
-
-}
-
-static int rand_status(void)
-{
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur;
- int ret;
- int do_not_lock;
-
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
- return 0;
-
- cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- /*
- * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
- * implementation calls RAND_status())
- */
- if (crypto_lock_rand) {
- CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
- do_not_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_compare_id(locking_threadid, cur);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
- } else
- do_not_lock = 0;
-
- if (!do_not_lock) {
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
- /*
- * Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine
- */
- ASYNC_block_pause();
-
- /*
- * prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
- */
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_tmp_lock);
- locking_threadid = cur;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_tmp_lock);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
- }
-
- if (!initialized) {
- RAND_poll();
- initialized = 1;
- }
-
- ret = randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
-
- if (!do_not_lock) {
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-
- ASYNC_unblock_pause();
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
- * currently supports rdrand.
- */
-#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
- defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
- defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
- && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND)
-
-# define RDRAND_CALLS 4
-
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
-extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
-
-static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i;
- if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
- return 1;
- for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) {
- size_t rnd;
- rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
- if (rnd == 0)
- return 1;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#else
-
-static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-#endif
-
-
-RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth = {
- rand_seed,
- rand_bytes,
- rand_cleanup,
- rand_add,
- rand_bytes,
- rand_status
-};
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c b/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
index 657a3bc..5eb3225 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
int RAND_egd(const char *path)
{
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
{
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
# else
@@ -72,12 +72,13 @@ int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
strcpy(addr.sun_path, path);
i = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path);
fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (fd == -1 || (fp = fdopen(fd, "r+")) == NULL)
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
+ setbuf(fp, NULL);
/* Try to connect */
for ( ; ; ) {
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
goto err;
ret = numbytes;
if (mybuffer)
- RAND_seed(tempbuf, i);
+ RAND_add(tempbuf, i, i);
err:
if (fp != NULL)
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
int RAND_egd(const char *path)
{
- return (RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255));
+ return RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255);
}
# endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
index b9df5d1..e5944f9 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -17,25 +17,55 @@
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# include "internal/rand.h"
-/* Amount of randomness (in bytes) we want for initial seeding. */
-# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED (128 / 8)
+/*
+ * Amount of randomness (in bytes) we want for initial seeding.
+ * This is based on the fact that we use AES-128 as the CRBG, and
+ * that we use the derivation function. If either of those changes,
+ * (see rand_init() in rand_lib.c), change this.
+ */
+# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED 16
+
+/* Maximum amount of randomness to hold in RAND_BYTES_BUFFER. */
+# define MAX_RANDOMNESS_HELD (4 * RANDOMNESS_NEEDED)
/* Maximum count allowed in reseeding */
-#define MAX_RESEED (1 << 24)
+# define MAX_RESEED (1 << 24)
-/* DRBG status values */
-# define DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED 0
-# define DRBG_STATUS_READY 1
-# define DRBG_STATUS_RESEED 2
-# define DRBG_STATUS_ERROR 3
+/* How often we call RAND_poll() in drbg_entropy_from_system */
+# define RAND_POLL_RETRIES 8
-/* A default maximum length: larger than any reasonable value used in pratice */
+/* Max size of entropy, addin, etc. Larger than any reasonable value */
# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH 0x7ffffff0
+
+/* DRBG status values */
+typedef enum drbg_status_e {
+ DRBG_UNINITIALISED,
+ DRBG_READY,
+ DRBG_RESEED,
+ DRBG_ERROR
+} DRBG_STATUS;
+
+
/*
- * The context for DRBG AES-CTR
+ * A buffer of random bytes to be fed as "entropy" into the DRBG. RAND_add()
+ * adds data to the buffer, and the drbg_entropy_from_system() pulls data from
+ * the buffer. We have a separate data structure because of the way the
+ * API is defined; otherwise we'd run into deadlocks (RAND_bytes ->
+ * RAND_DRBG_generate* -> drbg_entropy_from_system -> RAND_poll -> RAND_add ->
+ * drbg_add*; the functions with an asterisk lock).
*/
-typedef struct drbg_ctr_ctx_st {
+typedef struct rand_bytes_buffer_st {
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+ size_t size;
+ size_t curr;
+ unsigned char *buff;
+} RAND_BYTES_BUFFER;
+
+/*
+ * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR.
+ */
+typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st {
AES_KEY ks;
size_t keylen;
unsigned char K[32];
@@ -47,21 +77,28 @@ typedef struct drbg_ctr_ctx_st {
unsigned char bltmp[16];
size_t bltmp_pos;
unsigned char KX[48];
-} DRBG_CTR_CTX;
+} RAND_DRBG_CTR;
/*
- * The context for all DRBG's
+ * The state of all types of DRBGs, even though we only have CTR mode
+ * right now.
*/
-struct drbg_ctx_st {
+struct rand_drbg_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
- DRBG_CTX *parent;
- int nid; /* the NID of the underlying algorithm */
- unsigned int flags; /* various external flags */
-
- /* The following parameters are setup by mechanism drbg_init() call */
+ RAND_DRBG *parent;
+ int nid; /* the underlying algorithm */
+ unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */
+ unsigned short filled;
+ /*
+ * This is a fixed-size buffer, but we malloc to make it a little
+ * harder to find; a classic security/performance trade-off.
+ */
+ int size;
+ unsigned char *randomness;
+
+ /* These parameters are setup by the per-type "init" function. */
int strength;
- size_t blocklength;
size_t max_request;
size_t min_entropy, max_entropy;
size_t min_nonce, max_nonce;
@@ -69,43 +106,50 @@ struct drbg_ctx_st {
unsigned int reseed_counter;
unsigned int reseed_interval;
size_t seedlen;
- int status;
+ DRBG_STATUS state;
- /* Application data: typically (only?) used by test get_entropy */
+ /* Application data, mainly used in the KATs. */
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
- /* Implementation specific structures */
- DRBG_CTR_CTX ctr;
+ /* Implementation specific structures; was a union, but inline for now */
+ RAND_DRBG_CTR ctr;
- /* entropy gathering function */
+ /* Callback functions. See comments in rand_lib.c */
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy;
- /* Indicates we have finished with entropy buffer */
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy;
- /* nonce gathering function */
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce;
- /* Indicates we have finished with nonce buffer */
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce;
};
-
-extern RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth;
-void rand_drbg_cleanup(void);
+/* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */
+extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth;
+extern RAND_BYTES_BUFFER rand_bytes;
+extern RAND_DRBG rand_drbg;
/* Hardware-based seeding functions. */
-void rand_rdtsc(void);
-int rand_rdcpu(void);
+void rand_read_tsc(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
+int rand_read_cpu(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
+
+/* DRBG entropy callbacks. */
+void drbg_release_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out);
+size_t drbg_entropy_from_parent(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
+size_t drbg_entropy_from_system(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
/* DRBG functions implementing AES-CTR */
-int ctr_init(DRBG_CTX *dctx);
-int ctr_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx);
-int ctr_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+int ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+int ctr_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *nonce, size_t noncelen,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen);
-int ctr_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int ctr_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *ent, size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
-int ctr_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int ctr_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 05aa45c..059bd55 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+RAND_BYTES_BUFFER rand_bytes;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
@@ -40,14 +41,14 @@ static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
* it's not sufficient to indicate whether or not the seeding was
* done.
*/
-void rand_rdtsc(void)
+void rand_read_tsc(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
unsigned char c;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
- RAND_add(&c, 1, 0.5);
+ cb(arg, &c, 1, 0.5);
}
}
#endif
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
-int rand_rdcpu(void)
+int rand_read_cpu(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
size_t i, s;
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ int rand_rdcpu(void)
s = OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed();
if (s == 0)
break;
- RAND_add(&s, (int)sizeof(s), sizeof(s));
+ cb(arg, &s, (int)sizeof(s), sizeof(s));
}
if (i >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED)
return 1;
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ int rand_rdcpu(void)
s = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
if (s == 0)
break;
- RAND_add(&s, (int)sizeof(s), sizeof(s));
+ cb(arg, &s, (int)sizeof(s), sizeof(s));
}
if (i >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED)
return 1;
@@ -90,15 +91,117 @@ int rand_rdcpu(void)
}
#endif
+
+/*
+ * DRBG has two sets of callbacks; we only discuss the "entropy" one
+ * here. When the DRBG needs additional randomness bits (called entropy
+ * in the NIST document), it calls the get_entropy callback which fills in
+ * a pointer and returns the number of bytes. When the DRBG is finished with
+ * the buffer, it calls the cleanup_entropy callback, with the value of
+ * the buffer that the get_entropy callback filled in.
+ *
+ * Get entropy from the system, via RAND_poll if needed. The |entropy|
+ * is the bits of randomness required, and is expected to fit into a buffer
+ * of |min_len|..|max__len| size. We assume we're getting high-quality
+ * randomness from the system, and that |min_len| bytes will do.
+ */
+size_t drbg_entropy_from_system(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+
+ if (min_len > (size_t)drbg->size) {
+ /* Should not happen. See comment near RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. */
+ min_len = drbg->size;
+ }
+
+ if (rand_drbg.filled) {
+ /* Re-use what we have. */
+ *pout = drbg->randomness;
+ return drbg->size;
+ }
+
+ /* If we don't have enough, try to get more. */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_bytes.lock);
+ for (i = RAND_POLL_RETRIES; rand_bytes.curr < min_len && --i >= 0; ) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_bytes.lock);
+ RAND_poll();
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_bytes.lock);
+ }
+
+ /* Get desired amount, but no more than we have. */
+ if (min_len > rand_bytes.curr)
+ min_len = rand_bytes.curr;
+ if (min_len != 0) {
+ memcpy(drbg->randomness, rand_bytes.buff, min_len);
+ rand_drbg.filled = 1;
+ /* Update amount left and shift it down. */
+ rand_bytes.curr -= min_len;
+ if (rand_bytes.curr != 0)
+ memmove(rand_bytes.buff, &rand_bytes.buff[min_len], rand_bytes.curr);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_bytes.lock);
+ return min_len;
+}
+
+size_t drbg_entropy_from_parent(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ int st;
+
+ if (min_len > (size_t)drbg->size) {
+ /* Should not happen. See comment near RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. */
+ min_len = drbg->size;
+ }
+
+ /* Get random from parent, include our state as additional input. */
+ st = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent, drbg->randomness, min_len, 0,
+ (unsigned char *)drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
+ if (st == 0)
+ return 0;
+ drbg->filled = 1;
+ return min_len;
+}
+
+void drbg_release_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ drbg->filled = 0;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(drbg->randomness, sizeof(drbg->randomness));
+}
+
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
int ret = 1;
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_engine_lock != NULL;
#endif
rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL;
+
+ rand_bytes.lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ ret &= rand_bytes.lock != NULL;
+ rand_bytes.curr = 0;
+ rand_bytes.size = MAX_RANDOMNESS_HELD;
+ /* TODO: Should this be secure malloc? */
+ rand_bytes.buff = malloc(rand_bytes.size);
+ ret &= rand_bytes.buff != NULL;
+
+ rand_drbg.lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ ret &= rand_drbg.lock != NULL;
+ rand_drbg.size = RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
+ rand_drbg.randomness = OPENSSL_malloc(rand_drbg.size);
+ ret &= rand_drbg.randomness != NULL;
+ /* If you change these parameters, see RANDOMNESS_NEEDED */
+ ret &= RAND_DRBG_set(&rand_drbg,
+ NID_aes_128_ctr, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF) == 1;
+ ret &= RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(&rand_drbg, drbg_entropy_from_system,
+ drbg_release_entropy,
+ NULL, NULL) == 1;
return ret;
}
@@ -113,7 +216,24 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
- rand_drbg_cleanup();
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_bytes.lock);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(rand_drbg.randomness, rand_drbg.size);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_drbg.lock);
+ RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(&rand_drbg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * RAND_poll_ex() gets a function pointer to call when it has random bytes.
+ * RAND_poll() sets the function pointer to be a wrapper that calls RAND_add().
+ */
+static void call_rand_add(void* arg, const void *buf, int num, double r)
+{
+ RAND_add(buf, num, r);
+}
+
+int RAND_poll(void)
+{
+ return RAND_poll_ex(call_rand_add, NULL);
}
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
@@ -150,10 +270,10 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
} else {
ENGINE_finish(e);
- default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
+ default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
}
#else
- default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
+ default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
#endif
}
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 2cfd20d..eecd544 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -41,17 +41,16 @@
* uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
* interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
* relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
- * it can be read.
+ * it can be read. If it is ported to an environment where execution speed
+ * is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
+ * clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results
+ * would be far more predictable. This should only be used for legacy
+ * platforms.
*
- * If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is more
- * constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the clock can be
- * read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results would be far
- * more predictable.
- *
- * As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of seed
+ * As a precaution, we generate four times the required amount of seed
* data.
*/
-int RAND_poll(void)
+int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
short int code;
gid_t curr_gid;
@@ -73,11 +72,11 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
* different processes.
*/
curr_gid = getgid();
- RAND_add(&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 0);
+ cb(arg, &curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 0);
curr_pid = getpid();
- RAND_add(&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 0);
+ cb(arg, &curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 0);
curr_uid = getuid();
- RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 0);
+ cb(arg, &curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 0);
for (i = 0; i < (RANDOMNESS_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
/*
@@ -100,7 +99,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
/* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
- RAND_add(&v, sizeof v, 1);
+ cb(arg, &v, sizeof v, 1);
}
return 1;
}
@@ -128,36 +127,33 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
# error "librandom not (yet) supported"
# endif
-int RAND_poll(void)
+/*
+ * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when succesful.
+ */
+int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE
return 0;
# else
- int ok = 0;
+ int ok = 1;
char temp[RANDOMNESS_NEEDED];
# define TEMPSIZE (int)sizeof(temp)
-# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
- rand_rdtsc();
-# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
+ {
+ int i = getrandom(temp, TEMPSIZE, 0);
-# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
- if (rand_rdcpu())
- ok++;
+ if (i >= 0) {
+ cb(arg, temp, i, i);
+ if (i == TEMPSIZE)
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
+# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
{
- static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
- if (RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i], temp, TEMPSIZE) == TEMPSIZE) {
- RAND_add(temp, TEMPSIZE, TEMPSIZE);
- ok++;
- break;
- }
- }
+ /* Not yet implemented. */
}
# endif
@@ -172,29 +168,43 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
continue;
setbuf(fp, NULL);
if (fread(temp, 1, TEMPSIZE, fp) == TEMPSIZE) {
- RAND_add(temp, TEMPSIZE, TEMPSIZE);
- ok++;
+ cb(arg, temp, TEMPSIZE, TEMPSIZE);
fclose(fp);
- break;
+ goto done;
}
+ fclose(fp);
}
}
# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
+# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
+ rand_read_tsc(cb, arg);
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
+ if (rand_read_cpu(cb, arg))
+ goto done;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
{
- int i = getrandom(temp, TEMPSIZE, 0);
+ static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
+ int i;
- if (i >= 0) {
- RAND_add(temp, i, i);
- if (i == TEMPSIZE)
- ok++;
+ for (i = 0; paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i], temp, TEMPSIZE) == TEMPSIZE) {
+ cb(arg, temp, TEMPSIZE, TEMPSIZE);
+ goto done;
+ }
}
}
# endif
+ ok = 0;
+
+done:
OPENSSL_cleanse(temp, TEMPSIZE);
- return ok > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+ return ok;
# endif
}
# endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
index 16afae7..a6bb76d 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static struct items_data_st {
{0, 0}
};
-int RAND_poll(void)
+int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
/* determine the number of items in the JPI array */
struct items_data_st item_entry;
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
total_length += (tmp_length - 1);
/* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */
- RAND_add((PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length * 4, total_length * 2);
+ cb(arg, (PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length * 4, total_length * 2);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
index acc4286..5685ee8 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
# define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
# endif
-int RAND_poll(void)
+int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg)
{
# ifndef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
@@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
int ok = 0;
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
- rand_rdtsc();
+ rand_read_tsc(cb, arg);
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
- if (rand_rdcpu())
+ if (rand_read_cpu(cb, arg))
ok++;
# endif
@@ -60,14 +60,14 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buf, (ULONG)sizeof(buf),
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
return 0;
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ cb(arg, buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
return 1;
# else
/* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, (DWORD)sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) {
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ cb(arg, buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
ok++;
}
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC,
CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, (DWORD)sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) {
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ cb(arg, buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
ok++;
}
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
index 9cd733b..2b676fd 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c
@@ -136,16 +136,6 @@ BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
} else
e = rsa->e;
- if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL
- && bn_get_words(rsa->d) != NULL) {
- /*
- * if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as
- * unpredictable seed
- */
- RAND_add(bn_get_words(rsa->d), bn_get_dmax(rsa->d) * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
- 0.0);
- }
-
{
BIGNUM *n = BN_new();
diff --git a/doc/man3/RAND_add.pod b/doc/man3/RAND_add.pod
index ee54390..5006bdb 100644
--- a/doc/man3/RAND_add.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/RAND_add.pod
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
=head1 NAME
-RAND_add, RAND_poll, RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen
+RAND_add, RAND_poll, RAND_poll_ex, RAND_poll_fn,
+RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen
- add randomness to the PRNG or get its status
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -10,7 +11,11 @@ RAND_add, RAND_poll, RAND_seed, RAND_status, RAND_event, RAND_screen
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int RAND_status(void);
- int RAND_poll()
+
+ typedef void (*RAND_poll_fn)(void *arg,
+ const void *buf, int num, double randomness);
+ int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
+ int RAND_poll();
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness);
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
@@ -35,11 +40,16 @@ and network packet timings, can be reasonable sources of seeding material.
RAND_status() indicates whether or not the CSPRNG has been sufficiently
seeded. If not, functions such as RAND_bytes(3) will fail.
-RAND_poll() uses the current capabilities to seed the CSPRNG. The
-exact features used depends on how OpenSSL was configured, and can
-be displayed with the OpenSSL L<version(1)> command. This function is
-normally called automatically during OpenSSL initialization, but
-can be called by the application to reseed the CSPRNG.
+RAND_poll_ex() uses the system's capabilities to obtain a buffer
+containing random bits which can then be used to seed a CSPRNG. The
+exact features used depends on how OpenSSL was configured, and a summary
+can be displayed with the OpenSSL L<version(1)> command. This function
+is normally called as needed by the CSPRNG. The B<arg> parameter is an
+arbitrary pointer which will be passed as an argument to the callback.
+The B<cb> function is called each time there is data to add.
+
+RAND_poll() invokes RAND_poll_ex() with B<cb> and B<arg> set so that it
+will call RAND_add(), to add the randomness to the global CSPRNG.
RAND_add() mixes the B<num> bytes at B<buf> into the PRNG state.
The B<randomness> argument is an estimate of how much randomness is
diff --git a/include/internal/rand.h b/include/internal/rand.h
index 07568ea..2f38095 100644
--- a/include/internal/rand.h
+++ b/include/internal/rand.h
@@ -10,49 +10,55 @@
#ifndef HEADER_DRBG_RAND_H
# define HEADER_DRBG_RAND_H
-/* Flag for CTR mode only: use derivation function ctr_df */
+/* In CTR mode, use derivation function ctr_df */
#define RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF 0x2
-const RAND_METHOD *RAND_drbg(void);
-
-int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags);
-DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, DRBG_CTX *parent);
-int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+/*
+ * Object lifetime functions.
+ */
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent);
+int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags);
+int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen);
-int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx);
-int RAND_DRBG_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
-int RAND_DRBG_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+
+/*
+ * Object "use" functions.
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
+int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
-void RAND_DRBG_free(DRBG_CTX *dctx);
+int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int interval);
+
+/*
+ * EXDATA
+ */
+#define RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
+ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
+int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *dctx, int idx, void *arg);
+void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *dctx, int idx);
-typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
+/*
+ * Callback functions. See comments in drbg_lib.c
+ */
+typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
+ unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len,
size_t max_len);
-typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- size_t olen);
-typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
+typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out);
+typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len,
size_t max_len);
-typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
- size_t olen);
+typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char *out);
-int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *dctx,
RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy,
RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce);
-int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int interval);
-
-#define RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \
- CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, l, p, newf, dupf, freef)
-int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx, void *arg);
-void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx);
-
-DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_get_default(void);
-
-
#endif
-
-
diff --git a/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h b/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
index 49bdead..b007776 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+++ b/include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ec_key_st EC_KEY;
typedef struct ec_key_method_st EC_KEY_METHOD;
typedef struct rand_meth_st RAND_METHOD;
-typedef struct drbg_ctx_st DRBG_CTX;
+typedef struct rand_drbg_st RAND_DRBG;
typedef struct ssl_dane_st SSL_DANE;
typedef struct x509_st X509;
diff --git a/include/openssl/rand.h b/include/openssl/rand.h
index 17bd70d..2aecbb7 100644
--- a/include/openssl/rand.h
+++ b/include/openssl/rand.h
@@ -33,27 +33,37 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine);
# endif
+
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void);
+
# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
# define RAND_cleanup() while(0) continue
# endif
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num))
+
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+
# if defined(__ANDROID__) && defined(__NDK_FPABI__)
__NDK_FPABI__ /* __attribute__((pcs("aapcs"))) on ARM */
# endif
+
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness);
int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long max_bytes);
int RAND_write_file(const char *file);
const char *RAND_file_name(char *file, size_t num);
int RAND_status(void);
+
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EGD
int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes);
int RAND_egd(const char *path);
int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes);
# endif
+
+typedef void (*RAND_poll_fn)(void *arg,
+ const void *buf, int num, double randomness);
int RAND_poll(void);
+int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg);
# if defined(_WIN32) && (defined(BASETYPES) || defined(_WINDEF_H))
/* application has to include <windows.h> in order to use these */
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.c b/ssl/statem/statem.c
index e5a50c4..4f259fd 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem.c
@@ -272,7 +272,6 @@ static info_cb get_callback(SSL *s)
static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
- unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret = -1;
@@ -283,7 +282,6 @@ static int state_machine(SSL *s, int server)
return -1;
}
- RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
diff --git a/test/bntest.c b/test/bntest.c
index a570d00..4dae660 100644
--- a/test/bntest.c
+++ b/test/bntest.c
@@ -2035,11 +2035,8 @@ static int run_file_tests(int i)
int setup_tests(void)
{
- static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "If not seeded, BN_generate_prime might fail";
int n = test_get_argument_count();
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = BN_CTX_new()))
return 0;
diff --git a/test/build.info b/test/build.info
index db34a5f..34d72d7 100644
--- a/test/build.info
+++ b/test/build.info
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ INCLUDE_MAIN___test_libtestutil_OLB = /INCLUDE=MAIN
hmactest \
rc2test rc4test rc5test \
destest mdc2test \
- randtest dhtest enginetest casttest \
+ dhtest enginetest casttest \
bftest ssltest_old dsatest exptest rsa_test \
evp_test evp_extra_test igetest v3nametest v3ext \
crltest danetest bad_dtls_test lhash_test \
@@ -119,10 +119,6 @@ INCLUDE_MAIN___test_libtestutil_OLB = /INCLUDE=MAIN
INCLUDE[mdc2test]=../include
DEPEND[mdc2test]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
- SOURCE[randtest]=randtest.c
- INCLUDE[randtest]=../include
- DEPEND[randtest]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
-
SOURCE[dhtest]=dhtest.c
INCLUDE[dhtest]=.. ../include
DEPEND[dhtest]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
index 6403f77..595732c 100644
--- a/test/dhtest.c
+++ b/test/dhtest.c
@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@
static int cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg);
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
-
static int dh_test(void)
{
BN_GENCB *_cb = NULL;
@@ -40,8 +37,6 @@ static int dh_test(void)
int i, alen, blen, aout, bout;
int ret = 0;
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
-
if (!TEST_ptr(_cb = BN_GENCB_new()))
goto err;
BN_GENCB_set(_cb, &cb, NULL);
diff --git a/test/drbgtest.c b/test/drbgtest.c
index 90ed2ef..f28cd48 100644
--- a/test/drbgtest.c
+++ b/test/drbgtest.c
@@ -92,18 +92,18 @@ typedef struct drbg_selftest_data_st {
make_drbg_test_data(nid, RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF, pr, p)
static DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA drbg_test[] = {
- make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_128_ctr, aes_128_use_df, 0),
- make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_192_ctr, aes_192_use_df, 0),
- make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_256_ctr, aes_256_use_df, 1),
make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_128_ctr, 0, aes_128_no_df, 0),
make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_192_ctr, 0, aes_192_no_df, 0),
make_drbg_test_data (NID_aes_256_ctr, 0, aes_256_no_df, 1),
+ make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_128_ctr, aes_128_use_df, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_192_ctr, aes_192_use_df, 0),
+ make_drbg_test_data_df(NID_aes_256_ctr, aes_256_use_df, 1),
};
static int app_data_index;
/*
- * Test context data, attached as appdata to the DRBG_CTX
+ * Test context data, attached as EXDATA to the RAND_DRBG
*/
typedef struct test_ctx_st {
const unsigned char *ent;
@@ -114,29 +114,29 @@ typedef struct test_ctx_st {
int noncecnt;
} TEST_CTX;
-static size_t kat_entropy(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char **pout,
+static size_t kat_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
- TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index);
+ TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
t->entcnt++;
*pout = (unsigned char *)t->ent;
return t->entlen;
}
-static size_t kat_nonce(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char **pout,
+static size_t kat_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
- TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index);
+ TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index);
t->noncecnt++;
*pout = (unsigned char *)t->nonce;
return t->noncelen;
}
-static int uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
+static int uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- int ret = dctx == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(dctx);
+ int ret = drbg == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
ERR_clear_error();
return ret;
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
*/
static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
{
- DRBG_CTX *dctx = NULL;
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
TEST_CTX t;
int failures = 0;
unsigned char buff[1024];
@@ -156,9 +156,9 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
* Test without PR: Instantiate DRBG with test entropy, nonce and
* personalisation string.
*/
- if (!TEST_ptr(dctx = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL)))
+ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL)))
return 0;
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(dctx, kat_entropy, NULL,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
kat_nonce, NULL))) {
failures++;
goto err;
@@ -168,10 +168,10 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
t.entlen = td->entlen;
t.nonce = td->nonce;
t.noncelen = td->noncelen;
- RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index, &t);
+ RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen))
- || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->expected, td->exlen, buff, td->exlen))
failures++;
@@ -179,29 +179,29 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
/* Reseed DRBG with test entropy and additional input */
t.ent = td->entreseed;
t.entlen = td->entreseedlen;
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen)
- || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->kat2len, 0,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen)
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->kat2len, 0,
td->adin2, td->adin2len))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat2, td->kat2len, buff, td->kat2len)))
failures++;
- uninstantiate(dctx);
+ uninstantiate(drbg);
/*
* Now test with PR: Instantiate DRBG with test entropy, nonce and
* personalisation string.
*/
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(dctx, td->nid, td->flags))
- || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(dctx, kat_entropy, NULL,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, td->nid, td->flags))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
kat_nonce, NULL)))
failures++;
- RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index, &t);
+ RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, &t);
t.ent = td->ent_pr;
t.entlen = td->entlen_pr;
t.nonce = td->nonce_pr;
t.noncelen = td->noncelen_pr;
t.entcnt = 0;
t.noncecnt = 0;
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers_pr, td->perslen_pr)))
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers_pr, td->perslen_pr)))
failures++;
/*
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
*/
t.ent = td->entpr_pr;
t.entlen = td->entprlen_pr;
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->katlen_pr, 1,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->katlen_pr, 1,
td->adin_pr, td->adinlen_pr))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat_pr, td->katlen_pr, buff, td->katlen_pr))
failures++;
@@ -221,28 +221,28 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
t.ent = td->entg_pr;
t.entlen = td->entglen_pr;
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->kat2len_pr, 1,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->kat2len_pr, 1,
td->ading_pr, td->adinglen_pr))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat2_pr, td->kat2len_pr,
buff, td->kat2len_pr))
failures++;
err:
- uninstantiate(dctx);
- RAND_DRBG_free(dctx);
+ uninstantiate(drbg);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return failures == 0;
}
/*
* Initialise a DRBG based on selftest data
*/
-static int init(DRBG_CTX *dctx, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td, TEST_CTX *t)
+static int init(RAND_DRBG *drbg, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td, TEST_CTX *t)
{
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(dctx, td->nid, td->flags))
- || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(dctx, kat_entropy, NULL,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, td->nid, td->flags))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
kat_nonce, NULL)))
return 0;
- RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(dctx, app_data_index, t);
+ RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index, t);
t->ent = td->ent;
t->entlen = td->entlen;
t->nonce = td->nonce;
@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ static int init(DRBG_CTX *dctx, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td, TEST_CTX *t)
/*
* Initialise and instantiate DRBG based on selftest data
*/
-static int instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td,
+static int instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td,
TEST_CTX *t)
{
- if (!TEST_true(init(dctx, td, t))
- || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen)))
+ if (!TEST_true(init(drbg, td, t))
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -270,14 +270,14 @@ static int instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td,
*/
static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
{
- static char zero[sizeof(DRBG_CTX)];
- DRBG_CTX *dctx = NULL;
+ static char zero[sizeof(RAND_DRBG)];
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
TEST_CTX t;
unsigned char buff[1024];
unsigned int reseed_counter_tmp;
int ret = 0;
- if (!TEST_ptr(dctx = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
+ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
goto err;
/*
@@ -285,8 +285,8 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
*/
/* Test detection of too large personlisation string */
- if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
- || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, dctx->max_pers + 1) > 0)
+ if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
+ || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_pers + 1) > 0)
goto err;
/*
@@ -295,27 +295,27 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
/* Test entropy source failure detecion: i.e. returns no data */
t.entlen = 0;
- if (TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen), 0))
+ if (TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen), 0))
goto err;
/* Try to generate output from uninstantiated DRBG */
- if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
+ if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test insufficient entropy */
- t.entlen = dctx->min_entropy - 1;
- if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
- || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ t.entlen = drbg->min_entropy - 1;
+ if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
+ || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test too much entropy */
- t.entlen = dctx->max_entropy + 1;
- if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
- || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ t.entlen = drbg->max_entropy + 1;
+ if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
+ || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
@@ -323,37 +323,37 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
*/
/* Test too small nonce */
- if (dctx->min_nonce) {
- t.noncelen = dctx->min_nonce - 1;
- if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
- || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ if (drbg->min_nonce) {
+ t.noncelen = drbg->min_nonce - 1;
+ if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
+ || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
}
/* Test too large nonce */
- if (dctx->max_nonce) {
- t.noncelen = dctx->max_nonce + 1;
- if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
- || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(dctx, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ if (drbg->max_nonce) {
+ t.noncelen = drbg->max_nonce + 1;
+ if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
+ || RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
}
/* Instantiate with valid data, Check generation is now OK */
- if (!instantiate(dctx, td, &t)
- || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
+ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t)
+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen)))
goto err;
/* Request too much data for one request */
- if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, dctx->max_request + 1, 0,
+ if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, drbg->max_request + 1, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen)))
goto err;
/* Try too large additional input */
- if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
- td->adin, dctx->max_adin + 1)))
+ if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
+ td->adin, drbg->max_adin + 1)))
goto err;
/*
@@ -361,24 +361,24 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
* failure.
*/
t.entlen = 0;
- if (TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 1,
+ if (TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Instantiate again with valid data */
- if (!instantiate(dctx, td, &t))
+ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
- reseed_counter_tmp = dctx->reseed_counter;
- dctx->reseed_counter = dctx->reseed_interval;
+ reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_counter;
+ drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
/* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */
t.entcnt = 0;
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !TEST_int_eq(t.entcnt, 1)
- || !TEST_int_eq(dctx->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
@@ -386,24 +386,24 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
* failure.
*/
t.entlen = 0;
- if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 1,
+ if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test reseed counter works */
- if (!instantiate(dctx, td, &t))
+ if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
- reseed_counter_tmp = dctx->reseed_counter;
- dctx->reseed_counter = dctx->reseed_interval;
+ reseed_counter_tmp = drbg->reseed_counter;
+ drbg->reseed_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
/* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */
t.entcnt = 0;
- if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(dctx, buff, td->exlen, 0,
+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !TEST_int_eq(t.entcnt, 1)
- || !TEST_int_eq(dctx->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(drbg->reseed_counter, reseed_counter_tmp + 1)
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
@@ -411,41 +411,41 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
*/
/* Test explicit reseed with too large additional input */
- if (!init(dctx, td, &t)
- || RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adin, dctx->max_adin + 1) > 0)
+ if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
+ || RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adin + 1) > 0)
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with entropy source failure */
t.entlen = 0;
- if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with too much entropy */
- if (!init(dctx, td, &t))
+ if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
- t.entlen = dctx->max_entropy + 1;
- if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ t.entlen = drbg->max_entropy + 1;
+ if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with too little entropy */
- if (!init(dctx, td, &t))
+ if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
- t.entlen = dctx->min_entropy - 1;
- if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
- || !uninstantiate(dctx))
+ t.entlen = drbg->min_entropy - 1;
+ if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0)
+ || !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Standard says we have to check uninstantiate really zeroes */
- if (!TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(dctx->ctr), &dctx->ctr, sizeof(dctx->ctr)))
+ if (!TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(drbg->ctr), &drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr)))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
- uninstantiate(dctx);
- RAND_DRBG_free(dctx);
+ uninstantiate(drbg);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return ret;
}
@@ -475,6 +475,19 @@ err:
return rv;
}
+#define RAND_ADD_SIZE 500
+
+static int test_rand_add()
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(p = malloc(RAND_ADD_SIZE)))
+ return 0;
+ RAND_add(p, RAND_ADD_SIZE, RAND_ADD_SIZE);
+ free(p);
+ return 1;
+}
+
int setup_tests(void)
{
@@ -482,5 +495,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_kats, OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test));
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_error_checks, OSSL_NELEM(drbg_test));
+ ADD_TEST(test_rand_add);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/test/dsatest.c b/test/dsatest.c
index 09a49fc..7c58731 100644
--- a/test/dsatest.c
+++ b/test/dsatest.c
@@ -63,9 +63,6 @@ static unsigned char out_g[] = {
static const unsigned char str1[] = "12345678901234567890";
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
-
static int dsa_test(void)
{
BN_GENCB *cb;
@@ -77,8 +74,6 @@ static int dsa_test(void)
unsigned int siglen;
const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL;
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
-
if (!TEST_ptr(cb = BN_GENCB_new()))
goto end;
diff --git a/test/ecdsatest.c b/test/ecdsatest.c
index ed29bc7..8bd9e6c 100644
--- a/test/ecdsatest.c
+++ b/test/ecdsatest.c
@@ -28,10 +28,6 @@
# include <openssl/err.h>
# include <openssl/rand.h>
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
-
-
/* functions to change the RAND_METHOD */
static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
@@ -401,8 +397,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
TEST_note("Elliptic curves are disabled.");
#else
- /* initialize the prng */
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof(rnd_seed));
ADD_TEST(x9_62_tests);
ADD_TEST(test_builtin);
#endif
diff --git a/test/ectest.c b/test/ectest.c
index 85bb462..fb6027b 100644
--- a/test/ectest.c
+++ b/test/ectest.c
@@ -1425,9 +1425,6 @@ static int parameter_test(void)
ECPARAMETERS_free(ecparameters);
return r;
}
-
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
#endif
int setup_tests(void)
@@ -1438,8 +1435,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
|| !TEST_true(EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)))
return 0;
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */
-
ADD_TEST(parameter_test);
ADD_TEST(prime_field_tests);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
diff --git a/test/randtest.c b/test/randtest.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 47d28f4..0000000
--- a/test/randtest.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "testutil.h"
-
-/* some FIPS 140-1 random number test */
-/* some simple tests */
-
-static int fips_random_tests(void)
-{
- unsigned char buf[2500];
- int i, j, k, s, sign, nsign, ret = 1;
- unsigned long n1;
- unsigned long n2[16];
- unsigned long runs[2][34];
- long d;
-
- if (!TEST_int_ge(RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)), 0))
- return 0;
-
- n1 = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- n2[i] = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < 34; i++)
- runs[0][i] = runs[1][i] = 0;
-
- /* test 1 and 2 */
- sign = 0;
- nsign = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < 2500; i++) {
- j = buf[i];
-
- n2[j & 0x0f]++;
- n2[(j >> 4) & 0x0f]++;
-
- for (k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
- s = (j & 0x01);
- if (s == sign)
- nsign++;
- else {
- if (nsign > 34)
- nsign = 34;
- if (nsign != 0) {
- runs[sign][nsign - 1]++;
- if (nsign > 6)
- runs[sign][5]++;
- }
- sign = s;
- nsign = 1;
- }
-
- if (s)
- n1++;
- j >>= 1;
- }
- }
- if (nsign > 34)
- nsign = 34;
- if (nsign != 0)
- runs[sign][nsign - 1]++;
-
- /* test 1 */
- if (!TEST_true(9654 < n1 && n1 < 10346)) {
- TEST_info("test 1 failed, X=%lu", n1);
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- /* test 2 */
- d = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- d += n2[i] * n2[i];
- d = (d * 8) / 25 - 500000;
- if (!TEST_true(103 < d && d < 5740)) {
- TEST_info("test 2 failed, X=%ld.%02ld", d / 100L, d % 100L);
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- /* test 3 */
- for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
- if (!TEST_true(2267 < runs[i][0] && runs[i][0] < 2733)
- || !TEST_true(1079 < runs[i][1] && runs[i][1] < 1421)
- || !TEST_true(502 < runs[i][2] && runs[i][2] < 748)
- || !TEST_true(223 < runs[i][3] && runs[i][3] < 402)
- || !TEST_true(90 < runs[i][4] && runs[i][4] < 223)
- || !TEST_true(90 < runs[i][5] && runs[i][5] < 223)) {
- TEST_info("During run %d", i);
- ret = 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* test 4 */
- if (!TEST_int_eq(runs[0][33], 0)
- || !TEST_int_eq(runs[1][33], 0))
- ret = 0;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int setup_tests(void)
-{
- ADD_TEST(fips_random_tests);
- return 1;
-}
diff --git a/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t b/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
index 64840db..69c92ff 100644
--- a/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
+++ b/test/recipes/05-test_rand.t
@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@ use strict;
use warnings;
use OpenSSL::Test;
-plan tests => 2;
+plan tests => 1;
setup("test_rand");
-ok(run(test(["randtest"])));
ok(run(test(["drbgtest"])));
diff --git a/test/ssltest_old.c b/test/ssltest_old.c
index 7cfddd2..37e980d 100644
--- a/test/ssltest_old.c
+++ b/test/ssltest_old.c
@@ -613,8 +613,6 @@ static int custom_ext_3_srv_add_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
static char *cipher = NULL;
static int verbose = 0;
static int debug = 0;
-static const char rnd_seed[] =
- "string to make the random number generator think it has randomness";
int doit_localhost(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, int family,
long bytes, clock_t *s_time, clock_t *c_time);
@@ -928,8 +926,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1);
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
- RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
-
bio_stdout = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
s_cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
index 1707459..023b649 100644
--- a/util/libcrypto.num
+++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -4345,10 +4345,8 @@ OSSL_STORE_LOADER_get0_engine 4287 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_fork_prepare 4288 1_1_1 EXIST:UNIX:FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_fork_parent 4289 1_1_1 EXIST:UNIX:FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_fork_child 4290 1_1_1 EXIST:UNIX:FUNCTION:
-RAND_drbg 4291 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_instantiate 4292 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate 4293 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-RAND_DRBG_get_default 4294 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_set 4295 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks 4296 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RAND_DRBG_new 4297 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -4373,3 +4371,4 @@ SCRYPT_PARAMS_it 4314 1_1_1 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:
CRYPTO_secure_clear_free 4315 1_1_0g EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_meth_get0 4316 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_meth_get_count 4317 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+RAND_poll_ex 4318 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
diff --git a/util/private.num b/util/private.num
index a586a9b..a25f47a 100644
--- a/util/private.num
+++ b/util/private.num
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ OSSL_STORE_error_fn datatype
OSSL_STORE_load_fn datatype
OSSL_STORE_open_fn datatype
OSSL_STORE_post_process_info_fn datatype
+RAND_poll_fn datatype
SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func datatype
SSL_early_cb_fn datatype
SSL_psk_client_cb_func datatype
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