[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Rich Salz
rsalz at openssl.org
Sat Jul 15 12:12:24 UTC 2017
The branch master has been updated
via da8fc25a989cf4f4d26d626a85477e8a9282da12 (commit)
from 71d57be52e7c4d5389dfe950ad9ee4e54aea5411 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit da8fc25a989cf4f4d26d626a85477e8a9282da12
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
Date: Thu Jun 22 09:21:43 2017 -0400
Start to overhaul RAND API
Remove unused rand_hw_xor, MD/EVP indirection
Make rand_pseudo same as rand.
Cleanup formatting and ifdef control
Rename some things:
- rand_meth to openssl_rand_meth; make it global
- source file
- lock/init functions, start per-thread state
- ossl_meth_init to ossl_rand_init
Put state into RAND_STATE structure
And put OSSL_RAND_STATE into ossl_typ.h
Use "randomness" instead of "entropy"
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk at mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3758)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/rand/build.info | 2 +-
crypto/rand/{md_rand.c => ossl_rand.c} | 329 ++++++++++++++-------------------
crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h | 36 +---
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 95 +++++-----
crypto/rand/rand_unix.c | 19 +-
crypto/rand/rand_vms.c | 79 ++++----
6 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 322 deletions(-)
rename crypto/rand/{md_rand.c => ossl_rand.c} (65%)
diff --git a/crypto/rand/build.info b/crypto/rand/build.info
index 3ad50e2..9e0a90b 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/build.info
+++ b/crypto/rand/build.info
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
- md_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
+ ossl_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
similarity index 65%
rename from crypto/rand/md_rand.c
rename to crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
index 8cbfae1..016653d 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
@@ -23,35 +23,40 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/async.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
-
#include <openssl/err.h>
-
#include <internal/thread_once.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
#if defined(BN_DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
-# define PREDICT
+# define PREDICT 1
#endif
-/* #define PREDICT 1 */
-
#define STATE_SIZE 1023
-static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
-static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
-static double entropy = 0;
-static int initialized = 0;
+typedef struct ossl_rand_state_st OSSL_RAND_STATE;
+
+struct ossl_rand_state_st {
+ size_t num;
+ size_t index;
+ unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ long md_count[2];
+};
+static OSSL_RAND_STATE global_state;
+static double randomness = 0;
+static int initialized = 0;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key;
/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */
static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-/* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */
-/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+/*
+ * access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock;
+ * valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set
+ */
static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid;
#ifdef PREDICT
@@ -60,51 +65,35 @@ int rand_predictable = 0;
static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-static void rand_cleanup(void);
-static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
-static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
-static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-#endif
-static int rand_status(void);
+static void rand_thread_cleanup(void *arg)
+{
+ OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = arg;
-static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
- rand_seed,
- rand_nopseudo_bytes,
- rand_cleanup,
- rand_add,
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
- rand_pseudo_bytes,
-#else
- NULL,
-#endif
- rand_status
-};
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(sp, sizeof(*sp));
+}
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_rand_init)
{
+ int ret = 1;
+
OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ ret &= rand_lock != NULL;
rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- return rand_lock != NULL && rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
+ ret &= rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
+ ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&key, rand_thread_cleanup) == 1;
+ return ret;
}
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
- return (&rand_meth);
+ return &openssl_rand_meth;
}
static void rand_cleanup(void)
{
- OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
- state_num = 0;
- state_index = 0;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- md_count[0] = 0;
- md_count[1] = 0;
- entropy = 0;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&global_state, sizeof(global_state));
+ randomness = 0;
initialized = 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock);
@@ -114,10 +103,11 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
{
int i, j, k, st_idx;
long md_c[2];
- unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX *m;
int do_not_lock;
int rv = 0;
+ OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
if (!num)
return 1;
@@ -146,7 +136,7 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
if (m == NULL)
goto err;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
goto err;
/* check if we already have the lock */
@@ -160,58 +150,58 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
- st_idx = state_index;
+ st_idx = sp->index;
/*
* use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
* seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
* _some_ difference
*/
- md_c[0] = md_count[0];
- md_c[1] = md_count[1];
-
- memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
-
- /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
- state_index += num;
- if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
- state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
- state_num = STATE_SIZE;
- } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
- if (state_index > state_num)
- state_num = state_index;
+ md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
+ md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
+
+ memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md));
+
+ /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
+ sp->index += num;
+ if (sp->index >= STATE_SIZE) {
+ sp->index %= STATE_SIZE;
+ sp->num = STATE_SIZE;
+ } else if (sp->num < STATE_SIZE) {
+ if (sp->index > sp->num)
+ sp->num = sp->index;
}
- /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+ /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
/*
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
* will use now, but other threads may use them as well
*/
- md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
+ sp->md_count[1] += (num / RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
- for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i += RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
j = (num - i);
- j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
+ j = (j > RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
- if (!MD_Init(m))
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL))
goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
if (k > 0) {
- if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j - k))
goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
goto err;
- } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j))
+ } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j))
goto err;
- /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
- if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j))
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO EVP_DigestUpdate()! */
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, buf, j))
goto err;
/*
* We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
@@ -221,9 +211,9 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
* insecure keys.
*/
- if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
goto err;
- if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
goto err;
md_c[1]++;
@@ -238,7 +228,7 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
* conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
* random state.
*/
- state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
+ sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
st_idx = 0;
}
@@ -249,14 +239,14 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
/*
* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
* thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
- * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
+ * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much randomness as fits into
* md.
*/
- for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
- md[k] ^= local_md[k];
+ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(sp->md); k++) {
+ sp->md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}
- if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
- entropy += add;
+ if (randomness < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+ randomness += add;
if (!do_not_lock)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
@@ -271,15 +261,16 @@ static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
-static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
+static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i, j, k;
size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
- unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX *m;
+ OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
@@ -323,9 +314,9 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
if (m == NULL)
goto err_mem;
- /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ /* round upwards to multiple of RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
num_ceil =
- (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
+ (1 + (num - 1) / (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
@@ -345,7 +336,7 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
* global 'md'.
*/
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
goto err_mem;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
@@ -369,28 +360,28 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
if (!stirred_pool)
do_stir_pool = 1;
- ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+ ok = (randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
if (!ok) {
/*
* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
* output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
- * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
- * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
+ * to decrease the randomness estimate. Once we've had enough initial
+ * seeding we don't bother to adjust the randomness count, though,
* because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
* randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
- * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
- * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
- * entropy limit has been reached.
+ * we have enough randomness. Randomness should be collected in a
+ * separate input pool and be transferred to the output pool only
+ * when the randomness limit has been reached.
*/
- entropy -= num;
- if (entropy < 0)
- entropy = 0;
+ randomness -= num;
+ if (randomness < 0)
+ randomness = 0;
}
if (do_stir_pool) {
/*
* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
- * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
+ * better make sure that the required randomness gets 'evenly
* distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
* function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
* suitable for this purpose.
@@ -398,37 +389,37 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
while (n > 0) {
-#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
+#if RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
#endif
-#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH */
/*
* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
* rand_add expects to have something to hash.
*/
- rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
- n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
+ n -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
if (ok)
stirred_pool = 1;
}
- st_idx = state_index;
- st_num = state_num;
- md_c[0] = md_count[0];
- md_c[1] = md_count[1];
- memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+ st_idx = sp->index;
+ st_num = sp->num;
+ md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
+ md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
+ memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof sp->md);
- state_index += num_ceil;
- if (state_index > state_num)
- state_index %= state_num;
+ sp->index += num_ceil;
+ if (sp->index > sp->num)
+ sp->index %= sp->num;
/*
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
* ours (but other threads may use them too)
*/
- md_count[0] += 1;
+ sp->md_count[0] += 1;
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
@@ -436,63 +427,64 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
while (num > 0) {
- /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
- j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
+ /* num_ceil -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 */
+ j = (num >= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
num -= j;
- if (!MD_Init(m))
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL))
goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
- if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
- if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
goto err;
curr_time = 0;
if (!rand_hw_seed(m))
goto err;
}
- if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
goto err;
- k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
+ k = (st_idx + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
if (k > 0) {
- if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
goto err;
- } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
+ } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
goto err;
- if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
/* may compete with other threads */
- state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
+ sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
if (st_idx >= st_num)
st_idx = 0;
if (i < j)
- *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
+ *(buf++) = local_md[i + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
}
}
- if (!MD_Init(m)
- || !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))
- || !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
/*
* Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
*/
ASYNC_block_pause();
- if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, sp->md, NULL)) {
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
goto err;
}
@@ -502,14 +494,10 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
if (ok)
return (1);
- else if (pseudo)
- return 0;
- else {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
- ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
- "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
- return (0);
- }
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
+ "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
+ return (0);
err:
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
@@ -521,28 +509,13 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
}
-static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
- return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
-}
-
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
-/*
- * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
- */
-static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
- return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
-}
-#endif
-
static int rand_status(void)
{
CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur;
int ret;
int do_not_lock;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
return 0;
cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
@@ -578,7 +551,7 @@ static int rand_status(void)
initialized = 1;
}
- ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+ ret = randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
if (!do_not_lock) {
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
@@ -595,9 +568,6 @@ static int rand_status(void)
* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
* currently supports rdrand.
*/
-
-/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
-
#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
@@ -618,40 +588,12 @@ static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
if (rnd == 0)
return 1;
- if (!MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
-
-void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
-{
- size_t rnd;
- if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
- return;
- while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) {
- rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
- if (rnd == 0)
- return;
- *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
- buf += sizeof(size_t);
- num -= sizeof(size_t);
- }
- if (num) {
- rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
- if (rnd == 0)
- return;
- while (num) {
- *buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
- rnd >>= 8;
- buf++;
- num--;
- }
- }
-}
-
#else
static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
@@ -659,9 +601,14 @@ static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
return 1;
}
-void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
-{
- return;
-}
-
#endif
+
+
+RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth = {
+ rand_seed,
+ rand_bytes,
+ rand_cleanup,
+ rand_add,
+ rand_bytes,
+ rand_status
+};
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
index d98c90e..69c9630 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -10,37 +10,15 @@
#ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
# define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
-# define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */
-
-# if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-# define USE_SHA1_RAND
-# endif
+/* we require 256 bits of randomness */
+# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED (256 / 8)
# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# define MD_Update(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
-# define MD_Final(a,b) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL)
-# if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
-# include <openssl/md5.h>
-# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
-# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL)
-# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL)
-# elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
-# include <openssl/sha.h>
-# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
-# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
-# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
-# elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
-# include <openssl/mdc2.h>
-# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
-# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
-# elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-# include <openssl/md2.h>
-# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL)
-# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL)
-# endif
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+# define RAND_DIGEST EVP_sha1()
+# define RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
-void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
+extern RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth;
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 84d6b5d..1a1e282 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -14,17 +14,19 @@
#include "internal/rand.h"
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
-static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock = NULL;
+static ENGINE *funct_ref;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
#endif
-static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
+static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
int ret = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
@@ -36,9 +38,22 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
return ret;
}
+void rand_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
+
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
+ meth->cleanup();
+ RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+}
+
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
{
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
@@ -55,25 +70,26 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
- if (!default_RAND_meth) {
+ if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND();
- if (e) {
- default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e);
- if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
- ENGINE_finish(e);
- e = NULL;
- }
- }
- if (e)
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+ /* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
+ if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL
+ && (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) {
funct_ref = e;
- else
+ default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
+ } else {
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
+ }
+#else
+ default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
#endif
- default_RAND_meth = RAND_OpenSSL();
}
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
@@ -85,10 +101,10 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return 0;
- if (engine) {
+ if (engine != NULL) {
if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
return 0;
tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
@@ -106,55 +122,48 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
}
#endif
-void rand_cleanup_int(void)
-{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
- if (meth && meth->cleanup)
- meth->cleanup();
- RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
-#endif
-}
-
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->seed)
+
+ if (meth->seed != NULL)
meth->seed(buf, num);
}
-void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
+void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->add)
- meth->add(buf, num, entropy);
+
+ if (meth->add != NULL)
+ meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
}
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->bytes)
+
+ if (meth->bytes != NULL)
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->pseudorand)
+
+ if (meth->pseudorand != NULL)
return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
#endif
int RAND_status(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->status)
+
+ if (meth->status != NULL)
return meth->status();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 241f287..bfdd3e6 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
curr_uid = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (RANDOMNESS_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
/*
* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
* interference, etc.
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
unsigned long l;
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSS_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
- unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+ unsigned char tmpbuf[RANDOMNESS_NEEDED];
int n = 0;
# endif
# ifdef DEVRANDOM
@@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
# ifdef DEVRANDOM
memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats));
/*
- * Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have
+ * Use a randomness device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have
* this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs
* out of random entries.
*/
- for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) {
+ for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); i++) {
if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY
# ifdef O_NONBLOCK
| O_NONBLOCK
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (try_read) {
r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
- ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
+ RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n);
if (r > 0)
n += r;
} else
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
}
while ((r > 0 ||
(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0
- && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+ && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
close(fd);
}
@@ -255,16 +255,15 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
/*
- * Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy
- * collecting daemon.
+ * Use an EGD socket to read randomness from the daemon.
*/
- for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+ for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
egdsocket++) {
int r;
r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
- ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
+ RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n);
if (r > 0)
n += r;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
index 9c462dd..ec99dbf 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
@@ -7,16 +7,11 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-/*
- * Modified by VMS Software, Inc (2016)
- * Eliminate looping through all processes (performance)
- * Add additional randomizations using rand() function
- */
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include "rand_lcl.h"
# include <descrip.h>
# include <jpidef.h>
# include <ssdef.h>
@@ -34,9 +29,9 @@
# define PTR_T __void_ptr64
# pragma pointer_size save
# pragma pointer_size 32
-# else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+# else
# define PTR_T void *
-# endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+# endif
static struct items_data_st {
short length, code; /* length is number of bytes */
@@ -52,27 +47,22 @@ static struct items_data_st {
{4, JPI$_PPGCNT},
{4, JPI$_WSPEAK},
{4, JPI$_FINALEXC},
- {0, 0} /* zero terminated */
+ {0, 0}
};
int RAND_poll(void)
{
-
/* determine the number of items in the JPI array */
-
struct items_data_st item_entry;
- int item_entry_count = sizeof(items_data)/sizeof(item_entry);
-
+ int item_entry_count = OSSL_NELEM(items_data);
/* Create the JPI itemlist array to hold item_data content */
-
struct {
short length, code;
int *buffer;
int *retlen;
- } item[item_entry_count], *pitem; /* number of entries in items_data */
-
+ } item[item_entry_count], *pitem;
struct items_data_st *pitems_data;
- int data_buffer[(item_entry_count*2)+4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */
+ int data_buffer[(item_entry_count * 2) + 4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */
int iosb[2];
int sys_time[2];
int *ptr;
@@ -80,53 +70,46 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
int tmp_length = 0;
int total_length = 0;
- pitems_data = items_data;
- pitem = item;
-
-
/* Setup itemlist for GETJPI */
- while (pitems_data->length) {
+ pitems_data = items_data;
+ for (pitem = item; pitems_data->length != 0; pitem++) {
pitem->length = pitems_data->length;
pitem->code = pitems_data->code;
pitem->buffer = &data_buffer[total_length];
pitem->retlen = 0;
/* total_length is in longwords */
- total_length += pitems_data->length/4;
+ total_length += pitems_data->length / 4;
pitems_data++;
- pitem ++;
}
pitem->length = pitem->code = 0;
/* Fill data_buffer with various info bits from this process */
- /* and twist that data to seed the SSL random number init */
+ if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) != SS$_NORMAL)
+ return 0;
- if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) == SS$_NORMAL) {
- for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) {
- sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]);
- srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i);
+ /* Now twist that data to seed the SSL random number init */
+ for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) {
+ sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]);
+ srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i);
- if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */
- ptr = &data_buffer[i];
- for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
- data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j];
- /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */
- data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
- tmp_length++;
- }
- } else {
+ if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */
+ ptr = &data_buffer[i];
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+ data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j];
/* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */
- data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
+ data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
+ tmp_length++;
}
+ } else {
+ /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */
+ data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
}
-
- total_length += (tmp_length - 1);
-
- /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */
- RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length*4, total_length * 2);
- } else {
- return 0;
}
+ total_length += (tmp_length - 1);
+
+ /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */
+ RAND_add((PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length * 4, total_length * 2);
return 1;
}
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