[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update

Rich Salz rsalz at openssl.org
Sat Jul 15 12:12:24 UTC 2017


The branch master has been updated
       via  da8fc25a989cf4f4d26d626a85477e8a9282da12 (commit)
      from  71d57be52e7c4d5389dfe950ad9ee4e54aea5411 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit da8fc25a989cf4f4d26d626a85477e8a9282da12
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Jun 22 09:21:43 2017 -0400

    Start to overhaul RAND API
    
    Remove unused rand_hw_xor, MD/EVP indirection
    Make rand_pseudo same as rand.
    Cleanup formatting and ifdef control
    Rename some things:
        - rand_meth to openssl_rand_meth; make it global
        - source file
        - lock/init functions, start per-thread state
        - ossl_meth_init to ossl_rand_init
    Put state into RAND_STATE structure
    And put OSSL_RAND_STATE into ossl_typ.h
    Use "randomness" instead of "entropy"
    
    Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk at mit.edu>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3758)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/rand/build.info                 |   2 +-
 crypto/rand/{md_rand.c => ossl_rand.c} | 329 ++++++++++++++-------------------
 crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h                 |  36 +---
 crypto/rand/rand_lib.c                 |  95 +++++-----
 crypto/rand/rand_unix.c                |  19 +-
 crypto/rand/rand_vms.c                 |  79 ++++----
 6 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 322 deletions(-)
 rename crypto/rand/{md_rand.c => ossl_rand.c} (65%)

diff --git a/crypto/rand/build.info b/crypto/rand/build.info
index 3ad50e2..9e0a90b 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/build.info
+++ b/crypto/rand/build.info
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 LIBS=../../libcrypto
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
-        md_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
+        ossl_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
         rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
similarity index 65%
rename from crypto/rand/md_rand.c
rename to crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
index 8cbfae1..016653d 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c
@@ -23,35 +23,40 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/async.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
-
 #include <openssl/err.h>
-
 #include <internal/thread_once.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
 
 #if defined(BN_DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
-# define PREDICT
+# define PREDICT 1
 #endif
 
-/* #define PREDICT      1 */
-
 #define STATE_SIZE      1023
-static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
-static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
 
-static double entropy = 0;
-static int initialized = 0;
+typedef struct ossl_rand_state_st OSSL_RAND_STATE;
+
+struct ossl_rand_state_st {
+    size_t num;
+    size_t index;
+    unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    long md_count[2];
+};
 
+static OSSL_RAND_STATE global_state;
+static double randomness = 0;
+static int initialized = 0;
 static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL;
 static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key;
 
 /* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */
 static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-/* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */
-/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+/*
+ * access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock;
+ * valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set
+ */
 static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid;
 
 #ifdef PREDICT
@@ -60,51 +65,35 @@ int rand_predictable = 0;
 
 static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
 
-static void rand_cleanup(void);
-static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
-static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
-static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-#endif
-static int rand_status(void);
+static void rand_thread_cleanup(void *arg)
+{
+    OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = arg;
 
-static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
-    rand_seed,
-    rand_nopseudo_bytes,
-    rand_cleanup,
-    rand_add,
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
-    rand_pseudo_bytes,
-#else
-    NULL,
-#endif
-    rand_status
-};
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(sp, sizeof(*sp));
+}
 
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_rand_init)
 {
+    int ret = 1;
+
     OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
     rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    ret &= rand_lock != NULL;
     rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
-    return rand_lock != NULL && rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
+    ret &= rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
+    ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&key, rand_thread_cleanup) == 1;
+    return ret;
 }
 
 RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
 {
-    return (&rand_meth);
+    return &openssl_rand_meth;
 }
 
 static void rand_cleanup(void)
 {
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
-    state_num = 0;
-    state_index = 0;
-    OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    md_count[0] = 0;
-    md_count[1] = 0;
-    entropy = 0;
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(&global_state, sizeof(global_state));
+    randomness = 0;
     initialized = 0;
     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock);
     CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock);
@@ -114,10 +103,11 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
 {
     int i, j, k, st_idx;
     long md_c[2];
-    unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
     EVP_MD_CTX *m;
     int do_not_lock;
     int rv = 0;
+    OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
 
     if (!num)
         return 1;
@@ -146,7 +136,7 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
     if (m == NULL)
         goto err;
 
-    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
         goto err;
 
     /* check if we already have the lock */
@@ -160,58 +150,58 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
 
     if (!do_not_lock)
         CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
-    st_idx = state_index;
+    st_idx = sp->index;
 
     /*
      * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
      * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
      * _some_ difference
      */
-    md_c[0] = md_count[0];
-    md_c[1] = md_count[1];
-
-    memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
-
-    /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
-    state_index += num;
-    if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
-        state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
-        state_num = STATE_SIZE;
-    } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
-        if (state_index > state_num)
-            state_num = state_index;
+    md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
+    md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
+
+    memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md));
+
+    /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
+    sp->index += num;
+    if (sp->index >= STATE_SIZE) {
+        sp->index %= STATE_SIZE;
+        sp->num = STATE_SIZE;
+    } else if (sp->num < STATE_SIZE) {
+        if (sp->index > sp->num)
+            sp->num = sp->index;
     }
-    /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+    /* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
 
     /*
      * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
      * will use now, but other threads may use them as well
      */
 
-    md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
+    sp->md_count[1] += (num / RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
 
     if (!do_not_lock)
         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
 
-    for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i += RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
         j = (num - i);
-        j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
+        j = (j > RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
 
-        if (!MD_Init(m))
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL))
             goto err;
-        if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
             goto err;
         k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
         if (k > 0) {
-            if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k))
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j - k))
                 goto err;
-            if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
                 goto err;
-        } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j))
+        } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j))
             goto err;
 
-        /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
-        if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j))
+        /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO EVP_DigestUpdate()! */
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, buf, j))
             goto err;
         /*
          * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
@@ -221,9 +211,9 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
          * insecure keys.
          */
 
-        if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
             goto err;
-        if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
             goto err;
         md_c[1]++;
 
@@ -238,7 +228,7 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
              * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
              * random state.
              */
-            state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
+            sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
             if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
                 st_idx = 0;
         }
@@ -249,14 +239,14 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
     /*
      * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
      * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
-     * counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
+     * counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as much randomness as fits into
      * md.
      */
-    for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
-        md[k] ^= local_md[k];
+    for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(sp->md); k++) {
+        sp->md[k] ^= local_md[k];
     }
-    if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
-        entropy += add;
+    if (randomness < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+        randomness += add;
     if (!do_not_lock)
         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
 
@@ -271,15 +261,16 @@ static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
     return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
 }
 
-static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
+static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 {
     static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
     int i, j, k;
     size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
     int ok;
     long md_c[2];
-    unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
     EVP_MD_CTX *m;
+    OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
     pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
 #endif
@@ -323,9 +314,9 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
     if (m == NULL)
         goto err_mem;
 
-    /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+    /* round upwards to multiple of RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
     num_ceil =
-        (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
+        (1 + (num - 1) / (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
 
     /*
      * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
@@ -345,7 +336,7 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
      * global 'md'.
      */
 
-    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
         goto err_mem;
 
     CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
@@ -369,28 +360,28 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
     if (!stirred_pool)
         do_stir_pool = 1;
 
-    ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+    ok = (randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
     if (!ok) {
         /*
          * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
          * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
-         * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
-         * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
+         * to decrease the randomness estimate. Once we've had enough initial
+         * seeding we don't bother to adjust the randomness count, though,
          * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
          * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
-         * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
-         * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
-         * entropy limit has been reached.
+         * we have enough randomness. Randomness should be collected in a
+         * separate input pool and be transferred to the output pool only
+         * when the randomness limit has been reached.
          */
-        entropy -= num;
-        if (entropy < 0)
-            entropy = 0;
+        randomness -= num;
+        if (randomness < 0)
+            randomness = 0;
     }
 
     if (do_stir_pool) {
         /*
          * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
-         * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
+         * better make sure that the required randomness gets 'evenly
          * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
          * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
          * suitable for this purpose.
@@ -398,37 +389,37 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
 
         int n = STATE_SIZE;     /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
         while (n > 0) {
-#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
+#if RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
 # error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
 #endif
-#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH */
             /*
              * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
              * rand_add expects to have something to hash.
              */
-            rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
-            n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+            rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
+            n -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH;
         }
         if (ok)
             stirred_pool = 1;
     }
 
-    st_idx = state_index;
-    st_num = state_num;
-    md_c[0] = md_count[0];
-    md_c[1] = md_count[1];
-    memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+    st_idx = sp->index;
+    st_num = sp->num;
+    md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
+    md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
+    memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof sp->md);
 
-    state_index += num_ceil;
-    if (state_index > state_num)
-        state_index %= state_num;
+    sp->index += num_ceil;
+    if (sp->index > sp->num)
+        sp->index %= sp->num;
 
     /*
      * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
      * ours (but other threads may use them too)
      */
 
-    md_count[0] += 1;
+    sp->md_count[0] += 1;
 
     /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
     crypto_lock_rand = 0;
@@ -436,63 +427,64 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
 
     while (num > 0) {
-        /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
-        j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
+        /* num_ceil -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 */
+        j = (num >= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
         num -= j;
-        if (!MD_Init(m))
+        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL))
             goto err;
 #ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
         if (curr_pid) {         /* just in the first iteration to save time */
-            if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
                 goto err;
             curr_pid = 0;
         }
 #endif
         if (curr_time) {        /* just in the first iteration to save time */
-            if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
                 goto err;
-            if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
                 goto err;
             curr_time = 0;
             if (!rand_hw_seed(m))
                 goto err;
         }
-        if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
             goto err;
-        if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
             goto err;
 
-        k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
+        k = (st_idx + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
         if (k > 0) {
-            if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
                 goto err;
-            if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
+            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
                 goto err;
-        } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
+        } else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
             goto err;
-        if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
+        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
             goto err;
 
-        for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
+        for (i = 0; i < RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
             /* may compete with other threads */
-            state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
+            sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
             if (st_idx >= st_num)
                 st_idx = 0;
             if (i < j)
-                *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
+                *(buf++) = local_md[i + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
         }
     }
 
-    if (!MD_Init(m)
-        || !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))
-        || !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL)
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))
+        || !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
         goto err;
     CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
     /*
      * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
      */
     ASYNC_block_pause();
-    if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) {
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md))
+            || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, sp->md, NULL)) {
         CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -502,14 +494,10 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
     EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
     if (ok)
         return (1);
-    else if (pseudo)
-        return 0;
-    else {
-        RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
-        ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
-                           "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
-        return (0);
-    }
+    RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
+    ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
+                       "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
+    return (0);
  err:
     RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
     EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
@@ -521,28 +509,13 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
 
 }
 
-static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
-    return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
-}
-
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
-/*
- * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
- */
-static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
-    return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
-}
-#endif
-
 static int rand_status(void)
 {
     CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur;
     int ret;
     int do_not_lock;
 
-    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
         return 0;
 
     cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
@@ -578,7 +551,7 @@ static int rand_status(void)
         initialized = 1;
     }
 
-    ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+    ret = randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
 
     if (!do_not_lock) {
         /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
@@ -595,9 +568,6 @@ static int rand_status(void)
  * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
  * currently supports rdrand.
  */
-
-/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
-
 #if (defined(__i386)   || defined(__i386__)   || defined(_M_IX86) || \
      defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
      defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
@@ -618,40 +588,12 @@ static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
         rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
         if (rnd == 0)
             return 1;
-        if (!MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
+        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
             return 0;
     }
     return 1;
 }
 
-/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
-
-void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
-{
-    size_t rnd;
-    if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
-        return;
-    while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) {
-        rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
-        if (rnd == 0)
-            return;
-        *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
-        buf += sizeof(size_t);
-        num -= sizeof(size_t);
-    }
-    if (num) {
-        rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
-        if (rnd == 0)
-            return;
-        while (num) {
-            *buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
-            rnd >>= 8;
-            buf++;
-            num--;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 #else
 
 static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
@@ -659,9 +601,14 @@ static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
     return 1;
 }
 
-void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
-{
-    return;
-}
-
 #endif
+
+
+RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth = {
+    rand_seed,
+    rand_bytes,
+    rand_cleanup,
+    rand_add,
+    rand_bytes,
+    rand_status
+};
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
index d98c90e..69c9630 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -10,37 +10,15 @@
 #ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
 # define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
 
-# define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32      /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */
-
-# if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-#  define USE_SHA1_RAND
-# endif
+/* we require 256 bits of randomness */
+# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED (256 / 8)
 
 # include <openssl/evp.h>
-# define MD_Update(a,b,c)        EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
-# define MD_Final(a,b)           EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL)
-# if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
-#  include <openssl/md5.h>
-#  define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH        MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#  define MD_Init(a)              EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL)
-#  define MD(a,b,c)               EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL)
-# elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
-#  include <openssl/sha.h>
-#  define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH        SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#  define MD_Init(a)              EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
-#  define MD(a,b,c)               EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
-# elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
-#  include <openssl/mdc2.h>
-#  define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH        MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#  define MD_Init(a)              EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
-#  define MD(a,b,c)               EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
-# elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-#  include <openssl/md2.h>
-#  define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH        MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#  define MD_Init(a)              EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL)
-#  define MD(a,b,c)               EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL)
-# endif
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+# define RAND_DIGEST EVP_sha1()
+# define RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH        SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
 
-void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
+extern RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth;
 
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 84d6b5d..1a1e282 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -14,17 +14,19 @@
 #include "internal/rand.h"
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 /* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
-static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock = NULL;
+static ENGINE *funct_ref;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
 #endif
-static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock = NULL;
-static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
+static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
 
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
 {
     int ret = 1;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
@@ -36,9 +38,22 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
     return ret;
 }
 
+void rand_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+    const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
+
+    if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
+        meth->cleanup();
+    RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
+#endif
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+}
+
 int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
 {
-    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
         return 0;
 
     CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
@@ -55,25 +70,26 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
 
-    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
         return NULL;
 
     CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
-    if (!default_RAND_meth) {
+    if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND();
-        if (e) {
-            default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e);
-            if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
-                ENGINE_finish(e);
-                e = NULL;
-            }
-        }
-        if (e)
+        ENGINE *e;
+
+        /* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
+        if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL
+                && (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) {
             funct_ref = e;
-        else
+            default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
+        } else {
+            ENGINE_finish(e);
+            default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
+        }
+#else
+        default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
 #endif
-            default_RAND_meth = RAND_OpenSSL();
     }
     tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
     CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
@@ -85,10 +101,10 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
 
-    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
         return 0;
 
-    if (engine) {
+    if (engine != NULL) {
         if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
             return 0;
         tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
@@ -106,55 +122,48 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
 }
 #endif
 
-void rand_cleanup_int(void)
-{
-    const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
-    if (meth && meth->cleanup)
-        meth->cleanup();
-    RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
-    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
-#endif
-}
-
 void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-    if (meth && meth->seed)
+
+    if (meth->seed != NULL)
         meth->seed(buf, num);
 }
 
-void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
+void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-    if (meth && meth->add)
-        meth->add(buf, num, entropy);
+
+    if (meth->add != NULL)
+        meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
 }
 
 int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-    if (meth && meth->bytes)
+
+    if (meth->bytes != NULL)
         return meth->bytes(buf, num);
     RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
-    return (-1);
+    return -1;
 }
 
 #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
 int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-    if (meth && meth->pseudorand)
+
+    if (meth->pseudorand != NULL)
         return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
-    return (-1);
+    return -1;
 }
 #endif
 
 int RAND_status(void)
 {
     const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-    if (meth && meth->status)
+
+    if (meth->status != NULL)
         return meth->status();
     return 0;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 241f287..bfdd3e6 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
     RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
     curr_uid = 0;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
+    for (i = 0; i < (RANDOMNESS_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
         /*
          * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
          * interference, etc.
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
     unsigned long l;
     pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
 #  if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSS_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
-    unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+    unsigned char tmpbuf[RANDOMNESS_NEEDED];
     int n = 0;
 #  endif
 #  ifdef DEVRANDOM
@@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
 #  ifdef DEVRANDOM
     memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats));
     /*
-     * Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have
+     * Use a randomness device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have
      * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs
      * out of random entries.
      */
 
-    for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) {
+    for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); i++) {
         if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY
 #   ifdef O_NONBLOCK
                        | O_NONBLOCK
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
 
                 if (try_read) {
                     r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
-                             ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
+                             RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n);
                     if (r > 0)
                         n += r;
                 } else
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
             }
             while ((r > 0 ||
                     (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0
-                   && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+                   && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
 
             close(fd);
         }
@@ -255,16 +255,15 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
 
 #  if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
     /*
-     * Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy
-     * collecting daemon.
+     * Use an EGD socket to read randomness from the daemon.
      */
 
-    for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+    for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
          egdsocket++) {
         int r;
 
         r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
-                                 ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
+                                 RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n);
         if (r > 0)
             n += r;
     }
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
index 9c462dd..ec99dbf 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
@@ -7,16 +7,11 @@
  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
-/*
- * Modified by VMS Software, Inc (2016)
- *    Eliminate looping through all processes (performance)
- *    Add additional randomizations using rand() function
- */
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include "rand_lcl.h"
 # include <descrip.h>
 # include <jpidef.h>
 # include <ssdef.h>
@@ -34,9 +29,9 @@
 #  define PTR_T __void_ptr64
 #  pragma pointer_size save
 #  pragma pointer_size 32
-# else                          /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+# else
 #  define PTR_T void *
-# endif                         /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+# endif
 
 static struct items_data_st {
     short length, code;         /* length is number of bytes */
@@ -52,27 +47,22 @@ static struct items_data_st {
     {4, JPI$_PPGCNT},
     {4, JPI$_WSPEAK},
     {4, JPI$_FINALEXC},
-    {0, 0}                      /* zero terminated */
+    {0, 0}
 };
 
 int RAND_poll(void)
 {
-
     /* determine the number of items in the JPI array */
-
     struct items_data_st item_entry;
-    int item_entry_count = sizeof(items_data)/sizeof(item_entry);
-
+    int item_entry_count = OSSL_NELEM(items_data);
     /* Create the JPI itemlist array to hold item_data content */
-
     struct {
         short length, code;
         int *buffer;
         int *retlen;
-    } item[item_entry_count], *pitem; /* number of entries in items_data */
-
+    } item[item_entry_count], *pitem;
     struct items_data_st *pitems_data;
-    int data_buffer[(item_entry_count*2)+4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */
+    int data_buffer[(item_entry_count * 2) + 4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */
     int iosb[2];
     int sys_time[2];
     int *ptr;
@@ -80,53 +70,46 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
     int tmp_length   = 0;
     int total_length = 0;
 
-    pitems_data = items_data;
-    pitem = item;
-
-
     /* Setup itemlist for GETJPI */
-    while (pitems_data->length) {
+    pitems_data = items_data;
+    for (pitem = item; pitems_data->length != 0; pitem++) {
         pitem->length = pitems_data->length;
         pitem->code   = pitems_data->code;
         pitem->buffer = &data_buffer[total_length];
         pitem->retlen = 0;
         /* total_length is in longwords */
-        total_length += pitems_data->length/4;
+        total_length += pitems_data->length / 4;
         pitems_data++;
-        pitem ++;
     }
     pitem->length = pitem->code = 0;
 
     /* Fill data_buffer with various info bits from this process */
-    /* and twist that data to seed the SSL random number init    */
+    if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) != SS$_NORMAL)
+        return 0;
 
-    if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) == SS$_NORMAL) {
-        for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) {
-            sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]);
-            srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i);
+    /* Now twist that data to seed the SSL random number init */
+    for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) {
+        sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]);
+        srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i);
 
-            if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */
-                ptr = &data_buffer[i];
-                for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
-                    data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j];
-                    /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */
-                    data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
-                    tmp_length++;
-                }
-            } else {
+        if (i == (total_length - 1)) { /* for JPI$_FINALEXC */
+            ptr = &data_buffer[i];
+            for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+                data_buffer[i + j] = ptr[j];
                 /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */
-                data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
+                data_buffer[i + j] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
+                tmp_length++;
             }
+        } else {
+            /* OK to use rand() just to scramble the seed */
+            data_buffer[i] ^= (sys_time[0] ^ rand());
         }
-
-        total_length += (tmp_length - 1);
-
-        /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */
-        RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length*4, total_length * 2);
-    } else {
-        return 0;
     }
 
+    total_length += (tmp_length - 1);
+
+    /* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */
+    RAND_add((PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length * 4, total_length * 2);
     return 1;
 }
 


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