[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable update
Rich Salz
rsalz at openssl.org
Fri Jun 9 16:42:51 UTC 2017
The branch OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable has been updated
via a892766934c8e1b9de5645c526716efe4b14a133 (commit)
from 998636b80c799fdb7649a6c5e0a4da1ba9bf88ae (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a892766934c8e1b9de5645c526716efe4b14a133
Author: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
Date: Fri Jun 9 12:26:30 2017 -0400
fix broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites
removed the unnecessary upper bracket
add !SSL_USE_SIGALGS to check for broken implementations of GOST
client signature (signature without length field)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3588)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
index ce7bb33..c7cd9eb 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -2692,53 +2692,56 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
goto f_err;
}
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ int rv;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
+ if (rv == -1) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (rv == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ } else {
+ /* Use default digest for this key type */
+ int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
+ if (idx >= 0)
+ md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/*
- * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
- * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
+ * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
+ * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
- && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- len = 64;
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
+ && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
+ && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+ || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
+ || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
+ && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
+ len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
} else
#endif
- {
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int rv;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
- if (rv == -1) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (rv == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
-#endif
- } else {
- /* Use default digest for this key type */
- int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
- if (idx >= 0)
- md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
- if (md == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
+
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
|| (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
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