[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
Richard Levitte
levitte at openssl.org
Wed Apr 4 18:15:01 UTC 2018
The branch master has been updated
via 8e2bec9b8aaba602af6fda2523a15238aa49aade (commit)
from dbcfd9025f86e997f6246d51e4700a0560ce3977 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 8e2bec9b8aaba602af6fda2523a15238aa49aade
Author: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
Date: Wed Apr 4 18:31:50 2018 +0200
Remove ambiguity in rand_pool_add[_end] return value
When these two functions returned zero, it could mean:
1. that an error occured. In their case, the error is an overflow of
the pool, i.e. the correct response from the caller would be to
stop trying to fill the pool.
2. that there isn't enought entropy acquired yet, i.e. the correct
response from the caller would be to try and add more entropy to
the pool.
Because of this ambiguity, the returned zero turns out to be useless.
This change makes the returned value more consistent. 1 means the
addition of new entropy was successful, 0 means it wasn't. To know if
the pool has been filled enough, the caller will have to call some
other function, such as rand_pool_entropy_available().
Fixes #5846
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre at ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5876)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++------------------------
crypto/rand/rand_unix.c | 9 ++++++---
crypto/rand/rand_vms.c | 5 +++--
crypto/rand/rand_win.c | 9 ++++++---
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 143dfb0..3589e75 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -130,26 +130,20 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
-
- /* If RDSEED is available, use that. */
+ /* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */
if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed)
- return rand_pool_add_end(pool,
- bytes_needed,
- 8 * bytes_needed);
- }
-
- /* Second choice is RDRAND. */
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
+ == bytes_needed) {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
+ }
+ } else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed)
- return rand_pool_add_end(pool,
- bytes_needed,
- 8 * bytes_needed);
+ == bytes_needed) {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
}
-
- return rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
}
}
@@ -222,7 +216,8 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
bytes = bytes_needed;
rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent);
- entropy_available = rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
} else {
@@ -631,11 +626,10 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
* random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of
* randomness.
*
- * Return available amount of entropy after this operation.
- * (see rand_pool_entropy_available(pool))
+ * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0
*/
-size_t rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
- const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
+ const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
@@ -648,7 +642,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
pool->entropy += entropy;
}
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ return 1;
}
/*
@@ -685,7 +679,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
* to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
* It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
*/
-size_t rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
@@ -697,7 +691,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
pool->entropy += entropy;
}
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ return 1;
}
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index b86f94a..0f9407f 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
if (getrandom(buffer, bytes_needed, 0) == (int)bytes_needed)
bytes = bytes_needed;
- entropy_available = rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
@@ -203,7 +204,8 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
if (fread(buffer, 1, bytes_needed, fp) == bytes_needed)
bytes = bytes_needed;
- entropy_available = rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
fclose(fp);
if (entropy_available > 0)
@@ -241,7 +243,8 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
if (num == (int)bytes_needed)
bytes = bytes_needed;
- entropy_available = rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
index 7edec9e..1507c6f 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
@@ -148,8 +148,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
if (total_length > bytes_remaining)
total_length = bytes_remaining;
- return rand_pool_add(pool, (PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length,
- total_length * ENTROPY_BITS_PER_BYTE);
+ rand_pool_add(pool, (PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length,
+ total_length * ENTROPY_BITS_PER_BYTE);
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
index 7f34188..ad5e3d1 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS)
bytes = bytes_needed;
- entropy_available = rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
@@ -88,7 +89,8 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
}
- entropy_available = rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
@@ -106,7 +108,8 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
}
- entropy_available = rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
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