[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update
matthias.st.pierre at ncp-e.com
matthias.st.pierre at ncp-e.com
Fri Apr 13 18:49:50 UTC 2018
The branch master has been updated
via 5bc6bcf82d2adce982e04837b0810b1a6cd55a19 (commit)
from 0e3ecaec3ebf2ed0dfbcff07b7fa1cfdd8240d5c (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 5bc6bcf82d2adce982e04837b0810b1a6cd55a19
Author: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre at ncp-e.com>
Date: Tue Apr 10 10:22:52 2018 +0200
DRBG: implement a get_nonce() callback
Fixes #5849
In pull request #5503 a fallback was added which adds a random nonce of
security_strength/2 bits if no nonce callback is provided. This change raised
the entropy requirements form 256 to 384 bit, which can cause problems on some
platforms (e.g. VMS, see issue #5849).
The requirements for the nonce are given in section 8.6.7 of NIST SP 800-90Ar1:
A nonce may be required in the construction of a seed during instantiation
in order to provide a security cushion to block certain attacks.
The nonce shall be either:
a) A value with at least (security_strength/2) bits of entropy, or
b) A value that is expected to repeat no more often than a
(security_strength/2)-bit random string would be expected to repeat.
Each nonce shall be unique to the cryptographic module in which instantiation
is performed, but need not be secret. When used, the nonce shall be considered
to be a critical security parameter.
This commit implements a nonce of type b) in order to lower the entropy
requirements during instantiation back to 256 bits.
The formulation "shall be unique to the cryptographic module" above implies
that the nonce needs to be unique among (with high probability) among all
DRBG instances in "space" and "time". We try to achieve this goal by creating a
nonce of the following form
nonce = app-specific-data || high-resolution-utc-timestamp || counter
Where || denotes concatenation. The application specific data can be something
like the process or group id of the application. A utc timestamp is used because
it increases monotonically, provided the system time is synchronized. This approach
may not be perfect yet for a FIPS evaluation, but it should be good enough for the
moment.
This commit also harmonizes the implementation of the get_nonce() and the
get_additional_data() callbacks and moves the platform specific parts from
rand_lib.c into rand_unix.c, rand_win.c, and rand_vms.c.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5920)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h | 33 ++++++
crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c | 19 +++-
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 200 ++++++++++++-------------------------
crypto/rand/rand_unix.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
crypto/rand/rand_vms.c | 39 ++++++++
crypto/rand/rand_win.c | 38 +++++++
6 files changed, 354 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h
index baa9bfe..cf82e4a 100644
--- a/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h
+++ b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h
@@ -39,8 +39,15 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
int prediction_resistance);
void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
+size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
+
size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len);
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
/*
* RAND_POOL functions
@@ -77,4 +84,30 @@ int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy);
*/
size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
+/*
+ * Add some application specific nonce data
+ *
+ * This function is platform specific and adds some application specific
+ * data to the nonce used for instantiating the drbg.
+ *
+ * This data currently consists of the process and thread id, and a high
+ * resolution timestamp. The data does not include an atomic counter,
+ * because that is added by the calling function rand_drbg_get_nonce().
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ */
+int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
+
+
+/*
+ * Add some platform specific additional data
+ *
+ * This function is platform specific and adds some random noise to the
+ * additional data used for generating random bytes and for reseeding
+ * the drbg.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ */
+int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
+
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
index b9ad1b8..cc59236 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
@@ -184,9 +184,23 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
drbg->parent = parent;
if (parent == NULL) {
+ drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
+#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
+ drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
+#endif
+
drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
} else {
+ drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
+ /*
+ * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
+ * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
+ */
+
drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
}
@@ -208,11 +222,6 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
- if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, rand_drbg_get_entropy,
- rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy,
- NULL, NULL))
- goto err;
-
return drbg;
err:
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 6e98e4d..5ae51a1 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -15,49 +15,8 @@
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "rand_lcl.h"
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <unistd.h>
-# include <sys/time.h>
-#endif
#include "e_os.h"
-/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
-#define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
-
-/*
- * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard
- * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
- * are available.
- *
- * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
- * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc
- * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
- * so this needs to be checked for.
- *
- * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
- * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means
- * an extra check is needed.
- *
- * The final condition is:
- * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
- *
- * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
- * macro that might be undefined.
- */
-#undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-#if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
-# if defined(__GLIBC__)
-# if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
-# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
-# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# endif
-# endif
-# else
-# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# endif
-#endif
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
@@ -69,6 +28,9 @@ static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
int rand_fork_count;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
+static int rand_nonce_count;
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
@@ -247,72 +209,62 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
}
/*
- * Find a suitable source of time. Start with the highest resolution source
- * and work down to the slower ones. This is added as additional data and
- * isn't counted as randomness, so any result is acceptable.
+ * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
*
- * Returns 0 when we weren't able to find any time source
*/
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
- uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+}
- if (res != 0)
- return res;
-#if defined(_WIN32)
- {
- LARGE_INTEGER t;
- FILETIME ft;
- if (QueryPerformanceCounter(&t) != 0)
- return t.QuadPart;
- GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ft);
- return TWO32TO64(ft.dwHighDateTime, ft.dwLowDateTime);
- }
-#elif defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
- return gethrtime();
-#elif defined(_AIX)
- {
- timebasestruct_t t;
-
- read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ);
- return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low);
- }
-#else
+/*
+ * Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
+ *
+ */
+size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+ RAND_POOL *pool;
-# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
- {
- struct timespec ts;
- clockid_t cid;
-
-# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
- cid = CLOCK_BOOTTIME;
-# elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK)
- cid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC;
-# else
- cid = CLOCK_REALTIME;
-# endif
-
- if (clock_gettime(cid, &ts) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
- }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
- || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
- {
- struct timeval tv;
-
- if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
- return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
- }
-# endif
- {
- time_t t = time(NULL);
- if (t == (time_t)-1)
- return 0;
- return t;
- }
-#endif
+ struct {
+ void * instance;
+ int count;
+ } data = { 0 };
+
+ pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len);
+ if (pool == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ data.instance = drbg;
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count, rand_nonce_lock);
+
+ if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+
+ err:
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
+ *
+ */
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
/*
@@ -327,52 +279,26 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
*/
size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len)
{
+ size_t ret = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_ID thread_id;
- size_t len;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
- pid_t pid;
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
- DWORD pid;
-#endif
- uint64_t tbits;
pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
- pid = getpid();
- rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0);
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
- pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
- rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0);
-#endif
-
- thread_id = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
- if (thread_id != 0)
- rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&thread_id, sizeof(thread_id), 0);
-
- tbits = get_timer_bits();
- if (tbits != 0)
- rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&tbits, sizeof(tbits), 0);
+ if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0)
+ goto err;
- /* TODO: Use RDSEED? */
+ ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
- len = rand_pool_length(pool);
- if (len != 0)
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+ err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
- return len;
+ return ret;
}
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
@@ -393,6 +319,9 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL;
+ rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ ret &= rand_meth_lock != NULL;
+
return ret;
}
@@ -407,6 +336,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock);
}
/*
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 0f9407f..beb35a3 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -14,6 +14,50 @@
#include "rand_lcl.h"
#include "internal/rand_int.h"
#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <sys/time.h>
+
+static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
+static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
+
+/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
+# define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
+
+/*
+ * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard
+ * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
+ * are available.
+ *
+ * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
+ * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc
+ * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
+ * so this needs to be checked for.
+ *
+ * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
+ * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means
+ * an extra check is needed.
+ *
+ * The final condition is:
+ * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
+ *
+ * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
+ * macro that might be undefined.
+ */
+# undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+# if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
+# if defined(__GLIBC__)
+# if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
+# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+# endif
+# endif
+# else
+# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
@@ -54,9 +98,6 @@
size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
short int code;
- gid_t curr_gid;
- pid_t curr_pid;
- uid_t curr_uid;
int i, k;
size_t bytes_needed;
struct timespec ts;
@@ -69,17 +110,6 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
# endif
- /*
- * Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some* variation between
- * different processes.
- */
- curr_gid = getgid();
- rand_pool_add(pool, &curr_gid, sizeof(curr_gid), 0);
- curr_pid = getpid();
- rand_pool_add(pool, &curr_pid, sizeof(curr_pid), 0);
- curr_uid = getuid();
- rand_pool_add(pool, &curr_uid, sizeof(curr_uid), 0);
-
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 2 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) {
@@ -256,5 +286,126 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
# endif
}
# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
+int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ pid_t pid;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data = { 0 };
+
+ /*
+ * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
+ * ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for
+ * different process instances.
+ */
+ data.pid = getpid();
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+ data.time = get_time_stamp();
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data = { 0 };
+
+ /*
+ * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
+ * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
+ * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
+ */
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+ data.time = get_timer_bits();
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Get the current time with the highest possible resolution
+ *
+ * The time stamp is added to the nonce, so it is optimized for not repeating.
+ * The current time is ideal for this purpose, provided the computer's clock
+ * is synchronized.
+ */
+static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
+{
+# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
+ {
+ struct timespec ts;
+
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
+ }
+# endif
+# if defined(__unix__) \
+ || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
+ {
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
+ }
+# endif
+ return time(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get an arbitrary timer value of the highest possible resolution
+ *
+ * The timer value is added as random noise to the additional data,
+ * which is not considered a trusted entropy sourec, so any result
+ * is acceptable.
+ */
+static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
+{
+ uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+
+ if (res != 0)
+ return res;
+
+# if defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
+ return gethrtime();
+# elif defined(_AIX)
+ {
+ timebasestruct_t t;
+
+ read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ);
+ return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low);
+ }
+# elif defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
+ {
+ struct timespec ts;
+
+# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
+# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_BOOTTIME
+# elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK)
+# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+# else
+# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_REALTIME
+# endif
+
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_TYPE, &ts) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
+ }
+# endif
+# if defined(__unix__) \
+ || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
+ {
+ struct timeval tv;
+ if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
+ return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
+ }
+# endif
+ return time(NULL);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
index 1507c6f..c50b4b2 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include "e_os.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+# include <unistd.h>
# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
# include <openssl/rand.h>
# include "internal/rand_int.h"
@@ -153,4 +154,42 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
+int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ pid_t pid;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data = { 0 };
+
+ /*
+ * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
+ * ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for
+ * different process instances.
+ */
+ data.pid = getpid();
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+ sys$gettim_prec((struct _generic_64 *)&data.time);
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
+ uint64_t time;
+ } data = { 0 };
+
+ /*
+ * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
+ * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
+ * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
+ */
+ data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
+ sys$gettim_prec((struct _generic_64 *)&data.time);
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
index ad5e3d1..1d44204 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -118,6 +118,44 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
+
+int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ DWORD pid;
+ DWORD tid;
+ FILETIME time;
+ } data = { 0 };
+
+ /*
+ * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
+ * ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for
+ * different process instances.
+ */
+ data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
+ data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&data.time);
+
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
+int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ struct {
+ DWORD tid;
+ LARGE_INTEGER time;
+ } data = { 0 };
+
+ /*
+ * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
+ * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
+ * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
+ */
+ data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
+ QueryPerformanceCounter(&data.time);
+ return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
+}
+
# if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
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