[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update

[Viktor Dukhovni]

The branch master has been updated
       via  baba1545105131fa34068f62928322e99d695ab1 (commit)
      from  6f8b858d054c4eb1112531e39da9ceb5fa37e5f1 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit baba1545105131fa34068f62928322e99d695ab1
Author: Ken Goldman <kgoldman at us.ibm.com>
Date:   Fri Dec 14 15:04:04 2018 -0500

    Admit unknown pkey types at security level 0
    
    The check_key_level() function currently fails when the public key
    cannot be extracted from the certificate because its algorithm is not
    supported.  However, the public key is not needed for the last
    certificate in the chain.
    
    This change moves the check for level 0 before the check for a
    non-NULL public key.
    
    For background, this is the TPM 1.2 endorsement key certificate.
    I.e., this is a real application with millions of certificates issued.
    The key is an RSA-2048 key.
    
    The TCG (for a while) specified
    
         Public Key Algorithm: rsaesOaep
    
    rather than the commonly used
    
         Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
    
    because the key is an encryption key rather than a signing key.
    The X509 certificate parser fails to get the public key.
    
    Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7906)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 95a95c6..bbf61d4 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -3232,12 +3232,19 @@ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
     EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
     int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
 
+    /*
+     * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
+     * key type.  Some engines support key types not understood outside the
+     * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
+     * floor.
+     */
+    if (level <= 0)
+        return 1;
+
     /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
     if (pkey == NULL)
         return 0;
 
-    if (level <= 0)
-        return 1;
     if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
         level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;