[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable update

matthias.st.pierre at ncp-e.com matthias.st.pierre at ncp-e.com
Tue Feb 27 17:40:03 UTC 2018

The branch OpenSSL_1_1_0-stable has been updated
       via  5eb9a426d953b17c377b87315d0666c86126022f (commit)
      from  4974a6f21b3e1aee969174fd20e2a68c36237e71 (commit)

- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 5eb9a426d953b17c377b87315d0666c86126022f
Author: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre at ncp-e.com>
Date:   Wed Feb 21 01:45:14 2018 +0100

    bio_b64.c: prevent base64 filter BIO from decoding out-of-bound data
    Fixes #5405, #1381
    The base64 filter BIO reads its input in chunks of B64_BLOCK_SIZE bytes.
    When processing input in PEM format it can happen in rare cases that
    - the trailing PEM marker crosses the boundary of a chunk, and
    - the beginning of the following chunk contains valid base64 encoded data.
    This happened in issue #5405, where the PEM marker was split into
    "-----END CER" and "TIFICATE-----" at the end of the first chunk.
    The decoding of the first chunk terminated correctly at the '-' character,
    which is treated as an EOF marker, and b64_read() returned. However,
    when called the second time, b64_read() read the next chunk and interpreted
    the string "TIFICATE" as valid base64 encoded data, adding 6 extra bytes
    '4c 81 48 08 04 c4'.
    This patch restores the assignment of the error code to 'ctx->cont', which
    was deleted accidentally in commit 5562cfaca4f3 and which prevents b64_read()
    from reading additional data on subsequent calls.
    This issue was observed and reported by Annie Yousar.
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5422)


Summary of changes:
 crypto/evp/bio_b64.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c b/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
index 41a10a7..05019fd 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/bio_b64.c
@@ -288,6 +288,14 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
                                  (unsigned char *)ctx->tmp, i);
             ctx->tmp_len = 0;
+        /*
+         * If eof or an error was signalled, then the condition
+         * 'ctx->cont <= 0' will prevent b64_read() from reading
+         * more data on subsequent calls. This assignment was
+         * deleted accidentally in commit 5562cfaca4f3.
+         */
+        ctx->cont = i;
         ctx->buf_off = 0;
         if (i < 0) {
             ret_code = 0;

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