[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update
Matt Caswell
matt at openssl.org
Wed Jun 13 15:29:10 UTC 2018
The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
via 949ff36623eafc3523a9f91784992965018ffb05 (commit)
from 3984ef0b72831da8b3ece4745cac4f8575b19098 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 949ff36623eafc3523a9f91784992965018ffb05
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date: Fri May 25 12:10:13 2018 +0100
Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
CHANGES | 4 +++
crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c | 9 +++++-
crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index f17fbbf..a3861ab 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Add blinding to an ECDSA signature to protect against side channel attacks
+ discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
*) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
[Richard Levitte]
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
index 0f301f8..a130fc9 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int restore_rand(void)
return 1;
}
-static int fbytes_counter = 0;
+static int fbytes_counter = 0, use_fake = 0;
static const char *numbers[8] = {
"651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659",
"6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654",
@@ -158,6 +158,11 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
int ret;
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+ if (use_fake == 0)
+ return old_rand->bytes(buf, num);
+
+ use_fake = 0;
+
if (fbytes_counter >= 8)
return 0;
tmp = BN_new();
@@ -199,11 +204,13 @@ int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in)
/* create the key */
if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL)
goto x962_int_err;
+ use_fake = 1;
if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
goto x962_int_err;
BIO_printf(out, ".");
(void)BIO_flush(out);
/* create the signature */
+ use_fake = 1;
signature = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, key);
if (signature == NULL)
goto x962_int_err;
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
index 16d4f59..1d37551 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
{
int ok = 0, i;
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *blind = NULL, *blindm = NULL;
const BIGNUM *ckinv;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
@@ -269,14 +270,25 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
}
ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
- if (!ret) {
+ if (ret == NULL) {
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
s = ret->s;
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (blindm == NULL) {
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
@@ -315,26 +327,70 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
}
}
- if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
+ /*
+ * The normal signature calculation is:
+ *
+ * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
+ *
+ * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
+ *
+ * s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
+ */
+
+ /* Generate a blinding value */
+ do {
+ if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(order) - 1, -1, 0))
+ goto err;
+ } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
+ BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod order */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* blindm := blind * m mod order */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, order, ctx)) {
+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod order */
+ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, order)) {
+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) {
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, order, ctx)) {
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+
+ /* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+
if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
/*
* if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
* generate new kinv and r values
*/
if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
- ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN,
- ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
goto err;
}
} else
@@ -349,15 +405,11 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
- if (ctx)
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (m)
- BN_clear_free(m);
- if (tmp)
- BN_clear_free(tmp);
- if (order)
- BN_free(order);
- if (kinv)
+ }
+ if (kinv != NULL)
BN_clear_free(kinv);
return ret;
}
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