[openssl-commits] [openssl] master update

Matt Caswell matt at openssl.org
Tue Mar 27 14:56:32 UTC 2018


The branch master has been updated
       via  f6c024c2e7f33e9d26c62cf19d519e5ef7fa4a09 (commit)
       via  75a8f1eff03a1c91c22683b022e2145628962157 (commit)
       via  0b020b14882173918b9cc3e8e3bd85fb9ffac948 (commit)
       via  273f7fe16a6e4b2a443fb16846beaffd70461750 (commit)
       via  4cabbb9f485ba7d1edcfbbd2aa8610159f94543e (commit)
      from  faec5c4a8aa3943d835bdad26800a103426b0eda (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit f6c024c2e7f33e9d26c62cf19d519e5ef7fa4a09
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Mar 27 10:58:34 2018 +0100

    Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>

commit 75a8f1eff03a1c91c22683b022e2145628962157
Author: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Mar 26 10:55:35 2018 +0200

    test/test_test.c: add CRYPTO_memcmp regression test.
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 0b020b14882173918b9cc3e8e3bd85fb9ffac948
Author: Andy Polyakov <appro at openssl.org>
Date:   Wed Mar 21 23:48:10 2018 +0100

    pariscid.pl: fix nasty typo in CRYPTO_memcmp.
    
    Comparison was effectively reduced to least significant bits.
    
    CVE-2018-0733
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>

commit 273f7fe16a6e4b2a443fb16846beaffd70461750
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Jan 26 16:23:03 2018 +0000

    Add fuzz corpora file that found the ASN.1 stack depth issue
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

commit 4cabbb9f485ba7d1edcfbbd2aa8610159f94543e
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Thu Mar 22 09:39:53 2018 +0000

    Limit ASN.1 constructed types recursive definition depth
    
    Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in
    PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
    excessive recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth.
    
    CVE-2018-0739
    
    Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
    
    Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz at openssl.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES                                            |  46 ++++++++++++++++++++
 NEWS                                               |   5 ++-
 crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c                             |   3 +-
 crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c                             |  48 ++++++++++++++-------
 crypto/err/openssl.txt                             |   1 +
 crypto/pariscid.pl                                 |   2 +-
 .../asn1/eba5151118ff75ce6a86438a3a6f819c41d8be40  | Bin 0 -> 73846 bytes
 include/openssl/asn1err.h                          |   1 +
 test/test_test.c                                   |   5 +++
 9 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 fuzz/corpora/asn1/eba5151118ff75ce6a86438a3a6f819c41d8be40

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 3f6c8de..462394c 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -292,6 +292,52 @@
 
  Changes between 1.1.0g and 1.1.0h [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
+
+     Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found
+     in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
+     excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There
+     are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources
+     so this is considered safe.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz
+     project.
+     (CVE-2018-0739)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC
+
+     Because of an implementation bug the PA-RISC CRYPTO_memcmp function is
+     effectively reduced to only comparing the least significant bit of each
+     byte. This allows an attacker to forge messages that would be considered as
+     authenticated in an amount of tries lower than that guaranteed by the
+     security claims of the scheme. The module can only be compiled by the
+     HP-UX assembler, so that only HP-UX PA-RISC targets are affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd March 2018 by Peter Waltenberg
+     (IBM).
+     (CVE-2018-0733)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Add a build target 'build_all_generated', to build all generated files
+     and only that.  This can be used to prepare everything that requires
+     things like perl for a system that lacks perl and then move everything
+     to that system and do the rest of the build there.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Backport SSL_OP_NO_RENGOTIATION
+
+     OpenSSL 1.0.2 and below had the ability to disable renegotiation using the
+     (undocumented) SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS flag. Due to the opacity
+     changes this is no longer possible in 1.1.0. Therefore the new
+     SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION option from 1.1.1-dev has been backported to
+     1.1.0 to provide equivalent functionality.
+
+     Note that if an application built against 1.1.0h headers (or above) is run
+     using an older version of 1.1.0 (prior to 1.1.0h) then the option will be
+     accepted but nothing will happen, i.e. renegotiation will not be prevented.
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
   *) Removed the OS390-Unix config target.  It relied on a script that doesn't
      exist.
      [Rich Salz]
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index c60da87..60c841f 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0g and OpenSSL 1.1.1 [in pre-release]
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0h and OpenSSL 1.1.1 [in pre-release]
 
       o Support for TLSv1.3 added
       o Move the display of configuration data to configdata.pm.
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0g and OpenSSL 1.1.0h [under development]
 
+      o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the
+        stack (CVE-2018-0739)
+      o Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC (CVE-2018-0733)
       o rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738)
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0f and OpenSSL 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017]
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
index da856b2..de92adc 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /*
  * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG), "mstring wrong tag"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING),
     "nested asn1 string"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP), "nested too deep"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS),
     "non hex characters"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "not ascii format"},
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 8667bec..9cdee2d 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -17,9 +17,19 @@
 #include "internal/numbers.h"
 #include "asn1_locl.h"
 
+
+/*
+ * Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7)
+ * could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive
+ * recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth. This is the maximum number of
+ * recursive invocations of asn1_item_embed_d2i().
+ */
+#define ASN1_MAX_CONSTRUCTED_NEST 30
+
 static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
                                long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                               int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+                               int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx,
+                               int depth);
 
 static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len);
 static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf);
@@ -37,11 +47,11 @@ static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
 static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
                                 const unsigned char **in, long len,
                                 const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
-                                ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+                                ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
 static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
                                    const unsigned char **in, long len,
                                    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
-                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx);
+                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
 static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
                                  const unsigned char **in, long len,
                                  const ASN1_ITEM *it,
@@ -111,7 +121,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
                      int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
 {
     int rv;
-    rv = asn1_item_embed_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
+    rv = asn1_item_embed_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx, 0);
     if (rv <= 0)
         ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
     return rv;
@@ -124,7 +134,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
 
 static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
                                long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                               int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+                               int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx,
+                               int depth)
 {
     const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
     const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
@@ -145,6 +156,11 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
     else
         asn1_cb = 0;
 
+    if (++depth > ASN1_MAX_CONSTRUCTED_NEST) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EMBED_D2I, ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     switch (it->itype) {
     case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
         if (it->templates) {
@@ -160,7 +176,7 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
                 goto err;
             }
             return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
-                                        it->templates, opt, ctx);
+                                        it->templates, opt, ctx, depth);
         }
         return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
                                      tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
@@ -221,7 +237,7 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
             /*
              * We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised.
              */
-            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
+            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx, depth);
             /* If field not present, try the next one */
             if (ret == -1)
                 continue;
@@ -344,7 +360,8 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
              * attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
              */
 
-            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
+            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx,
+                                       depth);
             if (!ret) {
                 errtt = seqtt;
                 goto err;
@@ -420,7 +437,7 @@ static int asn1_item_embed_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
 static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
                                 const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
                                 const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
-                                ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+                                ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
 {
     int flags, aclass;
     int ret;
@@ -455,7 +472,7 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
             return 0;
         }
         /* We've found the field so it can't be OPTIONAL now */
-        ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx);
+        ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx, depth);
         if (!ret) {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
             return 0;
@@ -479,7 +496,7 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
             }
         }
     } else
-        return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx);
+        return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx, depth);
 
     *in = p;
     return 1;
@@ -491,7 +508,7 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
 static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
                                    const unsigned char **in, long len,
                                    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
-                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx)
+                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
 {
     int flags, aclass;
     int ret;
@@ -573,7 +590,8 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
             }
             skfield = NULL;
             if (!asn1_item_embed_d2i(&skfield, &p, len,
-                                     ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx)) {
+                                     ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx,
+                                     depth)) {
                 ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
                         ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
                 /* |skfield| may be partially allocated despite failure. */
@@ -595,7 +613,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
         /* IMPLICIT tagging */
         ret = asn1_item_embed_d2i(val, &p, len,
                                   ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt,
-                                  ctx);
+                                  ctx, depth);
         if (!ret) {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
             goto err;
@@ -604,7 +622,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
     } else {
         /* Nothing special */
         ret = asn1_item_embed_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-                                  -1, 0, opt, ctx);
+                                  -1, 0, opt, ctx, depth);
         if (!ret) {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
             goto err;
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index bb8c157..4fa56fd 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -1680,6 +1680,7 @@ ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE:189:missing value
 ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL:139:mstring not universal
 ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG:140:mstring wrong tag
 ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING:197:nested asn1 string
+ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP:201:nested too deep
 ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS:141:non hex characters
 ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT:190:not ascii format
 ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA:142:not enough data
diff --git a/crypto/pariscid.pl b/crypto/pariscid.pl
index f82e27a..3e26f8e 100644
--- a/crypto/pariscid.pl
+++ b/crypto/pariscid.pl
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ L\$oop_cmp
 	or		%r29,$rv,$rv
 
 	sub		%r0,$rv,%r29
-	extru		%r29,31,1,$rv
+	extru		%r29,0,1,$rv
 L\$no_data
 	bv		($rp)
 	.EXIT
diff --git a/fuzz/corpora/asn1/eba5151118ff75ce6a86438a3a6f819c41d8be40 b/fuzz/corpora/asn1/eba5151118ff75ce6a86438a3a6f819c41d8be40
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..030b710
Binary files /dev/null and b/fuzz/corpora/asn1/eba5151118ff75ce6a86438a3a6f819c41d8be40 differ
diff --git a/include/openssl/asn1err.h b/include/openssl/asn1err.h
index 7da927f..a53bc4a 100644
--- a/include/openssl/asn1err.h
+++ b/include/openssl/asn1err.h
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 # define ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL                     139
 # define ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG                         140
 # define ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING                        197
+# define ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP                           201
 # define ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS                        141
 # define ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT                          190
 # define ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA                           142
diff --git a/test/test_test.c b/test/test_test.c
index c45bf8d..76b61f8 100644
--- a/test/test_test.c
+++ b/test/test_test.c
@@ -531,6 +531,10 @@ static int test_bn_output(int n)
     return 1;
 }
 
+static int test_memcmp(void)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_memcmp("ab","cd",2);
+}
 
 int setup_tests(void)
 {
@@ -553,6 +557,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(test_messages);
     ADD_TEST(test_single_eval);
     ADD_TEST(test_output);
+    ADD_TEST(test_memcmp);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_bn_output, OSSL_NELEM(bn_output_tests));
     return 1;
 }


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