[openssl-commits] [openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update

[matthias.st.pierre at ncp-e.com]

The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  896e8c5713b50ff2ef1478d5c6709874ce57cf05 (commit)
      from  35cf781c20b65e51c6d0d3e9a199e74534b60b4a (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 896e8c5713b50ff2ef1478d5c6709874ce57cf05
Author: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre at ncp-e.com>
Date:   Thu Oct 18 23:17:46 2018 +0200

    md_rand.c: don't stop polling until properly initialized
    
    Previously, the RNG sets `initialized=1` after the first call to
    RAND_poll(), although its criterion for being initialized actually
    is whether condition `entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED` is true.
    
    This commit now assigns `initialized=(entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED)`,
    which has the effect that on the next call, RAND_poll() will be
    called again, if it previously failed to obtain enough entropy.
    
    Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale at oracle.com>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7439)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index abca70f..0c273ad 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
     static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
     int i, j, k;
     size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
-    int ok;
     long md_c[2];
     unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
     EVP_MD_CTX m;
@@ -400,14 +399,13 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
 
     if (!initialized) {
         RAND_poll();
-        initialized = 1;
+        initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
     }
 
     if (!stirred_pool)
         do_stir_pool = 1;
 
-    ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-    if (!ok) {
+    if (!initialized) {
         /*
          * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
          * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
@@ -446,7 +444,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
             ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
             n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
         }
-        if (ok)
+        if (initialized)
             stirred_pool = 1;
     }
 
@@ -539,7 +537,7 @@ int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo, int lock)
         CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
 
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
-    if (ok)
+    if (initialized)
         return (1);
     else if (pseudo)
         return 0;
@@ -612,10 +610,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
 
     if (!initialized) {
         RAND_poll();
-        initialized = 1;
+        initialized = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
     }
 
-    ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+    ret = initialized;
 
     if (!do_not_lock) {
         /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */