[openssl] master update
nic.tuv at gmail.com
nic.tuv at gmail.com
Sun Feb 17 19:08:48 UTC 2019
The branch master has been updated
via 8f58ede09572dcc6a7e6c01280dd348240199568 (commit)
via e0033efc30b0f00476bba8f0fa5512be5dc8a3f1 (commit)
from db42bb440e76399b89fc8ae04644441a2a5f6821 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 8f58ede09572dcc6a7e6c01280dd348240199568
Author: Billy Brumley <bbrumley at gmail.com>
Date: Tue Feb 12 16:00:20 2019 +0200
[test] unit test for field_inv function pointer in EC_METHOD
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv at gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8254)
commit e0033efc30b0f00476bba8f0fa5512be5dc8a3f1
Author: Billy Brumley <bbrumley at gmail.com>
Date: Sat Feb 2 10:53:29 2019 +0200
SCA hardening for mod. field inversion in EC_GROUP
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular
field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the
implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures.
The new pointer is defined as:
`int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)`
and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field,
storing the result in `r`.
Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA
countermeasures:
- `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through
blinding.
- `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's
Little Theorem (FLT) inversion.
- `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which
already features SCA hardening through blinding.
From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage
previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates.
This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e.,
`EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three
implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but
through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack
states.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv at gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv at gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8254)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
CHANGES | 6 +
crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c | 18 +-
crypto/ec/ec_err.c | 9 +-
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h | 11 ++
crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c | 49 +++++
crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c | 1 +
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c | 1 +
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c | 1 +
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c | 1 +
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c | 1 +
crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c | 49 ++++-
crypto/err/openssl.txt | 4 +
include/openssl/ecerr.h | 6 +-
test/build.info | 6 +-
test/ec_internal_test.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++
...t_internal_curve448.t => 03-test_internal_ec.t} | 6 +-
16 files changed, 365 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/ec_internal_test.c
copy test/recipes/{03-test_internal_curve448.t => 03-test_internal_ec.t} (73%)
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 2fbe89f..cca9ed9 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -9,6 +9,12 @@
Changes between 1.1.1 and 3.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through
+ a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD.
+ This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective
+ to affine coordinates.
+ [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri]
+
*) Added EVP_KDF, an EVP layer KDF API, to simplify adding KDF and PRF
implementations. This includes an EVP_PKEY to EVP_KDF bridge for
those algorithms that were already supported through the EVP_PKEY API
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index f9d7d08..7bd2a63 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_ladder_post(const EC_GROUP *group,
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t2, t0, ctx)
|| !BN_GF2m_add(t1, t2, t1)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, p->X, t0, ctx)
- || !BN_GF2m_mod_inv(t2, t2, group->field, ctx)
+ || !group->meth->field_inv(group, t2, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t1, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, r->Z, t2, ctx)
|| !BN_GF2m_add(t2, p->X, r->X)
@@ -889,6 +889,21 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
return ret;
}
+/*-
+ * Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(2^m), storing the result in r.
+ * If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+ * SCA hardening is with blinding: BN_GF2m_mod_inv does that.
+ */
+static int ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+ const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!(ret = BN_GF2m_mod_inv(r, a, group->field, ctx)))
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT);
+ return ret;
+}
+
const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
{
static const EC_METHOD ret = {
@@ -929,6 +944,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul,
ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr,
ec_GF2m_simple_field_div,
+ ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv,
0, /* field_encode */
0, /* field_decode */
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
index 1ede7c2..b7cf95b 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
"ec_asn1_group2fieldid"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY, 0),
"ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, 0),
+ "ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, 0),
"ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, 0),
@@ -90,6 +92,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
"ec_GFp_mont_field_decode"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE, 0),
"ec_GFp_mont_field_encode"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_INV, 0),
+ "ec_GFp_mont_field_inv"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL, 0),
"ec_GFp_mont_field_mul"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE, 0),
@@ -124,6 +128,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
"ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES, 0),
"ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, 0),
+ "ec_GFp_simple_field_inv"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT, 0),
"ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE, 0),
@@ -287,6 +293,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE), "bignum out of range"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL), "buffer too small"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT), "cannot invert"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE),
"coordinates out of range"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH),
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
index 3153e4f..312b538 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -154,6 +154,13 @@ struct ec_method_st {
int (*field_sqr) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *);
int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
+ /*-
+ * 'field_inv' computes the multipicative inverse of a in the field,
+ * storing the result in r.
+ *
+ * If 'a' is zero (or equivalent), you'll get an EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+ */
+ int (*field_inv) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *);
/* e.g. to Montgomery */
int (*field_encode) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
@@ -390,6 +397,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
BN_CTX *ctx);
int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_pre(const EC_GROUP *group,
@@ -413,6 +422,8 @@ int ec_GFp_mont_field_mul(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_mont_field_decode(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
index d3d770d..1654d59 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void)
ec_GFp_mont_field_mul,
ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_mont_field_inv,
ec_GFp_mont_field_encode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one,
@@ -206,6 +207,54 @@ int ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
return BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, a, a, group->field_data1, ctx);
}
+/*-
+ * Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(p), storing the result in r.
+ * If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+ * We have a Mont structure, so SCA hardening is FLT inversion.
+ */
+int ec_GFp_mont_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (group->field_data1 == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Inverse in constant time with Fermats Little Theorem */
+ if (!BN_set_word(e, 2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(e, group->field, e))
+ goto err;
+ /*-
+ * Exponent e is public.
+ * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+ */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, e, group->field, ctx, group->field_data1))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* throw an error on zero */
+ if (BN_is_zero(r)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_INV, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int ec_GFp_mont_field_encode(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c
index 151e8ad..9f9045b 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void)
ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
index cd8b8c4..6539659 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void)
ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
index 3c60976..ee5508f 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -1810,6 +1810,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void)
ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index 653b866..a32f302 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -1647,6 +1647,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void)
ec_GFp_nist_field_mul,
ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
index 82affd6..c0772ca 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
@@ -1677,6 +1677,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistz256_method(void)
ec_GFp_mont_field_mul,
ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr,
0, /* field_div */
+ ec_GFp_mont_field_inv,
ec_GFp_mont_field_encode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one,
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
index 7e8fe4f..f80f98a 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void)
ec_GFp_simple_field_mul,
ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr,
0 /* field_div */ ,
+ ec_GFp_simple_field_inv,
0 /* field_encode */ ,
0 /* field_decode */ ,
0, /* field_set_to_one */
@@ -553,7 +554,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_point_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
}
} else {
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(Z_1, Z_, group->field, ctx)) {
+ if (!group->meth->field_inv(group, Z_1, Z_, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
@@ -1266,7 +1267,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
* points[i]->Z by its inverse.
*/
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], group->field, ctx)) {
+ if (!group->meth->field_inv(group, tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
@@ -1370,6 +1371,50 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
}
/*-
+ * Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(p), storing the result in r.
+ * If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+ * Since we don't have a Mont structure here, SCA hardening is with blinding.
+ */
+int ec_GFp_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *e = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ if ((e = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ do {
+ if (!BN_priv_rand_range(e, group->field))
+ goto err;
+ } while (BN_is_zero(e));
+
+ /* r := a * e */
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, r, a, e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* r := 1/(a * e) */
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(r, r, group->field, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* r := e/(a * e) = 1/a */
+ if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, r, r, e, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
* Apply randomization of EC point projective coordinates:
*
* (X, Y ,Z ) = (lambda^2*X, lambda^3*Y, lambda*Z)
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index a269ac6..8d183fb 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ EC_F_ECX_PUB_ENCODE:268:ecx_pub_encode
EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE:153:ec_asn1_group2curve
EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID:154:ec_asn1_group2fieldid
EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY:208:ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply
+EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV:296:ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv
EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT:159:\
ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant
EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE:195:ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve
@@ -537,6 +538,7 @@ EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES:164:\
ec_GF2m_simple_set_compressed_coordinates
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE:133:ec_GFp_mont_field_decode
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE:134:ec_GFp_mont_field_encode
+EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_INV:297:ec_GFp_mont_field_inv
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL:131:ec_GFp_mont_field_mul
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE:209:ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one
EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR:132:ec_GFp_mont_field_sqr
@@ -557,6 +559,7 @@ EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_MUL:200:ec_GFp_nist_field_mul
EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR:201:ec_GFp_nist_field_sqr
EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE:202:ec_GFp_nist_group_set_curve
EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES:287:ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates
+EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV:298:ec_GFp_simple_field_inv
EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT:165:\
ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant
EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE:166:ec_GFp_simple_group_set_curve
@@ -2157,6 +2160,7 @@ EC_R_ASN1_ERROR:115:asn1 error
EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE:156:bad signature
EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE:144:bignum out of range
EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:100:buffer too small
+EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT:165:cannot invert
EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE:146:coordinates out of range
EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH:160:curve does not support ecdh
EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING:159:curve does not support signing
diff --git a/include/openssl/ecerr.h b/include/openssl/ecerr.h
index 1cbd3a3..8074481 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ecerr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/ecerr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ int ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE 153
# define EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID 154
# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_MONTGOMERY_POINT_MULTIPLY 208
+# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV 296
# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 159
# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE 195
# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_LADDER_POST 285
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ int ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES 164
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_DECODE 133
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_ENCODE 134
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_INV 297
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_MUL 131
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SET_TO_ONE 209
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_MONT_FIELD_SQR 132
@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ int ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_FIELD_SQR 201
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_NIST_GROUP_SET_CURVE 202
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_BLIND_COORDINATES 287
+# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV 298
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_CHECK_DISCRIMINANT 165
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_GROUP_SET_CURVE 166
# define EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_MAKE_AFFINE 102
@@ -202,6 +205,7 @@ int ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 156
# define EC_R_BIGNUM_OUT_OF_RANGE 144
# define EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 100
+# define EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT 165
# define EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE 146
# define EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ECDH 160
# define EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING 159
diff --git a/test/build.info b/test/build.info
index ecfcace..af8429b 100644
--- a/test/build.info
+++ b/test/build.info
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}]
PROGRAMS{noinst}=sm4_internal_test
ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{ec} -}]
- PROGRAMS{noinst}=curve448_internal_test
+ PROGRAMS{noinst}=ec_internal_test curve448_internal_test
ENDIF
SOURCE[poly1305_internal_test]=poly1305_internal_test.c
@@ -510,6 +510,10 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}]
INCLUDE[sm4_internal_test]=.. ../include ../apps/include ../crypto/include
DEPEND[sm4_internal_test]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a
+ SOURCE[ec_internal_test]=ec_internal_test.c
+ INCLUDE[ec_internal_test]=../include ../crypto/ec ../apps/include ../crypto/include
+ DEPEND[ec_internal_test]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a
+
SOURCE[curve448_internal_test]=curve448_internal_test.c
INCLUDE[curve448_internal_test]=.. ../include ../apps/include ../crypto/ec/curve448
DEPEND[curve448_internal_test]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a
diff --git a/test/ec_internal_test.c b/test/ec_internal_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d3a4fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+static size_t crv_len = 0;
+static EC_builtin_curve *curves = NULL;
+
+/* sanity checks field_inv function pointer in EC_METHOD */
+static int group_field_tests(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *c = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (group->meth->field_inv == NULL || group->meth->field_mul == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(c = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
+ /* 1/1 = 1 */
+ || !TEST_true(group->meth->field_inv(group, b, BN_value_one(), ctx))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_is_one(b))
+ /* (1/a)*a = 1 */
+ || !TEST_true(BN_pseudo_rand(a, BN_num_bits(group->field) - 1,
+ BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+ || !TEST_true(group->meth->field_inv(group, b, a, ctx))
+ || (group->meth->field_encode &&
+ !TEST_true(group->meth->field_encode(group, a, a, ctx)))
+ || (group->meth->field_encode &&
+ !TEST_true(group->meth->field_encode(group, b, b, ctx)))
+ || !TEST_true(group->meth->field_mul(group, c, a, b, ctx))
+ || (group->meth->field_decode &&
+ !TEST_true(group->meth->field_decode(group, c, c, ctx)))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_is_one(c)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* 1/0 = error */
+ BN_zero(a);
+ if (!TEST_false(group->meth->field_inv(group, b, a, ctx))
+ || !TEST_true(ERR_GET_LIB(ERR_peek_last_error()) == ERR_LIB_EC)
+ || !TEST_true(ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
+ EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT)
+ /* 1/p = error */
+ || !TEST_false(group->meth->field_inv(group, b, group->field, ctx))
+ || !TEST_true(ERR_GET_LIB(ERR_peek_last_error()) == ERR_LIB_EC)
+ || !TEST_true(ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) ==
+ EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT))
+ goto err;
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* wrapper for group_field_tests for explicit curve params and EC_METHOD */
+static int field_tests(const EC_METHOD *meth, const unsigned char *params,
+ int len)
+{
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
+ EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = BN_CTX_new()))
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
+ || !TEST_ptr(group = EC_GROUP_new(meth))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_bin2bn(params, len, p))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_bin2bn(params + len, len, a))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * len, len, b))
+ || !TEST_true(EC_GROUP_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx))
+ || !group_field_tests(group, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_free(group);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* NIST prime curve P-256 */
+static const unsigned char params_p256[] = {
+ /* p */
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ /* a */
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC,
+ /* b */
+ 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55,
+ 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6,
+ 0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B
+};
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/* NIST binary curve B-283 */
+static const unsigned char params_b283[] = {
+ /* p */
+ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0xA1,
+ /* a */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ /* b */
+ 0x02, 0x7B, 0x68, 0x0A, 0xC8, 0xB8, 0x59, 0x6D, 0xA5, 0xA4, 0xAF, 0x8A,
+ 0x19, 0xA0, 0x30, 0x3F, 0xCA, 0x97, 0xFD, 0x76, 0x45, 0x30, 0x9F, 0xA2,
+ 0xA5, 0x81, 0x48, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x26, 0x3E, 0x31, 0x3B, 0x79, 0xA2, 0xF5
+};
+#endif
+
+/* test EC_GFp_simple_method directly */
+static int field_tests_ecp_simple(void)
+{
+ TEST_info("Testing EC_GFp_simple_method()\n");
+ return field_tests(EC_GFp_simple_method(), params_p256,
+ sizeof(params_p256) / 3);
+}
+
+/* test EC_GFp_mont_method directly */
+static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void)
+{
+ TEST_info("Testing EC_GFp_mont_method()\n");
+ return field_tests(EC_GFp_mont_method(), params_p256,
+ sizeof(params_p256) / 3);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */
+static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void)
+{
+ TEST_info("Testing EC_GF2m_simple_method()\n");
+ return field_tests(EC_GF2m_simple_method(), params_b283,
+ sizeof(params_b283) / 3);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* test default method for a named curve */
+static int field_tests_default(int n)
+{
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+ int nid = curves[n].nid;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ TEST_info("Testing curve %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid))
+ || !TEST_ptr(ctx = BN_CTX_new())
+ || !group_field_tests(group, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_free(group);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int setup_tests(void)
+{
+ crv_len = EC_get_builtin_curves(NULL, 0);
+ if (!TEST_ptr(curves = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*curves) * crv_len))
+ || !TEST_true(EC_get_builtin_curves(curves, crv_len)))
+ return 0;
+
+ ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple);
+ ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
+#endif
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void cleanup_tests(void)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(curves);
+}
diff --git a/test/recipes/03-test_internal_curve448.t b/test/recipes/03-test_internal_ec.t
similarity index 73%
copy from test/recipes/03-test_internal_curve448.t
copy to test/recipes/03-test_internal_ec.t
index 01ca5ad..0d31d0a 100644
--- a/test/recipes/03-test_internal_curve448.t
+++ b/test/recipes/03-test_internal_ec.t
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /usr/bin/env perl
-# Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+# Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ use OpenSSL::Test; # get 'plan'
use OpenSSL::Test::Simple;
use OpenSSL::Test::Utils;
-setup("test_internal_curve448");
+setup("test_internal_ec");
plan skip_all => "This test is unsupported in a no-ec build"
if disabled("ec");
-simple_test("test_internal_curve448", "curve448_internal_test");
+simple_test("test_internal_ec", "ec_internal_test");
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