[openssl] master update
bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de
bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de
Mon Jul 22 11:38:26 UTC 2019
The branch master has been updated
via 1372560f64c9a7cfad1979fa8c41bee335a04373 (commit)
from a8f1aabd4b44db668bca638c111598b2e0688cc4 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1372560f64c9a7cfad1979fa8c41bee335a04373
Author: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de>
Date: Sat Jul 20 11:22:46 2019 +0200
Allocate DRBG additional data pool from non-secure memory
The additional data allocates 12K per DRBG instance in the
secure memory, which is not necessary. Also nonces are not
considered secret.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre at ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale at oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9423)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h | 3 ++-
crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c | 6 +++---
crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c | 4 ++--
crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h | 1 +
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h
index d964a1d..c5d0c20 100644
--- a/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h
+++ b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
/*
* RAND_POOL functions
*/
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
+RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
+ size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
size_t entropy);
void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool);
diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
index c1b9b3b..825e90d 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
return 0;
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
- pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len);
+ pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
/*
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) {
if (drbg->type == 0)
goto err;
- drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
+ drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL)
goto err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c b/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c
index 44e077e..a014f93 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static void *rand_crng_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
return NULL;
if ((crngt_glob->crngt_pool
- = rand_pool_new(0, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL) {
+ = rand_pool_new(0, 1, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(crngt_glob);
return NULL;
}
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
if (crngt_glob == NULL)
return 0;
- if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len)) == NULL)
+ if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len)) == NULL)
return 0;
while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
index 416237a..1a77c89 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ struct rand_pool_st {
size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */
int attached; /* true pool was attached to existing buffer */
+ int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */
size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */
size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 7768ade..9c99cc9 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
pool = drbg->seed_pool;
pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
} else {
- pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
+ pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, drbg->secure, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
}
@@ -203,8 +203,12 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
- if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+ if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
+ if (drbg->secure)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+ else
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
+ }
}
/*
@@ -331,7 +335,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
- pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
+ pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
if (pool == NULL)
@@ -360,7 +364,8 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
* Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
*/
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
+ size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
@@ -373,13 +378,18 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ?
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len;
- pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
+ if (secure)
+ pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
+ else
+ pool->buffer = OPENSSL_zalloc(pool->max_len);
+
if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested;
+ pool->secure = secure;
return pool;
@@ -434,8 +444,13 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
* to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
* (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()).
*/
- if (!pool->attached)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
+ if (!pool->attached) {
+ if (pool->secure)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
+ else
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
+ }
+
OPENSSL_free(pool);
}
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