[openssl] master update
Dr. Paul Dale
pauli at openssl.org
Tue Jul 23 08:07:46 UTC 2019
The branch master has been updated
via a6a66e4511eec0f4ecc2943117a42b3723eb2222 (commit)
from 82925f9dd0492f2e5f1d80ff46fd59f0704c8fe6 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a6a66e4511eec0f4ecc2943117a42b3723eb2222
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date: Tue Jul 23 18:07:19 2019 +1000
Make rand_pool buffers more dynamic in their sizing.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9428)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
CHANGES | 3 +++
crypto/err/openssl.txt | 1 +
crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
include/openssl/randerr.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 0ad7ac8..3507e35 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
The macro SYSerr() is deprecated.
[Rich Salz]
+ *) Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools.
+ [Paul Dale]
+
*) {CRYPTO,OPENSSL}_mem_debug_{push,pop} are now no-ops and have been
deprecated.
[Rich Salz]
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index 8aa62a6..b852fa2 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -1177,6 +1177,7 @@ RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN:113:rand_pool_add_begin
RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END:114:rand_pool_add_end
RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH:124:rand_pool_attach
RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED:115:rand_pool_bytes_needed
+RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW:127:
RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW:116:rand_pool_new
RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE:112:RAND_write_file
RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD:140:check_padding_md
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
index 1a77c89..e425d41 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -82,6 +82,24 @@
* 1.5 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8))
*/
+/*
+ * Initial allocation minimum.
+ *
+ * There is a distinction between the secure and normal allocation minimums.
+ * Ideally, the secure allocation size should be a power of two. The normal
+ * allocation size doesn't have any such restriction.
+ *
+ * The secure value is based on 128 bits of secure material, which is 16 bytes.
+ * Typically, the DRBGs will set a minimum larger than this so optimal
+ * allocation ought to take place (for full quality seed material).
+ *
+ * The normal value has been chosed by noticing that the rand_drbg_get_nonce
+ * function is usually the largest of the built in allocation (twenty four
+ * bytes and then appending another sixteen bytes). This means the buffer ends
+ * with 40 bytes. The value of forty eight is comfortably above this which
+ * allows some slack in the platform specific values used.
+ */
+# define RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure) ((secure) ? 16 : 48)
/* DRBG status values */
typedef enum drbg_status_e {
@@ -184,6 +202,7 @@ struct rand_pool_st {
size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */
size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */
+ size_t alloc_len; /* current number of bytes allocated */
size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */
size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */
};
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 9c99cc9..8b44b55 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
+ size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure);
if (pool == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -377,11 +378,14 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
pool->min_len = min_len;
pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ?
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len;
+ pool->alloc_len = min_len < min_alloc_size ? min_alloc_size : min_len;
+ if (pool->alloc_len > pool->max_len)
+ pool->alloc_len = pool->max_len;
if (secure)
- pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
+ pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->alloc_len);
else
- pool->buffer = OPENSSL_zalloc(pool->max_len);
+ pool->buffer = OPENSSL_zalloc(pool->alloc_len);
if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -424,7 +428,7 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
pool->attached = 1;
- pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->len;
+ pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->alloc_len = pool->len;
pool->entropy = entropy;
return pool;
@@ -446,9 +450,9 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
*/
if (!pool->attached) {
if (pool->secure)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
else
- OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
}
OPENSSL_free(pool);
@@ -581,6 +585,36 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
return pool->max_len - pool->len;
}
+static int rand_pool_grow(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ const size_t limit = pool->max_len / 2;
+ size_t newlen = pool->alloc_len;
+
+ do
+ newlen = newlen < limit ? newlen * 2 : pool->max_len;
+ while (len > newlen - pool->len);
+
+ if (pool->secure)
+ p = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(newlen);
+ else
+ p = OPENSSL_zalloc(newlen);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, pool->buffer, pool->len);
+ if (pool->secure)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
+ else
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
+ pool->buffer = p;
+ pool->alloc_len = newlen;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Add random bytes to the random pool.
*
@@ -604,6 +638,8 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
}
if (len > 0) {
+ if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
+ return 0;
memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len);
pool->len += len;
pool->entropy += entropy;
@@ -639,6 +675,8 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
return NULL;
}
+ if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
+ return NULL;
return pool->buffer + pool->len;
}
diff --git a/include/openssl/randerr.h b/include/openssl/randerr.h
index ca5a5ed..cd7ae66 100644
--- a/include/openssl/randerr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/randerr.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
# define RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END 0
# define RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH 0
# define RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED 0
+# define RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW 0
# define RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW 0
# define RAND_F_RAND_WRITE_FILE 0
# endif
More information about the openssl-commits
mailing list