[openssl] OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable update

bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de
Thu Mar 7 22:58:06 UTC 2019


The branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable has been updated
       via  6555a8941bd6be5790d3b45c41de23234a8e527f (commit)
      from  d5e37fc871be6910db931790b70323c78b332dff (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 6555a8941bd6be5790d3b45c41de23234a8e527f
Author: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de>
Date:   Thu Feb 28 10:08:18 2019 +0100

    Fix memory overrun in rsa padding check functions
    
    Backported from d7f5e5ae6d5
    
    Fixes #8364 and #8357
    
    Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at roeckx.be>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8438)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c  | 22 +++++++++++-----------
 crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c  | 33 ++++++++++++++++++---------------
 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 033ea5a..acba7f1 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the
      * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by
      * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly,
-     * num < 2 * mdlen + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
+     * |num| >= 2 * |mdlen| + 2 must hold for the modulus irrespective of
      * the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
      * This does not leak any side-channel information.
      */
@@ -180,17 +180,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         from -= 1 & mask;
         *--em = *from & mask;
     }
-    from = em;
 
     /*
      * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
      * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext  Attack on RSA
      * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001).
      */
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
 
-    maskedseed = from + 1;
-    maskeddb = from + 1 + mdlen;
+    maskedseed = em + 1;
+    maskeddb = em + 1 + mdlen;
 
     if (PKCS1_MGF1(seed, mdlen, maskeddb, dblen, mgf1md))
         goto cleanup;
@@ -231,7 +230,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     mlen = dblen - msg_index;
 
     /*
-     * For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.
+     * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
      */
     good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
 
@@ -245,15 +244,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
      * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
      */
-    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen);
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen),
+                                    dblen - mdlen - 1, tlen);
     msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);
     mlen = dblen - msg_index;
-    for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+    for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, dblen);
 
-        from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind   */
-        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */
-        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+        msg_index -= tlen & equals;  /* rewind at EOF */
+        mask &= ~equals;  /* mask = 0 at EOF */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, db[msg_index++], to[i]);
     }
 
     /*
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index 074bc0a..2c43a54 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -241,15 +241,14 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         from -= 1 & mask;
         *--em = *from & mask;
     }
-    from = em;
 
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
-    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
 
     /* scan over padding data */
     found_zero_byte = 0;
     for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
 
         zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
                                               i, zero_index);
@@ -257,7 +256,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     }
 
     /*
-     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
      * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
      * also fails.
      */
@@ -285,15 +284,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
      * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
      */
-    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+                                    num - 11, tlen);
     msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
     mlen = num - msg_index;
-    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+    for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, num);
 
-        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
-        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
-        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+        msg_index -= tlen & equals;  /* rewind at EOF */
+        mask &= ~equals;  /* mask = 0 at EOF */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[msg_index++], to[i]);
     }
 
     OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index e9a5fe2..61751fe 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 
 /*
  * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
- * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
+ * if nul delimiter is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
  * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
  */
 int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
@@ -116,7 +116,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
     int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
 
-    if (flen < 10) {
+    if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (flen > num || num < 11) {
         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
         return (-1);
     }
@@ -138,10 +141,9 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
         from -= 1 & mask;
         *--em = *from & mask;
     }
-    from = em;
 
-    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
-    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
+    good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+    good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
     err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
     mask = ~good;
 
@@ -149,18 +151,18 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     found_zero_byte = 0;
     threes_in_row = 0;
     for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
 
         zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
                                               i, zero_index);
         found_zero_byte |= equals0;
 
         threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
-        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
+        threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
     }
 
     /*
-     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
+     * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
      * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
      * also fails.
      */
@@ -169,7 +171,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
                                    RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
     mask = ~good;
 
-    good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
+    good &= constant_time_ge(threes_in_row, 8);
     err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
                                    RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
     mask = ~good;
@@ -197,15 +199,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      * should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
      * operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
      */
-    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
+    tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
+                                    num - 11, tlen);
     msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
     mlen = num - msg_index;
-    for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
-        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
+    for (mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+        unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(msg_index, num);
 
-        from -= tlen & equals;  /* if (i == mlen) rewind   */
-        mask &= mask ^ equals;  /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
-        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
+        msg_index -= tlen & equals;  /* rewind at EOF */
+        mask &= ~equals;  /* mask = 0 at EOF */
+        to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[msg_index++], to[i]);
     }
 
     OPENSSL_cleanse(em, num);


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