[openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

[Matt Caswell]

The branch OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable has been updated
       via  af6ce3b46cd0fba2235c9ec488973c90c56d92a1 (commit)
      from  66ed53c848c60cbaf7a11fa56f1959abf5ef09c0 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit af6ce3b46cd0fba2235c9ec488973c90c56d92a1
Author: Jake Massimo <pcai002 at live.rhul.ac.uk>
Date:   Wed Mar 27 04:13:08 2019 +0000

    Increase rounds of Miller-Rabin testing DH_check
    
    DH_check is used to test the validity of Diffie-Hellman parameter sets (p, q, g). Among the tests performed are primality tests on p and q, for this BN_is_prime_ex is called with the rounds of Miller-Rabin set as default. This will therefore use the average case error estimates derived from the function BN_prime_checks_for_size based on the bit size of the number tested.
    
    However, these bounds are only accurate on testing random input. Within this testing scenario, where we are checking the validity of a DH parameter set, we can not assert that these parameters are randomly generated. Thus we must treat them as if they are adversarial in nature and increase the rounds of Miller-Rabin performed.
    
    Generally, each round of Miller-Rabin can declare a composite number prime with probability at most (1/4), thus 64 rounds is sufficient in thwarting known generation techniques (even in safe prime settings - see https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/032 for full analysis). The choice of 64 rounds is also consistent with SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64 as used in srp_Verify_N_and_g in openssl/apps/s_client.c.
    
    Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale at oracle.com>
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8593)
    
    (cherry picked from commit 2500c093aa1e9c90c11c415053c0a27a00661d0d)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 52cc0eb..67b4cec 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include "dh_locl.h"
 
+# define DH_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64
+
 /*-
  * Check that p and g are suitable enough
  *
@@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
             if (!BN_is_one(t1))
                 *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
         }
-        r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->q, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+        r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->q, DH_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, ctx, NULL);
         if (r < 0)
             goto err;
         if (!r)
@@ -153,7 +155,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
     } else
         *ret |= DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR;
 
-    r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+    r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->p, DH_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, ctx, NULL);
     if (r < 0)
         goto err;
     if (!r)
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
     else if (!dh->q) {
         if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->p))
             goto err;
-        r = BN_is_prime_ex(t1, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+        r = BN_is_prime_ex(t1, DH_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, ctx, NULL);
         if (r < 0)
             goto err;
         if (!r)