[openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update
matthias.st.pierre at ncp-e.com
matthias.st.pierre at ncp-e.com
Thu Oct 3 12:39:06 UTC 2019
The branch OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable has been updated
via 1a9a56865cb66d9fca067ba00d0e030f4b6974aa (commit)
from 6f3ccda84fb0995166252cc0db2ff3df17539b2b (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1a9a56865cb66d9fca067ba00d0e030f4b6974aa
Author: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre at ncp-e.com>
Date: Thu Oct 3 14:20:52 2019 +0200
rsa: replace magic number '11' by RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE
Suggested by Matt Hart
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10084)
(cherry picked from commit f1d1903dd3dd1d68a5eae190b8c2a88bfe0a68ac)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
index 5deab15173..a3d0b7cef8 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* D - data.
*/
- if (num < 11)
+ if (num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)
return -1;
/* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
int i, j;
unsigned char *p;
- if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+ if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
return 0;
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* section 7.2.2.
*/
- if (flen > num || num < 11) {
+ if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
return -1;
@@ -226,8 +226,8 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
/*
- * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
- * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
+ * Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+ * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|.
* Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
* Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
* the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
@@ -235,16 +235,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
* The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
*/
- tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
- num - 11, tlen);
- for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
- mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
- for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen),
+ num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen);
+ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
+ for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++)
em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
- to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]);
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
index 0a659bc49c..1f155be175 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
int i, j;
unsigned char *p;
- if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
+ if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
return 0;
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
return -1;
- if (flen > num || num < 11) {
+ if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
return -1;
}
@@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
/*
- * Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
- * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
+ * Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+ * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|.
* Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
* Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
* the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
@@ -150,16 +150,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
* The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
*/
- tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
- num - 11, tlen);
- for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
- mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
- for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen),
+ num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen);
+ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
+ for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++)
em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
- to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]);
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
More information about the openssl-commits
mailing list