[openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

Matt Caswell matt at openssl.org
Tue Sep 10 11:08:35 UTC 2019


The branch OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable has been updated
       via  a95b0815c7d2dc0e03875fa553bb8309a206ab0a (commit)
      from  08229ad838c50f644d7e928e2eef147b4308ad64 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit a95b0815c7d2dc0e03875fa553bb8309a206ab0a
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Tue Sep 10 11:51:59 2019 +0100

    Remove duplicate CHANGES entry
    
    Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9844)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 CHANGES | 13 +------------
 NEWS    |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index c1388ad6fd..8c5dbd1de4 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -24,18 +24,6 @@
      (CVE-2019-1549)
      [Matthias St. Pierre]
 
-  *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt(). In situations
-     where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure
-     of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of
-     messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption
-     key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public
-     RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not
-     affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the
-     CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info
-     to decrypt.
-     (CVE-2019-1563)
-     [Bernd Edlinger]
-
   *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
      used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
      or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
@@ -66,6 +54,7 @@
      certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
      The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
      CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+     (CVE-2019-1563)
      [Bernd Edlinger]
 
   *) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 22be168091..bd33f9be19 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1c and OpenSSL 1.1.1d [under development]
 
       o Fixed a fork protection issue (CVE-2019-1549)
-      o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt()
+      o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
         (CVE-2019-1563)
       o For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
         used even when parsing explicit parameters


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