[openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de
Tue Apr 7 11:23:08 UTC 2020


The branch OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable has been updated
       via  5dc91f44a90b72f5c0a79ab9a19d0f2fa0bbac1f (commit)
      from  f9f2e609db4de8d1f2022189a99c8277c3f6289d (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 5dc91f44a90b72f5c0a79ab9a19d0f2fa0bbac1f
Author: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger at hotmail.de>
Date:   Mon Apr 6 10:41:36 2020 +0200

    Fix the error handling in EC_POINTs_mul
    
    This was pointed out by a false-positive
    -fsanitizer warning ;-)
    
    However from the cryptographical POV the
    code is wrong:
    A point R^0 on the wrong curve
    is infinity on the wrong curve.
    
    [extended tests]
    
    Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv at gmail.com>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11475)
    
    (cherry picked from commit 1eb9b54af7e00fa12196411964ce742ea8677766)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index 3554ada827..22b00e203d 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -1007,14 +1007,14 @@ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
     size_t i = 0;
     BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
 
-    if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0)) {
-        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
-    }
-
     if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
+
+    if (scalar == NULL && num == 0)
+        return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
+
     for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
         if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[i], group)) {
             ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);


More information about the openssl-commits mailing list