[openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update

Dr. Paul Dale pauli at openssl.org
Tue Apr 7 23:22:12 UTC 2020


The branch OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable has been updated
       via  163897267fab6d29dff1a4bf8247f8e02e158be8 (commit)
      from  43c242b0f687fc48c57ae3d721960db28e079ef6 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 163897267fab6d29dff1a4bf8247f8e02e158be8
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date:   Mon Apr 6 09:23:00 2020 +1000

    Integer overflow in ASN1_STRING_set.
    
    Addressing a potential integer overflow condition.
    
    Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz at fedoraproject.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11473)
    
    (cherry picked from commit 96218269f4c2da82f143727fb7697d572c190bc5)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
index a7d32ae5e2..5cd0e16b52 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -268,18 +268,29 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *str)
     return ret;
 }
 
-int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len)
+int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len_in)
 {
     unsigned char *c;
     const char *data = _data;
+    size_t len;
 
-    if (len < 0) {
+    if (len_in < 0) {
         if (data == NULL)
             return 0;
-        else
-            len = strlen(data);
+        len = strlen(data);
+    } else {
+        len = (size_t)len_in;
+    }
+    /*
+     * Verify that the length fits within an integer for assignment to
+     * str->length below.  The additional 1 is subtracted to allow for the
+     * '\0' terminator even though this isn't strictly necessary.
+     */
+    if (len > INT_MAX - 1) {
+        ASN1err(0, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
+        return 0;
     }
-    if ((str->length <= len) || (str->data == NULL)) {
+    if ((size_t)str->length <= len || str->data == NULL) {
         c = str->data;
         str->data = OPENSSL_realloc(c, len + 1);
         if (str->data == NULL) {


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