[openssl] OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable update
dev at ddvo.net
dev at ddvo.net
Fri Dec 4 06:06:24 UTC 2020
The branch OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable has been updated
via 315c47e00bb953abe8892a3c1272289330b29d23 (commit)
from 61168b5b8dde03f3b77ddf5e4b1b81c338c01746 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 315c47e00bb953abe8892a3c1272289330b29d23
Author: Dr. David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb at siemens.com>
Date: Tue Dec 1 14:22:16 2020 +0100
x509_vfy.c: Restore rejection of expired trusted (root) certificate
The certificate path validation procedure specified in RFC 5280 does not
include checking the validity period of the trusted (root) certificate.
Still it is common good practice to perform this check.
Also OpenSSL did this until version 1.1.1h, yet
commit e2590c3a162eb118c36b09c2168164283aa099b4 accidentally killed it.
The current commit restores the previous behavior.
It also removes the cause of that bug, namely counter-intuitive design
of the internal function check_issued(), which was complicated by checks
that actually belong to some other internal function, namely find_issuer().
Moreover, this commit adds a regression check and proper documentation of
the root cert validity period check feature, which had been missing so far.
Fixes #13471
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz at fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13585)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
CHANGES | 8 +++++
crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 2 ++
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 51 +++++++++++++++---------------
doc/man1/verify.pod | 12 ++++---
doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod | 4 +--
test/certs/root-expired.pem | 18 +++++++++++
test/certs/setup.sh | 5 +--
test/recipes/25-test_verify.t | 6 +++-
8 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 test/certs/root-expired.pem
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index b927cf1361..044108d036 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
pass an EVP_PKEY instead.
[Matt Caswell]
+ *) In 1.1.1h, an expired trusted (root) certificate was not anymore rejected
+ when validating a certificate path. This check is restored in 1.1.1i.
+ [David von Oheimb]
+
Changes between 1.1.1g and 1.1.1h [22 Sep 2020]
*) Certificates with explicit curve parameters are now disallowed in
@@ -44,6 +48,10 @@
on renegotiation.
[Tomas Mraz]
+ *) Accidentally, an expired trusted (root) certificate is not anymore rejected
+ when validating a certificate path.
+ [David von Oheimb]
+
*) The Oracle Developer Studio compiler will start reporting deprecated APIs
*) Add support for Apple Silicon M1 Macs with the darwin64-arm64-cc target.
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index d1600e1e8d..ad620af0af 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int rv;
+ if (a == b) /* for efficiency */
+ return 0;
/* ensure hash is valid */
if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0) != 1)
return -2;
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index ffa8d637ff..730a0160ff 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -312,8 +312,20 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return ret;
}
+static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert)
+{
+ int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
- * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+ * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk a non-expired issuer cert (if any) of given cert x.
+ * The issuer must not be the same as x and must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the
+ * exceptional case x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
*/
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
@@ -322,7 +334,13 @@ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
+ /*
+ * Below check 'issuer != x' is an optimization and safety precaution:
+ * Candidate issuer cert cannot be the same as the subject cert 'x'.
+ */
+ if (issuer != x && ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)
+ && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) {
rv = issuer;
if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
break;
@@ -331,30 +349,13 @@ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
return rv;
}
-/*
- * Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer'
- * and the issuer is not yet in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case
- * that 'x' is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
- */
+/* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
- if (x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) != X509_V_OK)
- return 0;
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0 || sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) != 1) {
- int i;
- X509 *ch;
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
- ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (ch == issuer || X509_cmp(ch, issuer) == 0)
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
+ return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK;
}
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
-
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
@@ -1740,7 +1741,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
xs = xi;
xi = NULL;
- goto check_cert;
+ goto check_cert_time;
}
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
@@ -1748,7 +1749,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
else {
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
xs = xi;
- goto check_cert;
+ goto check_cert_time;
}
if (n <= 0) {
if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
@@ -1756,7 +1757,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
xs = xi;
- goto check_cert;
+ goto check_cert_time;
}
n--;
@@ -1817,7 +1818,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
}
- check_cert:
+ check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */
/* Calls verify callback as needed */
if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
return 0;
diff --git a/doc/man1/verify.pod b/doc/man1/verify.pod
index 71288be40d..da2b702482 100644
--- a/doc/man1/verify.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/verify.pod
@@ -382,10 +382,14 @@ should be trusted for the supplied purpose.
For compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL, a certificate with no
trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
-The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity
-period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter
-dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this
-point.
+The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain.
+For each element in the chain, including the root CA certificate,
+the validity period as specified by the C<notBefore> and C<notAfter> fields
+is checked against the current system time.
+The B<-attime> flag may be used to use a reference time other than "now."
+The certificate signature is checked as well
+(except for the signature of the typically self-signed root CA certificate,
+which is verified only if the B<-check_ss_sig> option is given).
If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If
any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod
index 526790938a..6d7098250d 100644
--- a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func.pod
@@ -137,9 +137,7 @@ I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
function will be used instead.>
X509_STORE_set_check_issued() sets the function to check that a given
-certificate B<x> is issued by the issuer certificate B<issuer> and
-the issuer is not yet in the chain contained in <ctx>, where the exceptional
-case that B<x> is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
+certificate B<x> is issued by the issuer certificate B<issuer>.
This function must return 0 on failure (among others if B<x> hasn't
been issued with B<issuer>) and 1 on success.
I<If no function to get the issuer is provided, the internal default
diff --git a/test/certs/root-expired.pem b/test/certs/root-expired.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eb5b697ed2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/certs/root-expired.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/test/certs/setup.sh b/test/certs/setup.sh
index 2bb01fa13e..04591bcc05 100755
--- a/test/certs/setup.sh
+++ b/test/certs/setup.sh
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-#! /bin/sh
+#! /bin/bash
# Primary root: root-cert
# root cert variants: CA:false, key2, DN2
# trust variants: +serverAuth -serverAuth +clientAuth -clientAuth +anyEKU -anyEKU
#
./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-cert
+DAYS=-1 ./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key root-expired
./mkcert.sh genss "Root CA" root-key root-nonca
./mkcert.sh genroot "Root CA" root-key2 root-cert2
./mkcert.sh genroot "Root Cert 2" root-key root-name2
@@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ openssl x509 -in sca-cert.pem -trustout \
./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-name2 ca-key ca-name2
./mkcert.sh genee -p clientAuth server.example ee-key ee-client ca-key ca-cert
./mkcert.sh genee server.example ee-key ee-pathlen ca-key ca-cert \
- -extfile <(echo "basicConstraints=CA:FALSE,pathlen:0")
+ -extfile <(echo "basicConstraints=CA:FALSE,pathlen:0") # bash needed here
#
openssl x509 -in ee-cert.pem -trustout \
-addtrust serverAuth -out ee+serverAuth.pem
diff --git a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
index 9b8648e670..1336b8a726 100644
--- a/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
+++ b/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ sub verify {
run(app([@args]));
}
-plan tests => 143;
+plan tests => 145;
# Canonical success
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [], [qw(ca-cert)], "-partial_chain"),
"fail untrusted partial chain");
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"accept trusted partial chain");
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-expired)], [], "-partial_chain"),
+ "reject expired trusted partial chain"); # this check is beyond RFC 5280
+ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-expired)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
+ "reject expired trusted root"); # this check is beyond RFC 5280
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(sca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"accept partial chain with server purpose");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(cca-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"),
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