[openssl] master update
shane.lontis at oracle.com
shane.lontis at oracle.com
Sun Mar 15 11:36:09 UTC 2020
The branch master has been updated
via edd3b7a309f8767fc7d8a5c4f7d350b53e144c1b (commit)
from 2decdad31d36fdd36e1de3608a8a7a55a873e1f8 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit edd3b7a309f8767fc7d8a5c4f7d350b53e144c1b
Author: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis at oracle.com>
Date: Sun Mar 15 21:34:29 2020 +1000
Add ECDSA to providers
Added ECDSA support for OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10968)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/ec/build.info | 2 +-
crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c | 105 +++++
doc/man7/provider-signature.pod | 17 +
include/crypto/ec.h | 2 +-
include/openssl/core_names.h | 2 +
providers/defltprov.c | 3 +-
providers/fips/fipsprov.c | 5 +-
.../implementations/include/prov/implementations.h | 2 +
providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c | 7 +-
providers/implementations/signature/build.info | 2 +
providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c | 2 +-
providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c | 514 +++++++++++++++++++++
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt | 2 +-
13 files changed, 655 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c
create mode 100644 providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c
diff --git a/crypto/ec/build.info b/crypto/ec/build.info
index 0e01d4af38..f70543dd00 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/build.info
+++ b/crypto/ec/build.info
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ $COMMON=ec_lib.c ecp_smpl.c ecp_mont.c ecp_nist.c ec_cvt.c ec_mult.c \
ecdsa_ossl.c ecdsa_sign.c ecdsa_vrf.c curve25519.c \
curve448/arch_32/f_impl.c curve448/f_generic.c curve448/scalar.c \
curve448/curve448_tables.c curve448/eddsa.c curve448/curve448.c \
- $ECASM
+ $ECASM ecdsa_aid.c
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON ec_ameth.c ec_pmeth.c ecx_meth.c ecx_key.c \
ec_err.c ecdh_kdf.c eck_prn.c ec_evp_lib.c
SOURCE[../../providers/libfips.a]=$COMMON
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01bca40f8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "crypto/ec.h"
+
+#define ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x30
+#define ASN1_OID 0x06
+#define OID_FIRST(a, b) a * 40 + b
+#define DER_840() 0x86, 0x48 /* DER encoding of number 840 is 2 bytes */
+#define DER_10045() 0xCE, 0x3D /* DER encoding of number 10045 is 2 bytes */
+#define SHA1_SZ 7
+#define SHA2_SZ 8
+#define SHA3_SZ 9
+
+/*
+ * -- RFC 3279
+ * ansi-X9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }
+ * id-ecSigType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-X9-62 signatures(4) }
+ *
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ecSigType 1 }
+ */
+#define ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA1(name) \
+static const unsigned char algorithmidentifier_##name##_der[] = { \
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE, 2 + SHA1_SZ, \
+ ASN1_OID, SHA1_SZ, OID_FIRST(1, 2), DER_840(), DER_10045(), 4, 1 \
+}
+
+/*
+ * -- RFC 5758
+ *
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
+ * us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }
+ *
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
+ * us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
+ *
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
+ * us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
+ *
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
+ * us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }
+ */
+#define ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(name, n) \
+static const unsigned char algorithmidentifier_##name##_der[] = { \
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE, 2 + SHA2_SZ, \
+ ASN1_OID, SHA2_SZ, OID_FIRST(1, 2), DER_840(), DER_10045(), 4, 3, n \
+}
+
+/*
+ * https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/computer-security-objects-register/algorithm-registration
+ *
+ * sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 }
+ *
+ * id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 ::= { sigAlgs 9 }
+ * id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 ::= { sigAlgs 10 }
+ * id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 ::= { sigAlgs 11 }
+ * id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 ::= { sigAlgs 12 }
+ */
+#define ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(name, n) \
+static const unsigned char algorithmidentifier_##name##_der[] = { \
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE, 2 + SHA3_SZ, \
+ ASN1_OID, SHA3_SZ, OID_FIRST(2, 16), DER_840(), 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, n \
+}
+
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA1(sha1);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(sha224, 1);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(sha256, 2);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(sha384, 3);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(sha512, 4);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(sha3_224, 9);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(sha3_256, 10);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(sha3_384, 11);
+ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(sha3_512, 12);
+/* TODO - Add SHAKE OIDS when they are standardized */
+
+#define MD_CASE(name) \
+ case NID_##name: \
+ *len = sizeof(algorithmidentifier_##name##_der); \
+ return algorithmidentifier_##name##_der
+
+const unsigned char *ecdsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (md_nid) {
+ MD_CASE(sha1);
+ MD_CASE(sha224);
+ MD_CASE(sha256);
+ MD_CASE(sha384);
+ MD_CASE(sha512);
+ MD_CASE(sha3_224);
+ MD_CASE(sha3_256);
+ MD_CASE(sha3_384);
+ MD_CASE(sha3_512);
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/doc/man7/provider-signature.pod b/doc/man7/provider-signature.pod
index 771c55f6f5..edd4013fa6 100644
--- a/doc/man7/provider-signature.pod
+++ b/doc/man7/provider-signature.pod
@@ -332,6 +332,23 @@ Gets or sets the output size of the digest algorithm used for the input to the
signature functions.
The length of the "digest-size" parameter should not exceed that of a B<size_t>.
+= item "algorithm-id" (B<OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID>) <octet string>
+
+Gets the DER encoded AlgorithmIdentifier that corresponds to the combination of
+signature algorithm and digest algorithm for the signature operation.
+
+=item "kat" (B<OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT>) <unsigned integer>
+
+Sets a flag to modify the sign operation to return an error if the initial
+calculated signature is invalid.
+In the normal mode of operation - new random values are chosen until the
+signature operation succeeds.
+By default it retries until a signature is calculated.
+Setting the value to 0 causes the sign operation to retry,
+otherwise the sign operation is only tried once and returns whether or not it
+was successful.
+Known answer tests can be performed if the random generator is overriden to
+supply known values that either pass or fail.
=back
diff --git a/include/crypto/ec.h b/include/crypto/ec.h
index 91540fd856..00b1b25aff 100644
--- a/include/crypto/ec.h
+++ b/include/crypto/ec.h
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-
# include <openssl/ec.h>
/*-
@@ -56,5 +55,6 @@ int ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx);
OPENSSL_CTX *ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY *eckey);
const char *ec_curve_nid2name(int nid);
int ec_curve_name2nid(const char *name);
+const unsigned char *ecdsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif
diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h
index 1f67475a9a..2d48f00da2 100644
--- a/include/openssl/core_names.h
+++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h
@@ -257,6 +257,8 @@ extern "C" {
#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST
#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES \
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES
+#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT "kat"
/* Asym cipher parameters */
#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE
diff --git a/providers/defltprov.c b/providers/defltprov.c
index 7bb23e300e..f89363341a 100644
--- a/providers/defltprov.c
+++ b/providers/defltprov.c
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_keyexch[] = {
{ "DH:dhKeyAgreement", "provider=default", dh_keyexch_functions },
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- { "ECDH:id-ecPublicKey", "provider=default", ecdh_keyexch_functions },
+ { "ECDH", "provider=default", ecdh_keyexch_functions },
{ "X25519", "provider=default", x25519_keyexch_functions },
{ "X448", "provider=default", x448_keyexch_functions },
#endif
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_signature[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
{ "ED25519:Ed25519", "provider=default", ed25519_signature_functions },
{ "ED448:Ed448", "provider=default", ed448_signature_functions },
+ { "ECDSA", "provider=default", ecdsa_signature_functions },
#endif
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
index 61573f0337..b5bf5aa1fc 100644
--- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
+++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch[] = {
{ "DH:dhKeyAgreement", "provider=fips,fips=yes", dh_keyexch_functions },
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- { "ECDH:id-ecPublicKey", "provider=fips,fips=yes", ecdh_keyexch_functions },
+ { "ECDH", "provider=fips,fips=yes", ecdh_keyexch_functions },
#endif
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
@@ -807,6 +807,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = {
{ "DSA:dsaEncryption", "provider=fips,fips=yes", dsa_signature_functions },
#endif
{ "RSA:rsaEncryption", "provider=fips,fips=yes", rsa_signature_functions },
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ { "ECDSA", "provider=fips,fips=yes", ecdsa_signature_functions },
+#endif
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
diff --git a/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h b/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
index 94265adfc2..57a3122b13 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
+++ b/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ extern const OSSL_DISPATCH dsa_signature_functions[];
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[];
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ed25519_signature_functions[];
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ed448_signature_functions[];
+extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ecdsa_signature_functions[];
+
/* Asym Cipher */
extern const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_asym_cipher_functions[];
diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
index 43ccb5d0a9..47872553b3 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
@@ -49,10 +49,8 @@ const char *ec_query_operation_name(int operation_id)
switch (operation_id) {
case OSSL_OP_KEYEXCH:
return "ECDH";
-#if 0
case OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE:
- return deflt_signature;
-#endif
+ return "ECDSA";
}
return NULL;
}
@@ -135,7 +133,8 @@ int domparams_to_params(const EC_KEY *ec, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl)
if ((curve_name = ec_curve_nid2name(curve_nid)) == NULL)
return 0;
- if (!ossl_param_bld_push_utf8_string(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_NAME, curve_name, 0))
+ if (!ossl_param_bld_push_utf8_string(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_NAME,
+ curve_name, 0))
return 0;
}
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/build.info b/providers/implementations/signature/build.info
index bb229be90d..6f19ca83f6 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/build.info
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/build.info
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
$DSA_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
$EC_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
+$ECDSA_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
IF[{- !$disabled{dsa} -}]
SOURCE[$DSA_GOAL]=dsa.c
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ ENDIF
IF[{- !$disabled{ec} -}]
SOURCE[$EC_GOAL]=eddsa.c
+ SOURCE[$ECDSA_GOAL]=ecdsa.c
ENDIF
SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=rsa.c
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
index 99183e8f86..92c3b571c2 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ typedef struct {
char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
- /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
unsigned char aid[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE];
size_t aid_len;
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..733c0a23a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
+#include <string.h> /* memcpy */
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "internal/sizes.h"
+#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "crypto/ec.h"
+
+static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn ecdsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn ecdsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn ecdsa_sign;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn ecdsa_verify;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn ecdsa_digest_sign_final;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_final;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn ecdsa_dupctx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
+
+/*
+ * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
+ * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes DSA structures, so
+ * we use that here too.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+ EC_KEY *ec;
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
+ unsigned char aid[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE];
+ size_t aid_len;
+ size_t mdsize;
+
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
+ /*
+ * This indicates that KAT (CAVS) test is running. Externally an app will
+ * override the random callback such that the generated private key and k
+ * are known.
+ * Normal operation will loop to choose a new k if the signature is not
+ * valid - but for this mode of operation it forces a failure instead.
+ */
+ unsigned int kattest;
+ /*
+ * Internally used to cache the results of calling the EC group
+ * sign_setup() methods which are then passed to the sign operation.
+ * This is used by CAVS failure tests to terminate a loop if the signature
+ * is not valid.
+ * This could of also been done with a simple flag.
+ */
+ BIGNUM *kinv;
+ BIGNUM *r;
+} PROV_ECDSA_CTX;
+
+static void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_ECDSA_CTX));
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_signature_init(void *vctx, void *ec)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ec == NULL || !EC_KEY_up_ref(ec))
+ return 0;
+ EC_KEY_free(ctx->ec);
+ ctx->ec = ec;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_sign(void *vctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+ size_t ecsize = ECDSA_size(ctx->ec);
+
+ if (sig == NULL) {
+ *siglen = ecsize;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->kattest && !ECDSA_sign_setup(ctx->ec, NULL, &ctx->kinv, &ctx->r))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sigsize < (size_t)ecsize)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = ECDSA_sign_ex(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ctx->kinv, ctx->r, ctx->ec);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ *siglen = sltmp;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_verify(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ECDSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ctx->ec);
+}
+
+static int get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ /*
+ * Because the ECDSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
+ * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
+ * map.
+ */
+ static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
+ { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
+ { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
+ { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
+ { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
+ { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
+ { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
+ { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
+ { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
+ { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
+ /* TODO - Add SHAKE OIDS when they are standardized */
+
+ };
+ size_t i;
+ int mdnid = NID_undef;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
+ if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
+ mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+
+ end:
+ return mdnid;
+}
+
+static void free_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->mdctx = NULL;
+ ctx->md = NULL;
+ ctx->mdsize = 0;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *props, void *ec)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0;
+ const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier;
+
+ free_md(ctx);
+
+ if (!ecdsa_signature_init(vctx, ec))
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props);
+ algorithmidentifier =
+ ecdsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(get_md_nid(ctx->md),
+ &algorithmidentifier_len);
+ if (algorithmidentifier == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ ctx->mdsize = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
+ ctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx->mdctx == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len);
+ ctx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->mdctx, ctx->md, NULL))
+ goto error;
+ return 1;
+error:
+ free_md(ctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vctx, const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, data, datalen);
+}
+
+int ecdsa_digest_sign_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ size_t sigsize)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dlen = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
+ * are ignored. Defer to ecdsa_sign.
+ */
+ if (sig != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
+ * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
+ * but that problem is much larger than just in DSA.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ecdsa_sign(vctx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+}
+
+int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t siglen)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dlen = 0;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
+ * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
+ * but that problem is much larger than just in DSA.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return ecdsa_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+}
+
+static void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+
+ free_md(ctx);
+ EC_KEY_free(ctx->ec);
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->kinv);
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->r);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void *ecdsa_dupctx(void *vctx)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *dstctx;
+
+ dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
+ if (dstctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *dstctx = *srcctx;
+ dstctx->ec = NULL;
+ dstctx->md = NULL;
+ dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
+
+ if (srcctx->ec != NULL && !EC_KEY_up_ref(srcctx->ec))
+ goto err;
+ /* Test KATS should not need to be supported */
+ if (srcctx->kinv != NULL || srcctx->r != NULL)
+ goto err;
+ dstctx->ec = srcctx->ec;
+
+ if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
+ goto err;
+ dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
+
+ if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
+ dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
+ || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return dstctx;
+ err:
+ ecdsa_freectx(dstctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || params == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->aid, ctx->aid_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->mdsize))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, ctx->md == NULL
+ ? ctx->mdname
+ : EVP_MD_name(ctx->md)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ char *mdname;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || params == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctx->md != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * You cannot set the digest name/size when doing a DigestSign or
+ * DigestVerify.
+ */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ctx->kattest))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &ctx->mdsize))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We never actually use the mdname, but we do support getting it later.
+ * This can be useful for applications that want to know the MD that they
+ * previously set.
+ */
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
+ mdname = ctx->mdname;
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
+ * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
+ * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
+ * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
+ */
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(ctx->mdctx, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(ctx->md);
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(ctx->mdctx, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx)
+{
+ PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx;
+
+ if (ctx->md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(ctx->md);
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ecdsa_signature_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_newctx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_verify },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_sign_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_verify_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_freectx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_dupctx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_get_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt
index 8429213d25..1c85fdfaee 100644
--- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt
+++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR
Reason = invalid salt length
-Title = EC tests
+Title = ECDSA tests
Verify = P-256
Availablein = default
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