[openssl] master update
Dr. Paul Dale
pauli at openssl.org
Wed Nov 18 21:41:36 UTC 2020
The branch master has been updated
via b24d6c335d3beb431f8f9847623d4db39ae1f96b (commit)
via b68a947fd23a1e9189399cb9cc4ee75801bb142b (commit)
via 5687afdf032ac1d0e92958c209f6c493c347fa25 (commit)
via 1dc188ba0e7bd00e206d0190b2128e96287838df (commit)
via 893d3df9728aedece5aa9fc6eef9db4f1a215c25 (commit)
via 572e6df7dba37552d520e563ab97f3de9ad14ee9 (commit)
via 627b73cc72d0c42a01c464b8b567ea0f7d907e05 (commit)
from 3800cc6f4d285699210da496a42434bd2b42e065 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit b24d6c335d3beb431f8f9847623d4db39ae1f96b
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date: Mon Nov 16 12:18:56 2020 +1000
Rename internal drbg_ functions so they have an ossl_ prefix.
These functions are: drbg_enable_locking(), drbg_get_ctx_params(),
drbg_lock(), drbg_set_ctx_params() and drbg_unlock().
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13417)
commit b68a947fd23a1e9189399cb9cc4ee75801bb142b
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date: Mon Nov 16 12:14:26 2020 +1000
Rename SHA3 internal functions so they have an ossl_ prefix
These are: keccak_kmac_init(), sha3_final(), sha3_init(), sha3_reset() and
sha3_update().
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13417)
commit 5687afdf032ac1d0e92958c209f6c493c347fa25
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date: Mon Nov 16 12:08:30 2020 +1000
rename sha1_ctrl to ossl_sha1_ctrl.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13417)
commit 1dc188ba0e7bd00e206d0190b2128e96287838df
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date: Mon Nov 16 12:04:56 2020 +1000
Provide side RNG functions renamed to have an ossl_ prefix.
These are: prov_crngt_cleanup_entropy(), prov_crngt_get_entropy(),
prov_pool_acquire_entropy(), prov_pool_add_nonce_data(),
prov_rand_drbg_free() and prov_rand_drbg_new().
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13417)
commit 893d3df9728aedece5aa9fc6eef9db4f1a215c25
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date: Mon Nov 16 12:00:34 2020 +1000
rename mac_key_* to ossl_mac_key_*
mac_key_free(), mac_key_new(), mac_key_up_ref().
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13417)
commit 572e6df7dba37552d520e563ab97f3de9ad14ee9
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date: Mon Nov 16 11:57:52 2020 +1000
rename md5_block_asm_data_order to ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13417)
commit 627b73cc72d0c42a01c464b8b567ea0f7d907e05
Author: Pauli <paul.dale at oracle.com>
Date: Mon Nov 16 11:52:39 2020 +1000
Rename md5_sha1_* ossl_md5_sha1_*
md5_sha1_init(), md5_sha1_update(), md5_sha1_final() and md5_sha1_ctrl().
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13417)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/evp/legacy_md5_sha1.c | 4 +-
crypto/evp/legacy_sha.c | 7 ++--
crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl | 2 +-
crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl | 8 ++--
crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl | 16 ++++----
crypto/md5/md5_local.h | 6 +--
crypto/md5/md5_sha1.c | 14 +++----
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c | 2 +-
crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl | 4 +-
crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c | 2 +-
crypto/sha/sha3.c | 14 +++----
include/crypto/sha.h | 2 +-
include/internal/sha3.h | 11 +++---
providers/implementations/digests/md5_sha1_prov.c | 6 +--
providers/implementations/digests/sha2_prov.c | 4 +-
providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c | 8 ++--
.../implementations/include/prov/macsignature.h | 6 +--
providers/implementations/include/prov/md5_sha1.h | 8 ++--
providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h | 4 +-
.../implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c | 16 ++++----
providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c | 6 +--
providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c | 44 +++++++++++-----------
providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c | 14 +++----
providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c | 14 +++----
providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c | 14 +++----
providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h | 18 ++++-----
.../implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c | 6 +--
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c | 4 +-
.../implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c | 4 +-
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c | 4 +-
providers/implementations/rands/test_rng.c | 14 +++----
providers/implementations/signature/mac_legacy.c | 8 ++--
32 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/evp/legacy_md5_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/legacy_md5_sha1.c
index a332e29941..7002bc275c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/legacy_md5_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/legacy_md5_sha1.c
@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@
#include "prov/md5_sha1.h" /* diverse MD5_SHA1 macros */
#include "legacy_meth.h"
-IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH_LC(md5_sha1_int, md5_sha1)
+IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH_LC(md5_sha1_int, ossl_md5_sha1)
static int md5_sha1_int_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
{
- return md5_sha1_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), cmd, mslen, ms);
+ return ossl_md5_sha1_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), cmd, mslen, ms);
}
static const EVP_MD md5_sha1_md = {
diff --git a/crypto/evp/legacy_sha.c b/crypto/evp/legacy_sha.c
index 188f3e34e3..158591e9ab 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/legacy_sha.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/legacy_sha.c
@@ -60,12 +60,13 @@ IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH(sha384, SHA384)
IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH(sha512, SHA512)
IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH(sha512_224_int, sha512_224)
IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH(sha512_256_int, sha512_256)
-IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH_SHA3(sha3_int, sha3, '\x06')
-IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH_SHAKE(shake, sha3, '\x1f')
+IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH_SHA3(sha3_int, ossl_sha3, '\x06')
+IMPLEMENT_LEGACY_EVP_MD_METH_SHAKE(shake, ossl_sha3, '\x1f')
static int sha1_int_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
{
- return sha1_ctrl(ctx != NULL ? EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx) : NULL, cmd, p1, p2);
+ return ossl_sha1_ctrl(ctx != NULL ? EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx) : NULL,
+ cmd, p1, p2);
}
static int shake_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *evp_ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
diff --git a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl
index 2a9e910d4f..8dd8fa0cf7 100644
--- a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-586.pl
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ $X="esi";
0, 7, 14, 5, 12, 3, 10, 1, 8, 15, 6, 13, 4, 11, 2, 9, # R3
);
-&md5_block("md5_block_asm_data_order");
+&md5_block("ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order");
&asm_finish();
close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!";
diff --git a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl
index 755648e5f8..64e53a003f 100644
--- a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl
+++ b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-sparcv9.pl
@@ -216,9 +216,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
SPARC_PIC_THUNK(%g1)
#endif
-.globl md5_block_asm_data_order
+.globl ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
.align 32
-md5_block_asm_data_order:
+ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order:
SPARC_LOAD_ADDRESS_LEAF(OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P,%g1,%g5)
ld [%g1+4],%g1 ! OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[1]
@@ -371,8 +371,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
wr %g0,$saved_asi,%asi
ret
restore
-.type md5_block_asm_data_order,#function
-.size md5_block_asm_data_order,(.-md5_block_asm_data_order)
+.type ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order,#function
+.size ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order,(.-ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order)
.asciz "MD5 block transform for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.align 4
diff --git a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
index c09d8f20ed..6625fb7d08 100755
--- a/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/md5/asm/md5-x86_64.pl
@@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ $code .= <<EOF;
.text
.align 16
-.globl md5_block_asm_data_order
-.type md5_block_asm_data_order,\@function,3
-md5_block_asm_data_order:
+.globl ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
+.type ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order,\@function,3
+ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order:
.cfi_startproc
push %rbp
.cfi_push %rbp
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ $code .= <<EOF;
.Lepilogue:
ret
.cfi_endproc
-.size md5_block_asm_data_order,.-md5_block_asm_data_order
+.size ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order,.-ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
EOF
# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
@@ -378,13 +378,13 @@ se_handler:
.section .pdata
.align 4
- .rva .LSEH_begin_md5_block_asm_data_order
- .rva .LSEH_end_md5_block_asm_data_order
- .rva .LSEH_info_md5_block_asm_data_order
+ .rva .LSEH_begin_ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
+ .rva .LSEH_end_ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
+ .rva .LSEH_info_ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
.section .xdata
.align 8
-.LSEH_info_md5_block_asm_data_order:
+.LSEH_info_ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva se_handler
___
diff --git a/crypto/md5/md5_local.h b/crypto/md5/md5_local.h
index 629fccdc04..1bd392b979 100644
--- a/crypto/md5/md5_local.h
+++ b/crypto/md5/md5_local.h
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@
#ifdef MD5_ASM
# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
-# define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order
+# define md5_block_data_order ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
# elif defined(__ia64) || defined(__ia64__) || defined(_M_IA64)
-# define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order
+# define md5_block_data_order ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
# elif defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__)
-# define md5_block_data_order md5_block_asm_data_order
+# define md5_block_data_order ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order
# endif
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/md5/md5_sha1.c b/crypto/md5/md5_sha1.c
index db359dba2f..56defab163 100644
--- a/crypto/md5/md5_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/md5/md5_sha1.c
@@ -17,28 +17,28 @@
#include "prov/md5_sha1.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-int md5_sha1_init(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx)
+int ossl_md5_sha1_init(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx)
{
if (!MD5_Init(&mctx->md5))
return 0;
return SHA1_Init(&mctx->sha1);
}
-int md5_sha1_update(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+int ossl_md5_sha1_update(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, const void *data, size_t count)
{
if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, data, count))
return 0;
return SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, data, count);
}
-int md5_sha1_final(unsigned char *md, MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx)
+int ossl_md5_sha1_final(unsigned char *md, MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx)
{
if (!MD5_Final(md, &mctx->md5))
return 0;
return SHA1_Final(md + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, &mctx->sha1);
}
-int md5_sha1_ctrl(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
+int ossl_md5_sha1_ctrl(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
{
unsigned char padtmp[48];
unsigned char md5tmp[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int md5_sha1_ctrl(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
* with master secret and pad_1.
*/
- if (md5_sha1_update(mctx, ms, mslen) <= 0)
+ if (ossl_md5_sha1_update(mctx, ms, mslen) <= 0)
return 0;
/* Set padtmp to pad_1 value */
@@ -78,10 +78,10 @@ int md5_sha1_ctrl(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
/* Reinitialise context */
- if (!md5_sha1_init(mctx))
+ if (!ossl_md5_sha1_init(mctx))
return 0;
- if (md5_sha1_update(mctx, ms, mslen) <= 0)
+ if (ossl_md5_sha1_update(mctx, ms, mslen) <= 0)
return 0;
/* Set padtmp to pad_2 value */
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 211f4f3f51..9790b21646 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
- if (prov_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
+ if (ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
goto err;
if (meth->add == NULL
diff --git a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl
index 2d2e2ef807..90c94dcb5e 100644
--- a/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-md5-x86_64.pl
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
# minimize register usage, which was used as "main thread" with RC4
# weaved into it, one RC4 round per one MD5 round. In addition to the
# stiched subroutine the script can generate standalone replacement
-# md5_block_asm_data_order and RC4. Below are performance numbers in
+# ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order and RC4. Below are performance numbers in
# cycles per processed byte, less is better, for these the standalone
# subroutines, sum of them, and stitched one:
#
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ if ($rc4 && !$md5) {
$func="RC4"; $nargs=4;
} elsif ($md5 && !$rc4) {
($ctx,$inp,$len) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx");
- $func="md5_block_asm_data_order"; $nargs=3;
+ $func="ossl_md5_block_asm_data_order"; $nargs=3;
} else {
($dat,$in0,$out,$ctx,$inp,$len) = ("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx","%r8","%r9");
$func="rc4_md5_enc"; $nargs=6;
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c b/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c
index 1ece0db301..65d7e62e58 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha1dgst.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#include "sha_local.h"
#include "crypto/sha.h"
-int sha1_ctrl(SHA_CTX *sha1, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
+int ossl_sha1_ctrl(SHA_CTX *sha1, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
{
unsigned char padtmp[40];
unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha3.c b/crypto/sha/sha3.c
index fafa3556f3..4aa008f984 100644
--- a/crypto/sha/sha3.c
+++ b/crypto/sha/sha3.c
@@ -12,18 +12,18 @@
void SHA3_squeeze(uint64_t A[5][5], unsigned char *out, size_t len, size_t r);
-void sha3_reset(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx)
+void ossl_sha3_reset(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx)
{
memset(ctx->A, 0, sizeof(ctx->A));
ctx->bufsz = 0;
}
-int sha3_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad, size_t bitlen)
+int ossl_sha3_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad, size_t bitlen)
{
size_t bsz = SHA3_BLOCKSIZE(bitlen);
if (bsz <= sizeof(ctx->buf)) {
- sha3_reset(ctx);
+ ossl_sha3_reset(ctx);
ctx->block_size = bsz;
ctx->md_size = bitlen / 8;
ctx->pad = pad;
@@ -33,16 +33,16 @@ int sha3_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad, size_t bitlen)
return 0;
}
-int keccak_kmac_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad, size_t bitlen)
+int ossl_keccak_kmac_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad, size_t bitlen)
{
- int ret = sha3_init(ctx, pad, bitlen);
+ int ret = ossl_sha3_init(ctx, pad, bitlen);
if (ret)
ctx->md_size *= 2;
return ret;
}
-int sha3_update(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, const void *_inp, size_t len)
+int ossl_sha3_update(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, const void *_inp, size_t len)
{
const unsigned char *inp = _inp;
size_t bsz = ctx->block_size;
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ int sha3_update(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, const void *_inp, size_t len)
return 1;
}
-int sha3_final(unsigned char *md, KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx)
+int ossl_sha3_final(unsigned char *md, KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx)
{
size_t bsz = ctx->block_size;
size_t num = ctx->bufsz;
diff --git a/include/crypto/sha.h b/include/crypto/sha.h
index 57a3d20d0e..450c011f92 100644
--- a/include/crypto/sha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/sha.h
@@ -15,6 +15,6 @@
int sha512_224_init(SHA512_CTX *);
int sha512_256_init(SHA512_CTX *);
-int sha1_ctrl(SHA_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms);
+int ossl_sha1_ctrl(SHA_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms);
#endif
diff --git a/include/internal/sha3.h b/include/internal/sha3.h
index 81ba41ac0d..7cd4630c27 100644
--- a/include/internal/sha3.h
+++ b/include/internal/sha3.h
@@ -40,11 +40,12 @@ struct keccak_st {
PROV_SHA3_METHOD meth;
};
-void sha3_reset(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx);
-int sha3_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad, size_t bitlen);
-int keccak_kmac_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad, size_t bitlen);
-int sha3_update(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, const void *_inp, size_t len);
-int sha3_final(unsigned char *md, KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx);
+void ossl_sha3_reset(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx);
+int ossl_sha3_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad, size_t bitlen);
+int ossl_keccak_kmac_init(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, unsigned char pad,
+ size_t bitlen);
+int ossl_sha3_update(KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx, const void *_inp, size_t len);
+int ossl_sha3_final(unsigned char *md, KECCAK1600_CTX *ctx);
size_t SHA3_absorb(uint64_t A[5][5], const unsigned char *inp, size_t len,
size_t r);
diff --git a/providers/implementations/digests/md5_sha1_prov.c b/providers/implementations/digests/md5_sha1_prov.c
index 7c127d74a6..d96b72676b 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/digests/md5_sha1_prov.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/digests/md5_sha1_prov.c
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ static int md5_sha1_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
if (ctx != NULL && params != NULL) {
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DIGEST_PARAM_SSL3_MS);
if (p != NULL && p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING)
- return md5_sha1_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, p->data_size,
- p->data);
+ return ossl_md5_sha1_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ p->data_size, p->data);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -53,5 +53,5 @@ static int md5_sha1_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
/* ossl_md5_sha1_functions */
IMPLEMENT_digest_functions_with_settable_ctx(
md5_sha1, MD5_SHA1_CTX, MD5_SHA1_CBLOCK, MD5_SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0,
- md5_sha1_init, md5_sha1_update, md5_sha1_final,
+ ossl_md5_sha1_init, ossl_md5_sha1_update, ossl_md5_sha1_final,
md5_sha1_settable_ctx_params, md5_sha1_set_ctx_params)
diff --git a/providers/implementations/digests/sha2_prov.c b/providers/implementations/digests/sha2_prov.c
index dec9c316e7..2f01149ad9 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/digests/sha2_prov.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/digests/sha2_prov.c
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ static int sha1_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
if (ctx != NULL && params != NULL) {
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_DIGEST_PARAM_SSL3_MS);
if (p != NULL && p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING)
- return sha1_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, p->data_size,
- p->data);
+ return ossl_sha1_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ p->data_size, p->data);
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c b/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
index 38e2beb1e7..6b44792529 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/digests/sha3_prov.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int keccak_init(void *vctx)
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
/* The newctx() handles most of the ctx fixed setup. */
- sha3_reset((KECCAK1600_CTX *)vctx);
+ ossl_sha3_reset((KECCAK1600_CTX *)vctx);
return 1;
}
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static size_t generic_sha3_absorb(void *vctx, const void *inp, size_t len)
static int generic_sha3_final(unsigned char *md, void *vctx)
{
- return sha3_final(md, (KECCAK1600_CTX *)vctx);
+ return ossl_sha3_final(md, (KECCAK1600_CTX *)vctx);
}
static PROV_SHA3_METHOD sha3_generic_md =
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static void *name##_newctx(void *provctx) \
\
if (ctx == NULL) \
return NULL; \
- sha3_init(ctx, pad, bitlen); \
+ ossl_sha3_init(ctx, pad, bitlen); \
SHA3_SET_MD(uname, typ) \
return ctx; \
}
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void *uname##_newctx(void *provctx) \
\
if (ctx == NULL) \
return NULL; \
- keccak_kmac_init(ctx, pad, bitlen); \
+ ossl_keccak_kmac_init(ctx, pad, bitlen); \
ctx->meth = sha3_generic_md; \
return ctx; \
}
diff --git a/providers/implementations/include/prov/macsignature.h b/providers/implementations/include/prov/macsignature.h
index 1e59884cbc..9bfaaf9b6e 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/include/prov/macsignature.h
+++ b/providers/implementations/include/prov/macsignature.h
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@ struct mac_key_st {
typedef struct mac_key_st MAC_KEY;
-MAC_KEY *mac_key_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int cmac);
-void mac_key_free(MAC_KEY *mackey);
-int mac_key_up_ref(MAC_KEY *mackey);
+MAC_KEY *ossl_mac_key_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int cmac);
+void ossl_mac_key_free(MAC_KEY *mackey);
+int ossl_mac_key_up_ref(MAC_KEY *mackey);
diff --git a/providers/implementations/include/prov/md5_sha1.h b/providers/implementations/include/prov/md5_sha1.h
index 3e80fdcf97..9b9dc3d5ef 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/include/prov/md5_sha1.h
+++ b/providers/implementations/include/prov/md5_sha1.h
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ typedef struct md5_sha1_st {
SHA_CTX sha1;
} MD5_SHA1_CTX;
-int md5_sha1_init(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx);
-int md5_sha1_update(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, const void *data, size_t count);
-int md5_sha1_final(unsigned char *md, MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx);
-int md5_sha1_ctrl(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms);
+int ossl_md5_sha1_init(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx);
+int ossl_md5_sha1_update(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, const void *data, size_t count);
+int ossl_md5_sha1_final(unsigned char *md, MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx);
+int ossl_md5_sha1_ctrl(MD5_SHA1_CTX *mctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_MD5 */
diff --git a/providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h b/providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h
index bd0a57a769..ec69040606 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h
+++ b/providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ size_t prov_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout);
void prov_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out);
-size_t prov_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
-int prov_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
+size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
+int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
/*
* Add some platform specific additional data
diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c
index 196d3516ed..08de2a07cc 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ struct mac_gen_ctx {
PROV_CIPHER cipher;
};
-MAC_KEY *mac_key_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int cmac)
+MAC_KEY *ossl_mac_key_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int cmac)
{
MAC_KEY *mackey;
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ MAC_KEY *mac_key_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, int cmac)
return mackey;
}
-void mac_key_free(MAC_KEY *mackey)
+void ossl_mac_key_free(MAC_KEY *mackey)
{
int ref = 0;
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ void mac_key_free(MAC_KEY *mackey)
OPENSSL_free(mackey);
}
-int mac_key_up_ref(MAC_KEY *mackey)
+int ossl_mac_key_up_ref(MAC_KEY *mackey)
{
int ref = 0;
@@ -118,17 +118,17 @@ int mac_key_up_ref(MAC_KEY *mackey)
static void *mac_new(void *provctx)
{
- return mac_key_new(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx), 0);
+ return ossl_mac_key_new(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx), 0);
}
static void *mac_new_cmac(void *provctx)
{
- return mac_key_new(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx), 1);
+ return ossl_mac_key_new(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx), 1);
}
static void mac_free(void *mackey)
{
- mac_key_free(mackey);
+ ossl_mac_key_free(mackey);
}
static int mac_has(const void *keydata, int selection)
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static void *mac_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg)
if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || gctx == NULL)
return NULL;
- if ((key = mac_key_new(gctx->libctx, 0)) == NULL) {
+ if ((key = ossl_mac_key_new(gctx->libctx, 0)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static void *mac_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg)
if (gctx->priv_key == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY);
- mac_key_free(key);
+ ossl_mac_key_free(key);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c b/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
index 5f613f1c4e..72907b5a88 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/crngt.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static int crngt_get_entropy(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
- n = prov_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
+ n = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
fmd = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHA256", "");
if (fmd == NULL)
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int prov_crngt_compare_previous(const unsigned char *prev,
return res;
}
-size_t prov_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance)
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ err:
return r;
}
-void prov_crngt_cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+void ossl_crngt_cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
index f3111fddb6..a294ed7f1d 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static const OSSL_DISPATCH *find_call(const OSSL_DISPATCH *dispatch,
static int rand_drbg_restart(PROV_DRBG *drbg);
-int drbg_lock(void *vctx)
+int ossl_drbg_lock(void *vctx)
{
PROV_DRBG *drbg = vctx;
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ int drbg_lock(void *vctx)
return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
}
-void drbg_unlock(void *vctx)
+void ossl_drbg_unlock(void *vctx)
{
PROV_DRBG *drbg = vctx;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void drbg_unlock(void *vctx)
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
}
-static int drbg_lock_parent(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+static int ossl_drbg_lock_parent(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
{
void *parent = drbg->parent;
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int drbg_lock_parent(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
return 1;
}
-static void drbg_unlock_parent(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+static void ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
{
void *parent = drbg->parent;
@@ -93,12 +93,12 @@ static int get_parent_strength(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int *str)
}
*params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH, str);
- if (!drbg_lock_parent(drbg)) {
+ if (!ossl_drbg_lock_parent(drbg)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT);
return 0;
}
res = drbg->parent_get_ctx_params(parent, params);
- drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
+ ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
if (!res) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH);
return 0;
@@ -113,16 +113,16 @@ static unsigned int get_parent_reseed_count(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
unsigned int r;
*params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_COUNTER, &r);
- if (!drbg_lock_parent(drbg)) {
+ if (!ossl_drbg_lock_parent(drbg)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT);
goto err;
}
if (!drbg->parent_get_ctx_params(parent, params)) {
- drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
+ ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_RESEED_PROP_CTR);
goto err;
}
- drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
+ ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
return r;
err:
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static unsigned int get_parent_reseed_count(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
* is fetched using the parent's ossl_prov_drbg_generate().
*
* Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
- * using prov_pool_acquire_entropy().
+ * using ossl_pool_acquire_entropy().
*
* If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
* its entropy will be used up first.
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
* generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
* if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
*/
- drbg_lock_parent(drbg);
+ ossl_drbg_lock_parent(drbg);
/*
* Get random data from parent. Include our DRBG address as
* additional input, in order to provide a distinction between
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
(unsigned char *)&drbg,
sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
bytes = bytes_needed;
- drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
+ ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
}
} else {
/* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
- entropy_available = prov_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
+ entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0) {
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static size_t get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, int entropy,
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (drbg->parent == NULL)
- return prov_crngt_get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len,
+ return ossl_crngt_get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len,
prediction_resistance);
#endif
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static void cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (drbg->parent == NULL)
- prov_crngt_cleanup_entropy(drbg, out, outlen);
+ ossl_crngt_cleanup_entropy(drbg, out, outlen);
else
#endif
prov_drbg_cleanup_entropy(drbg, out, outlen);
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static size_t prov_drbg_get_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
- if (prov_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
+ if (ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
goto err;
data.instance = drbg;
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static const OSSL_DISPATCH *find_call(const OSSL_DISPATCH *dispatch,
return NULL;
}
-int drbg_enable_locking(void *vctx)
+int ossl_drbg_enable_locking(void *vctx)
{
PROV_DRBG *drbg = vctx;
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ int drbg_enable_locking(void *vctx)
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new
+PROV_DRBG *ossl_rand_drbg_new
(void *provctx, void *parent, const OSSL_DISPATCH *p_dispatch,
int (*dnew)(PROV_DRBG *ctx),
int (*instantiate)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
@@ -883,11 +883,11 @@ PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new
return drbg;
err:
- prov_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
+ ossl_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
return NULL;
}
-void prov_rand_drbg_free(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
+void ossl_rand_drbg_free(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
{
if (drbg == NULL)
return;
@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ void prov_rand_drbg_free(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
OPENSSL_free(drbg);
}
-int drbg_get_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int ossl_drbg_get_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
OSSL_PARAM *p;
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ int drbg_get_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
return 1;
}
-int drbg_set_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+int ossl_drbg_set_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c
index 6f9dc658d7..9785c083fe 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_ctr.c
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static int drbg_ctr_new(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
static void *drbg_ctr_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
{
- return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_ctr_new,
+ return ossl_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_ctr_new,
&drbg_ctr_instantiate, &drbg_ctr_uninstantiate,
&drbg_ctr_reseed, &drbg_ctr_generate);
}
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ static void drbg_ctr_free(void *vdrbg)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(ctr, sizeof(*ctr));
}
- prov_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
+ ossl_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
}
static int drbg_ctr_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static int drbg_ctr_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
return 0;
}
- return drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
+ return ossl_drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_ctr_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ static int drbg_ctr_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
if (cipher_init && !drbg_ctr_init(ctx))
return 0;
- return drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
+ return ossl_drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_ctr_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
@@ -744,9 +744,9 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_drbg_ctr_functions[] = {
(void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_uninstantiate_wrapper },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_generate_wrapper },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_reseed_wrapper },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))drbg_enable_locking },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_lock },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_unlock },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_enable_locking },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_lock },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_unlock },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_ctr_set_ctx_params },
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c
index 2b7ac2bd5f..57e789099b 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hash.c
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static int drbg_hash_new(PROV_DRBG *ctx)
static void *drbg_hash_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
{
- return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_hash_new,
+ return ossl_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_hash_new,
&drbg_hash_instantiate, &drbg_hash_uninstantiate,
&drbg_hash_reseed, &drbg_hash_generate);
}
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static void drbg_hash_free(void *vdrbg)
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&hash->digest);
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(hash, sizeof(*hash));
}
- prov_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
+ ossl_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
}
static int drbg_hash_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int drbg_hash_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
return 0;
}
- return drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
+ return ossl_drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hash_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int drbg_hash_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
ctx->min_noncelen = ctx->min_entropylen / 2;
}
- return drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
+ return ossl_drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hash_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
@@ -507,9 +507,9 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_drbg_hash_functions[] = {
(void(*)(void))drbg_hash_uninstantiate_wrapper },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_generate_wrapper },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_reseed_wrapper },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))drbg_enable_locking },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_lock },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_unlock },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_enable_locking },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_lock },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_unlock },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))drbg_hash_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hash_set_ctx_params },
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c
index 95ee2a1db5..6311a57a97 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_hmac.c
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int drbg_hmac_new(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
static void *drbg_hmac_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
{
- return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_hmac_new,
+ return ossl_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch, &drbg_hmac_new,
&drbg_hmac_instantiate, &drbg_hmac_uninstantiate,
&drbg_hmac_reseed, &drbg_hmac_generate);
}
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void drbg_hmac_free(void *vdrbg)
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&hmac->digest);
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(hmac, sizeof(*hmac));
}
- prov_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
+ ossl_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
}
static int drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static int drbg_hmac_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
return 0;
}
- return drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
+ return ossl_drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hmac_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ static int drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
ctx->min_noncelen = ctx->min_entropylen / 2;
}
- return drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
+ return ossl_drbg_set_ctx_params(ctx, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *p_ctx)
@@ -421,9 +421,9 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_drbg_ossl_hmac_functions[] = {
(void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_uninstantiate_wrapper },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_generate_wrapper },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_reseed_wrapper },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))drbg_enable_locking },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_lock },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_unlock },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_enable_locking },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_lock },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_unlock },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))drbg_hmac_set_ctx_params },
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
index 40ca6fadaa..1877dce44f 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/drbg_local.h
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ struct prov_drbg_st {
OSSL_CALLBACK *cleanup_nonce_fn;
};
-PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new
+PROV_DRBG *ossl_rand_drbg_new
(void *provctx, void *parent, const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch,
int (*dnew)(PROV_DRBG *ctx),
int (*instantiate)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ PROV_DRBG *prov_rand_drbg_new
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len),
int (*generate)(PROV_DRBG *, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adin_len));
-void prov_rand_drbg_free(PROV_DRBG *drbg);
+void ossl_rand_drbg_free(PROV_DRBG *drbg);
int ossl_prov_drbg_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int strength,
int prediction_resistance,
@@ -230,13 +230,13 @@ int ossl_prov_drbg_generate(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
}
/* locking api */
-OSSL_FUNC_rand_enable_locking_fn drbg_enable_locking;
-OSSL_FUNC_rand_lock_fn drbg_lock;
-OSSL_FUNC_rand_unlock_fn drbg_unlock;
+OSSL_FUNC_rand_enable_locking_fn ossl_drbg_enable_locking;
+OSSL_FUNC_rand_lock_fn ossl_drbg_lock;
+OSSL_FUNC_rand_unlock_fn ossl_drbg_unlock;
/* Common parameters for all of our DRBGs */
-int drbg_get_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
-int drbg_set_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+int ossl_drbg_get_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+int ossl_drbg_set_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
#define OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_SETTABLE_CTX_COMMON \
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS, NULL), \
@@ -258,11 +258,11 @@ int drbg_set_ctx_params(PROV_DRBG *drbg, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, NULL)
/* Continuous test "entropy" calls */
-size_t prov_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+size_t ossl_crngt_get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance);
-void prov_crngt_cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+void ossl_crngt_cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
#endif
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
index 3696688dd2..35d2878d5c 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
*
* As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte.
*/
-size_t prov_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
short int code;
int i, k;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
* of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality,
* possibility of blocking).
*/
-size_t prov_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ size_t prov_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
|| defined(__DJGPP__)
-int prov_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
struct {
pid_t pid;
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c
index 7adf3e718a..da143f3dbe 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ size_t data_collect_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
-int prov_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
struct {
pid_t pid;
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ size_t get_entropy_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
* These functions are called by the RAND / DRBG functions
*/
-size_t prov_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (init_get_entropy_address())
return get_entropy_method(pool);
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c
index f601f77a47..70b4c7b677 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
-int prov_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
struct {
pid_t pid;
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int prov_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
-size_t prov_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB)
/* vxRandLib based entropy method */
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c
index d820d3e395..bac6b5723e 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
# define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
# endif
-size_t prov_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
# ifndef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ size_t prov_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
}
-int prov_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
+int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
struct {
DWORD pid;
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/test_rng.c b/providers/implementations/rands/test_rng.c
index bb0d2a46a9..68aedda344 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/rands/test_rng.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/rands/test_rng.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static void test_rng_free(void *vdrbg)
OPENSSL_free(t->entropy);
OPENSSL_free(t->nonce);
OPENSSL_free(drbg->data);
- prov_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
+ ossl_rand_drbg_free(drbg);
}
static int test_rng_instantiate(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static int test_rng_get_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
PROV_DRBG *drbg = (PROV_DRBG *)vdrbg;
- return drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
+ return ossl_drbg_get_ctx_params(drbg, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *test_rng_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int test_rng_set_ctx_params(void *vdrbg, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|| !set_size_t(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ADINLEN,
&drbg->max_adinlen))
return 0;
- return drbg_set_ctx_params(drbg, params);
+ return ossl_drbg_set_ctx_params(drbg, params);
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *test_rng_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int test_rng_verify_zeroization(void *vdrbg)
static void *test_rng_new_wrapper(void *provctx, void *parent,
const OSSL_DISPATCH *parent_dispatch)
{
- return prov_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch,
+ return ossl_rand_drbg_new(provctx, parent, parent_dispatch,
&test_rng_new, &test_rng_instantiate,
&test_rng_uninstantiate, &test_rng_reseed,
&test_rng_generate);
@@ -309,9 +309,9 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_test_rng_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_GENERATE, (void(*)(void))test_rng_generate_wrapper },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_RESEED, (void(*)(void))test_rng_reseed_wrapper },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_NONCE, (void(*)(void))test_rng_nonce },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))drbg_enable_locking },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_lock },
- { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))drbg_unlock },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_ENABLE_LOCKING, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_enable_locking },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_LOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_lock },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RAND_UNLOCK, (void(*)(void))ossl_drbg_unlock },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))test_rng_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_RAND_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))test_rng_set_ctx_params },
diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/mac_legacy.c b/providers/implementations/signature/mac_legacy.c
index 12a78b7ea4..b92dabde3c 100644
--- a/providers/implementations/signature/mac_legacy.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/signature/mac_legacy.c
@@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ static int mac_digest_sign_init(void *vpmacctx, const char *mdname, void *vkey)
if (!ossl_prov_is_running()
|| pmacctx == NULL
|| vkey == NULL
- || !mac_key_up_ref(vkey))
+ || !ossl_mac_key_up_ref(vkey))
return 0;
- mac_key_free(pmacctx->key);
+ ossl_mac_key_free(pmacctx->key);
pmacctx->key = vkey;
if (pmacctx->key->cipher.cipher != NULL)
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static void mac_freectx(void *vpmacctx)
OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->macctx);
- mac_key_free(ctx->key);
+ ossl_mac_key_free(ctx->key);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static void *mac_dupctx(void *vpmacctx)
dstctx->key = NULL;
dstctx->macctx = NULL;
- if (srcctx->key != NULL && !mac_key_up_ref(srcctx->key))
+ if (srcctx->key != NULL && !ossl_mac_key_up_ref(srcctx->key))
goto err;
dstctx->key = srcctx->key;
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