[openssl] master update

Matt Caswell matt at openssl.org
Wed Apr 28 15:36:44 UTC 2021


The branch master has been updated
       via  e9b30d9f50a356b3b0a9d60e6fc877e08f68a40e (commit)
       via  f42e68dc473081393835b0ae7dad19d393ee589d (commit)
      from  460d2fbcd75bef492638b54c17aa5f5bca7eec2a (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit e9b30d9f50a356b3b0a9d60e6fc877e08f68a40e
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Apr 19 16:46:30 2021 +0100

    Test a Finished message at the wrong time results in unexpected message
    
    We test that sending a Finished message instead of a ClientHello results
    in an unexpected message error.
    
    Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14930)

commit f42e68dc473081393835b0ae7dad19d393ee589d
Author: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Apr 19 15:21:54 2021 +0100

    Defer Finished MAC handling until after state transition
    
    In TLS we process received messages like this:
    
    1) Read Message Header
    2) Validate and transition state based on received message type
    3) Read Message Body
    4) Process Message
    
    In DTLS we read messages like this:
    
    1) Read Message Header and Body
    2) Validate and transition state based on received message type
    3) Process Message
    
    The difference is because of the stream vs datagram semantics of the
    underlying transport.
    
    In both TLS and DTLS we were doing finished MAC processing as part of
    reading the message body. This means that in DTLS this was occurring
    *before* the state transition has been validated. A crash was occurring
    in DTLS if a Finished message was sent in an invalid state due to
    assumptions in the code that certain variables would have been setup by
    the time a Finished message arrives.
    
    To avoid this problem we shift the finished MAC processing to be after
    the state transition in DTLS.
    
    Thanks to github user @bathooman for reporting this issue.
    
    Fixes #14906
    
    Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14930)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/statem/statem.c       | 19 +++++++-----
 ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c  | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 ssl/statem/statem_local.h |  3 +-
 test/dtlstest.c           | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem.c b/ssl/statem/statem.c
index 3b6e78e3f8..4c463974ea 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem.c
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
                 /*
                  * In DTLS we get the whole message in one go - header and body
                  */
-                ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt, &len);
+                ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt);
             } else {
                 ret = tls_get_message_header(s, &mt);
             }
@@ -625,13 +625,18 @@ static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
             /* Fall through */
 
         case READ_STATE_BODY:
-            if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-                /* We already got this above for DTLS */
+            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                /*
+                 * Actually we already have the body, but we give DTLS the
+                 * opportunity to do any further processing.
+                 */
+                ret = dtls_get_message_body(s, &len);
+            } else {
                 ret = tls_get_message_body(s, &len);
-                if (ret == 0) {
-                    /* Could be non-blocking IO */
-                    return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
-                }
+            }
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                /* Could be non-blocking IO */
+                return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
             }
 
             s->first_packet = 0;
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c b/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c
index c4bed3d3ee..1fcd064ea6 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_dtls.c
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
     return 0;
 }
 
-int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, size_t *len)
+int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt)
 {
     struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
     unsigned char *p;
@@ -352,7 +352,6 @@ int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, size_t *len)
     *mt = s->s3.tmp.message_type;
 
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-    *len = s->init_num;
 
     if (*mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
         if (s->msg_callback) {
@@ -373,32 +372,54 @@ int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, size_t *len)
     s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
     l2n3(0, p);
     l2n3(msg_len, p);
-    if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
-        p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-        msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-    }
 
+    memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+    s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+    s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Actually we already have the message body - but this is an opportunity for
+ * DTLS to do any further processing it wants at the same point that TLS would
+ * be asked for the message body.
+ */
+int dtls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
+{
+    unsigned char *msg = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+    size_t msg_len = s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+    if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+        /* Nothing to be done */
+        goto end;
+    }
     /*
      * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
      * Finished verification.
      */
-    if (*mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
+    if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
         /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len))
+    if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+        msg += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        msg_len -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msg, msg_len))
         return 0;
+
     if (s->msg_callback)
         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-                        p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-    memset(msg_hdr, 0, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
-
-    s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-
-    s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+                        s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                        s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
+ end:
+    *len = s->init_num;
     return 1;
 }
 
diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_local.h b/ssl/statem/statem_local.h
index 61de225584..25bfdffc6c 100644
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_local.h
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_local.h
@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
 /* Functions for getting new message data */
 __owur int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt);
 __owur int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len);
-__owur int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt, size_t *len);
+__owur int dtls_get_message(SSL *s, int *mt);
+__owur int dtls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len);
 
 /* Message construction and processing functions */
 __owur int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s);
diff --git a/test/dtlstest.c b/test/dtlstest.c
index 2d8aaf4709..4f0f9d549d 100644
--- a/test/dtlstest.c
+++ b/test/dtlstest.c
@@ -337,6 +337,79 @@ static int test_dtls_duplicate_records(void)
     return testresult;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Test just sending a Finished message as the first message. Should fail due
+ * to an unexpected message.
+ */
+static int test_just_finished(void)
+{
+    int testresult = 0, ret;
+    SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+    SSL *serverssl = NULL;
+    BIO *rbio = NULL, *wbio = NULL, *sbio = NULL;
+    unsigned char buf[] = {
+        /* Record header */
+        SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, /* content type */
+        (DTLS1_2_VERSION >> 8) & 0xff, /* protocol version hi byte */
+        DTLS1_2_VERSION & 0xff, /* protocol version lo byte */
+        0, 0, /* epoch */
+        0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, /* record sequence */
+        0, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* record length */
+
+        /* Message header */
+        SSL3_MT_FINISHED, /* message type */
+        0, 0, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* message length */
+        0, 0, /* message sequence */
+        0, 0, 0, /* fragment offset */
+        0, 0, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* fragment length */
+
+        /* Message body */
+        0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+    };
+
+
+    if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(NULL, DTLS_server_method(),
+                                       NULL, 0, 0,
+                                       &sctx, NULL, cert, privkey)))
+        return 0;
+
+    serverssl = SSL_new(sctx);
+    rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+    wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+    if (!TEST_ptr(serverssl) || !TEST_ptr(rbio) || !TEST_ptr(wbio))
+        goto end;
+
+    sbio = rbio;
+    SSL_set0_rbio(serverssl, rbio);
+    SSL_set0_wbio(serverssl, wbio);
+    rbio = wbio = NULL;
+    DTLS_set_timer_cb(serverssl, timer_cb);
+
+    if (!TEST_int_eq(BIO_write(sbio, buf, sizeof(buf)), sizeof(buf)))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* We expect the attempt to process the message to fail */
+    if (!TEST_int_le(ret = SSL_accept(serverssl), 0))
+        goto end;
+
+    /* Check that we got the error we were expecting */
+    if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_get_error(serverssl, ret), SSL_ERROR_SSL))
+        goto end;
+
+    if (!TEST_int_eq(ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_get_error()), SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE))
+        goto end;
+
+    testresult = 1;
+ end:
+    BIO_free(rbio);
+    BIO_free(wbio);
+    SSL_free(serverssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+
+    return testresult;
+}
+
 OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certfile privkeyfile\n")
 
 int setup_tests(void)
@@ -356,6 +429,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
 #endif
     ADD_TEST(test_cookie);
     ADD_TEST(test_dtls_duplicate_records);
+    ADD_TEST(test_just_finished);
 
     return 1;
 }


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