[openssl] master update
dev at ddvo.net
dev at ddvo.net
Thu Feb 4 15:43:39 UTC 2021
The branch master has been updated
via 88444854affe31ce08a5daaf4b6afc86e6972c63 (commit)
from af4d6c26af0bfaa837589b4fe39ec4942dd4c5b3 (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 88444854affe31ce08a5daaf4b6afc86e6972c63
Author: Dr. David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb at siemens.com>
Date: Sun Oct 4 21:55:49 2020 +0200
x509_vfy.c: Improve coding style and comments all over the file
No changes in semantics.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13070)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 680 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 301 insertions(+), 379 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 8e78c13b8e..ec7df5caa6 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -29,41 +29,16 @@
/* CRL score values */
-/* No unhandled critical extensions */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
-
-/* certificate is within CRL scope */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
-
-/* CRL times valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
-
-/* Issuer name matches certificate */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
-
-/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
-
-/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
-
-/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
-
-/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
-
-/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \
+ (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
@@ -137,6 +112,7 @@ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
X509 *xtmp = NULL;
int i;
+
/* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
ERR_set_mark();
certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
@@ -233,26 +209,26 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
(ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
- return ok;
+ return 0;
err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->flags);
CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err);
/* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
- ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify != NULL ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
if (!ok)
- return ok;
+ return 0;
if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0)
- return ok;
+ return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
- return ok;
+ return 0;
if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
- return ok;
+ return 0;
#endif
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
@@ -292,10 +268,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert),
ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
- ret = dane_verify(ctx);
- else
- ret = verify_chain(ctx);
+ ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx);
/*
* Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
@@ -353,13 +326,9 @@ static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
+ if (*issuer != NULL && X509_up_ref(*issuer))
+ return 1;
- if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer))
- goto err;
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
*issuer = NULL;
return 0;
}
@@ -440,10 +409,8 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
- int proxy_path_length = 0;
- int purpose;
- int allow_proxy_certs;
- int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ int ret, proxy_path_length = 0;
+ int purpose, allow_proxy_certs, num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
@@ -457,23 +424,21 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */
- if (ctx->parent) {
+ if (ctx->parent != NULL) {
allow_proxy_certs = 0;
purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
} else {
allow_proxy_certs =
- ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+ (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS) != 0;
purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- int ret;
-
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0,
ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION);
- CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY),
+ CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0,
ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED);
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
switch (must_be_ca) {
@@ -489,7 +454,7 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0
|| ((i + 1 < num
- || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0)
&& ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
break;
}
@@ -607,8 +572,9 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
proxy_path_length++;
must_be_ca = 0;
- } else
+ } else {
must_be_ca = 1;
+ }
}
return 1;
}
@@ -644,7 +610,7 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int j;
/* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */
- if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ if (i != 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0)
continue;
/*
@@ -653,16 +619,16 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* added.
* (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
*/
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) {
X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
- int last_object_nid = 0;
+ int last_nid = 0;
int err = X509_V_OK;
- int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
+ int last_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
/* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
- if (last_object_loc < 1) {
+ if (last_loc < 1) {
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
goto proxy_name_done;
}
@@ -681,10 +647,9 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
* multi-valued RDN
*/
- if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
- last_object_loc))
+ if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc))
== X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
- last_object_loc - 1))) {
+ last_loc - 1))) {
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
goto proxy_name_done;
}
@@ -700,12 +665,10 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
}
- tmpentry =
- X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
- last_object_nid =
- OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
+ tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc);
+ last_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
- if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
+ if (last_nid != NID_commonName
|| X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
}
@@ -713,7 +676,7 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
- proxy_name_done:
+ proxy_name_done:
CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err);
}
@@ -780,15 +743,17 @@ static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
X509 *x = ctx->cert;
- if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
+
+ if (vpm->hosts != NULL && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
- if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (vpm->email != NULL
+ && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
- if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (vpm->ip != NULL && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
@@ -850,7 +815,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
i = 0;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
- if (!mx)
+ if (mx == NULL)
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
/*
@@ -864,7 +829,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
}
/* Replace leaf with trusted match */
- (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
X509_free(x);
ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
goto trusted;
@@ -894,11 +859,12 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) == 0)
return 1;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) != 0) {
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- else {
+ } else {
/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
if (ctx->parent)
return 1;
@@ -925,14 +891,14 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0)
return 1;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
- if (ctx->get_crl)
+ if (ctx->get_crl != NULL)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
else
ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
@@ -946,15 +912,16 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (!ok)
goto done;
- if (dcrl) {
+ if (dcrl != NULL) {
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
if (!ok)
goto done;
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
if (!ok)
goto done;
- } else
+ } else {
ok = 1;
+ }
/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
if (ok != 2) {
@@ -992,9 +959,9 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
if (notify)
ctx->current_crl = crl;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
- else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+ else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
return 1;
else
ptime = NULL;
@@ -1024,10 +991,8 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
return 0;
}
/* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */
- if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
+ if (i < 0 && (ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA) == 0) {
+ if (!notify || !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
return 0;
}
}
@@ -1057,6 +1022,7 @@ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
/* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
int day, sec;
+
if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
continue;
@@ -1073,7 +1039,7 @@ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
best_reasons = reasons;
}
- if (best_crl) {
+ if (best_crl != NULL) {
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
*pcrl = best_crl;
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
@@ -1097,50 +1063,44 @@ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
*/
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
{
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
- int i;
- i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta = NULL, *extb = NULL;
+ int i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+
if (i >= 0) {
/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
return 0;
exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
- } else
- exta = NULL;
+ }
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
-
if (i >= 0) {
-
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
return 0;
extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
- } else
- extb = NULL;
+ }
- if (!exta && !extb)
+ if (exta == NULL && extb == NULL)
return 1;
- if (!exta || !extb)
- return 0;
-
- if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+ if (exta == NULL || extb == NULL)
return 0;
- return 1;
+ return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb) == 0;
}
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
{
/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
- if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+ if (delta->base_crl_number == NULL)
return 0;
/* Base must have a CRL number */
- if (!base->crl_number)
+ if (base->crl_number == NULL)
return 0;
/* Issuer names must match */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)) != 0)
return 0;
/* AKID and IDP must match */
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
@@ -1151,9 +1111,7 @@ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
return 0;
/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0;
}
/*
@@ -1165,9 +1123,10 @@ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
{
X509_CRL *delta;
int i;
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS) == 0)
return;
- if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+ if (((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST) == 0)
return;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
@@ -1192,35 +1151,35 @@ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
-
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0)
return 0;
/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) {
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
return 0;
- } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+ } else if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) != 0) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
- if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ if ((crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0)
return 0;
}
/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
- else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+ else if (crl->base_crl_number != NULL)
return 0;
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
- if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)) != 0) {
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT) == 0)
return 0;
- } else
+ } else {
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+ }
- if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+ if ((crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) == 0)
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
/* Check expiration */
@@ -1231,14 +1190,13 @@ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
- if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+ if ((crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID) == 0)
return 0;
/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
-
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
- if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ if ((crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0)
return 0;
tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
@@ -1283,7 +1241,7 @@ static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
}
/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0)
return;
/*
@@ -1292,7 +1250,7 @@ static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm) != 0)
continue;
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
@@ -1314,7 +1272,7 @@ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
int ret;
/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
- if (ctx->parent)
+ if (ctx->parent != NULL)
return 0;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted))
return -1;
@@ -1350,12 +1308,10 @@ static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
{
- X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
- cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
- crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
- if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ X509 *cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+ X509 *crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+
+ return X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta) == 0;
}
/*-
@@ -1371,25 +1327,23 @@ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
int i, j;
- if (!a || !b)
+
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return 1;
if (a->type == 1) {
- if (!a->dpname)
+ if (a->dpname == NULL)
return 0;
/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
if (b->type == 1) {
- if (!b->dpname)
- return 0;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
- return 1;
- else
+ if (b->dpname == NULL)
return 0;
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname) == 0;
}
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
nm = a->dpname;
gens = b->name.fullname;
} else if (b->type == 1) {
- if (!b->dpname)
+ if (b->dpname == NULL)
return 0;
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
gens = a->name.fullname;
@@ -1397,12 +1351,12 @@ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
}
/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
- if (nm) {
+ if (nm != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
continue;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
@@ -1414,7 +1368,7 @@ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
- if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+ if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb) == 0)
return 1;
}
}
@@ -1427,14 +1381,16 @@ static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
{
int i;
const X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+
/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
- if (!dp->CRLissuer)
- return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+ if (dp->CRLissuer == NULL)
+ return (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+
if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
continue;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
@@ -1445,29 +1401,30 @@ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
unsigned int *preasons)
{
int i;
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) != 0)
return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) {
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) != 0)
return 0;
} else {
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) != 0)
return 0;
}
*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+
if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
- if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+ if (crl->idp == NULL
+ || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
return 1;
}
}
}
- if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
- && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return (crl->idp == NULL || crl->idp->distpoint == NULL)
+ && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0;
}
/*
@@ -1495,7 +1452,7 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
- if (!skcrl && crl)
+ if (skcrl == NULL && crl != NULL)
goto done;
get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
@@ -1504,7 +1461,7 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
done:
/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
- if (crl) {
+ if (crl != NULL) {
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
@@ -1524,15 +1481,15 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
/* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
- if (ctx->current_issuer)
+ if (ctx->current_issuer != NULL) {
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
/*
* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
* certificate in chain.
*/
- else if (cnum < chnum)
+ } else if (cnum < chnum) {
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
- else {
+ } else {
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
/* If not self-issued, can't check signature */
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
@@ -1546,39 +1503,38 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
/*
* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
*/
- if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+ if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL) {
/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
- if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
- !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 &&
+ (issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) == 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
return 0;
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
+ if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) == 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
return 0;
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
+ if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) == 0 &&
check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
return 0;
- if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
return 0;
}
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
+ if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) == 0 &&
!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
return 0;
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
-
- if (!ikey &&
+ if (ikey == NULL &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
return 0;
- if (ikey) {
+ if (ikey != NULL) {
int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
@@ -1602,8 +1558,8 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
* was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
* change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
return 0;
/*
@@ -1675,7 +1631,7 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
}
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) != 0) {
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
/*
* Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
@@ -1702,9 +1658,9 @@ int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
time_t *ptime;
int i;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
- else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+ else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
return 1;
else
ptime = NULL;
@@ -1728,55 +1684,54 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
- X509 *xs;
+ X509 *xs = xi;
- /*
- * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
- * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
- * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
- */
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
- xs = xi;
+ /*
+ * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures,
+ * on the top certificate we check only the timestamps.
+ * We report the issuer as NULL because all we have is a bare key.
+ */
xi = NULL;
- goto check_cert_time;
- }
-
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
- xs = xi; /* The typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
- else {
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
- xs = xi;
- goto check_cert_time;
- }
- if (n <= 0) {
- CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
-
- xs = xi;
- goto check_cert_time;
+ } else if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)
+ /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */
+ && ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) == 0)) {
+ if (n > 0) {
+ n--;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ } else {
+ CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
}
-
- n--;
- ctx->error_depth = n;
- xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ /*
+ * The below code will certainly not do a
+ * self-signature check on xi because it is not self-issued.
+ */
}
/*
- * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
- * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
+ * Do not clear ctx->error = 0, it must be "sticky",
+ * only the user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
*/
while (n >= 0) {
/*-
* For each iteration of this loop:
* n is the subject depth
* xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
- * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
+ * xi is NULL for DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures
+ * else the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
* Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
- *
- * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly
+ */
+ /*
+ * Do signature check for self-signed certificates only if explicitly
* asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
*/
- if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)
- && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) {
+ if (xi != NULL
+ && (xs != xi
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)
+ && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0))) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
/*
* If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
@@ -1810,7 +1765,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
}
- check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */
+ /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */
/* Calls verify callback as needed */
if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
return 0;
@@ -1849,6 +1804,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
#else
const char upper_z = 'Z';
#endif
+
/*-
* Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
* In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
@@ -1893,7 +1849,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
goto err;
- if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
+ if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time) == 0)
goto err;
/*
@@ -1952,7 +1908,7 @@ ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
else
time(&t);
- if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
+ if (s != NULL && (s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING) == 0) {
if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
@@ -2000,19 +1956,21 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
int i;
+
STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
/* CRLs can't be delta already */
- if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
+ if (base->base_crl_number != NULL || newer->base_crl_number != NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
return NULL;
}
/* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
- if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
+ if (base->crl_number == NULL || newer->crl_number == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
return NULL;
}
/* Issuer names must match */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
@@ -2031,8 +1989,8 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
return NULL;
}
/* CRLs must verify */
- if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
- X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
+ if (skey != NULL && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+ X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
@@ -2058,8 +2016,8 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
* number to correct value too.
*/
for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
- X509_EXTENSION *ext;
- ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+
if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
goto memerr;
}
@@ -2069,6 +2027,7 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+
rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
/*
* Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
@@ -2076,7 +2035,7 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
*/
if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
- if (!rvtmp)
+ if (rvtmp == NULL)
goto memerr;
if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
@@ -2086,7 +2045,7 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
}
/* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
- if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+ if (skey != NULL && md != NULL && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
goto memerr;
return crl;
@@ -2144,7 +2103,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (!ctx->chain)
+ if (ctx->chain == NULL)
return NULL;
return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
}
@@ -2208,12 +2167,14 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
int purpose, int trust)
{
int idx;
+
/* If purpose not set use default */
if (purpose == 0)
purpose = def_purpose;
/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
if (purpose != 0) {
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
if (idx == -1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
@@ -2234,10 +2195,10 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
}
/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
- if (!trust)
+ if (trust == 0)
trust = ptmp->trust;
}
- if (trust) {
+ if (trust != 0) {
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
if (idx == -1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
@@ -2245,9 +2206,9 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
}
}
- if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
+ if (ctx->param->purpose == 0 && purpose != 0)
ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
- if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
+ if (ctx->param->trust == 0 && trust != 0)
ctx->param->trust = trust;
return 1;
}
@@ -2279,7 +2240,6 @@ X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL, NULL);
}
-
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
@@ -2289,7 +2249,6 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */
OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
-
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
@@ -2322,62 +2281,62 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
/* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
- if (store)
+ if (store != NULL)
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
else
ctx->cleanup = 0;
- if (store && store->check_issued)
+ if (store != NULL && store->check_issued != NULL)
ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
else
ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
- if (store && store->get_issuer)
+ if (store != NULL && store->get_issuer != NULL)
ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
else
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
- if (store && store->verify_cb)
+ if (store != NULL && store->verify_cb != NULL)
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
else
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
- if (store && store->verify)
+ if (store != NULL && store->verify != NULL)
ctx->verify = store->verify;
else
ctx->verify = internal_verify;
- if (store && store->check_revocation)
+ if (store != NULL && store->check_revocation != NULL)
ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
else
ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
- if (store && store->get_crl)
+ if (store != NULL && store->get_crl != NULL)
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
else
ctx->get_crl = NULL;
- if (store && store->check_crl)
+ if (store != NULL && store->check_crl != NULL)
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
else
ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
- if (store && store->cert_crl)
+ if (store != NULL && store->cert_crl != NULL)
ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
else
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
- if (store && store->check_policy)
+ if (store != NULL && store->check_policy != NULL)
ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
else
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
- if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+ if (store != NULL && store->lookup_certs != NULL)
ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
else
ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
- if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+ if (store != NULL && store->lookup_crls != NULL)
ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
else
ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
@@ -2389,7 +2348,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
}
/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */
- if (store)
+ if (store != NULL)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
@@ -2525,19 +2484,20 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return ctx->verify;
}
-X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->get_issuer;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_issued;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_revocation;
}
@@ -2547,30 +2507,32 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return ctx->get_crl;
}
-X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_crl;
}
-X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->cert_crl;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_policy;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->lookup_certs;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->lookup_crls;
}
@@ -2621,10 +2583,8 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
ctx->dane = dane;
}
-static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
- X509 *cert,
- uint8_t selector,
- unsigned int *i2dlen)
+static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509 *cert, uint8_t selector,
+ unsigned int *i2dlen)
{
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int len;
@@ -2653,7 +2613,7 @@ static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
return buf;
}
-#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
+#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
{
@@ -2715,7 +2675,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
* exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
* sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
*/
- recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
+ recnum = (dane->umask & mask) != 0 ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
@@ -2759,6 +2719,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
*/
if (t->mtype != mtype) {
const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
+
cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
cmplen = i2dlen;
@@ -2803,7 +2764,7 @@ static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
X509 *cert;
if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
/*
* Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
@@ -2815,10 +2776,10 @@ static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
if (matched > 0) {
ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
- return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
}
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
@@ -2955,9 +2916,9 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
- int self_signed;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+ X509 *curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); /* current end of chain */
+ int self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0); /* always refers to curr */
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk_untrusted = NULL;
unsigned int search;
int may_trusted = 0;
int may_alternate = 0;
@@ -2968,21 +2929,14 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int i;
/* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
- if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- return 0;
- }
-
- self_signed = X509_self_signed(cert, 0);
- if (self_signed < 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- return 0;
- }
-
-#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
-#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
-#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
+ if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num))
+ goto int_err;
+ if (self_signed < 0)
+ goto int_err;
+
+#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
+#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
+#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
/*
* Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
* If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
@@ -2992,7 +2946,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
- if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+ if (search == 0 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) != 0)
search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
may_alternate = 1;
@@ -3004,7 +2958,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
* multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
*/
- if ((sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
+ if ((sk_untrusted = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
return 0;
@@ -3021,13 +2975,13 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* this to change. ]
*/
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
- if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ if (sk_untrusted == NULL && (sk_untrusted = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
return 0;
}
- if (!X509_add_certs(sktmp, dane->certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) {
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+ if (!X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, dane->certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) {
+ sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
return 0;
}
@@ -3037,8 +2991,8 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
* might be reasonable.
*/
- if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
- ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
+ if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX / 2)
+ ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX / 2;
/*
* Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
@@ -3048,8 +3002,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
while (search != 0) {
- X509 *x;
- X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
/*
* Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
@@ -3085,15 +3038,14 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
i = alt_untrusted;
}
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
+ curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
- ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ ok = depth < num ? 0 : get_issuer(&issuer, ctx, curr);
if (ok < 0) {
trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
- search = 0;
- continue;
+ break;
}
if (ok > 0) {
@@ -3114,11 +3066,10 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && !self_signed)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509_free(issuer);
trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- search = 0;
- continue;
+ break;
}
search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
for (; num > i; --num)
@@ -3141,19 +3092,15 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
*/
if (!self_signed) {
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
- X509_free(xtmp);
+ curr = issuer;
+ if ((self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0)) < 0)
+ goto int_err;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, curr)) {
+ X509_free(issuer);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
- self_signed = X509_self_signed(x, 0);
- if (self_signed < 0) {
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- return 0;
+ break;
}
} else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
/*
@@ -3162,14 +3109,16 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
* possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
*/
- if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
+ if (X509_cmp(curr, issuer) != 0) {
/* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
- X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509_free(issuer);
ok = 0;
- } else {
- X509_free(x);
+ } else { /* curr "==" issuer */
+ X509_free(curr);
ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
- (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, issuer);
+ curr = issuer;
+ /* no need to update self_signed */
}
}
@@ -3187,20 +3136,13 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
*/
if (ok) {
- if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
+ if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num))
+ goto int_err;
search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
- switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
- case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
- case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
+ trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
+ || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ break;
if (!self_signed)
continue;
}
@@ -3228,26 +3170,21 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
/*
- * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
+ * Extend chain with peer-provided untrusted certificates
*/
if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
-
- /*
- * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
- * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
- */
- xtmp = (self_signed || depth < num) ? NULL
- : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
- if (xtmp == NULL) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted))
+ goto int_err;
+ curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ issuer = (self_signed || depth < num) ?
+ NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sk_untrusted, curr);
+ if (issuer == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num exceeds depth
+ * or can't find an issuer in the untrusted list we stop looking
+ * there and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
+ */
search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
if (may_trusted)
search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
@@ -3255,44 +3192,23 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
/* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
- (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+ (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sk_untrusted, issuer);
- if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
- X509_free(xtmp);
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
+ if (!X509_add_cert(ctx->chain, issuer, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF))
+ goto int_err;
- x = xtmp;
++ctx->num_untrusted;
- self_signed = X509_self_signed(x, 0);
- if (self_signed < 0) {
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- return 0;
- }
+ curr = issuer;
+ if ((self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0)) < 0)
+ goto int_err;
/* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */
- switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
- case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
- case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
+ trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1);
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ break;
}
}
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+ sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
/*
* Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
@@ -3316,20 +3232,26 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
default:
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
CB_FAIL_IF(num > depth,
- ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
+ ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)
&& (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0),
- ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
+ ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
if (self_signed)
- return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1,
sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1
? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
: X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
- return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1,
ctx->num_untrusted < num
? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
: X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
}
+
+ int_err:
+ sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ return 0;
}
static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
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