[openssl] master update
dev at ddvo.net
dev at ddvo.net
Wed Jan 20 10:08:53 UTC 2021
The branch master has been updated
via 07b6068d240fb5af56fab880f2f971293a49f124 (commit)
from 3e878d924f138f4a71c04628b57be75f1d45ef8e (commit)
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 07b6068d240fb5af56fab880f2f971293a49f124
Author: Dr. David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb at siemens.com>
Date: Mon Jan 4 20:27:33 2021 +0100
x509_vfy.c: Rename CHECK_CB() to the more intuitively readable CB_FAIL_IF()
Also improve list layout of some comments.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli at openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13895)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 243 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
1 file changed, 106 insertions(+), 137 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 1bef0a3665..1d79449331 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
-#define CHECK_CB(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \
- if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \
+#define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \
+ if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \
return 0
/*-
@@ -204,14 +204,14 @@ static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
* check the security of issuer keys.
*/
- CHECK_CB(i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert),
- ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert),
+ ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
/*
* We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
* except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
*/
- CHECK_CB(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert),
- ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert),
+ ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
}
return 1;
}
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->flags);
- CHECK_CB(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err);
/* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
@@ -287,8 +287,8 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
/* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
- CHECK_CB(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert),
- ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert),
+ ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
ret = dane_verify(ctx);
@@ -433,11 +433,7 @@ static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
}
-/*
- * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
- * purpose
- */
-
+/* Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose */
static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
@@ -472,34 +468,34 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- CHECK_CB((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION);
- CHECK_CB(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY),
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY),
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED);
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
switch (must_be_ca) {
case -1:
- CHECK_CB((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0
- && ret != 1 && ret != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0
+ && ret != 1 && ret != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
break;
case 0:
- CHECK_CB(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA);
break;
default:
/* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
- CHECK_CB(ret == 0
- || ((i + 1 < num
- || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0
+ || ((i + 1 < num
+ || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
break;
}
if (num > 1) {
/* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
ret = check_curve(x);
- CHECK_CB(ret < 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED);
- CHECK_CB(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret < 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS);
}
/*
* Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested
@@ -514,63 +510,64 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
*/
/* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */
if (x->ex_pathlen != -1) {
- CHECK_CB((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA);
- CHECK_CB((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0, ctx, x, i,
- X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0, ctx,
+ x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN);
}
- CHECK_CB((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL);
/* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) {
- CHECK_CB((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE);
} else {
- CHECK_CB((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0, ctx, x, i,
- X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0, ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA);
}
/* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */
- CHECK_CB(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY);
/* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */
- CHECK_CB(((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
- || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0
- || x->altname == NULL
- ) && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY);
- CHECK_CB(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0
- && x->altname != NULL
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
+ || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0
+ || x->altname == NULL)
+ && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0
+ && x->altname != NULL
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL);
/* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */
- CHECK_CB(x->altname != NULL && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(x->altname != NULL
+ && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME);
/* TODO add more checks on SAN entries */
/* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */
- CHECK_CB(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY);
- CHECK_CB(x->akid != NULL
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL);
- CHECK_CB(x->skid != NULL
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(x->akid != NULL
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(x->skid != NULL
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL);
if (X509_get_version(x) >= 2) { /* at least X.509v3 */
/* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */
- CHECK_CB(i + 1 < num /*
- * this means not last cert in chain,
- * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
- */
- && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), ctx,
- x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i + 1 < num /*
+ * this means not last cert in chain,
+ * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
+ */
+ && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), ctx,
+ x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER);
/* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */
- CHECK_CB((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER);
} else {
- CHECK_CB(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3);
}
}
@@ -578,9 +575,9 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
return 0;
/* Check path length */
- CHECK_CB(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1
- && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1
+ && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
/* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */
if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
plen++;
@@ -602,8 +599,8 @@ static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* increment proxy_path_length.
*/
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
- CHECK_CB(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
}
proxy_path_length++;
@@ -715,7 +712,7 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
proxy_name_done:
- CHECK_CB(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err);
}
/*
@@ -745,7 +742,7 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
return 0;
default:
- CHECK_CB(1, ctx, x, i, rv);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, x, i, rv);
break;
}
}
@@ -937,9 +934,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
else
ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
- /*
- * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
- */
+ /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */
if (!ok) {
ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
goto done;
@@ -988,7 +983,6 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
-
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
{
time_t *ptime;
@@ -1099,7 +1093,6 @@ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
* both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
*/
-
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
@@ -1136,7 +1129,6 @@ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
}
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
-
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
{
/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
@@ -1166,7 +1158,6 @@ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
* retrieve a chain of deltas...
*/
-
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
@@ -1196,7 +1187,6 @@ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
* also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
* is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
*/
-
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
@@ -1239,7 +1229,6 @@ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
-
if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
return 0;
@@ -1292,7 +1281,6 @@ static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
}
/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
-
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
return;
@@ -1318,7 +1306,6 @@ static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
* parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
* be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
*/
-
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
@@ -1357,7 +1344,6 @@ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
* though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
* RFC5280 version
*/
-
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
@@ -1377,7 +1363,6 @@ static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
* 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
* 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
*/
-
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
{
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
@@ -1454,7 +1439,6 @@ static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
}
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
-
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
unsigned int *preasons)
{
@@ -1488,7 +1472,6 @@ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
* to find a delta CRL too
*/
-
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
{
@@ -1507,7 +1490,6 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
goto done;
/* Lookup CRLs from store */
-
skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
@@ -1676,8 +1658,8 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- CHECK_CB((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
}
return 1;
}
@@ -1728,14 +1710,14 @@ int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
return 0;
- CHECK_CB(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD);
- CHECK_CB(i > 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID);
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
return 0;
- CHECK_CB(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD);
- CHECK_CB(i < 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i < 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED);
return 1;
}
@@ -1758,14 +1740,14 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
- xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
+ xs = xi; /* The typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
else {
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
xs = xi;
goto check_cert_time;
}
if (n <= 0) {
- CHECK_CB(1, ctx, xi, 0, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
xs = xi;
goto check_cert_time;
@@ -1781,7 +1763,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
*/
while (n >= 0) {
- /*
+ /*-
* For each iteration of this loop:
* n is the subject depth
* xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
@@ -1816,13 +1798,13 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs);
- CHECK_CB(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret);
if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
- CHECK_CB(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth,
- X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY);
} else {
- CHECK_CB(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0,
- ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0,
+ ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
}
}
@@ -1865,7 +1847,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
#else
const char upper_z = 'Z';
#endif
- /*
+ /*-
* Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
* In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
@@ -2011,7 +1993,6 @@ int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
}
/* Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs */
-
X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
{
@@ -2067,7 +2048,6 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
goto memerr;
/* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
-
if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
goto memerr;
@@ -2075,7 +2055,6 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
* number to correct value too.
*/
-
for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
@@ -2084,7 +2063,6 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
}
/* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
-
revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
@@ -2408,9 +2386,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
goto err;
}
- /*
- * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
- */
+ /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */
if (store)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
@@ -2697,9 +2673,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
- /*
- * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
- */
+ /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */
if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
@@ -2884,9 +2858,7 @@ static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
{
- /*
- * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
- */
+ /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */
X509_free(dane->mcert);
dane->mcert = NULL;
dane->mtlsa = NULL;
@@ -2898,7 +2870,7 @@ static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
{
int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
- CHECK_CB(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, cert, 0, err);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, cert, 0, err);
return 1;
}
@@ -3309,9 +3281,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
}
- /*
- * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
- */
+ /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */
switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
@@ -3343,10 +3313,11 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
default:
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- CHECK_CB(num > depth, ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
- CHECK_CB(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)
- && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0),
- ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(num > depth,
+ ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)
+ && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0),
+ ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
if (self_signed)
return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1
@@ -3362,10 +3333,8 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
-/*
- * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
- * ``ctx``.
- *
+/*-
+ * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
@@ -3392,7 +3361,7 @@ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
}
-/*
+/*-
* Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
* for an elliptic curve.
*
@@ -3418,7 +3387,7 @@ static int check_curve(X509 *cert)
return 1;
}
-/*
+/*-
* Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
* level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
* self-signed or otherwise).
More information about the openssl-commits
mailing list