[openssl] master update

[Dr. Paul Dale]

The branch master has been updated
       via  9dddcd90a1350fa63486cbf3226c3eee79f9aff5 (commit)
      from  7220085f22cf6c49933ea8287eb15db57f7ab0db (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9dddcd90a1350fa63486cbf3226c3eee79f9aff5
Author: x2018 <xkernel.wang at foxmail.com>
Date:   Fri Oct 22 22:50:27 2021 +0800

    add checks for the return values of BN_new(), sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(),
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new().
    Otherwise may result in memory errors.
    
    Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli at openssl.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16892)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c    | 4 ++++
 crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c    | 3 ++-
 crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c      | 3 ++-
 crypto/evp/p_lib.c       | 2 ++
 crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c      | 5 +++++
 crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c | 2 ++
 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
index bc2b5179b7..380240561f 100644
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
         goto merr;
     }
     ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
 
     if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
index 6e87bd1657..21b0cbd5fb 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.c
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ DSA_SIG *d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **psig, const unsigned char **ppin, long len)
         sig->r = BN_new();
     if (sig->s == NULL)
         sig->s = BN_new();
-    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(sig->r, sig->s, ppin, (size_t)len) == 0) {
+    if (sig->r == NULL || sig->s == NULL
+        || ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(sig->r, sig->s, ppin, (size_t)len) == 0) {
         if (psig == NULL || *psig == NULL)
             DSA_SIG_free(sig);
         return NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
index 31519137c6..6323131a22 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -1223,7 +1223,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **psig, const unsigned char **ppin, long len)
         sig->r = BN_new();
     if (sig->s == NULL)
         sig->s = BN_new();
-    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(sig->r, sig->s, ppin, (size_t)len) == 0) {
+    if (sig->r == NULL || sig->s == NULL
+        || ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(sig->r, sig->s, ppin, (size_t)len) == 0) {
         if (psig == NULL || *psig == NULL)
             ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
         return NULL;
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
index 38e22f3b6c..2552dd702a 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
@@ -1850,6 +1850,8 @@ void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
     if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL) {
         EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pk, propquery);
 
+        if (ctx == NULL)
+            goto end;
         tmp_keymgmt = ctx->keymgmt;
         ctx->keymgmt = NULL;
         EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
index 6f5207abd1..83166b5887 100644
--- a/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
+++ b/crypto/pem/pvkfmt.c
@@ -839,6 +839,11 @@ static void *do_PVK_body_key(const unsigned char **in,
 #endif
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 
+    if (cctx == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PEM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     if (saltlen) {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
         unsigned int magic;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
index 85ad54e4cf..46283265d2 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_backend.c
@@ -392,6 +392,8 @@ RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection)
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0
         && (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) {
         dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
+        if (dupkey->prime_infos == NULL)
+            goto err;
         for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
             const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
             RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL;